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Abstract 
This thesis is an examination of the United Arab Emirates claim to 
maritime zones and its practice in determining the boundaries of 
these zones. Such a comprehensive examination scarcely requires 
justification or introduction. The political and economic importance 
of determining the boundary of any state is self-evident. The matter 
of an undetermined boundary in the resource rich Gulf in particular 
was, and still is, a major threat to stability in the region. 
This study focuses on the problem of unsettled maritime 
boundaries with particular reference to the effect of certain disputed 
islands on the UAE-Iran boundary in the Arabian Gulf. The study 
assumes that the less the i.mpact these Islands are afforded, the 
greater the opportunity of reaching a solution to the related 
sovereignty dispute between the two parties. Certain methods of 
dispute settlement are suggested where the restricted effect of these 
Islands could most readily be obtained. Finally, this work has the 
benefit of examining the UAE Federal Law of 1993 in respect of 
delimitation of its maritime boundaries; the Dubai/Sharjah Border 
Award of 1981, which was published in 1993; and the UAE-Saudi 
Arabia secret boundary agreement of 197 4, released in 1994. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first will examine 
the issue of maritime zones in international law, as well as the UAE 
practice in this field. The second and third chapters will address the 
issue of maritime boundary delimitation in international law. Chapter 
Four will focus on the UAE practice in determining its maritime 
boundaries both internal and external. It will also identify the UAE' s 
potential boundary with neighbouring states. Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven will be devoted to ~ddressing the overall problem of the 
Iranian-UAE's un-delimited maritime boundaries. Chapter Five will 
examine the policy of the two states on offshore boundaries. It will 
also discuss the boundaries between Iran and the UAE in the Gulf of 
Oman and in the Abu-Dhabi sector. Chapter Six will discuss in some 
detail the issue of the three disputed islands, namely, Abu Musa, 
Greater and Little Tunbs islands, and their effect on the boundary of 
Iran and the UAE. It will also examine the effect of islands on 
maritime boundaries in general. The final chapter will address certain 
methods of disputes settlement that the parties have not yet utilised, 
which have the potential to facilitate an amicable solution. 
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Introduction 
The focus of this study is the maritime boundaries of the United Arab 
Emirates in the Arabian Gulf.
1 
The Gulf is a semi-enclosed sea which extends 
north-westward about 460 miles from its entrance at the Strait of Hormuz to the 
Shatta al Arab. Its maximum width is about 160 nautical miles.2 The Arabian 
Gulf is unusually shallow, 
3 
the average depth being only 35 metres. It is deeper 
on the Iranian than on the Arabian side.4 The shores in the Gulf are divided 
between seven states. These are, going counter-clockwise from the entrance of the 
Gulf, Iran (with the longest coastline), Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman. In addition, there is the island state of Bahrain 
positioned close to the Arabian side of the Gulf. The Gulf has two particularly 
important features.
5 
First, in terms of natural resources-both living and non-
living-it is one of the richest seas in the world.6 The second is that it contains a 
large number of islands. 7 
1 The area is known also as the Persian Gulf. However. in this work, the term Arabian Gulf will 
generally be used to refer to the area in question. For an Iranian view on the name of the Gulf, see 
Amin, S. H., International and legal Problems of the Gulf; Middle East and North African 
Studies Press Limited, London ( 1981 ), at pp. 31-42. 
2 Young, Y., "The Persian Gulf," New Direction in the Law of the Sea, vol. 3, Nordquist et al. 
(eds), published by The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, vol. I, Oceana 
Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York (1973), at p.231; Amin, Ibid., at p.9. 
3 Hence, the entire area of the Gulf is within the technical reach of the oil industry." See Gault, 
L.T .. "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian/Persian Gulf," Ocean BoundaJJJ Making, 
Douglas M. Johnston and Phillip M. Saunders (eds.), Croom Helm, London ( 1988), at p.204. 
·
1 According to Mitchell the "area of 20 metres or less in depth closely follows the coast of the 
United Arab Emirates to Abu-Dhabi city." See Mitchell, K., ''The Persian Gulf," Persian Gulf 
,"i'tates: A General Survey, Alvin J. Cottrell (ed.). The John Hopkins, University Press, London 
( 1980). at p.541. See also Amin. op. cit., n. I, at p.9; El-Hakim, A., The Middle Eastern States and 
the Law qlthe Sea, Manchester University Press. Manchester ( 1979), at p.66. 
) As far as its maritime boundary is concerned. 
" For more statistical information on the natural resources in the Gulf, see al-Neshrh al-Hsaih al-
Sanawih (the Annual Statistical Report), Information Centre, statistics management, GCC 
Secretariat, Saudi Arabia ( 1992); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia. 1981-1990, Thirteenth issue, Amman, December ( 1992); The Statesman's Year-book, Brian 
Hunter (ed.), The Chaucer Press, UK, (1991-2). 
7 It is interesting to note that 200 of these islands are claimed by the UAE. See the statement of 
the UAE representative at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS Ill Official 
Records, vol. 6. at p.141, para.29. 
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The Strait of Hormuz connects the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and 
the Arabian Sea, "its width varies between 29 and 51 nm." 8 The Strait "is one of 
the most vital channels of trade in the world since about two-thirds of seaborne 
trade in crude oil pass through it." 9 
As will be seen from the map reproduced below, the United Arab Emirates is 
located in the eastern part of the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Its coastline 
extends for approximately 275 miles from Ra's Shaam on the west side of Ru'us 
al-Jibal to the Khor al-Udayd coastline at the south east of Qatar peninsula. In 
addition, the UAE occupies a 50-mile stretch of coastline on the Gulf of Oman 
between Diba and Khutom al-Malahah. It is encircled by four states, Iran in the 
north, Qatar and Saudi Arabia in the west, northwest, south and southeast, and 
Oman in the northeast and southeast. 10 This geographical location imposes on the 
UAE the need to work out acceptable maritime boundary lines with its 
neighbouring states in a narrow and shallow area such as the Arabian Gulf. 
The UAE was created in 1971. Prior to that time it was known as the Trucial 
Coast States. The individual Trucial States had long enjoyed a special 
relationship with the United Kingdom. This was first shown in 1806 through the 
conclusion of an agreement between al-Qawasim 11 and the East India Company. 12 
In February 1820, another treaty was signed whereby the Trucial States accepted 
8 The Times Atlas and Encyclopaedia of the Sea ( 1989), at p.154. 
9 Ibid. See Chapter Six below for an illustrative map on navigation on the Strait of Hormuz. For 
more discussion on the importance of the Strait, see Amin, op. cit., n. I, at p.49; Fadale, S.Y ., 
"Strait of Hormuz: Its Nature and Regional and International Strategic Importance," Allaawun 
Quarter~v .Journal. issue no.9-5, Department of Information, GCC General Secretariat, Saudi 
Arabia ( 1988), at pp.39-68: Ramazani. R., The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, Hurst, 
London ( 1972). 
Jo See the enclosed map. 
11 There were two great political groupings: an alliance of the al-Qawasim centred in Ras al-
Khaimah. and the Beni Vas tribe centred in Abu-Dhabi had influence in the Trucial Oman. These 
two rival groupings resulted from the war between al Ghafiri and al-Hinawi. This war "had 
divided the whole of the coast of Oman during the early eighteenth century." See Dubai-ShG1jah 
Award, 91 /LR. at p.558. For more discussion on the history of the area, see Slot, B.J., The Arabs 
<l the Gu(l 1602-1784. Leidschendam. the Netherlands ( 1993), at p.329; Al-Bahama, H., The 
Arabian Gulf States, 2nd ed, Librairie De Liban, Beirut ( 1975), at p.70; George Joffe, "The 
Concepts of Sovereignty in the Gulf Region," Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, 
Schofield (ed.). UCL Press Limited, London ( 1994), at p.83; Smwir, Z., Tarikh Sahl Oman 
Alssiwy (The Political History of the Oman Coast), vol.2, Date Al-Sallasel Press, Kuwait (1985). 
J:! For the text of the agreement, see Arabian Treaties 1600-1960, United Arab Emirates, Archive 




the cessation of plunder and piracy on both land and sea. 13 In 1835, a maritime 
truce was concluded between Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman, with the 
mediation of the British Agent in the Gulf, to prevent conflict during the pearl-
fishing season of the Gulf. The truce was renewed "on an annual basis from 1838 
and then in 1843 for a period of ten years. Ultimately this arrangement was 
formally included within the Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, 14 of 24 
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In 1892 a new era began in the relationship between the Trucial States and 
Britain. This era commenced with the undertaking of each of the Chiefs of the 
Trucial States not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power 
other than the British Government; not to consent to the residence within his 
territory of the agent of any other .government, without the consent of the British 
Government; and finally to on no account to cede, sell, or mortgage, or otherwise 
give for occupation, any part of his territory save to the British Government. 16 
The undertakings were known as the "'Exclusive Agreement." 
While an examination of the nature and scope of this agreement and the 
closely associated questions of the status of the Trucial States in international law 
during this period are beyond the scope of this paper, the following points should 
be noted. The 1892 Agreement did not contain a specific promise of protection. 
Nor did it give the British Government the right to represent the Sheikhdoms in 
their foreign relations. The Protection system, however, was developed in 
accordance with British practice~ 17 and they continued to conduct the foreign 
1.~ Article I from the General Treaty for the Cessation of Plunder and Piracy by land and sea in 
1820. For the text of the agreement. see Hawley, D .. The Trucial States, George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, London ( 1970). at pp.314-6. 
1
•
1 The name of the Trucial States which was given to the region as a whole sprang from the 
Perpetual Truce Treaty of 1853. 
15 In addition. there were a number of treaties between the Trucial States and Britain dealing with 
various matters. "such as the slave trade (Treaties of 1838, 1839 and 1847). the protection of 
telegraphic communications ( 1864) and the prevention of absconding debtors ( 1879)." See 
Duhai/Shw:jah Award, at p.560. For the 1853 Treaty of Peace, see Arabian Treaties, op. cit., 
n.12. at pp.469-70. 
16 For the text of the agreement, see Arabian Treaties, op. cit., n.12, at p.505. 
17 Fawcett, J .E.S .. The British Commonwealth in the International law, Stevens & Sons, London 
( 1963), at p.120. An example of this practice was that in a treaty with the Saudi Arabia in 1915, 
asserted that: "Kuwait. Bahrain, and ... the Shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast,. .. are under the 




affairs of the Trucial States.
18 
The "relationships between the Emirates and Great 
Britain lasted for a century and a half. They rested upon what has often been 
called a 'special relationship', a· complex of reciprocal rights and obligations 
which allowed Great Britain during the whole of this period to assert and 
maintain a privileged and exclusive position on the Trucial Coasts." 19 Given that 
this work is concerned with the question of maritime boundaries, it should be 
noted that it was stated that "no treaty authorised the British authorities to delimit 
uni laterally the boundaries between the Emirates and that no British 
administration ever asserted that it had the right to do so ... therefore .. .the consent 
of the Rulers concerned was necessary before any such delimitation could have 
b d k "20 een un erta en. 
In January 1968 the British Government announced its intention "to withdraw 
its forces from the Gulf region by the end of 1971. "21 On first of December 1971 
a proposal to terminate the special treaty relationships between the United 
Kingdom government and the Trucial States Emirates of 1892 was presented to 
the governments of these Emirates. In letters to the British Political Resident at 
the Gulf, the governments of the Trucial States Emirates declared their 
acceptance of the British proposal.22 
On Second of December 1971 the British withdrawal from the region took 
effect and it was announced that the Trucial States had been allied into a single 
state, to be known as the 'United Arab Emirates', with complete independence 
Arabian Treaties 1600-1960, Saudi Arabia, vol. 4, Archive Editions, Penelope Tuson and Emma 
Quick (eds.), Redwood Press Ltd., England ( 1992), at p. I 03, Article 6. 
18 
An example of this conduct was that in the preamble to the United Kingdom-Saudi Arabia 
Arbitration Agreements of 1954 concerning the border dispute between Saudi Arabia, Oman and 
/\bu-Dhabi over al-Buraim i oasis. Abu-Dhabi Emirate was described as a "State for the conduct 
<f whose /oreir.n relations the Government of the United Kingdom is responsible." See Ibid., at 
p.625. For a documentary study on UAE-Britain agreements, see Al-Sagri, S.H., Britain and the 
Arah Emirates 1820-1956, A documentary study. Thesis for Ph.D., University of Kent at 
Canterbury. UK ( 1988). 
l'J D11hai!Sha1:Jah A ward. at p.562. 
:w . Ibid., at p.567. 
21 Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.11. at p.xxi. For further discussion of the political developments in the 
period between 1968 and 1971, see Al-Bahama, op. cit., n. 11, at pp. xxi to xxvii; Al-Alkim, H., 
The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, Saqi Books, London ( 1989), at pp.6-15; Gause, 
G., "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973," I I Review of International 
Studies, no. 4, October ( 1985), at pp.24 7-73. 
22 Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.11, at pp.396-8. 
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and full sovereignty. The Rulers of the Emirates (i.e. Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 
Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujayrah), as the Provisional 
Constitution
23 
indicated, had chosen the federal method of forming the 
government of the UAE. 24 
The central feature of the UAE Constitution which is of relevance to this 
study was the decision to preserve the authority of each Emirate within its 
existing boundaries in all matters not assigned to the Union.25 This was achieved 
by dividing constitutional competence between the federal government and the 
local authorities in the member Emirates. This separation of authority between 
the Union government and the local government in the member Emirates takes 
three different levels: 
1- Exclusive exercise of sovereignty by the Union in respect of specific matters. 
Article 120 enumerated these matters over which the federal government has 
exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction. Foreign affairs, defence, 
security and currency are among these matters so allocated. As an exception to 
Article 120(1) of the Constitution, any member Emirate of the Union, according 
to Article 123, may enter into local and administrative agreements with 
neighbouring states. The constitutional requirements for such an exception, and 
the capacity of the member Emirates in international law to enter into a treaty 
relationship with neighbouring s·tates, are discussed in detail in Chapter Four in 
the course of our examination of the UAE-Oman boundary. 
2- Sharing jurisdiction between the Union authority and the local government. 
This took the form of allocating to the Union government an exclusive 




For further examination of the UAE Provisional Constitution, see Murad, N.A., Territorial 
/Jisp111es in 1he Uniled Arah Emirales. Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. Department of 
Politics. University of Lancaster, UK ( 1990). at pp.258-70, see also Appendix no. 9 of Murad's 
thesis. And see Al-Bahama. op. cil .. n.11, at p. xlvi top. lvii. In 1996 the word "Provisional" was 
omitted in a constitutional amendment, and the UAE's constitution becomes a permanent. See Al-
ll/ihad. UAE daily newspaper. 15 December ( 1996), at p. I. 
2
.i For more discussion on the federal system of the UAE, see Al-Ulama, H.M, The Federal 
Boundaries of !he Uniled Arab Emirates, Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. Department of 
Geography, University of Durham (1994), at pp.52-62. 
25 Article 3 of the Constitution. see also Article 120. 
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Constitution. Delimitation of territorial sea boundaries and the regulation of 
navigation are among these matters. Where Union laws do not govern matters 
listed in Article 121, the member Emirates of the Union may issue legislation to 
regulate these matters until such a time as the Union laws cover them.26 In 
respect of executive jurisdiction, Article 121 remains silent. Thus the member 
Emirates exercise jurisdiction, in respect of those matters specified in the 
Article, over implementing Union laws in this respect, since they have 
jurisdiction in all matters not allocated to the Union. 
3- Exclusive exercise of legislative and exclusive jurisdiction for the member 
Emirates "over their own territories and territorial waters in all matters which 
are not within the jurisdiction of the Union as assigned in [the] Constitution." 
27 
This division of authority within the federal system justifies the existence of 
boundaries between the Emirates, and thus explains the need to determine them. 
The importance for present purposes of examining these internal boundaries, 
together with the UAE practice on determining its external boundaries, is that 
light will thereby be shed on the policy of the UAE on maritime boundary 
delimitation. The value of this exercise is to help understand the difficulty the 
UAE has in addressing the un-delimited sectors in its maritime boundary with 
neighbouring states. 
2
<' See Collection of official Gaze/leers.for UAE, Part 9. Abu-Dhabi ( 1989), at pp. 83 16-20. 
27 
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Maritime Zones 
Throughout history, states have employed different measures to protect the 
security of their land territories and the interests of their people. Extending 
coastal state control and jurisdiction over off-shore zones has been one of these 
measures. 
1 
This projection, however. obviously has an impact on the right of 
other states to enjoy the freedom of the seas for all.2 International law in general 
recognizes the rights of coastal states to claim a territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
continental shelf and EEZ. Figure 2 below illustrates these four zones. Moreover, 
international law lays down specific rules that govern the rights and duties of 
coastal states in these areas, and tlie rules which determine the outer limit and the 
boundaries of these zones.3 Jn this chapter we will discuss these four zones. 
illustrated in figure 2, in terms of their outer limits, and provide an overview of 
coastal states' rights and duties in them. The importance of this discussion is that 
it will provide the necessary background for our analysis of the rules of maritime 
boundary delimitation in general and an examination of its application to the 
4 UAE in particular. Accordingly. this chapter does not discuss, except 
incidentally, the rules relating to: internal waters,5 navigation, fishing, pollution, 
1 Fitzmaurice. G .. The Law and Procedure of the /111ernational Court of Justice, Cambridge 
Un ivcrsity Press, Cambridge ( 1995), at p.204. See also the decision of the PCIJ in North Atlantic 
Coast Fisheries Case ( 1910). 11 UN Rf AA. at p.205. . 
~ Fitzmaurice. op. cit .. n. I, at p.204 . 
.- For a definition of the terms maritime boundary, see Jagota. S.P., "Maritime Boundary," 171 
Academic De Droit lnternationa/(1981-11), at p.90. 
·
1 Sec Chapters Two. Three and Four. 
5 Internal waters are one of the maritime areas which are recognized by international law. 
However. since th is area is on the landward side of the baseline, it is extremely unlikely that there 
would be any question of a delimitation of its boundary with other states. Judge Oda, in his 
dissenting opinion in the Gu(lqlFonseca Case. held to the conclusion that "the internal waters of 
one state can not abut the internal waters of another state." See ICJ Reports 1992. at p.746. para. 
24. 
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scienti fie research. straits. arc hi pelagic states. and the high seas regime. since 
these topics have no direct relevance to the rules of maritime boundary 
delimitation. 
Our treatment of the subject falls into three broad categories. Firstly. we 
explain the relevant rules and recount the actual practice of various states in the 
period prior to I 958 for each of the maritime areas. Secondly. we study the 
approach to these matters taken in the I 958 Geneva Conventions and the I 982 
Law of the Sea Convention. Finally, we consider the situation in the UAE. 
For ease and clarity of exposition this chapter has been divided into five 
sections: viz., the territorial sea, the contiguous zone. the continental shelf, the 
EEZ and the legal regime of islands. 
I 
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Figure: (2) Maritime zones within national jurisdiction. 
Source: Brown, E.D., Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: 
The llltemational Legal Regime, vol. 1, Continental Shelf, 
2nd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands, 
(1992), at p.12 
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Section One 
Territorial Sea 
Development of the concept 
The idea of sovereignty over the seas appeared in the early seventeenth 
century when a number of states claimed control and sovereignty over seas 
adjacent to their coasts.
6 
Sweden, for example, claimed sovereignty over the 
Baltic Sea. 
7 
Elsewhere, the King of England claimed sovereignty over the British 
8 
seas. 
The theory that the sea is a res·nullius, i.e. belongs to nobody, was the basis in 
the seventeenth century of the coastal states' extension of their jurisdiction over 
the sea by effective occupation. The exercise of power from the shore was the 
most direct and effective mode of occupation.9 The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case held in this respect that: 
The marginal strip of the territorial waters based originally on the cannon-shot, was founded on 
the necessity of the riparian State to protect itself from outward attack, by providing something 
. I f . I . 10 111 t 1e nature o an 111su at111g zone. 
The res nullius theory asserted that the territorial sea is property like land, but 
subject to the right of innocent passage for foreign ships. However, the ""property" 
theory was rejected by many writers, especially in Germany, 11 on the grounds that 
the sea, unlike the mainland, was incapable of appropriation. Consequently, a 
coastal state should be regarded as merely possessing rights of jurisdiction. 
12 
By 
<·O'Connell. D.P .. The International Law qlthe Sea. vol. I. Shearer (ed.).Clarendon Press. Oxford 
( 1982 ). at pp.2-3. 
~Ibid. 
s Ibid .. at p.7. For more details on the origin of the territorial sea and on state practice in this 
regard, see Wilder, R.J .. "The Three-Mile Territorial Sea: Its Origins and Implications for 
Contemporary Offshore Federalism:· 32 VJIL (1991-1992), at pp. 689-97. 
'' As will be seen this theory later yielded to the ''cannon-shot" rule of measuring the breadth of 
the territorial sea. 
10 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case. at p.205. 
11 Raumstheorie, for example, argued that: "Sovereignty is not the equation of property: it is not a 
right over territory, but the right to rule over it." Quoted from O'Connell, op. cit., n.6, at p.66. For 
a detailed survey of the early academic controversy and states' position on the juridical nature of 
the territorial sea, see Chapter Three of O'Connell. op. cit., n.6. 
12 Shearer, I.A., ''Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement Against Delinquent Vessels," 35 
ICLQ ( 1986), at p.323. 
3 
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the nineteenth century, the doctrine of territorial sea had become accepted in 
customary law, and a distinction had been made between the high seas and 
territorial seas.
13 
The former were free and open to all, whereas the latter were 
subject to coastal states' exclusive rights and jurisdiction. State practice during 
this period, in regard to the nature of territorial sea, fell into two categories. ( 1) 
those, such as Britain and America who claimed sovereignty and plenary 
jurisdiction over a belt of water surrounding their coasts; (2) those, such as France 
and Spain, who did not claim sovereignty but merely jurisdiction, for specific 
purposes over the sea adjoining their coasts. 14 
The position of the first group of states was gradually preferred by a number 
of writers in the early twentieth century, 15 and the tendency in state practice was 
to recognize that "coastal states have sovereignty over their territorial sea." 16 This 
tendency was mirrored in the Hague Conference of 1930, 17 where the majority of 
the participating states was in favour of coastal states exercising sovereignty over 
the territorial sea.
18 
The confere~ce, neve11heless, failed to come out with a 
convention on the territorial sea regime. This was due to the difficulties of 
reconciling the different kinds and degrees of states' interests in respect to the 
.d l f' I . . I 19 w1 t 1 o -t 1e terntona sea. 
In the period following the Hague Conference up to 1949 the "controversy 
[over] the juridical natural of the territorial sea waned. "20 This was reflected in 
r:; See Elinu Root's argument in the North Atlantic Fisheries. Reproduced in Jessup, P.C., The 




1 Churchill and Lowe, The law o.f the Sea. Manchester University Press, New rev. ed., 
Manchester ( 1988). at p.60: O'Connell. D.P .. ''The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea." 45 
IJYB!L ( 1971 ). at pp.345-7. 
1 ~ O'Connell. op. cit .. n.6. at p.72. 
'"Churchill and Lowe. op. cit., n.14, at p. 62: O'Connell, op. cit., n.6, at p.74. 
17 The Hague Conference was the first attempt under the League of Nations to codify the rules of 
the law of the sea. 
18 Indeed, this approach was adopted in the final text of the Second Committee, which was put 
before the Hague Conference. For the text of the Second Committee, see league of Nations 
Cm?ference for the Cod(/ication of International law (1930), Rosenne S. (ed.), vol.4, Oceana 
Publications Inc .. Dobbs Ferry. New York (1975) at p.1414; O'Connell. op. cit., n.14, at pp.347-
51. 
l'J See below. 
20 O'C II . 14 '"'4" onne , op. ell., n. . at P·-' -'· 
4 
--------------------------- Chapter One 
most subsequent state practice and in the writings of most scholars on the subject, 
where the territorial sea was regarded as a sea under the sovereignty of the coastal 
21 
state. 
Attempts to codify state practice 
(1) The International Law Com!11ission 
The International Law Commission [hereafter ILC] was "established in 
pursuance of General Assembly resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 194 7, and in 
accordance with the statute of the Commission annexed thereto."22 It was in 
charge of codifying the rules of international law and promoting its progressive 
development.
23 
The task of codification of the law of the sea was divided into 
eight sessions, between 1949 and 1956. As far as the regime of the territorial sea 
was concerned 
24 
the ILC by the end of its eighth session submitted to the General 
Assembly a draft of 73 articles concerning the regime of territorial seas and high 
seas. 
25 
Article 1 ( 1) of the draft articles removed any remaining doubt concerning 
the status of the territorial sea as an area where a coastal state has sovereignty. 26 
21 Ibid .. at pp. 352-7. See also Ahu-Dhahi Arbitration, at pp.151-2; Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., 
n.14, at pp.62-3; Gilmore, W., "Sea and Continental Shelf," 21 The laws of Scotland ( 1994), at 
p. I I, para. I I. 
22 The Report of the ILC to the General Assembly, /LC Yearbook (1956), vol.2, at p.253, para. I. 
2
:; The Commission adopted the following items as an agenda: Regime of the high seas; regime of 
the territorial sea: law of treaties: diplomatic and consular intercourse and immunities: state 
responsibility: Arbitral procedure: question of amending Article 11 of the statute of the 
Commission: publication of the documents of the Commission: Co-operation with inter-American 
bodies: date and place of the ninth session: planning of future work of the Commission and other 
business. See /LC Yearbook ( 1956). vol.2. at p.253. para.5. See also Shaw, M .. International law, 
3rd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1991 ), at p.96; Oppenheim 's International law, 
9th ed., vol. I, Peace. Jennings and Watts (eds.), Longman, London (1996), at pp.103-10. 
2
·
1 The ILC used the Hague Conference work as the basis of its task, see Churchill and Lowe. op. 
cit .. n.14, at p.63. 
25 Whiteman, M.M., Digest of International law. vol. 4, Department of State Publication, 
Washington ( 1965), at p. I. 
2
<• A11icle I (I) provided that: "The sovereignty of a state extends to a belt of sea adjacent to its 
coast, described as the territorial sea." See Report of the International Law Commission covering 
the work of its eighth session, 23 April-4 July 1956. !LC Yearbook (1956), vol.2, at p.265. See 
also Oppenheim 's. op. cit .. n.23. at pp.600-1. 
5 
(2) The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
The first United Nations Conference on the law of the sea was held in Geneva 
from 24 February to 27 April 1958. The conference yielded four international 
conventions on the law of the sea; 27 viz. the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
Convention, 
28 
the High Seas Convention, 29 the Geneva Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 30 and the Continental 
Shelf Convention. 31 
There was no unanimity among writers with respect to the status of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1958 in customary law. O'Connell, for example, stated 
that: 
What is now clear is that the Geneva Conventions cannot be regarded as a package all of the 
provisions of which are incumbent without regard to their genesis or character. For parties they 
are such a package, but for non-parties their rules apply only inasmuch as they are customary 
rules. 32 
Shaw has made a distinction between the Geneva Convention on the high seas 
and the other three conventions: 
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas was stated in its Preamble to be "generally declaratory 
of established principles of international law", while the other three 1958 instruments can be 
generally accepted as containing both reiterations of existing rules and new rules. :i:i 
Bowett finally asserted that: 
There are already clear indications that these Conventions have achieved a status as evidence of 
what present international law is far beyond that which is apparent from the list of formal 
ratification' s. :;.i 
As this work is concerned primarily with the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries, only two of the four Geneva Conventions are relevant; the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone C~nvention, (TSCZ) and the Continental Shelf 
27 In addition, the conference adopted an Optional Protocol of signature concerning the 
compulsory settlement of disputes. 
zx Which came into force on I 0 September 1964. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the 
Secret at)' General. UN pub I ications, New York ( 1986), at p.677. 
2
') Which came into force on 30 September 1962, see Ibid., at p.684. 
30 Which came into force on 20 March 1966, see Ibid., at p.692. 
31 Which came into force on 10 June 1964, see Ibid., at p.694. 
:;z O'Connell, op. cit., n.6, at p.23. To the same effect, see Gilmore, op. cit., n.21, at p.2, para.2. 
:;:; Shaw. op. cit., n.23, at p.338. 
:;.i Bowett. D. W., The law of the Sea, Manchester University Press, Manchester ( 1967), at p.4. 
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Convention. The status of the relevant articles from these two conventions have 
been highlighted elsewhere in this .work.35 
(3) The 1958 Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Convention 
The formula of Articles 1 ( 1) and 2 of the ILC final report of 1956 were 
adopted almost unchanged
36 
in the 1958 TSCZ Convention. They were worded as 
follows: 
Article 1 ( 1) 
The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of 
sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea. 
Article 2 
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to 
its bed and subsoil. 
These Articles, which were reproduced in the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention 
37 
with some minor modifications,38 were said by the World Court in 
the Nicaragua Case to, ''merely respond to firmly established and longstanding 
tenets of customary international law. "39 
It should be noted that designating the territorial sea as an area of sovereignty 
entitles a coastal state to exercise prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over 
this area. The aim of such entitlement is to provide a coastal state with the 
necessary means to protect its interest in the territorial sea area. An example of 
this is the authorization in Article 21 ( 1) of the 1982 Convention for a coastal state 
to adopt laws and regulations in respect to all or any of the specific issues listed 
in the Article. These matters included navigation, fisheries, customs and 
>' See for example Section Two and Three of the present Chapter, Section Two of Chapter Two 
and Section One of Chapter Three. 
•<· Except for the insertion of the words "beyond its land territory and its internal waters:· For the 
motive behind this insertion, see !LC Yearbook ( 1952), at pp.145-52; UNCLOS I Official 
Record,·. vol. 3. at p.24 7 and p. I 17; see also O'Connell, op. cit., n.6, at p.81. 
·'
7 For further discussion on this convention, see below. 
:;x These modifications are two: first the insertion of the words " in the case of an archipelagic 
State, its archipelagic waters" after that to internal waters; second, Articles I and 2 were merged 
into Article 2 of the 1982 Convention. 
-''> Nicaragua v. US. Case of 1986, at para.212. A similar view was held by the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal in the case concerning Reference re Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the 
Continental She(( Case (1983). 145 DLR 3d ( 1983 ), at p.23. 
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immigration laws.
40 
Another example is the right of a coastal state to take the 
necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent,41 or 
to exercise in some cases 
42 
a criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign merchant 
ship 
43 
passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any 
investigation in connection with aI?Y crime committed on board the ship during its 
I . . I 44 passage on t 1e terntona sea. 
(4) The breadth of the territorial sea 
The difficulty of maintaining a balance between two opposmg important 
principles, viz. the coastal states' respective interests in the belt of water 
contiguous to their coasts, and the principle that the sea is open to all, resulted in 
a disagreement among nations as to how to determine an acceptable limit for the 
territorial sea area. There were a number of vague criteria that had been used to 
determine that limit, such as the limits of visibility.45 However, the principle of 
protection, which coastal states used to justify their claims to the territorial sea, 
had drawn Bynkershoek's attention to suggest the ''cannon-shot" doctrine as a 
criterion to be used in determining the limit of territorial seas.46 To do so, it was 
necessary to have artillery present at various places on coastline.47 The cannon-
shot doctrine, howeveL was not a universal approach in determing the limit of the 
.w Para. 3 of Article 21 calls on the coastal state that it "shall give due publicity to all such laws 
and regulations." 
.ii The 1982 Convention thoroughly illustrates the activities which may deprive the passage of a 
foreign ship of its innocent character. In the present context it will suffice to assert that passage is 
innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of a coastal state. See 
A11iclc 19 of the 1982 Convention. 
-1
2 Sec Articles 27. 73. 56(b). Article 211 and Article 220 . 
.. _. Warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purpose enjoy immunities 
from coastal state enforcement jurisdiction. In the event of non-compliance with the laws and 
regulation of coastal states, they may be "required to leave the territorial sea immediately." See 
Articles 30. 32 and 236 of the 1982 Convention. 
-1.i Article 27(5) of the 1982 Convention. 
·•'i For more discussion. see Wilder, op. cit., n.8, at pp. 698-9; A I-A wadi, B., General Principles of 
l111ernational Lm1• (f the Sea and Its Applicability in the Arabian Gu((, Kuwait University Press, 
Kuwait ( 1988). at p.229 . 
• 1<, Bynkershoek, in this respect. wrote that ''the territorial dominion of the state extended as far as 
projectiles could be thrown from cannon on the shore." Quoted from Jessup, op. cit., n.13, at p.6, 
see also p.22. For fu11her discussion on the cannon-shot rule, see Wilder. op. cit .. n.8, at pp.699-
706. 
-1? See the remark of Churchill and Lowe. op. cit., n.14. at p.65. 
8 
---------------------------- Chapter One 
territorial sea. Scandinavian states, for example, preferred to claim "maritime 
dominium over fixed distances from the shore along the whole coastline, 
regardless of the presence or absence of shore batteries. These distances were 
progressively narrowed from those claimed around the sixteenth century, and had 
largely settled at the four-mile Scandinavian 'league' by the mid-eighteenth 
century. "
48 
In 1782, Galiani suggested replacement of the cannon-shot doctrine 
by a fixed limit of three miles along the shore of the coastal state. This limit was 
chosen as a matter of convenience and reasonableness and not because the 3-
nautical-mile was the precise range of a cannon in that day. 49 
Because the three-nautical-mile limit was to meet the interest of major naval 
powers in minimizing the area of national jurisdiction, and maximizing the area 
of high seas, it received wide-spread support from these states. 50 However, a 
claim for a wider limit was asserted by some states. 51 This wider claim was 
sometimes extended up to twenty nautical miles. 52 These different positions53 
were manifested in the Hague Conference, and caused the failure to reach an 
agreement on the question of the territorial sea limit. 54 The effect of this on the 
territorial sea limit was, as Gidel said, that it "killed the claim of the 3-mile limit 
to be a definite rule of international law."55 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. See also Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n 23, at pp.61 1-2. 
5° For further discussion, see below at pp. I 1-2. 
51 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14. at p.66. 
52 See the comment of Article 2 of the draft convention in Territorial Waters. A research 
organized by the Faculty of the Harvard Law School. (hereafter referred to as the Harvard Draft 
Convention). For more information about the research of Harvard Law School, see 23 AJ/l 
Supplement. Special Number ( 1929). at p.3. The draft convention reprinted in the 23 A.JIL 
Supplement, Special Number ( 1929). at pp.243-5. The comment of Article 2 is in the Supplement 
to 23 A.Ill. at pp.250-6. The said report also gives an explanation for the differences between 
states in respect to the territorial sea limit. see the Supplement to 23 AJIL, at p.250. See also 
Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.66. 
5
> For a general survey on states' statements and national legislation concerning the territorial 
seas' limit, see Harvard Draft Convention, Ibid., at pp.252-74. 
54 
See Whiteman, op. cit., n.25, at p.15. see also Oppenheim's, op. cit., n.23, at p.612. 
55 Quoted from Waldock, C.H.M., "The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf," 36 The 
Grotius Society ( 1951 ), at p. I 16. 
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(5) Subsequent attempts to formulate an acceptable breadth 
The ILC attempt to codify the rules of international law on a territorial sea 
limit was unsuccessful. The members of the ILC held conflicting views 
throughout the period between 1952 and 1956. "Some members of the 
Commission even felt that there is no rule of international law fixing a universal 
breadth for the territorial sea. At its eighth session in 1956, no single view was 
subscribed to by a majority of the members of the Commission, and it was unable 
either to formulate a statement of the existing law or to propose a new rule of 
international la\v. " 5(1 
The inability of the ILC to reach a conclusion can be understood in the light 
of the state practice of that time. This practice might suggest that the three miles 
was the minimum distance which had been claimed by coastal states. 57 State 
practices with respect to the 1rn;1ximum limit of the territorial sea exhibited 
differences. Some states such as Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States 
retained the three miles. 
58 
Other states such as Russia 59 and Iran claimed a 12-
mile territorial sea limit.
60 
The Scandinavian countries four miles, and several 
56 Whiteman, op. cit., n.25, at p.76. The ILC, after coming out with draft articles concerning the 
law of the sea, recommended that: "the General Assembly should summon an international 
conference of plenipotentiaries to examine the law of the sea, ... and to embody the results of its 
work in one or more international conventions or such other instruments as it may deem 
appropriate.'' See UNClOS I Official Record,·, vol. I, at p.172, para.4. On 21 February 1957, the 
General Assembly adopted resolution no. 1105 (XI) to carry out the ILC. recommendation, see 
Ibid., at p.172, para. 2. 
57 See Mr. Thomas Jefferson's, the Secretary of State of the United States of America, note to the 
British Minister Mr. Hammond. and to the Minster of France Mr. Genet, reproduced in Harvard 
Draft Convention, op. cit., n 50, at p. 252: and see Saudi Arabian draft resolution to the First 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Document A/conf-l 3/c. l/L.153, UNCLOS I 
(!f/icial Records, vol. 8, at p.251. See also Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14. at p.68~ Abu-Hife 
Ali. Al-qa111111 aldw~v a/Am (Public International Law), 2nd ed. Al-bsir Press, Egypt ( 1948), at 
p.300. 
58 
Jessup, op. cit., n.13, at p.62: Dickinson. E.D., "Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier," 40 
/-larvard Law Review ( 1926). at p.3. 
511 
See the statement of Mr. Sazonoff. the Russian Foreign Secretary, reproduced in Jessup. op. 
cir .. n.13. at pp.27-8. A translation of the Russian Law of 29 May 1911 in extending Russian 
territorial sea limit was reproduced in the Report Harvard Draft Convention. op. cit., n.50, at 
p.257. 
(,() See the Iranian Act of 1959 on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone, United Nations 
Legislative Series, National legislation and Treaties Relating to the law of the Sea. New York 
(1974), at p.10. 
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states, such as Spain, Italy, France and the Ottoman Empire, claimed to have 
control of specific activities beyond the three-mile limit. 61 
The situation did not improve in the first UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea. The 1958 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention which resulted 
from the Conference contained no article on the issue. This remarkable omission 
was a reflection of the conflict in the national interests between small states and 
superpowers. This conflict was centred, inter alia, on the following: 
1. Small states were anxious to claim a 12-nautical-mile limit to keep the 
superpower fleets at a reasonable distance from their coasts. By way of contrast, 
the superpowers were anxious to minimize the limit of the territorial seas, thus 
being able to exercise a 'gun-boat' diplomacy and thereby put some pressure on 
smal 1 states. 62 
2. Major naval states considered the extension of the territorial sea limit to a 12-
nautical-mile as a threat to the freedoms of their forces' mobility rights, 
especially in international straits. Hence they did not accept the new limit, since 
such limit would cause some international straits, like the Strait of Hormuz, to 
be within the national jurisdiction of the strait states, instead of being a part of 
the high seas where the territorial sea is limited to three nautical miles. 
63 
3. Some states, especially those which depended primarily on fishing activities,64 
called for the 12-nautical-mile limit to secure the maximum area of exclusive 
61 Jessup, op. cit., n.13, at p.63: Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.66; Oppenheim 's, op. cit., 
n.23. at p.612. 
62 Bowett, op. cit., n.34, at pp.7-9; Bowett. D.W., "The Second UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea." 9 ICLQ ( 1960). at pp.416-8. 
<•' The US Department of Defence in a memorandum entitled "National Security and UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea'', suggested that about 135 straits "would have been closed as a 
result of the extension of the territorial sea to 12 NM." This problem, however, has been solved 
between the parties to the 1982 Convention by the provisions of Part 3 of the Convention which 
provides the right of transit through and over international straits. See the US Department of 
Defence Memorandum of July 1994. published in internet information services: 
http://www.clark.net/pub/diplonet/dod.jcs.htm/. For further discussion on this regime, see 
Churchill and Lowe, op. cit .. n.14, Chapter Five: Moore, J. N., ''The Regime of Straits and the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,'' 74 AJIL (1980), at pp.77-121; 
Reisman. W.M .. ''The Regime of Strait_s and National Security. An appraisal of International 
Lawmaking," 74 A.Ill ( 1980), at pp.48-76; Schachte L. and Bernhardt A., "International Straits 
and Navigational Freedoms." 33 V.JIL ( 1993), at pp.530-89; Gilmore, op. cit., n.21, at pp.9-70, 
para. I 0. 
<i.t Such as Iceland. Mexico and Chile. 
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fisheries, '"since territorial waters gave such exclusive" rights. 65 While, on the 
contrary, the ·Jong-range fishing states ' 66 insisted on maintaining to the 3-
nautical-mile limit. This was to minimize the area of territorial seas where their 
' 
fleets could be excluded from fishing. 67 
(6) The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
This conference was held at Geneva from 17 March to 26 April 1960 " for the 
purpose of considering further the questions of the breadth of the territorial sea 
and fishery limits."
68 
A number of proposals were submitted to the Conference 
and can, generally speaking, be divided into two categories; The first proposal 
was a limit of twelve nautical miles, but ifthe breadth of a state's territorial sea is 
less than this limit, it '"may establish a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea 
provided, however, that the total breadth of the territorial sea and the fishing zone 
does not exceed twelve nautical miles."
69 
The second category suggested a six-
mile territorial sea zone with a further six-mile fishing zone. 70 At the end of the 
Conference on 26 April 1960. no formulation had achieved the two-thirds 
. . . d c- I 71 maJonty require 1or approva . 
(7) The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
The origins of the Third United Nations Conference on the law of the sea date 
back to 1967, when the General Assembly, following a proposal by the 
ambassador of Malta. adopted a resolution to establish a Sea-Bed Committee in 
order to examine the legal regulation of the deep sea-bed beyond national 
'·' B . ""'4 10 owctt. op. ct/., n.-' . at p. . 
""Such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
1
'
7 B . ""'4 10 owett. op. cl/ .. n. _, . at p. . 
1
'
8 The United Nations General Assembly in a Res. no.VIII on 27 April 1958, see Whiteman. op. 
cit .. n.25, at p.119. 
"'
1 
The 12-nautical-mile limit was embodied in the Soviet Union proposal of 21 March 1960: in a 
16-power proposal in April, 1960. and finally by the Mexico proposal of 21 March 1960, with 
some differences with respect to fishing zones when the breadth of the territorial sea was less than 
12 nautical miles. see Ibid., at pp.122-4. 
70 
This was expressed in the US proposal of 23 March 1960, and in the Canadian proposal of 24 
March 1960. In April, of the same year, the US and Canada each withdrew their earlier proposal 
in favour of a joint Canadian-US proposal with the same draft. 
71 The joint Canadian-US proposal failing by only one vote to obtain the requisite majority. See 
Ibid. at p.136. 
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jurisdiction. 
72 
However, in the post-1958 period, many newly independent states 
also wanted to review the 1958 Conventions because they did not have any role in 
the formulation of their articles due to their then colonial status. 73 Furthermore, 
""many States were increasingly concerned about the problems of overfishing and 
marine pollution off their coasts, neither of which could satisfactorily be 
controlled within the narrow jurisdictional limits on which the 1958 regime was 
based."
74 
The need to work out a comprehensive convention on the law of the sea, 
therefore, was put forward by many states. The General Assembly, as a result, 
adopted in 1970 Resolution No. 2750 by which it decided to convene a UN 
Conference ""in order to carry out the negotiations and other work required to 
complete the drafting and adoptiol). of articles for a comprehensive convention on 
the law of the sea."
75 
Unlike the Hague and Geneva Conferences, the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea had no text or report as a basis for discussion. 





The first meetings were held in New York between 3 and 15 
December 1973 to examine the rules of procedure. 
The problem of voting was the most difficult issue. The Conference adopted 
rules of procedure for discussion. In accordance with these rules, it was to 
conduct its discussion by way of consensus rather than through formal votes. In 
addition, the "Conference agreed to work on the basis of a "package deal'. 
Implicit in this package deal concept was the assumption that the Convention 
should meet the minimum interests of the largest possible m~jority while 
72 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.13. For a historical background on UNCLOS III, see 
Nordquist M.H. and Choon-ho P. (eds.), Reports of the United States Delegation to the Third 
United Nations Co1?/erence on the law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper 
no. 33, Honolulu ( 1983 ), at pp.6-25; Gilmore, op. cit., n.21, at para.3. 
7 ·~ Tommy Koh and Shanmugam Jayakumar, "The Negotiating Process of the Third United 
nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,'' United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea 
1982: A commenta1:v, vol. I, Nordquist, M.H. (ed.), Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands 
( 1985). at p.38. 
74 Churchill and Lowe. op. cit .. n.14. at p.14. See also Tommy Koh and Shanmugam Jayakumar, 
op. cit .. n.73, at p.38. 
75 
UNClOS Ill O.fficial Record\-, vol. I, at p. vii. 
7
<• Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.14. 
13 
_______________ Chapter One 
accommodating the essential interests of the major powers and the dominant 
interest groups. Another assumption implicit in this package deal concept was 
that there would be trade-offs and reciprocal support between various claims: for 
example, support for navigation freedoms in straits and in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) in return for support for claims for sovereign rights over 
,,77 
resources. 
However, when attempts to achieve consensus had been exhausted, it was 
agreed that the formal votes rule, such as the traditional two-third majority, 
should be applied. The Conference carried on its work on a consensus basis until 
the final text of the Convention came up for approval, when the delegation of the 
United States called for a vote. The Convention was adopted by 130 votes in 
favour to 4 against, with I 7 abstentions. The four negative votes were cast by 
Israel, Turkey, the United States and Venezuela; the abstentions included the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. 78 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, [hereafter the 
1982 Convention] was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 at Montego 
Bay in Jamaica. It was subject to ratification or accession by states, and was to 
enter into force 12 months after the date of deposit of the 60th instrument of 
ratification or accession. It entered into force on 16 November 1994.79 The 
present status of the Convention, as of 3rd November 1997, was that 122 
instruments of ratification, accession and succession had been deposited with the 
Secretary General of the United Nations. The last state which deposited its 
. f .fi . p 1 80 mstrument o rat1 1cat1on was ortuga . 
The delay in its entering into force was due to the fact that the industrialized 
states withheld their support or rejected the Convention. Part XI was the main 
77 
Tommy Koh and Shanmugam Jayakumar. op. cit .. n. 73, at p.40. 
78 
Limits in the Seas, Series No.36, at pp.171-80. 
711 
The 60th ratification was deposited by Guyana with the United Nations Secretary General on 
16 November 1993. 
80 
UN Legal Office, The Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of I 0 
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reason that prevented industrialized states from accepting the Convention,81 and 
thus the number of ratifications increased only slowly. Most states who initially 
ratified the Convention were developing states. An attempt to enhance the 
prospect for widespread ratification of the convention originated in 1990 under 
the leadership of the UN Secretary General. On 28 July 1994 an agreement 
relating to the implementation of ~art XI of the 1982 Convention was adopted by 
a vote of 121 in favour, none against, and 7 abstaining. This agreement 
"'substantially accommodates the objections of the United States and other 
industrial states to the deep seabed mining provisions of the Law of the Sea 
Convention." 
82 
(8) The Breadth of the Territorial Sea in the 1982 Convention 
The Convention, with regard to the breadth of the territorial sea, adopted, in 
Article 3, the doctrine of the twelve-mile limit. Not surprisingly, the provisions of 
this Article had been incorporated in approximately 117 instruments of national 
legislation by 1994. 
83 
This wide adoption of Article 3 presents the question of 
whether or not it reflects present-day customary law. Regarding this, Shaw has 
written that: 
Article 3 of the 1982 Convention ... accords with the evolving practice of states [and there] is 
little doubt that this now reflects customary international law. 84 
Churchill and Lowe in a similar manner assert that: 
The twelve-mile limit is now firmly established in international law, and it is likely that the 
practice, if not always the legislation, of all States will in the near future be brought into line 
with this limit. 85 
81 For example. President Reagan declared that the US would not sign the Convention because of 
its objection to Part XI dealing with deep sea-bed mining. See US Ocean policy statement, March 
1983. Printed in the limits in the Seas. Series No. I 12. March 9 ( 1992), at pp. 78-80. 
82 Oxman, B .. "Law of the Sea Forum: the 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of the Sea-bed 
provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea," 88 AJIL ( 1994), at p.695. See also 
Galdorisi, G., "The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: A National Security Perspective," 89 
A.JIL ( 1995). at pp.208-13. And see 27 ODIL. Special Double Issue in the New Law of the Sea, 
no. I and 2 ( 1996 ). See also Jagota, S.P., The Problems arising at the time of the Entry inLO Force 
<f the 1982 Law <?l the Sea Convention. Paper submitted at Qatar Conference on International 
Legal Issue Qatar, March 22-25 ( 1994 ). 
8 ~ In contrast there were some other claims, as follows: 6 states still claiming 3-nm./ 2 states claim 
4-nm./ 3 states claims 6-nm./ one state claims 20-nm./ 2 states claims 30-nm./ one state claims 35-
nm/ one state claims 50-nm./ one state claims 200-nm/ and finally one state claims a rectangle. 




Shaw, op. cit., n.23, at p.349. See also O'Connell, op. cit., n.6. at p.166. 
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The doctrine of the territorial sea in the United Arab Emirates 
The developments of the territorial sea regime in the UAE can best be 
~~amined in two stages. ( 1) before 1971 during the period of the Trucial States: 
(2) after 1971 under the Federal State. 
( 1) The period prior to 1971 
At the international level the member Emirates did not participate either at the 
First or the Second UN Conference of 1958 and 1960. respectively. on the Law of 
the Sea. This was for two main reasons: ( 1) The United Kingdom was 
responsible. as mentioned at an ea~lier stage of this work. for the foreign affairs of 
these Emirates in 1958 and 1960: (2) The lack of relevant experts in these 
Emirates \\·ould. in am· event. have been an obstacle to taking a full and effective 
~ ~ 
part at these international gatherings even if participation had been otherwise 
possible. 
Moreover. these Emirates did not subsequently ratify any of the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
86 
Not\vithstanding the debates of the legal 
status of the Emirates during their special relationship with the British. it should 
be noted that the UK never sought to extend its participation in multilateral 
conventions to the entities in question. Indeed it has specifically stressed this 
issue. For example. the British Government appended the following declaration 
to its ratification87 to the 1958 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention: 
ratification of this Convention on behalf of the United Kingdom does not extend to the States in 
the Persian Gulf enjoying British pr<?tection. Multilateral conventions to which the United 
8
.c. See Churchill and Lowe. op. cit .. n.14. at p.67. Moreover, the government of the United 
Kingdom stated in the Anglo/French Arbitration of 1977 that "coastal States today have a right 
under international law to extend their territorial sea to 12 miles. [The Court of Arbitration 
accepted the British argument. and thus took] account of the potentiality of an extension of [the 
Channel Islands] territorial sea from three to 12 miles." Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.187. 
81
' Thus it would only be bound by the provision of these Conventions so long as they were 
regarded as reflecting customary law. 
87 
The British Government ratified the 1958 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention on 
14 March 1960. See the Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretm:v-General, UN 
publications. New York ( 1986). at p.679. Similar action was taken in respect of its ratification to 
the High Sea Convention of 1958. see Ibid .. at p. 687; the Fisheries Convention of 1958, see Ibid., 
at p.692. 
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Kingdom becomes a party are not extended to these States until such times as an extension is 
requested by the Ruler of the States concerned. 88 
At the domestic level there was no specific claim for territorial sea limits until 
late 1960. Prior to that time it was assumed that the three-nautical-mile limit was 
the breadth of the Emirates' territorial sea. The basis for this belief is reflected by 
a number of facts. Firstly, during this period the Emirates, as noted earlier, had a 
special relationship with the United Kingdom, which had supported the three-
mile rule. Hence it was assumed that the rule would apply to the Emirates.89 
Secondly, a three-mile limit for oil concessions was claimed by some Emirates.90 
Finally, Lord Asquith in the Ahu-Dhahi Arhitration stated, in regard to the Abu-
Dhabi territorial sea limit, that: 
I should have thought [the territorial water] expression could only have been intended to mean 
the territorial maritime belt in the Persian Gulf, which is a three mile belt. 91 
Professor Young, however, expressed his doubt as to whether Abu-Dhabi, 
except for the allocation of oil concessions, was bound by Lord Asquith's 
statement. His view was that since "the two principal coastal states, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, [had] each expressly declared their adherence to a six-mile limit," it 
was erroneous to assert that a three-mile belt was the limit of the territorial sea in 
the Gulf.92 Indeed, Commanders Kennedy and Boggs in a joint report in 1948, 
regarding an orderly and equitable longitudinal line and lateral jurisdictional line 
in the Arabian Gulf, suggested that: 
88 It is worth mentioning here that, despite the generality of the last sentence of this declaration, 
the British government made no such declaration in the case of the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention. Whatever the reason for that omission. one could hardly conclude that the right of 
assertion jurisdiction and control over ~he sea-bed and subsoil area adjacent to the Emirates' 
coasts. did not lie within the jurisdiction of these Emirates. Indeed the assertion of jurisdiction 
over the continental shelf area was, with the exception of the Sharjah Emirate, the only maritime 
zone the Emirates had claimed during their special relationship with the British government. For 
further discussion on these continental shelf claims, see Section Three. 
811 
Al-Bahama. H., Arahian Gu((States, 2nd ed, Librairie De Liban, Beirut ( 1975), at p.281. 
90 See. for example, the 1950 Oil Concession Agreement between the Ruler of Abu-Dhabi 
Emirate and the Superior Oil Company. The text of the agreement is reprinted in the Arabian 
Treaties: 1600-1960, Tuson P. and Quick E. (eds.), Archive Editions, vol.2, Redwood Press Ltd., 
England ( 1992), at p.729. 
91 
Abu-Dhabi Arbitration, at p.151. 
92 Young, R., "Lord Asquith and the Continental Shelf," 46 AJ/l ( 1952). at p.515. 
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Qut:stions relating lo the .. seaward limit of territorial waters .. involve: (a) questions regarding 
tht: width of the zone ... lraq and perhaps all other former Turkish states. including the 
Sheikhdoms. may therefore claim a 6-mile heft <?f territorial waters.9~ ~ 
In 1969 the first clear modern legislation concerning the question of the 
territorial sea was enacted in the Emirates. The Amir of Sharjah. on 10 September 
1969. issued a Decree concerning the territorial sea of the Emirate of Sharjah and 
its Dependencies. and the territorial waters of its Islands. Article 1 reads: 
The extent of the territorial sea of Sha~jah and its Dependencies. and the territorial waters of its 
Islands. is twelve nautical miles. as measured b\' the rules of the territorial water Treat\' issued 
• • - 9~ q.:; - -
by the Geneva Conference 111 19)8. · 
(2) The period after 1971 
After the formulation of the Federation the UAE Government took part in the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and supported the 
doctrine of 12 nautical miles for the territorial sea limit.96 On 10 December 1982 
the UAE signed the final Act of the conference but. to date. it has failed to ratify 
} } 
. . q7 
t 1e resu tmg convention. 
At the domestic level. the UAE Constitution did not specify the authority that 
was responsible for claiming maritime zones for the State.98 One may suggest that 
the member Emirates \\·ere so entitled. since the jurisdiction of the Union was 
limited to the matters which were assigned to it in the Constitution.99 However. in 
so far as claiming an off-shore zone is an act of foreign affairs. the Union-not 
9~ Italics added. See Arabian Boundaries Primal)' Documents 1853-1957. vol. 21. Territorial 
\\.aters and Seabed Claims. Schofield and Blake (eds.). Archive Editions. Redwood Press Ltd .. 
England ( 1988). at p.98: Al-Awadi. op. cit .. n.45. at p.229: Al-Khateeb. M .. The Legal Status <?f 
the Territorial Sea. Thesis for Doctorate in Law. Cairo ( 1975), at p.670. 
9~ For the text of the Amir of Sharjah · s Decree. see the Report of Trucial States .Hediation. 
unpublished studies on the matter of Sharjah Territorial Sea and Continental shelf rights. The 
report was prepared in 1970 by Bathurst. Jennings. and Ely and submitted to Sir Gawain Bell. A 
copy of the Sharjah Decree of 1969 is reproduced in Arabic and English on p.36 of vol. 2 of the 
repo11. Access lo the report was kindly allowed by Clifford Chance Office, London. 1996. 
95 
In March 1970. one year before the formation of the United Arab Emirates; a supplementary 
Decree to the 1969 decree was issued by the Emirate of Sharjah government. The text of this 
supplementary decree is reproduced in Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.89, at pp.402-3. See Chapter Four 
below for further discussion about the effect of Sharjah's claim to a 12 nautical miles territorial 
sea limit. 
% UAE statement on the 34th meeting-9 July 1974. UNCLOS Ill O.fficial Records, vol. I, at p. 14 I, 
para.35. 
'
17 See limits in the Seas, Series No.36 ( 1995), at p. 152. 
•>x See the introduction for a discussion on the Union and the individual components respective 
jurisdiction. 
''"Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. 
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the member Emirates-is entitled to exercise such a power. 100 Indeed, in 1993 the 
Union authority issued a Federal Law to claim off-shore zones for the UAE. 
Federal Law no. 19 in respect of the Delimitation of the Maritime Zones of the 
United Arab Emirates makes provisions which cover five zones of maritime 
territory; internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental 
shelf and the EEZ. 
101 
It also specifies the nature of the legal regime claimed in 
respect of these zones and stipulates the limit of the territorial sea, the contiguous 
zone, the continental shelf and the EEZ. In this section we shall limit our 
discussion to the territorial sea. Other areas will be discussed in subsequent 
sections of the present chapter. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the 1993 Federal Law was the first municipal 
law to deal with the question of the territorial sea, it is difficult to hold that the 
UAE (and the Trucial States previously) had no territorial sea prior to that date. 
This was because, in the prevailing view in the literature, 102 the sovereignty of a 
coastal state extends automatically by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, to a 
minimum belt of territorial sea around its coasts. The three miles limit had been 
generally accepted as "'being the smallest claimed for the territorial sea during 
modern times." 103 The justification for the automatic attachment of the territorial 
sea to any coast is that international law asserted certain rights and imposed 
certain obligations on a coastal state in respect to its sovereignty over the 
territorial sea. 104 These obligations presuppose the existence of a territorial sea 
where such duties can be fulfilled. 105 This extension of sovereignty does not 
depend on any municipal law or any national declaration. 106 In short, there are 
100 
According to Article 120 of the Constitution the matter of foreign affairs falls within the 
exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction of the Union. 
'°' UA E qfficial Gazelle. issue No. 257, 1993. An English translation of this 1993 Federal Law 
may be found in law of the Sea Bulletin Series. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, No. 25, June ( 1994), at pp.94-100. 
10~ Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n. l, at pp.202-3: Judge McNair's dissenting opinion in Anglo v. 
Norwegian Fisheries Case. at p.166: Abu-Dhabi Arbitration, at pp.151-2; the Beagle Channel 
Arhitration, at p.179. para. 98. 
103 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.68. See also above at p. l 0. 
10
·
1 See for example the obligation in Article 15(2) of the TSCZ (now Article 24(2) of the 1982 
LOS). See also Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n. l. at pp.204-5. 
105 Judge Mc Nair's dissenting opinion, op. cit .. n. l 02; Churchill and Lowe, op. cit .. n.14, at p.68. 
10<' J d M N . ' d' . . . . 10...., u ge c air s 1ssent111g op1111on, op. cit., n. L.. 
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. . 1 107 A . . 11 h . ipso.1ure ng 1ls. mumc1pa aw, owever, is necessary to determine the outer 
limit of the territorial sea, or ''for the purpose of making special claims." 108 
Hence, national legislation on the territorial sea, such as the 1993 UAE's Federal 
Law, did not convert a territorial sea area into the property of the UAE, but 
merely extended the breadth of this area to 12 nautical miles, and illustrated in 
some detail its existent sovereignty over it. 
The UAE Territorial Sea 
The United Arab Emirates has adopted the doctrine of a 12-nautical-mile limit. 
Article 4 of the Federal Law reads: 
The sovereignty of the State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters, to its 
territorial sea, the air space over the te~ritorial sea as well as its bed and subsoil. The state shall 
exercise its sovereignty over the territorial sea in accordance with the provisions of this Law 
and the rules of international law. 
The territorial sea of the State means the belt of sea waters beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and adjacent to its coast. It extends towards the sea with a breadth of 12 nautical miles 
from the baseline. 
Five possible baselines are listed in Article 6 of the Federal Law. First, from 
the low-water mark where the coast of the mainland or a shore is exposed to the 
open sea. Second, from a straight line not exceeding 24 nautical miles in length 
joining the low-water marks of the entrance of bays. Third, from a straight line 
joining the outer points of the outermost islands forming the group. Fourth, from 
lines drawn adjacent to the seaward side of the outermost port or harbour 
installations. Fifth, from a low-tide elevation where it is wholly or partly situated 
at a distance from the mainland or from an island not exceeding 12 nautical 
·1 109 1111 es. 
107 /LC }'earhook ( 1950). vol. I, at p.229. See also Oppenheim 's International law, vol. I. 8th ed., 
Lauterpacht H. (ed.), Longmans. London ( 1955), at pp.501-2. For further details, see O'Connell, 
op. cit., n.14, at p.352; Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.68. 
10
" Fitzmaurice. G., ''The General Principles of International Law," 92 Academie De Droit 
/111ernational ( 1957-11 ), at pp.136-7. 
111
') If the measurement of the UAE territorial sea resulted in a situation where an area of the EEZ 
was wholly surrounded by the territorial sea. Article 7 of the Federal Law in this relation provides 
that such an area shall form part of the state territorial sea, if it extends not more than 12 nautical 
miles. 
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The UAE Federal Law thus reproduces the rules and the principles of the 
1982 Convention on the subject of baselines. The first mentioned baseline is 
found in Article 5 and the rem~ining baselines follow closely; Article 10(4) 
dealing with bays; Article 7(1) dealing with "locations where the coastline is 
deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity"; Article 11 dealing with ports; and Article 13(1) dealing with 
low-tide elevations. 
Having said that Article 4 extends the UAE sovereignty over the territorial 
sea, it should be stressed that it does not elaborate on the scope of this 
sovereignty. However, it makes reference to other provisions of the Federal Law 
and to the rules of international law, according to which the UAE should exercise 
its sovereignty. As we have noted, a coastal state in general is entitled to exercise 
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over foreign merchant ships in its 
territorial sea area.
110 
The right of innocent passage is enunciated by Article 5 of 
the Federal Law. This Article denies the right of innocent passage to foreign 
warships without prior permissio11. 111 By way of contrast, the right of innocent 
passage for foreign merchant ships is reaffirmed in section one of this Article. In 
respect to the passage of aircraft over the territorial sea, there is no right, as a 
general rule, of overflight existing over a territorial sea. Therefore, the passage of 
foreign aircraft, whether merchant or military, is subject-according to Article 
38(2) of the 1982 Convention-to prior authorization or notification. But, where 
the territorial sea includes a strait which is used for international navigation, such 
as the Strait of Hormuz, foreign aircraft enjoy the rights of transit passage 
regardless. Although the UAE lies close to the Strait of Hormuz, it is a matter of 
geographical and geopolitical acceptance that the Strait, as it appears from the 
110 See above at pp.7-8. 
111 In international law there is some controversy over the recognition of an equivalent right for 
warships. For example, the Court in the Corfu Channel Case avoided answering the questioning 
of innocent passage of warships through territorial seas not included in a strait. See ICJ Reports 
1949, at p.30. See also Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.23, at pp.618-20: O'Connell, op. cit., n.6. at 
pp.274-97: Jessup, op. cit .. n.13. at p.120: Bowett, op. cit., n.62, at p.418; McDougal and Burke, 
The Puhlic Order (?(the Oceans, Yale University Press. USA ( 1962), at pp.192-4; Gilmore, op. 
cit., n.21, at p.9. para.9. 
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map below. ·"lies between Iran on the north and north-west and Oman on the 
south.'. 112 This indeed is reflected in the fact that the t\VO littoral states in the 
Strait reached. in 1974. an agreement to determine the boundary line between 
their territorial sea areas in the Strait of Hormuz. 113 As a result the right of 
overflight over the UAE·s territorial sea is subject to prior authorization. since the 
UAE is not geographically a strait state. 
------------ ------- - --- Gr~t Qvo1r1 4.-------------
• Litflc Qvoin 
\ 
\ 
Figure: (3) Strait of Hormuz 
Source: UNCLOS I Official Records, vol. 1, at p.155. 
112 For further geographical description to the Strait of Homrnz. see UNCLOS I Official Records. 
vol. I, at pp.129-30. 
11 ~ For further discussion on this agreement, see Chapter Five/Section One. 
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Section Two 
The Contiguous Zone 
Development of the concept 
After the doctrine of the territorial sea had become universally acknowledged, 
some coastal states began to exercise jurisdiction for the purpose of defence and 
for the prevention of infractions of certain of their laws---especially customs 
regulations-in a zone of the sea contiguous to and beyond the territorial sea 
I imit. The Supreme Court of the United States (US) in 1891 pointed out this 
principle by holding that: "all governments, for the propose of self-protection in 
time of war or for the prevention of frauds on its revenue, exercise an authority 
beyond [the three-mile] limit.r 114 
As early as 1718, the British Government enacted legislation giving British 
customs officers the authority to visit any ship or vessel "found hovering on the 
coasts of the Kingdom, within the limits of any port." 115 In 1736, a Hovering Act 
came into force to permit seizure of ships within a limit of two leagues. By an Act 
of 1784, the distance was increased to four leagues, i.e. 12 miles, and then to 
eight leagues in 1802. 116 However, the Queen's Advocate, in an opinion on the 
legality of the seizure of the French vessel, the Petit-Jules, twenty-five miles off 
the British shore in 1850, held that the seizure was unlawful under international 
law. As a result, the British government set free the one member of the crew who 
had been captured by the British authority, when they seized the vessel. 117 
Thereafter. the three-nautical-mile rule applied around the British isles and its 
dominions and colonies ... But this rule was subject to two qualifications allowing 
11
·
1 Quoted from Jessup, op. cit., n.13, at pp.76-7. See also Waldock, op. cit., n.55, at p.121. 
115 This power, according to the 1718 Act, should be exercised against a ship of the burden of 50 
tons. or under, laden with customizable or prohibited goods. See Masterson, W.E., Jurisdiction in 
A1!arginal Seas, Cornwall Press, USA ( 1929), at p.8. 
11
'' By an Act on June 22, 1802. as a result of an increase in smuggling trade. See Ibid., at p.26 
and p.73. · 
117 Sec Ibid .. at pp.127-9; Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14. at p. I 12. 
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the exercise of jurisdiction agaii:st foreign vessels at greater distances from 
shore." 118 These two cases were: 
1. The doctrine of constructive presence. This is when a ship, hovering beyond 
the three-nautical-mile limit, sends its boats within that limit for the purpose of 
illegal fishing or smuggling or committing a crime under the British laws. In 
this case, the authority may seize the mother ship, although it is located beyond 
the British three-nautical-mile limit. 119 
2. The doctrine of hot pursuit. This is when a ship is found within the three-
nautical-mile territorial sea, and there is good reason to believe that the ship has 
violated the laws of the coastal state. In this case it could, subject to the 
satisfaction of certain conditions, be pursued and arrested beyond the territorial 
sea 1 imit. 
120 
In the United States, the government, by an Act of 1799, allowed vessels 
bound for the US ports to be boarded, examined and searched within four leagues 
off the American coast.
121 
In 1924, the US government concluded 'The Liquor 
Treaty' with the British government~ whereby the British Government would 
raise no objection to a British vessel being searched by the US authorities off the 
American coast within a distance that could be traversed in one hour by a vessel 
suspected of endeavouring to commit an offence on the American coast. 122 
118 Churchill and Lowe,'op. cit., n.14, at p.112. 
119 McNair, International law Opinions, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1956), 
at p.245: Fitzmaurice. op. cit .. n. I, at p.210. For a distinction between simple and extensive 
constructive presence. sec O'Connell, op. cit., n.6. vol.2. at p. I 093. See also the case of R. v. 
,c...,·unilu and Solayman (I 986), 28 DLR 4th ( 1986). at p.453. For the comment on this case, see 
Gilmore, W.C.. "Hot Pursuit and Constrictive Presence in Canadian Law Enforcement," 12 
Marine PolilJ· ( 1988). at pp. I 05-11. See ~gain Gilmore's comments on the case of R. v. Mills and 
Others. 44 ICLQ ( 1995), at pp.949-58: Reuland, R.C., "The Customary Right of Hot Pursuit on 
the High Seas; Annotations to Article 111 of the Law of the Sea Convention," 33 VJIL ( 1993), at 
pp.557-89: finally, see Brownlie. I., Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed, Clarendon 
Press. Oxford ( 1990), at pp.245-8. 
1.:w The doctrine of hot pursuit was embodied in Article 23 of the Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas of 1958 and repeated in Article I I I of the 1982 Convention. See also Churchill and Lowe, 
op. cit., n.14, at pp.112-3 and p.173. 
121 Jessup, op. cit., n.13, at pp.81-6; Dickinson, op. cit., n.58, at pp.13-4. 
122 See Colombos, C. J., The International Law of the Sea, 6th ed, Longmans, London ( 1967), at 
p.142. 
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Other states, such as Russia and France, claimed a customs' zone up to 12 
nautical miles.
123 
Italy, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and others adopted a 
range of between six and twelve nautical miles for customs' zones. 124 
Attempts to codify state practice 
In the Hague Conference of 1930, a proposal regarding the contiguous zone 
was submitted to the second commission. It was worded as follows: 
On the high seas, adjacent to its territorial waters, the coastal State may exercise the control 
necessary to prevent, within its territory or territorial waters, the infringement of its Customs or 
sanitary regulations or interference with its security by foreign ships. Such control may not be 
exercised more than twelve miles from the coast. 125 
However, the proposal was rejected by a group of states including Britain, 
Japan, Germany, Denmark and Netherlands. These states denied the validity of 
contiguous zone claims, and they asserted that a coastal state has no jurisdiction 
beyond the three-nautical-mile limit, except where a treaty is in existence, e.g. the 
Liquor Treaty, or under the doctrines of 'hot pursuit' and constructive 
126 presence. 
In the period between the Hague and Geneva Conferences, the number of 
coastal states who claimed special zones on the high seas contiguous to their 
territorial seas increased. For this and other reasons the final report of the ILC of 
1956 included a draft article on the subject of Contiguous Zone. It, in turn, was 
adopted unchanged in the 1958 Convention as Article 24. It provides: 127 
In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the 
control necessary to : . 
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its 
territory or territorial sea; 
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. 
12 ~ Jessup. op. cit .. n.13. at pp.86-8: Lowe. V ., "The Development of the Concept of the 
Contiguous Zone:· 52 B YB/ L ( 1981 ). p.135-7. 
12
.i Ibid .. at pp. 89-9 I. The purpose of the Spanish claim to exercise jurisdiction up to six miles. in 
addition to customs. was fisheries. This claim, however, was challenged by some other nations. 
See Jessup, op. cit., n.13, at p.42 and p.89: Masterson, op. cit., n.115, at pp. 25 7-62. 
125 See Whiteman. op. cit., n.25, at pp.48~-6. 
12
<• See Churchill and Lowe. op. cit., n.14, at pp.113-4. See also Lowe, op. cit., n.123, at pp.130-3. 
127 For the status of Article 24 into customary law. see Re Martines and Others, 28 /LR ( 1959), at 
pp.173-4. 
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According to Article 24 the contiguous zone is not a part of the state's 
territory. A coastal state has only enforcement jurisdiction for the purpose of 
preventing and punishing any infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws within either its territory or territorial sea. It follows that a coastal 
state cannot exercise any jurisdiction regarding an offence committed within the 
contiguous zone.
128 
The breadth of this enforcement jurisdiction zone may not 
extend beyond the 12 nautical miles from the baseline. 
The contiguous zone under of the 1982 Convention 
Article 24 of the 1958 TSCZ Convention was reproduced, with some 
modifications, in Article 33 of the 1982 Convention. These changes were 
threefold. First, the contiguous zone remains a part of the high seas under the 
1958 Convention. By way of contrast under the 1982 Convention, it falls within 
the regime of the EEZ, and not within that of the high seas. 129 The consequence 
of shifting the legal status of the contiguous zone from the high seas' regime to 
the EEZ regime is that, if a conflict arises concerning a claim of jurisdiction by a 
coastal state and it is not assigned in the convention, such a conflict should be 
resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances. 
But, under the 1958 Convention, such conflict would be resolved against the 
existence of coastal state jurisdiction over foreign ships, because ships on the 
I "'O 
high seas are subject only to the jurisdiction of the flag state. -' Furthermore, 
regarding the contiguous zone as· a pai1 of the EEZ regime would attribute, by 
virtue of the provisions applicable to the EEZ, additional powers of prescriptive 
and enforcement jurisdiction to be exercised in that area. 131 
1 ~ 8 This view, however. is not universal. A number of states considered that Article 24 "was 
merely permissive. not exhaustive, and that contiguous zones, apparently including both 
enforcement and legislative jurisdiction. could be established for purposes other than those 
detailed in the article." See Churchill and Lowe. op. cit., n.14, at p. l l 7; see also Harris, D.J., 
C 'ases and Materials on International law, 4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London ( 199 l ), at p.4 l 0. 
I:!'' In fact. Article 33 did not indicate the legal status of the contiguous zone; it is referred to only 
as 'a zone contiguous to'. However, because the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, there is a strong argument to 
suggest that the contiguous zone becomes part of the EEZ regime. 
i:;o lotus Case (1927), PCIJ Reports Series A-N°/0, at p.25. 
i:; 
1 See below for more discussion on the EEZ regime. 
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Second, the breadth of the contiguous zone was set at 12 nautical miles under 
the 1958 Convention, but it was extended to twenty-four nautical miles under the 
1982 Convention. This "largely because most States now claim a twelve-mile 
territorial sea."
132 
To allow these territorial sea claims, "UNCLOS III decided to 
move the contiguous zone seaward'' to 24 nautical miles. 133 
Finally, paragraph 3 of Article 24 dealing with the delimitation of contiguous 
zone boundary was omitted from Article 33 of the 1982 Convention. This may be 
due to the fact that the delimitation of the EEZ boundary will automatically bring 
about the delimitation of the contiguous zone. 134 
The Concept of the contiguous zone in the United Arab Emirates 
The Federal Law of 1993 gives the UAE government, in the zone contiguous 
to its territorial sea, the right to exercise supervision and control for preventing 
and punishing infringement of its security, customs, fiscal, sanitary or 
immigration laws within its land territory, internal waters or territorial sea. The 
provisions of the Federal Law, without the addition of the word security, are 
identical to those .granted to coastal states in Article 33(1) of the 1982 
C . 13" onvent1on. --
The breadth of the contiguous zone is provided for in Article 11. This 
stipulates a breadth of 12 nautical miles measured from the outer limit of the 
territorial sea of the U AE which, as has been seen, extends up to 12 nautical miles 
from the baselines. Here ag~in the provision of the Federal Law is in agreement 
with the provisions of Article 33(2) of the 1982 Convention. 
1 ~~ Churchill and Lowe. op. cit .. n.14. at p. I 16. 
1.•; Ibid. See here the remark of Churchill and Lowe on the necessity of the contiguous zone, as a 
protection area. after the extension of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles. 
1.•·1 Caflisch. however, contemplates that some problems may arise where a state has made no 
claim to EEZ. See Caflisch, L., "Maritime Boundary Delimitation," 11 EP!l ( 1989), at p. 214. 
1>
5 For the question of the validity of claiming a security zone in time of peace, see Whiteman, op. 
cit., n.25. at p.486. See also !LC Yearbook ( 1956) vol.2. at p.295; Oda, S., "The Concept of the 
Contiguous Zone," 11 ICLQ ( 1962), at pp.14 7-8; Brownlie, op. cit., n.119, at pp.203-4; 
Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n.1, at p.207; Churchill and Lowe. op. cit., n.14, at p.117. It is interesting to 
note that the UAE claim of control for preventing and punishing infringement of its security is not 
an unusual claim in state practice. Similar claims were made, for example, by Iran, Bangladesh, 
Burma, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. For more details, see limits in the Seas, 
Series No. I 12, at p.34 and No. I 14, at p.14, and pp.30-2. 
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Section Three 
The Continental Shelf 
Development of the concept 
In September 1945, in his well-known Proclamation, US President Truman 
claimed jurisdiction over the adjacent continental shelf for the purpose of 
exploiting its resources. 136 This claim, which was justified on the basis of justice 
and reasonableness, 
137 
was described by the World Court in the North Sea Cases.~· 
""as the starting point of the positive law on the subject." 138 
Other unilateral claims by other states followed the Truman Proclamation. In 
general, these claims may be said to fall into two groups. First, claims consistent 
with the Truman Proclamation, such as the various claims of the Gulf States. 
139 
Second, claims asserting actual sovereignty over the shelf area, and not just 
jurisdiction and control over its resources. Such claims may be found in the 
. l . d . d b 1 L . A . · 140 vanous proc amat1ons an enactments issue y t 1e atm menca countries. 
The difference between the two groups is that the second type of claim 
regards the continental shelf as a part of state territory. Such claims, in some 
cases, extended to the supe1jacent waters and to the air space above them and not 
n<> This Proclamation "while asserting jurisdiction and control of the United States over the 
mineral resources of the continental shelf.. .. in no wise abridges the right of free and unimpeded 
navigation of waters [or] the character of high seas above the shelf, nor does it extend the present 
limits of the territorial waters of the United States." For the text of the Truman Proclamation, see 
United Nations Legislative Series. laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas (1951), 
vol. I. at pp.38-40. 
i:n See the text of the Truman Proclamation, Ibid. 
i>x North Sea Cases. at para. 47. 
1
-''J These claims are printed in the United Nations Legislative Series, op. cit., n.136, at pp.23-9. 
For evaluation of the claim of the United Arab Emirates as one of the Gulf States, see below. 
i.w See for example Article I of the Argel)tine Decree no.14, 708 of 1946; the Chilean Declaration 
of 1947; the Costa Rican Decree-law, no.190 of 1949; Articles I and 2 of the Peruvian Decree 
no.781 of 1947. See the United Nations Legislative Series, op. cit., n.136, at pp.4-17. 
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just to the sea-bed and subsoil.
141 
By way of contrast, the claims of the first group 
were limited to the assertion of jurisdiction over continental shelf resources. 142 
This practice did not lead immediately to the acceptance of the doctrine of the 
continental shelf as a rule of international law. This was acknowledged by Lord 
Asquith in the Abu-Dhabi Arbitration, between Petroleum Development Ltd and 
the Abu-Dhabi Emirate in I 95 I. In his words: 
I am of the opinion that there are in this field so many ragged ends and unfilled blanks, so 
much that is merely tentative and explpratory, that in no form can the doctrine claim as yet to 
have assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or the definitive status of an established rule of 
International law. 1•0 
In supporting Lord Asquith's opm1on, the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
Reference re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Sheff Offshore 
Ne11:foundland, I 984, held that: 
we conclude: (c) in any event, international law did not recognise continental shelf rights by 
1949, such rights were not indisputably recognised before the Geneva Convention of 1958. 144 
The legal basis of jurisdiction over the continental shelf 
(1) The concept of effective occupation 
This concept is based on the idea that the sea-bed and subsoil of the sea 
beyond the three-mile territorial sea limit is res nullius, and it is capable of 
acquisition by effective occupation. 145 Waldock, in his article 'The Legal Basis of 
Claims to the Continental Shelf, was of the view: "that the continental shelf 
under the high seas is capable of occupation but the seas themselves are not." 146 
141 For example, A11icle I of the Argentine declaration on the continental shelf asserted that: 
.. Argentine epicontinental sea and continental shelf are subject to the sovereign power of the 
nation:· See United Nations Legislative Series, op. cit., n.136, at p.5. 
i-1:! In addition. the claim of the Latin America Countries was sometimes extended to 200 nautical 
miles. irrespective of the geological entity of the area. See Abu-Dhabi Arbitration, at pp.153-4. 





1 See 5 DLR 4th ( 1984), at p.419, para. 2(c) in the conclusion. For comment and discussion on 
the dispute between Newfoundland and the Canadian Federal government, see Gilmore, W., "The 
Newfoundland Continental Shelf dispute in the Supreme Court of Canada," 8 Marine Policy 
( 1984 ), at pp.323-9. 
i.is Effective occupation was defined as "a term of art denoting not physical settlement but the 
actual, continuous, and peaceful display of the functions of a state." Waldock, C.H.M., "Disputed 
Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies," 25 BYB!l ( 1948), at p. 334. 
146 Waldock, op. cit., n.55, at p.13 7. See also Hurst, C.J.B., "Whose is the Bed of the Sea?" 4 
B YBIL ( 1923-24 ), at p.39. And see below for the difficulty of applying the concept of effective 
occupation in the Gulf area. 
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By way of contrast, Lauterpacht stressed his objection to the view of the 
doctrine of effective occupation as the legal basis of jurisdiction. This concept, he 
said, could only serve the interest of the industrialized states, who alone could 
exercise such effective occupation.
147 
In the final result, Article 2(3) of the 1958 
Convention ruled out the concept of effective occupation as a legal basis for 
coastal state title over the continental shelf by providing that: 
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective 
or notional, or on any express proclamation. 
(2) The concept of contiguity 
The doctrine of contiguity or geographical unity has been used as a basis for 
claiming sovereignty over the sea-bed and subsoil. 148 This contiguity, as 
Lauterpacht put it, is " to be not contiguity in the accepted sense, i.e. as connoting 
horizontal prolongation of the already occupied territory, but a different, and 
apparently more intense, degree of unity-a unity provided by the fact that the 
shelf is supposed to constitute the base, the platform, on which the continent 
rests." 149 Though controversial when first articulated, 150 it was this characteristic 
of continental shelf right which eventually prevailed. 
In the North Sea Casess, the World Court in considering the legal basis of 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf, held that: 
the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue 
of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring the sea-bed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here 
. . I 151 • 
an 111herent ng 1t. 
1
•
17 Lautcrpacht. l-L "Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas," 27 BYB/l ( 1950), at p.420. See below 
for more discussion. 
i.ii1 For example, the Truman proclamation regarded the continental shelf as "an extension of the 
landmass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it.'' The Mexican Declaration of 
I 945, asserted that: ''it is well known, that the land forming the constitute continental 
plateaux ... rests on a submarine platform known as the continental shelf .. , this shelf clearly forms 
an integral part of the continental countries." The proclamation of Abu-Dhabi, 1949, claimed that: 
''the sea-bed and subsoil. .. contiguous to the territorial of Abu-Dhabi ... appertain to the land of 
Abu-Dhabi.'' See United Nations Legislative Series, op. cit., n. l 36, at p.13, p.23 and p.38. 
i.w Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.147, at p.424. 
150 See for example, Arbitrator Huber remark, in the Island of Pa/mas A1vard, in respect to the 
title of contiguity. The Hague Court Report, Second Series, Oxford University Press, New York 
( 1932), at p.83. Similarly, see Waldock, op. cit., n.55, at p.120. 
151 
North Sea Cases, at para.19. Similarly, see the Aegean Sea Case, at para.86. It is worth 
quoting here the explanation that Judge Oda gave for the reason why the Court in the North Sea 
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The Court went on to say that: 
What confers the ipso jure title 152 which international law attributes to the coastal State in 
respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to 
be actually part of the territory over which the coastal State already has dominion,-in the 
sense that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continuation of that 
. . f. d I is1 territory, an extension o · 1t un er tie sea. · 
This emphasis by the World Court here and elsewhere on the element of 
geographical and continuity was to be a major influence on the development of 
the continental shelf doctrine. Indeed the term natural prolongation, to which we 
shall refer again, was embodied in Article 77 of the 1982 Convention. 
Furthermore, this remark by the World Court has stressed the relation between 
the continental shelf doctrine and the facts of physical geography by introducing 
h . f 1 1 . 154 t e not10n o natura pro ongat1on. 
The doctrine of the continental shelf in the 1958 Convention 
The adoption of the continental shelf doctrine at the First UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea of 1958 was not a surprise. Rather it was a natural result of the 
increasing number of coastal states which had claimed a continental shelf area. 
Moreover, its adoption, as Professor Brown has remarked, was highly desirable 
since it ''would facilitate a secure, regulated, commercial exploitation of the 
resources of the continental shelf out to depths which, at that time, were regarded 
as economically exploitable. An interim solution was better than none." 155 
Article 1 of the Convention defines the continental shelf "as referring (a) to 
the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside 
the area of the territorial sea ... ~ (b) to the sea-bed and subsoil of similar submarine 
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.'' 
Cases used the concept of ipso faclo and ah inilio. This was, in his view, "to strengthen the 
regime of the continental shelf: which had not yet achieved a firm status in international law." 
Judge Oda ·s dissenting opinion in the Tunisia v. Lihya Case, at p.191, para. 57. 
152 That is to say "by operation of law." See 5 DLR. 4th ( 1984), at p.411. 
15> N I " /' 4"' or! 1 .>ea .._uses, at para. -'· 
154 O I · ' · 2"' 771 8 'ppen 1e1111 s, op. c11., n. _,, at pp. - . 
155 Brown, E.D., The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, Stevens & Sons, London ( 1971 ), at p.14. 
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The status of this Article is not difficult to ascertain as being part. of 
customary law. The 1958 Convention itself indicated this by prohibiting states 
from making any reservations regarding Articles 1 to 3 of the Convention. 156 As, 
the World Court in the North S'ea Cases noted: 
Article 12 of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention ... permits reservations to be made to all 
the articles of the Convention other than to Articles I to 3 inclusive-these three Articles being 
the ones which, it is clear, were then regarded as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at 
least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the continental shelf...
157 
l . l d. B l. I S8 • I S9 Many scho ars, me u mg rown 1e, - Churchill and Lowe, - have 
acknowledged the Court's view on this issue. 
Article 1 of the 1958 Convention adopted a dual formula 160 for determining 
the limit of the continental shelf; the 200 isobath or, beyond that limit, to where 
the depth of the waters is exploitable. The 'exploitability criterion', needless to 
say, is vague and flexible and for these reasons has become subject to criticism. It 
is flexible because the rapidly developing technology would give coastal states 
the opportunity to extend the continental shelf boundary farther and farther out to 
sea so as to cover the entire ocean floor. 
161 
This fear motivated the introduction of 
a much more precise legal definition for the continental shelf in the 1982 
Convention. 
162 
The modern doctrine of the continental shelf 
In order to avoid the negative consequences of the depth and exploitability 
criteria, a legal definition has been emP,loyed in the text of Article 76( 1) of the 
1982 Convention to define the outer limit of the continental shelf.
163 
According to 
'~'· Article 12 of the Continental Shelf Convention. 
1 ~ 7 V I c C' 6"" 1 ort 1.)ea ases. at para . .J. 
'~x See Brownlie, op. cit., n.119. at p.216. 
l"'J . . · See Churchill and Lowe. op. ell., n.14, at p.125. 
iw For more discussion of the history of the adoption of this dual formula, see Ibid., at pp.124-6. 
"" See in particular the remark of the Secretariat of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation, in a memorandum dating from 1957. UNCLOS I Official Records, vol. 
I. at p.42. para.26. To the same effect. see Brown, op. cit., n. 155, at pp.22-3. See also Churchill 
and Lowe. op. cit .. n.14, at pp.125-6. 
"
12 See below. 
"
1
> See the remark of Judge Oda on this Article in his separate opinion in the Greenland v. Jan 
Mayen Case, at p.99, para.36 of the· opinion. See also Weil, P., The Law of Maritime 
Delimitation-Reflections, Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge ( 1989), at p.35. 
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the Article, the outer edge of the continental margin and the distance criterion 
would be used to determine the outer limit of the continental shelf up to 200 
nautical miles. This distance, which extends from the baseline, 164 was chosen, as 
we shall see below, because of the parallel development of the concept of the 
EEZ. States within the EEZ have exclusive sovereign rights over the sea-bed and 
subsoil up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. The Court in the Tunisia v. 
Libya Case considered this new development on the legal basis of title to 
continental shelf as a departure "from the principle that natural prolongation is the 
sole basis of the title." 
165 
Moreover, the fact that the concept of natural prolongation "is an invention of 
the legal mind, [and] appears not to be a term known to geology, geography or 
any of the allied sciences," 166 diminished it's imp011ance and viewed it as a cause 
for confusion on the question of the continental shelf limit.
167 
The turning point 
for the value of the concept of natural prolongation vis-a-vis the distance principle 
came in the World Court judgement in the Libya v. Malta Case. 168 The Court in 
this case stressed that: 
since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental shelf appertaining 
to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever the geological characteristics of 
the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe any role to geological or 
geophysical factors within that distance either in verifying the legal title of the States concerned 
. d. d 1 · . . b h . I . 169 or 111 procee 111g to a e 11111tat1on as etween t eir c a11ns. 
It is difficult not to agree with this view. Indeed, a number of leading 
international jurists have also ac~epted the 200-nautical-mile continental shelf 
limit as being part of customary law. O'Connell, for example, asserted that: 
Except for the technicalities of delineation, and the granting of sea-bed rights to States with 
continental shelves narrower than 200 nautical miles, the Draft Caracas Convention [i.e. now 
1<..i See Figure 2 above. 
J(,'i T . .~ l 'h C' 48 · 11111s1a v. 1 ya ase, at para. . 
1
"" Jennings. R .. "The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries," Staat und Volkerrechtsordnung, 
Festschr(fifiir Karl Doehring ( 1989), at p.405. 
1<·
7 Brown, E.D .. Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International legal Regime, vol. I, The 
Continental Shelf, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1992), at p.271. 
1
"
8 For evolution of legal title to the continental shelf from natural prolongation to distance 
principle, see Weil, op. cit., n.163, at pp.33-41. 
169 Libya v. Malta Case. at para.39. An opposite view was held by Judge Sette-Camara in his 
separate opinion in this case; see p.70. 
.,., 
.) .) 
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article 76] provisions may be taken to represent the present position in customary international 
170 
law. 
Brownlie has similarly stated that: 
The general modus operandi presented in this provision (200-mile breadth limit or continental 
margin, whichever is the greater) will probably be recognized as the new standard of customary 
171 
law. 
However, this is not to suggest that the natural prolongation concept has lost 
its importance in toto, or that it has been "superseded by [the idea] of distance. 
What it does mean is that where the continental margin does not extend as far as 
200 miles from the shore, natural prolongation, which in spite of its physical 
origins has throughout its history become more and more a complex and juridical 
concept, is in part defined by distance from the shore, irrespective of the physical 
nature of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil. The concepts of natural 
prolongation and distance are therefore not opposed but complementary~ and both 
remain essential elements in the juridical concept of the continental shelf." 172 
This is so for the inner limit of continental shelf, but what about the case 
where the outer edge of continental shelf extends beyond 200 miles? 173 In this 
case the continental shelf limit would be determined by reference to a highly 
complex formula. 174 In this formula the notion of natural prolongation has a 
170 O'Connell, op. cit., n.6, at p.497. 
171 B 1· ., 119 t 12"" rown 1e, op. c1 ., n. , a P·- -'· 
172 Libya v. Malta Case, at para.34. A similar position was taken by the Tribunal in the 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para.115. For a discussion on the role of natural prolongation on 
the delimitation process. see also Chapter Three. 
i-:-.• Some here have stressed their doubts on the rights of a coastal state to extend its continental 
shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles limit, as having the value of customary rules. See for 
example, Judge Oda. op. cit .. n.151, at p.220, para. I 04~ Professor Weil's dissenting opinion, at 
p.1215. para.40. See below at p.41 for the view of the Arabic States regarding the extension of the 
continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles. 
rn Where the continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles, the outer limit of the 
continental shelf is a straight line not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length connecting, either (a) 
the outermost fixed point at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent 
of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental shelf; or (b) fixed points not 
more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental shelf. Finally, the maximum distance 
to which the continental shelf can extend is 350 miles or within I 00 miles of the 2,500 metre 
isobath. See Articles 76(3.4.5,6 & 7) of the 1982 Convention. Approximately twenty-seven states, 
by the end of 1993, defined the outer limit of their continental shelf in terms closely related to the 
provisions of Article 76 of the 1982 Convention. 
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significant role to play. The Tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award stated 
that: 
[The] rule for determining the continental shelf by reference to distance, without derogating 
from the rule of natural prolongation, reduces its scope by substituting it in certain 
circumstances specified in [para~raph I] of Article 76 of the 1982 Convention, and through the 
other provisions of that Articlc.
1 5 
The juridical nature of the waters superjacent to continental shelf 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in this regard 
provides that: 
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the 
supe1:jacent waters as high seas, or that of the air space above those waters. 
This Article, mentioned previously, regarded by the World Court in 1969 as 
part of customary law, 176 preserves the high seas character of the superjacent 
waters. However, the establishment of the EEZ regime in the 1982 Convention, 
as we shall see in this next section, has affected that status within 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines. According to the new trend, the coastal state has 
sovereign rights up to 200 nautic'll miles over the sea-bed and the water-column 
above the sea-bed. It follows that the superjacent water over the sea-bed may no 
longer be regarded as high seas where other states enjoy the freedoms that are 
specified in Article 87 of the 1982 Convention. Nevertheless, where the 
continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles, the water-column over this 
. . h" 1 h 177 part retams its 1g 1 seas c aracter. 
Coastal state rights in the continental shelf 
A coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights 178 for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting the natural resources of the continental shelf. 179 In exercising such 
175 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para. 115. 
17
<> North Sea Cases. at para. 63. 
177 This is because. as we shall see, the maximum limit for the exclusive economic zone is 200 
nautical miles. . 
178 It follows that a coastal state has no territorial sovereignty rights and the continental shelf 
remains outside coastal state territory. See Professor O'Connell's argument in the Aegean Sea 
Case, ICJ Pleadings 1978, at p.457: Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.23, at p.773: Gilmore, op. cit., 
n.144, at p.327. 
179 Article 2( 1) of the 1958 Convention (now Article 77( 1) of the 1982 Convention), and see the 
Commentary on Article 68, the 1956 ILC report, !LC Yearbook ( 1956), vol.2, at p.253, para.8. It 
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rights, it must not interfere, unjustifiably, with navigation and other rights and 
freedoms of other states. 1 so Furthermore, the coastal state has no rights beyond 
the exploring and exploiting of the natural resources and thus non-natural 
resources, e.g. historic wrecks, are excluded from the coastal states' sovereign 
rights over the continental shelf. 1s
1 
Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion in the 
North Sea Cases, stated in respect to coastal states' rights in the continental shelf, 
that: 
The legal content of the sovereign rights remains limited to those acts which are strictly 
necessary for the exploration, exploitation or protection of the resources of the continental 
shelf ... There would thus be no question, in any case, of sovereignty in the form in which it is 
exercised over the territorial sea. 11!2 
The doctrine of the continental shelf in the United Arab Emirates 
The Emirates' practice concerning the continental shelf doctrine was one of 
the earliest in this field, just four years behind the Truman Proclamation of 1945. 
Thus the Emirates' practice with other state practices has often been cited in the 
literature of the continental shelf. Here we shall examine this practice, then we 
shall consider the matter after the creation of the U AE Federation in 1971. 
(1) The period prior to 1971 
In order to understand the position of the Emirates in claiming the continental 
shelf, it is necessary first to examine the practice of the British Government in 
this sphere. This is because the latter in this period was responsible for the 
conduct of all the foreign affairs of the former, and the matter of claiming the 
continental shelf naturally fell within the scope of foreign affairs. 
183 
The early British view in regard to the sea-bed and subsoil of the sea beyond 
the three miles territorial sea was that it was res nullius (i.e. belonged to no state) 
should be noted that Article 2 was regarded as being part of customary law, North Sea Cases, at 
para. 63. See also Professor O'Connell's argument in the Aegean Sea Case, ICJ Pleadings 1978, 
at p. 454. 
ixo Article 5( I) of the 1958 Convention (now Article 78(2) of 1982 Convention). 
ixi Churchill and Lowe. op. cit .. n.14, at p.128. For a definition of natural resources, see Article 
2(4) of the 1958 Convention (now Article 77(4) of the 1982 Convention). 
ix~ Judge Ammoun's separate opinion in the North Sea Cases, at p.118, para.18. A similar view 
was held by Professor O'Connell in his argument in the Aegean Sea Case, ICJ Pleadings 1978. at 
pp.458-60. 
ix:; For more discussion, see the introduction to this thesis. 
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and was therefore capable of acquisition by effective occupation. 184 This view 
was expressed on several occasions by the British Government. For example, Mr. 
Baxter, a Foreign Office official in a letter, dated November 1938 to the Anglo-
1 ranian Oil Company, indicated acceptance of this view. He stated that "the 
subsoil outside the three-mile line is res nullius and can be acquired only by 
effective occupation." 185 Such effective occupation could be established by, inter 
alia, erecting artificial constructions and derricks. 186 Effective occupation, in 
addition, was the basis for the various littoral states in the Gulf 187 possessing 
rights over pearl fisheries in the region. 
188 
This took the form of asserting the 
exclusive right to exploit the bank, and preventing foreign fishermen from fishing 
in the area.
189 
Brown wrote regarding the pearl bank in the Gulf that: 
184 The superjacent waters, in contrast, were considered as res communis and incapable of 
acquisition by any nation. See Jewett, M.L.. "The Evolution of the Legal Regime of the 
Continental Shelf, Part 11," CY/l ( 1985), at p.202. 
ix; Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers, FO. 371 21896 E7138/201 /34. This position held 
by the British Government was consistent with its policy toward pearl and sponge fisheries in the 
Gulf and elsewhere. See Jewett, Ibid., at p. 202. See also below. 
186 Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers, FO. 371 21896 E7138/201/34. 
187 Brown in his A11icle "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf' referred to scholars who dated 
the beginnings of the inhabitants of the Gulf States engagement in Pearl Fishing at about 2000 
BC. See Brown, R. in 5 The Middle East .Journal ( 1951 ), at p.161. See also Abu-Dhabi 
Arbitration, at p.155; Peter Macalister-Smith, "Pearl Fisheries," 11 EP!l ( 1989) at pp.256-8; 
Hurst, op. cit., n.146, at p.43. 
188 The Political Resident in the Gulf described the pearl· banks' locations in the Gulf in his letter 
on 22 November 1936, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Tehran, in which he said: "The pearl 
banks are scattered all down the Arab coast from Kuwait to Res Masandam, very roughly 
speaking, on the side of a line drawn dm~n the middle of the Gulf. Almost all of these banks are 
situated on the high seas, though a few of minor importance are within the territorial waters of 
various Arab Sheikhdoms."' Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers, F0.371 20040 
E768 I/ I 2/34. 
ix•i See, for example, Political Resident's inquiry about the possibility of informing the Iranian 
Government "that His Majesty's Government regard the pearl banks as the property of the Arabs 
of the sheikhdoms of the Arab littoral and the therefore permission for [any] investigation on 
these banks should be obtained through His Majesty's Government from the Shaiks concerned." 
Letter from the Political Resident in the Gulf on 22 November 1936 to British Ambassador in 
Tehran. "regarding the investigation of Persian fishing waters by a Danish vessel." Public Record 
Office. Foreign Office Papers: F0.371 20040 E7681 /12/34. In a similar manner, the Foreign 
Office discussed a proposal that the littoral Arab States in the Gulf needed to issue proclamations 
in which they would state that the fisheries had been reserved for "their nationals. and that other 
persons had always been forbidden to fish there by law." See the letter from the Foreign Office to 
India Office, 11 February 1938 respecting encroachment by foreigners on the pearl fisheries in 
the Persian Gulf. Public Record Office-Foreign Office Papers: F0.371 21812 E48/48/91. 
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The right to the Persian Gulf pearl fisheries are jealously guarded by the Arabs, and these rights 
have been backed up by the British Government for over a hundred years. They are limited to 
the inhabitants of the Gulf littoral.
190 
· 
The implementation of the effective occupation theory was not, however, free 
from obstacles. The fear was that it would be difficult in the light of this theory to 
exclude State A from establishing a prior occupation off the coast of State B, 
especially if State A was a powerful state with the means to establish such 
occupation. 191 This danger led the British government to seek a solution whereby 
the right of a coastal state to occupy the sea-bed and subsoil off its coast was 
exclusive, and thus third states would have no right to establish a prior occupation 
off the coastal state's coastline. Such a suggestion, however, was thought to be 
very dubious and liable to cause a breach of the rules of international law, 192 
unless it was based on the ground that a coastal state would have ipso jure rights 
over the shelf, and not a new acquisition. 193 This justification, however, was 
neither preferred by the British Cabinet nor by the United States government. The 
reason lay, so far as the Gulf area was concerned, in the fear of giving the oil 
companies who had existing oil concession agreements in the Gulf, room for 
arguing for an automatic extension to their agreements to cover the sea-bed of the 
shelf. 194 The ipso jure doctrine, therefore, was not supported by them. Lord 
Asquith in the Abu-Dhabi Arbitration, 195 although reaching a conclusion which 
190 . Brown, op. cit., n.187, at p.171. 
191 • ') See Jewett, op. cit., n.184, at p.20_. 
192 Ibid., at p.209. 
19
:; Draft despatch from the Foreign Office to H.M. Ambassador, Washington (Lord Inverchapel), 
4 February 1948. Public Record Office Document No.E 1478/276/91. 




' This Arbitration, it will be recalled, arose between Abu-Dhabi and Petroleum Development 
(Trucial Coast) Ltd. in 1951. The two parties concluded an oil concession agreement in 1939 
whereby the latter would have the right to drill in the former area. Abu-Dhabi, by a proclamation 
in 1949, asserted its jurisdiction and control over the sea-bed and subsoil area outside its 
territorial sea limit. In 1950 the Superior Oil Company obtained from Abu-Dhabi a new 
concession to drill in the Abu-Dhabi shelf area. The Petroleum Development company disputed 
Abu-Dhabi's right to grant such a new concession on the ground that the sea-bed and subsoil 
outside Abu-Dhabi's territorial sea were already included in the 1939 agreement. Thus the Ruler 
of Abu-Dhabi had no right to give the Superior Oil Company a new concession. The Ruler of 
Abu-Dhabi rejected the plaintiffs claim on the ground that the 1939 agreement was limited to the 
land of Abu-Dhabi and not to the offshore area. Lord Asquith found that the dispute between the 
two parties was centred. as far as the shelf area was concerned, on the question whether the sea-
bed and subsoil was res nul/ius and thus capable of acquisition by effective occupation, "Or is the 
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was 111 fact in general agreement with the British and the American positions, 196 
found that the ipso jure doctrine could facilitate a good and convenient solution 
for recognizing the right of a coastal state in the shelf area as exclusive. 197 
Britain and America, after ruling out the possibility of suggesting the ipso 
ju re doctrine as a basis for a coastal state's claim of sovereignty over the 
continental shelf, agreed-in principle-on the need to advise the Gulf States to 
issue proclamations to assert jurisdiction (in the US view), or sovereignty (in the 
British view), 198 over the continental shelf area adjacent to their coasts. This 
Anglo-American disagreement was eventually resolved in favour of the US 
government formula. In a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, entitled 'Sea-bed Oil in the Persian Gulf of 10 February 1949, he wrote 
that: 
We should join with the United States Government in advising the Saudi Arabian Government 
to extend its Jurisdiction over the sea-bed outside territorial waters ... and ... we must at the same 
time inform all our protected rulers in order that they might be ready to take early action to 
k h 
. I . . .. 1 199 sta et etr own c a11ns m a s11nt ar manner. 
This, however_ should not be taken to mean that the British government had 
modified its early understanding regarding the rights of coastal states over the 
sea-bed and subsoil outside the territorial sea limit. An effective occupation was 
still felt to be required in order to obtain a valid title over the sea-bed and subsoil 
position, as the claimant's main argument maintains, that the rights in the subsoil of the shelf 
adhere .. . ipsojure to the contiguous coastal power?" See Abu-Dhabi Arbitration, at p.155. 
196 That an oil-concession agreement which had concluded in 1939, could not be regarded as 
including the shelf area, over which a coastal state asse11ed sovereignty at a later stage. This 
conclusion was based on the fact that the continental shelf doctrine did not exist in 1939. See the 
Award at p.152. and see also p.155. p.158 and p.160. 
JI)/ By way of contrast, Lord Asquith expressed his worry about the theory of effective 
occupation. because it "entails obvious and grave dangers so far as occupation is possible at all." 
Sec Ahu-Dhahi Arhitration Award. at p.156. 
19
R The British Foreign Office in a telegram to the State Department in Washington on 26 June 
1948, remarked that 
"I cannot understand how jurisdiction can legally be obtained over something which is res nul/ius 
at the moment except as the result of the annexation, and such annexation means a claim of 
sovereignty over it. I do not see how in these circumstances jurisdiction without sovereignty can 
be obtained. and I have always regarded the Truman Declaration as in fact meaning that the 
United States had annexed and thereafter claimed sovereignty over the subsoil of their continental 
shelf." Foreign Office papers, Document.No. FO. 371 E8192/276/91. 
19
'> Foreign Office papers, Document No. E2 I 70/l 27 /91. For an explanation of the meaning of 
this British support for the Truman Proclamation, see Jewett, op. cit., n.184, at p.222. 
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of the area adjacent to a state coast.
200 
Indeed the Gulf States exercised such an 
occupation over the shelf area. This exercise had been asserted by way of 
granting exploitation leases and exploration permissions.201 
On various dates in June 1949, the Gulf States issued identical proclamations 
to assert jurisdiction and control over the areas of sea-bed and subsoil adjacent to 
their coasts and beyond the territorial sea limit.
202 
The Abu-Dhabi Proclamation, 
10 June 1949, may be cited as an example. The Ruler of Abu-Dhabi in this 
Proclamation recited that 
We, Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Sa'id, Ruler of Abu-Dhabi, hereby proclaim that the sea-bed and 
subsoil lying beneath the high seas in· the Persian Gulf contiguous to the territorial waters of 
Abu-Dhabi and extending seaward to boundaries to be determined more precisely, as occasion 
arises, on equitable principles, by us after consultation with the neighbouring states,203 
appertain to the land of Abu-Dhabi and are subject to its exclusive jurisdiction and control.
204 
(2) The period after 1971 
In 1993 the UAE reclaimed its sovereign rights over the shelf area adjacent to 
its coasts in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Article 17 of the Federal 
Law reads: 
Subject to Articles 23(2) and 24 of this law, the continental shelf of the State comprises the 
sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas extending beyond its territorial sea and considered 
a natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance. 
The provision of Article 17 is obviously derived from the prov1s1ons of 
Article 76( 1) of the 1982 Convention. It is also reflective of the position of the 
Arab states at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea during which they 
opposed the extension of the continental shelf limit beyond the 200 nautical miles 
200 See Waldock. op. cit .. n.55. at p.135. A similar conclusion was reached by Jewett, op. cit., 
n.184. at p.216. 
201 The exploitation leases and exploration permission were two of the four measures which the 
USA government used to exercised its jurisdiction over the continental shelf. See Brown, op. cit .. 
n.155, at p.19. 
202 See above for more discussion on the Emirates' territorial sea limit at this period. 
20
-' So. "until agreements have been reached, this claim [has] no certain boundaries." Waldock, 
op. cit., n.55, at p.134. 
20
·
1 See United Nations Legislative Series, op. cit .. n.136. at p.23. 
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from the baseline.
205 
This objection refers to the fact that the geographically 
disadvantaged features of the continental shelf in the Arabic States, with the 
exception of Oman, Somali, Yemen, Mauritius and Morocco where the 
continental shelf might extend beyond the 200 nautical miles limit, makes the 
extension of the continental shelf in these states impossible over a long distance. 
Therefore, they were in favour of limiting the maximum area of national 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf to 200 nautical miles, thereby maintaining a 
greater area to be available for inclusion in the common heritage of mankind. 206 
Article 18 of the Federal Law gives the UAE government sovereign rights 
over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources. These rights were described as being exclusive to the UAE, and not 
dependent on occupation or any express proclamation. Paragraph two of the 
Article elaborates on the meaning of natural resources. The two paragraphs of 
Article 18 thus reproduce Articles 77 and 80 of the 1982 Convention.207 
As a necessary consequence of the right of exploration of natural resources, 
the Federal Law gives the UAE government in Article 20 the right to contract, 
operate and use artificial islands and offshore installations and to establish safety 
zones around these artificial islands and installations. Similarly Article 20 
repeats, in general, the provisions of Article 60 paras. 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the 1982 
Convention. 
20
" Sec UNCLOS Ill Official Record,·, vol. 14. at p.25. It must be mentioned that the objection of 
the extenuation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles came not only from the Arab 
States, but also from other states such as the former Yugoslavia. See UNCLOS Ill Official 
Records. vol. 14, at p.148. 
206 For more details, see Dahak, D., Al Msalh al Arbih Ji qanwn al Bhara al Jdiid (Arab Interests 
in the New Law of the Sea) Lecture delivered at the UAE Foreign Ministry, Abu-Dhabi, 17 
February 1987. Publicised in a Collection of the work of the 15th Diplomatic Symposium 
organized by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu-Dhabi, ( 1987). 
207 The Federal Law imposes a punishment for any violation of the provision of Article 18. This 
punishment, according to Article 26(2) would be, in addition to a fine, imprisonment for a term of 




The Exclusive Economic Zone 
Development of the concept 
The protection of coastal state fishery interests was one of the principal 
measures behind the insistence of some states on a wider territorial sea limit. 208 
This was, as noted above, to secure preferential rights over the fisheries resources 
off the coasts of these states. An example of this claim is the Declaration of 
Santiago of 1952. In it the signatory states, namely Chile, Ecuador and Peru, 
declared that: 
each of them possesses sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area of sea adjacent to the 
coast of its own country and extending not less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast. 209 
The Latin American states' 200 nautical miles territorial sea limit was not 
acceptable to some states, including the United States.210 At the same time, a 
claim for establishing a conservation fishing zone with less coastal state power 
and less breadth was advanced by other states. 211 The latter claim was said to be 
established in customary law as· far as it did not exceed a 12-nautical-mile 
limit.212 In 1970 nine of the Latin American states 213 formulated the Montevideo 
Declaration on the Law of the Sea. This declaration was seen as a step toward 
reconciliation between the territorial sea claims and the fishing zone claims. In it 
the participant states claimed a 200-nautical-mile zone involving "sovereignty 
208 Similarly. the desire to assert an exclusive jurisdiction over fishery resources on the water 
above the continental shelf was one of the elements which characterized the continental shelf 
proclamations of some Latin Americas Countries. See Section One and Three above for 
discussion on these claims. 
:!o•i Printed in Whiteman. op. cit .. n.25, at p. I 090. See also Oppenheim 's, op. cit .. n.23. at pp.785-
8. 
21° For comprehensive detail of the historic background of the concept of the EEZ, see O'Connell, 
op. cit .. n.6, at pp.552-63; Attard. D.J., The Exclusive Economic Zone in International law. 
Clarendon Press. Oxford ( 1987). at pp. 1-30; United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea 
1982: A commentWJ', vol. II, Nandan S and Rosenne S. (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the 
Netherlands ( 1993 ), at pp.493-510. 
211 
E.g. The Truman Fisheries Proclamation of I 945. 
212 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (UK v. Iceland), at para.52; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal 
~:public of Germany v. Iceland). at para.44. 
-'"Brownlie. op. cit., n.119, at p.208. 
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and jurisdiction to the extent necessary to conserve, develop and exploit the 
natural resources of the maritime area adjacent to their coasts, its soil and its 
subsoil."
214 
Nothing in this declaration could affect the freedom of navigation and 
fl . l 21" over· 1g 1t. · 
Tl . d f "" · . l ,,216 "" . ,,211 . d f 1e 1 ea o · a patnmoma zone or economic zone mstea o a 
territorial sea zone was beginning to develop. In I 971, for example, the concept 
of the EEZ was expressed by some states in the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee at Colombo.
218 
One year later Kenya presented a paper to the 
Committee containing the first attempt to articulate the EEZ regime. 219 The idea 
of the EEZ was supported by many states in the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee. Nevertheless, the committee failed to come up with any declaration 
in relation to this matter.220 At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, the idea of the EEZ again received general agreement and support. 221 
Notwithstanding these developments in 1974, the validity of an Icelandic 
Regulation of 1972-prohibiting foreign vessels from fishing within 50 nautical 
miles around the Icelandic coast-was challenged before the World Court by 
B · · 2' 2 d W G " 3 Th C .c: d h d . . . . ntam - an est ermany.-- e ourt 1oun t e ec1s1on m question not 
opposable to the Applicant States.224 Iceland, however, the Court emphasized, 
214 Nordquist et al. (eds), New Directions in the Law of the Sea, published by The British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law, vol. I, Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York 
~ \_973) at p.235. 
-'' Il .d '"'6 11 .. at P·--' . 
21
" The term was used in the Declaration of Santo Domingo. 9 June 1972. see Ibid., at p. 247. 
217 The term was used in the Yaounde Seminar of African States, Recommendations, 30 June 
1972: Ibid .. at p.250. 
21 xA d . !JO IJ ttar . op. cit .• n.- . at P·- . 
:!l'J Ibid .. at pp.22-3. See also Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.134. 
220 A d . ? I 0 t ?? ttar . op. cit .• n.- . a P·--· 
221 Nonetheless. with regard to the Arabian Gulf, Mr. Al-Qadhi, the Iraquian delegate stated that: 
''the concept of the economic zone or patrimonial sea should not be applied to semi-closed seas, 
where it was vitally important to recognise the rights of all the States in the area." See UNCLOS 
Ill qfficial Records. vol. 6. at p.148. 
222 Fisheries .Jurisdiction Case (UK. v. Iceland) of 1974 . 
.:m Fisheries .Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) of 1974. 
224 Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland Case, at para. 59: UK. v. Iceland Case, at para.79. 
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. (.' . l . l 22s was entitled to ""claim pre.-erentia ng 1ts m the distribution of fishery 
. d' ,,226 resources m a .1acent waters. 
The EEZ in the 1982 Convention 
Not surprisingly, the 1982 Convention adopted the EEZ regime as a 
compromise solution "'between those states seeking a 200 mile territorial sea and 
those wishing a more restricted system of coastal state power."227 Article 55 
reads: 
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the 
specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant 
provisions of this Convention. 
The breadth of the EEZ can be extended up to 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 228 The new 
Zone is '"subject to the specific legal regime", which is neither high seas nor 
territorial sea, but sui generis, in the sense that the EEZ is a zone in which a 
229 
coastal state has rights and other states have rights as well. Now we shall 
provide a brief overview of these different rights in turn. 
(1) A coastal state's rights in the EEZ 
A coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, both living and non-
living, in the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, 
and with regard to the other activities for the economic exploitation of the zone. 
Moreover, the coastal state has jurisdiction in regard to: (a) the establishment and 
use of artificial islands and installations~ (b) regulating~ authorizing and 
conducting marine scientific research; (c) the protection and preservation of the 
22~ For the status and the conditions of preferential rights in customary law. Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Iceland Case, at paras. 44, 47-53. Also, for the difference between the preferential 
rights and the concept of fishing zone. see Ibid., at para.54; Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.23, at p.788. 
22
<' The Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland Case, at para.59. 
n7 
-- Shaw. op. cit., n.23. at p.359. 
228 Article 57 of the 1982 Convention. 
229 . ') Attard, op. cit., n._ J 0, at p.67. 
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. . 210 'fl l . . . h manne environment. · 1e coasta state m exercising t ese rights "shall have 
due regard to the rights and duties of other states. " 231 
(2) The rights of other states in the EEZ 
Other states enjoy in a coastal state EEZ the freedom of navigation, 
overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines,232 and other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms. 233 Furthermore, the right of hot 
pursuit is guaranteed for all states in the EEZ.234 Moreover, the land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged states are entitled to have access to the coastal 
state's surplus allowable catch of the EEZ' s living resources. 235 When exercising 
these freedoms, Article 56 of the 1982 Convention and other related Articles 
imposed on other states the following restrictions: 
(a) A coastal state may exercise legislative and enforcement jurisdiction to protect 
and preserve the marine environment. Consequently, foreign ships or aircraft 
should comply with the coastal state's pollution regulations, as far as these 
regulations are consistent with international rules and standards. 236 So, a breach 
of such regulations will bring th.e foreign ship or aircraft under the jurisdiction 
of the coastal state. ·237 
(b) The rights of coastal states to construct artificial islands and installations may 
affect navigation in the EEZ, by forcing ships to use sea-lanes during its 
passage in the EEZ. Similarly, these installations may prevent aircraft from low 
flying in the vicinity of such structures and installations. 
( c) The delineation of the course for the laying of pipelines and the conduct of 
marine scientific research is sub1ect to the consent of coastal state.238 
2
·'
0 Article 56 of the 1982 Convention. 
2> 1 Article 56(2) of the 1982 Convention. 
2
'
2 Sec the remark of Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at pp. 142-3. 
2» Article 58( I) of the 1982 Convention. 
2
·'·
1 Article 111 (3) of the 1982 Convention. See also Churchill and Lowe. op. cit., n.14. at p 173. 
2 >~ Article 62(2) of the 1982 Convention. 
D<> Article 211 of the 1982 Convention. See also Attard, op. cit., n.210, at pp. 94-106. 
m Article 56( I )(b )(111) of the 1982 Convention. 
:!:ix Article 79(3) of the 1982 Convention. Churchill and Lowe remarked that: "Although this 
article is in the part of the Law of the Sea Convention dealing with the continental shelf, it must 
also apply to the EEZ, since the sea-bed of the EEZ is coterminous with the continental shelf." 
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(d) Article 58(3) obliges other states when exercising their rights in a coastal 
state's EEZ to: "have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state and 
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal state in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law." 
These restrictions on the rights of third states in the EEZ require the 
conclusion that: "the rights of other states to navigate, overfly and lay cables and 
pipelines in a coastal state's EEZ are less extensive than their corresponding 
. 1 1 1 . 1 "139 F 1 "f fl. . b . f ng 1ts on t 1e 11g 1 seas. - urt 1ermore, 1 a con ict anses etween mterests o · 
the coastal state and any other state's or states' s interests regarding a matter not 
mentioned in the 1982 Convention, such conflict-according to Article 
59-should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances. 
The EEZ in customary Jaw 
As a result of the wide support for the EEZ regime in state practice, there is a 
nearly unanimous view that it has become part of the rules of customary law. For 
example, the World Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case stated that the EEZ '"may 
be regarded as part of modern international law. "
240 
In similar vein it held in the 
Libya v. Malta Case that the "institution of the exclusive economic zone .. .is 
shown by the practice of States to have become pa11 of customary law." 241 As 
Shaw has explained: "A wide variety of states have in the last decade claimed 
exclusive fishing or economic zones of 200 miles. It would appear that such is the 
number and distribution of these states, that it is possible to talk of the 
establishment of a rule of customary law regarding the zones."242 In a similar 
manner. Churchill and Lowe wrote that: "The number of claims to an EEZ, 





Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.143. 
240 Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. I 00. See also Gu([ of Maine Case, at para. 94. 
241 l "I LI I C' ""4 1 1ya v. 1na ta ase. at para.-' . 
-i.p SI 2"" 361 - - iaw, op. cit., n. _,, at p. -· 
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coupled with an almost complete absence of protest, strongly suggests that the 
right to a 200 mile EEZ has now become part of customary international law."243 
However, the practice favouring the EEZ was not universal. Some states, such 
as the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Denmark, 
claimed an EFZ instead of claiming an EEZ. The reason behind the more limited 
claim was that "a 200 mile EFZ, together with the exclusive rights over the sea-
bed resources which they already have under the continental shelf regime, give 
these States all that they at present want from an EEZ. They are less certain about 
the other principal rights of the coastal State in the EEZ-the regulation of 
research and pollution control-and at the time they made their claims to a 200 
mile EFZ (in 1977 in most cases) preferred not to prejudice negotiations at 
UNCLOS over the content of coastal State jurisdiction over pollution and 
research by claiming such jurisdiction themselves. It is also noteworthy that a 
number of States which originally claimed a 200 mile EFZ in 1977 or so, e.g. 
Senegal, the USSR and the USA, have subsequently changed their claim to an 
EEZ.''244 
The relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf regime245 
The sea-bed and subsoil of the sea adjacent to the territorial sea, as we have 
seen, were initially subject to the continental shelf regime. Coastal states thereby 
acquired sovereign rights over the natural resources in the sea-bed and subsoil. 
The supe~jacent waters were in no way affected, and they retained their high seas 
character. However, a new development in international law, as noted above, has 
made the water-column above the continental shelf area, together ·with its sea-bed 
and subsoil, subject to the exclusi~e sovereign rights of the coastal state up to 200 
miles from the baselines. The emergence of the new regime raises the question of 
2
•
11 Churchill and Lowe. op. cit .. n.14, at p.146. To the same effect, see Attard. op. cit., n.210, at 
p.308. See also Oppenheim 's, op. cit .. n. 23. p.789. Judge Oda, with regard to the acceptance of 
the EEZ into customary law, wrote that: "Throughout the history of international law, scarcely 
any other major concept has ever stood on the threshold of acceptance within such a short 
period." Judge Oda. op. cit., n.151, at p.228. para.120. 
244 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.145. 
2
·
15 For more discussion on the relation between the two concept, see Evans, M., "Delimitation and 
the common Maritime Boundary," 64 BYBIL ( 1993), at pp.286-93. 
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whether or not the continental shelf regime has been incorporated into the regime 
or the EEZ. However, before we can give an appropriate answer to this question, 
it is of value to mention some important differences between the two regimes in 
respect of: ( 1) coastal state rights in establishing the EEZ and the continental 
shelf~ (2) the outer limit of the two zones. Each of these two points will be 
discussed in turn. 
(l) Coastal state rights in establishing the EEZ and the continental shelf 
Whereas the rights of a coastal state, as mentioned earlier in this study, over 
the continental shelf area exist ipso facto and ab inito, and do not depend on 
occupation or proclamation, the rights of a coastal state over the EEZ arise 
differently. This difference is reflected in the fact that there is no inherent or 
automatic right here as far as the supe1j acent waters are concerned, and "an 
express claim is necessary for the existence of the exclusive economic zone."246 
This necessity stems from state practice, and not from the 1982 
Convention-which remains silen.t, and the issue is left to coastal state to claim 
such a zone. 247 
The difference between the case where there is an inherent right and the case 
where there is not is that where coastal states do not explore the continental shelf 
or exploit its natural resources, within the continental shelf limit, no one may 
undertake these activities. This is because coastal states, according to A11icle 77, 
have inherent rights over the natural resources of the continental shelf. Where 
there is no inherent right, if a coastal state fails to claim exclusive rights over the 
~.I(, See Sette-Camara's separate opinion in Libya v. Malta Case, at p.70. Some states have chosen 
not to claim an EEZ or to restrict their claim in establishing an EEZ in respect to some part of 
their coasts. See, for example. Article 1 of the final provisions of the Spanish Law of 1978. Some 
other states. e.g. Guyana. did not establish an EEZ but gave the President of Guyana the rights to 
do so. if he should consider it necessary to establish such a zone. See Article 15 of the Maritime 
boundaries Act of 1977, see UN Legislative Series. National legislation and Treaties Relating to 




Sette-Camara, op. cit., n.246, at p.70; Kwiatkowska, 8., "Judge Shigeru Oda's opinions in 
Law-of-the-Sea Cases: Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation,'' 36 German Yrbk ( 1993), at 
p.242; Attard, op. cit., n.210, at pp.54-81; Chiu, H., "The Problem of Delimiting the Maritime 
Boundary between the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of Opposite States," 
Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, Macdonald J. (ed.), Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht; the 
Netherlands ( 1994), at p.185. 
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waler-column within 200 miles, the water area will retain its high seas character. 
Therefore all states are free to exploit it. 
(2) The outer limit of the continental shelf and the EEZ 
In the case of the EEZ the outer limit of the zone may not extend beyond the 
200 miles limit. The case, however, is different with respect to the continental 
shelf. Article 76 of the 1982 Convention provides that the continental shelf may 
extend throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge 
of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles where the outer 
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. But where it 
does so extend, the continental shelf may follow this extension up to 350 nautical 
miles as a maximum limit.248 In short, the difference between the two cases is that 
whereas distance is the only criterion whereby the breadth of the EEZ is 
determined, the natural prolongation and the distance criteria may have a role to 
play in determining the breadth of the continental shelf.
249 
Now we turn to the question which we posed regarding the incorporation of 
the continental shelf regime into the EEZ regime. A distinction needs to be drawn 
here between the inner limit of the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles and 
the area beyond. As far as the inner limit is concerned, some international jurists, 
including Judge Oda, suggested that the continental shelf is in the process of 
being incorporated into the EEZ regime. The provision of Article 56(3) of the 
1982 Convention should, he argues, be ""interpreted to mean that the regime of the 
exclusive economic zone [incorporates], in principle, the whole regime of the 
continental shelf." 250 Judge Arechaga has expressed a similar opinion. He stated: 
it is difficult to deny that, at least in the case of continental shelves not extending beyond 200 
miles, the notion of the continental shelf is in the process of being assimilated to, or 
incorporated in that of the Exclusive Economic Zone. 
251 





1 See in this regard the remarks of Brown, op. cit., n.167, at p. 352. 
250 Judge Oda, op. cit., n.151. at pp.233-4. para.130. Article 56(3) of the Law of the Sea 
Conventions reads: "The rights set in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall be 
exercised in accordance with Part VI [i.e. continental shelf regime]." See below. 
251 Judge Arechaga 's separate opinion in the Tunisia v. Libya Case, at p.115, para. 55. 
49 
____________ Chapter One 
By way of contrast, other jurists have declined to accept such an argument. 
Judge Gros, for example, in his dissenting opinion in the Gu(l of Maine Case, 
held that: 
What is left of the legal unity of maritime spaces and of the idea that the continental shelf 
should be merged with the zone, if the last paragraph of Article 56 defining the zone refers 
back to Part VI for another definition of the continental shelf element not contained in Article 
77, and why shou Id there be two articles on a de I imitation defined in one and the same way? 
The construction of the Treaty with a Part V (Exclusive Economic Zone) and a Part VI 
(Continental She!() only makes sense if the two areas differ in certain ways, to such an extent 
i-1 
that it was necessary to devote to them two parts of a convention on the law of the sea. ::i_ 
He further states that: 
It scarcely makes sense to eliminate the continental shelf within the Gulf by assimilating it to 
the water column, when the final part of it will remain to be delimited and will be treated as a 
specific area of shelf as from the 200-niile line where the water will cease to be a factor. 
253 
Were it to be correct that the inner limit of the continental shelf up to 200 
nautical miles has been incorporated into the EEZ, it would not mean that the 
boundary line of the two areas ought not to be different. A possible single 
boundary line and the rules of the continental shelf and the EEZ boundary 
delimitation will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. In the present context, it 
is sufficient to note that a single boundary line is desirable from a practical point 
of view. It is not, however, a necessary result. This is because the concept of a 
single maritime boundary line "has not been established in either customary 
international law or treaty law."254 Therefore it is possible to have a separate line 
for each zone. 255 Indeed the Tribunal, in the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Award of 
1989~25 () confirmed the possibility of having a different line for the two concepts, 
252 Judge Gros's dissenting opinion in the Gu(( of Maine Case, at p.374 para. 21. 
~ 5 ' Ibid .. at p.376, para. 23. It is worth mentioning here that Judge Oda who supported the 
opposite view did not regard the right of coastal states to extend their continental shelf beyond the 
200 nautical miles as being incorporated into customary law. See Judge Oda, op. cit., n.151, at 
p.220. para. I 04 
2 ~·1 Judge Oda's remark in Denmark v. Norway. /CJ Verbatim Record of Pleadings, CR 
93/9.83.85. Quoted from K wiatkowska. op. cit .. n.24 7. at p.276. 
255 See Brown, op. cit., n.167. at p.353. 
25
<i The Tribunal. it will be recalled, was in charge of determining whether the 1960 agreement 
between Portugal and France concerning the maritime boundaries between their colonial territory, 
(i.e .. Guinea-Bissau and Senegal) had any binding force upon the states of Guinea-Bissau and 
Senegal after they gained their independence. The agreement defined the boundaries of the 
territorial seas. contiguous zones and the continental shelves. The Tribunal answered the question 
in the affirmative, but stressed that the 1960 agreement did not determine the boundaries of the 
two parties' EEZ, because the EEZ did not exist in 1960. Hence the two parties needed to 
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and, on the other hand, doubted the incorporation of one regime into another. 257 
Furthermore, the difference between the two doctrines, regarding the right to 
establish each of them, their breadth, the right and power of coastal states, their 
historical development, and the way they are articulated in two parts in the 1982 
Convention, may support the autonomy of both institutions. 258 Moreover, Judge 
Oda, who argued in 1982 that the EEZ was in the process of absorbing the 
continental shelf doctrine, has subsequently acknowledged a separation between 
the two regimes. For instance, he wrote that: 
the two regimes of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf exist separately and 
in parallel in the 1982 United Nations Convention, hence in existing international law, and the 
delimitation for each is different. 
259 
So much for the inner limit of the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles. 
But what about the outer limit of the continental shelf? There is obviously no 
valid argument with respect to this part of the continental shelf that it may be 
absorbed by the EEZ regime, sinee it extends beyond the maximum EEZ limit. 
Coastal states in the area beyond 200 miles may have a continental shelf, but no 
EEZ. The water-column above the continental shelf remains high seas. 
Furthermore, in the outer limit of the continental shelf, the concept of natural 
prolongation holds sway, since it is the legal basis for coastal states projecting 
their rights beyond 200 miles. 
260 
The doctrine of the EEZ in the United Arab Emirates 
The EEZ was the first maritime zone to be claimed by the Union Authority. 
This took the form of a declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1980. 
Article 1 of the declaration reads: 
determine de novo the boundary between their respective EEZ boundaries. This may lead to the 
conclusion that the Tribunal believed that it was possible to have one line for the continental shelf 
and another for the EEZ. · 
~'7 c.iuinea-Bi.s.rnu/Senegal, at para.85. 
~~ 8 Evans came to a similar conclusion after he examining case law since the mid 1980s. See 
Evans. op. cit .. n.245. at pp.3 13 and 33 I. 
:!s•i Judge Oda, op. cit .. n.163. at p.110. para.73. See also Judge Oda's dissenting opinion in the 
case concerning the Arbitration Award of 31 July 1989 between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, ICJ 
Reports 1991, at p.89. para.18. See Evans' analysis of Judge Oda's opinion on this issue: Evans, 
op. cit .. n.245, at pp.317-8. 
:!W See Article 76(a). 
~.,. \- " \ . \ :. ' 
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The United Arab Emirates shall have an exclusive economic zone contiguous to its main coast 
and to the coast of its Islands in the Arabian Gulf and Sea of Oman. 
261 
· 
In thus asserting an EEZ the UAE was influenced by the work of the Third 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea on the right of coastal states to claim a 
200-mile zone of this kind. The outer limit of this zone, according to Article 3 of 
the declaration, was to be determined "''in accordance with the provisions of the 
agreements concluded by the Emirates members of the Union in connection with 
their continental shelf:~ In the case where no agreement has yet been concluded. 
the EEZ extends up to the median line. every point of which is equidistant from 
the baselines. As we shall see in Chapter Four the UAE has so far reached 
agreements with two neighbouring states, namely Qatar in 1969 and Iran-in 
respect of a certain part of the continental shelf--in 1974. 
262 
The rights of fishing by other states, as a natural result of claiming an EEZ, 
were prohibited within the EEZ without prior permission from the UAE 
authorities. This permission, according to Article 5. should not be issued except 
where there is a surplus of fish stocks in the EEZ. In addition, the rights of 
navigation for other states. and the status quo between the member Emirates of 
the Union with regard to their respective territorial sea areas, are in no way to be 
deemed to have been affected by the Declaration. 
In 1993, in Article 12 of the Federal Law, the UAE government reclaimed its 
sovereign rights over the sea-bed and superjacent waters that are adjacent to its 
territorial sea limit to a distance not exceeding 200 nautical miles. Here we must 
distinguish between this Article and Article 1 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs~ 
Declaration of 1980. Article 1 of the Declaration does not suggest any distance 
criterion to determine the outer limit of the EEZ. Rather it refers to the median 
line system. in Article 4, as an outer limit, where there is no agreement to the 
contrary for the EEZ. This being so, the geographical character of the area 
suggests that the median line formula is more realistic and reflects the true 
:!<ii Article 4 of the declaration illustratep the sovereign rights which the UAE possesses in the 
EEZ. See UN Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The law of the Sea, National 
Claims to Maritime .Jurisdiction, New York ( 1992), at p.135. 
,<>, d. . Ch F - - For more 1scuss1on, see apter our. 
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geographical circumstances of the area. This is simply because the UAE would 
not be able to extend its EEZ limit up to 200 nautical miles, since the distance 
between the two shores in the Arabian Gulf or in the Gulf of Oman, is less than 
400 nautical miles. 
The rights of the UAE in the EEZ are illustrated in Articles 13 and 14 of the 
Federal Law which are derived from Articles 56(1) and 52 of the 1982 
Convention. There is no essential difference between the two Articles and Article 
4 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Declaration of 1980. 
Article 15 of the Federal La~, like Article 5 of the 1980 Declaration, has 
reserved the rights of fishing to nationals of the United Arab Emirates. 
Nonetheless, nationals of other states may have access to the UAE's EEZ, by first 
obtaining permission from the UAE authorities in accordance with the rules and 
conditions laid down by the State. Here again, the content of the law is derived 
directly from the Law of the Sea Convention; in this instance, Article 62(2). 
Violation of the provisions of Article 15 may result, according to Article 
26(3) of the Federal Law, in imprisonment and a fine. It is of interest to note that 
there is an apparent conflict between this Article and paragraph 3 of Article 73 of 
the 1982 Convention. The latter stipulates that "coastal state penalties for 
violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the EEZ [in the absence of bilateral 
agreement] may not include imprisonment."263 Therefore, under the 1982 
Convention, punishment would only be a fine. By way of contrast, under the 
Federal Law there should be two punishments: imprisonment and a fine for 
violating the provision of Article 15. However, at the present time there would 
appears to be no violations of international law resulting from the conflict 
between the two Articles. This is because the UAE is not party to the Convention, 
and Article 73(3) does not appear to be a codification of a customary law. 264 
:!<>~ Article 73(3) of the 1982 Convention. 
:!<>·
1 It is worth mentioning here that there are a number of states who also contained the 
punishment of imprisonment for the violation of national fishery regulations. The state 
Department's Boundary Series, limits in the Seas, listed about 20 States who contained 
imprisonment punishment in their EEZ laws. This may endorse the argument that Article 73(3) is 
a progressively developing rule. See limits in the Seas, Series No.112, 9 March ( 1992). at p.39. 
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As a necessary consequence ·of giving the UAE the right to regulate and 
authorize the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the 
living resources in the EEZ, Article 16 of the Federal Law grants the State 
enforcement jurisdiction to take the necessary measures to ensure compliance 
with its laws and regulations. Such measures may include boarding, inspection, 
arrest and judicial proceedings against vessels. Here again Article 16 reproduced 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Article 73 of the 1982 Convention. 
Section Five 
Regime of Islands 
An island has been defined in Article 121 ( 1) of the 1982 Convention as "a 
naturally formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above water at high-
tide." This paragraph reproduces ·Article 10(1) of the 1958 Territorial Sea and 
Continuous Zone Convention. The entitlement of islands to maritime zones is, in 
principle, on an equal footing to that of other land territory. Article 121 (2) of the 
1982 Convention states: 
Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 
This equal entitlement of islands to zones of maritime jurisdictions has been 
reinforced in case law whenever the question has arisen. For example, in the 
Dubai/Shwjah Award, the Court of Arbitration stressed that "every island, no 
matter how small, has its belt of territorial sea. "265 Elsewhere, the Court of 
Arbitration was to remark: "The entitlement of an island, as well as a mainland, to 
a continental shelf is well established.'~266 Furthermore, Article 1 (b) of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental si1elf provides that the term continental shelf is 
used to refer to the sea-bed areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. This Article, as 
has been noted. was said to be regarded as reflecting the rules of customary 
l 267 aw. 
2
''
5 Duhai!Shw:jah Award, at p.673. 




N I "" c· 6"' or11 .1ea ases, at para. -'· 
54 
----·-------------- Ch"pter One 
Notwithstanding the assimilation in law between an island and other land 
territory in the entitlement of maritime zones, an island in some cases might be 
denied full effect maritime areas.
268 
This question will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six. Having said that a.n island is a naturally formed area of land, 
international law does not, in principle, recognize any effect for artificial islands 
and technical installations.
269 
Jessup, in this regard wrote that: 
It would be dangerous doctrine in many parts of the world to allow states to appropriate new 
areas of water by means of structures on hidden shoals. 
270 
Islands and /ow-tide elevations 
Article 13 of the 1982 Convention has defined a low-tide elevation as ''a 
naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low-tide 
but submerged at high-tide." The difference between an island and a low-tide 
elevation is that a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by water 
would be accounted-according to international law-an island, if above the 
water at high-tide, and a low-tide elevation, if submerged at high-tide. 
International law recognizes, in principle, that an island is capable of having 
maritime zones, and that a low-tide elevation is not. Notwithstanding this fact, 
Article 13 of the 1982 Convention, nonetheless, gives limited effect to low-tide 
elevations for the purpose of drawing normal baselines. However, this is subject 
to the condition that the low-tide elevation should be situated wholly or partly at a 
distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an 
island. 
Similarly, in regard to the use of straight baselines, low-tide elevations may 
he employed as basepoints only if lighthouses or similar installations, which are 
permanently above sea level. have been built on them; or, the 1982 Convention 
:!Ml Bowett. D .. The legal Regime of Islands in International law, Oceana Publications Inc., 
Dobbs Ferry, New York (1979), at p.34. · 
2
''
9 An exception to this prohibition is that a coastal state, which is in accordance with Article 
60(4) of the 1982 Convention, has the right to establish a 500-metre safety zone around these 
artificial islands and installations. 
270 J . I"" 69 essup, op. cit., n. -'· at p. . 
55 
--------------------------- Chapter One 
adds, where the drawing of baselines to and from such elevation has received 
l . . l . . 271 genera 111ternat1ona recog111t1on. 
Islands and rocks 
A new trend in international practice has been to articulate a distinction 
between rocks and islands. This distinction is that, in principle, rocks should have 
no continental shelf or EEZ, whereas islands would continue to generate the full 
range of normal entitlements. This is reflected in Article 121 (3) of the 1982 
Convention which states that: 
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
Several key questions arise for consideration in this regard. Firstly, what is a 
rock? Regrettably, Article 121 (3) was poorly drafted and does not provide a ready 
answer. It does not define the term, nor does it "suggest any dividing line between 
rocks and other islands. "
272 
Scholars and international jurists have set out to clarify the meaning of this 
term. 
273 
Hodgson, for example, has defined rocks as possessing an area of less 
than 0.001 square miles. 274 The size of the area of the rock as a criterion to 
distinguish a rock from an island seems to be used by some scholars. Professor 
Boyle, for example, suggested, that "a rock is smaller than an island", but (like an 
island) it is above water at high. tide.275 Professor Bowett, on the other hand, 
attempts to elaborate on the meaning of the phrase "cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own" in order to identify a clear definition for 
271 Article 7( 4) of the 1982 Convention. 
~ 7 ~ See Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.41. See also Boyle, A.E .. "UN CLOS, ITLOS and 
the Settlement of maritime Boundary Disputes between Taiwan and Japan,'· (unpublished paper) 
Taiwan. April ( 1997), at p. I. 
m A rock was defined in the African proposal to the UN CLOS Ill as "a naturally formed rocky 
elevation of ground. surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide." See UN Document 
A/conf.62/C.2/L.62/Rev. I. 27/8/1974. UNCLOS Ill Official Records, vol. 3, Documents of the 
Conference, First and Second Sessions, at p.232. 
~ 7 .i Hodgson, R. D., Islands: normal and special circumstances, the Geographer Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research ( 1973). at p. 17. for their effect in the boundary delimitation, see at 
p.43. See Bowett's remark on the Hodgson classification: Bowett, op. cit., n.261, at p. 44. 
~ 75 See Boyle, A.E., "Maritime Boundaries and UNCLOS: Some Current Problems," (unpublished 
paper) Greenwich Forum, 30 May ( 1996), at p.7. 
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a rock. In this regard, he suggests that the phrase could mean that a rock cannot 
be considered an island "by injecting an artificial economic life, based on 
resources from its other land territory,"276 or by expanding, artificially, the area of 
the ""rock and make it habitable."
277 
In contrast the Jan Mayen Commission in the 
Iceland-Norway boundary delimitation, in the view of Kwiatkowska, pointed to 
the conclusion that the test of capacity to sustain human habitation or economic 
life of their own ""does not necessarily exclude islands obtaining external suppo11 
for a population that is not necessarily permanent."278 
Secondly, what is the status of Article 121(3) in customary law? It is perhaps 
not surprising that there is some controversy regarding the status of paragraph 3 
of Article 121. Professor Brown, for example, has expressed the view that the 
Article has passed into customary law. 279 By way of contrast, Churchill has 
concluded that state practice in this field
280 
is such that it is extremely unlikely 
that the Article has become pai1 of customary law.
281 
Notwithstanding these differences the Conciliation Commission on the 
continental shelf area between Iceland and Jan Mayen asserted that Article 121 
""reflects the present status of international law on this subject."
282 
The 
commission did not give any evidence to support its statement. Furthermore, the 
question of whether or not rocks are entitled to a continental shelf and an EEZ, 
276 B . 261 ...,4 owett, op. cit., n. , at P·-' . 
277 Ibid. For a comprehensive survey of the meaning of a rock, see Kwiatkowska and Soons, 
"Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks which Cannot Sustain Human Habitation or Economic 
life of their Own," 21 Neths. Yll ( 1990), at pp.150-73. 
m Kwiatkowska, B., "Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation," F((ty Years of the 
International Court of.Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir R. Jennings, Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1996). at p. 289; Kwiatkowska. B .. "Equitable Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation. as Exemplified in the Work of the International Court of Justice During 
the Presidency of Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings and Beyond," 28 ODIL ( 1997), at p. I 06. See also 
the remark of 0 'Connell, op. cit .. n.6. at p. 732. 
2711 Brown, op. cit., n.167, at p.41. A similar view was held by Dolliver Nelson, "The Delimitation 
of Maritime Boundaries in the Caribbean," Ocean BoundGJJ' Making, Regional Issues and 
Development, Johnston and Saunders (ed.), Croom Helm, London ( 1988), at p. 174. 
280 An example of these practices, in which a rock or a tiny islet was granted continental shelf and 
the EEZ or EFZ, have been cited in Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.14, at p.135. Further examples 
have been reproduced in Kwiatkowska and Soons, op. cit .. n.269, at pp.176-9. 
281 Churchill, R.R .. ''Maritime delimitation in the Jan Mayen Area," 9 Marine Policy ( 1985), at 
p.20. A similar view was shared by Brownlie. op. cit., n.119, at p.192; Gilmore, op. cit., n.21, at 
p.21. para.25. at p.21: Kwiatkowska and Soons. op. cit., n.269, at p.175, see also at pp.176-80. 
282 Iceland-Jan Mayen Conciliation Commission. 20 ILM ( 1981 ), at p.803. 
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was not, in fact, a relevant point to the task of the commission. This was simply 
because Jan Mayen was too large to be regarded as a rock. (It has an area of 373 
square kilometres, and is inhabited.) What was important was that the 
Commission was to examine Jan Mayen 's capacity as an island, in international 
law. to have its own continental shelf and EEZ limit. If so, is this entitlement on 
the same footing as that of Iceland?283 
Careful study was not required to answer these questions, since the World 
Court in the North Sea Cases stated that Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf (in which "the entitlement of an island, as well as a mainland, 
to a continental shelf is well established"),284 was a declaratory of customary 
law.285 The Commission was aware of this fact as being well known, hence it did 
not give evidence to support its statement. This may lead some to asse11 that it is 
hard to accept at face value the statement of the commission with respect to the 
status of Article 121 (3 ). 
Thirdly, how was it applied in state practice? There were inconsistencies in 
some practices, where a distinction between rocks and islands was alleged. For 
example, Denmark had disputed the UK claim of continental shelf and Fishery 
zone for RockalL since, Denmark alleged, Rockall is a rock within the meaning of 
Article 121 (3) and thus it should have no continental shelf or EFZ. 286 
Interestingly, in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, Denmark while describing Jan 
Mayen island as a rock within the definition of Article 121 (3 ), "does not argue 
that Jan Mayen has no entitlement to continental she?( or fishery zones, but that 
when maritime boundaries are to be established between that island and the 
tcrri tori es of lee land and Greenland. the island of Jan Mayen cannot be accorded 
full effect. but only partial effect.·· 287 
It is evident from the above that the position regarding the meaning of rocks 
and the status of Article 121 (3) is still unsettled. State practice in the coming 
:!in Churchill, op. cif., n.273, at p.18. 
28
"
1 Duhai/Shm:fah Award, at p. 675. 
285 N I C' c· 6" ort 1 ,,ea ases, at para. _,. 
28
" Symmons, C.R., ''The Rockall Dispute:· 3 5 ICLQ April ( 1986), at p.348. 
287 
Italic added. Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at para. 80. 
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years may add some clarification to the provision of paragraph 3, or to its value in 
customary law. 
The regime of Islands in the UAE Federal Law 
The Federal Law, in Article 1, distinguishes between islands and low-tide 
elevations. The Article in this regard reproduces Article 121 ( 1) of the 1982 
Convention in defining the term 'island', and Article 13 of the Convention in 
defining the term 'low-tide elevation'. The entitlement to maritime zones, 
according to Article 19 of the Federal Law, was asserted for islands and not for 
low-tide elevations. A distinction between an island and rock for the purpose of 
granting a continental shelf and an EEZ is not recognized in the Federal Law. 
Hence the UAE, technically, claims a continental shelf and an EEZ for all insular 
territories whether or not they be regarded as islands or rocks. 
Finally, Article 2(2) gives the UAE the right to use low-tide elevations which 
are situated at a distance not exceeding 12 nautical miles from the mainland or 
from any island belonging to the State as a basepoint to construct the straight-line 
system envisaged therein. 
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Territorial Sea Boundary Delimitation 
We saw in Chapter One that every coastal state is entitled to claim national 
jurisdiction over various offshore zones. The exact limit of this jurisdiction 
should logically be defined in order to avoid any overlap with the rights of other 
states. This is the function of the rules of maritime boundary delimitation which 
is the subject matter for this and the next chapter. However before we can 
commence our examination of that issue, a distinction should be drawn, in order 
to provide an appropriate legal context for analysis, between: ( 1) boundary 
disputes and territorial disputes; (2) maritime boundary delimitation and land 
boundary determination; and, (3) the delimitation of maritime boundaries and the 
drawing of maritime limits. Furthermore, the entitlement of a coastal state to 
claim a territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf and EEZ suggest that 
there might be different rules for the delimitation of each zonal boundary. 
However, as we have seen, under current developments in international law, the 
importance of the contiguous zone boundary delimitation has been eliminated. 1 
Moreover, the 1982 Convention has provided an identical rule for the 
delimitation of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries. 
2 
Therefore, we shall 
examine the rules for the EEZ and the continental shelf boundary delimitation in 
a separate chapter_ and the rules of territorial sea boundary delimitation here. The 
position with regard to the contiguous zone boundary will be discussed briefly 
within the context of the delimitation of the territorial sea.3 Therefore this chapter 
1 See Chapter One/Section Two. 
2 This however does not mean that the boundary line of the two areas should coincide: see 
Chapter Three/ Section One. 
:; Unlike Chapter One above there will be no discussion of the rules of delimitation in the UAE 
Maritime Laws, since that issue will be discussed in some details in Chapters Four and Five of 
this work. 
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has been divided into two sections, (I) terminological distinctions; (2) the rules of 
delimitation for the territorial sea boundary. 
Section One 
Terminology 
Territorial disputes and boundary disputes 
A territorial dispute is a conflict which arises when two or more states claim 
sovereignty over a certain area: in other words it involves a question of title. By 
way of contrast a boundary 4 dispute is a conflict which arises ''about the locus of 
a boundary line, not about the existence or not of territorial sovereignty."5 An 
example of a territorial dispute is that between the UK and Argentina over 
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. 
6 
On the other hand, the dispute between the 
UK and France in 1977 in the Channel Islands area can be cited as an example of 
a boundary dispute, because France did not dispute the UK's sovereignty over the 
Channel Islands. The dispute was, inter alia, over the course of the maritime 
boundaries between the English coast and the French coast. 7 
However, it is not always simple to draw a clear distinction between a 
territorial dispute and a boundary dispute, since both are part of the general 
question of territorial sovereignty, which is, as Judge Huber the arbitrator in the 
Island of Pa/mas suggested: "a situation recognized and delimited in space, either 
by the so-called natural frontiers as recognized by international law or by outward 
signs of delimitation that are undisputed, or else by legal engagements entered 
·
1 For a definition of the term .. boundary", see the commentary of the ILC report of 1982 on the 
Law of Treaties Concluded between States and International Organisation or between two or 
more International Organisations, the !LC Yearbook ( 1982), vol. 2(2), at p. 60, para. 5. 
~ Jennings. R., "General Course on Principles of International Law," 121 Academie De Droit 
/111ernational, ( 1967-11), at p.428. See also Taha, F., International law and Boundary Dispute, 
Abu-Dhabi Press, UAE ( 1982). at p.117: Tyranowski, J., "Boundaries and Boundaries Treaties in 
the Law of State Succession.'' National and International Boundaries, vol. 14, Session 1983, 
Thessaloniki ( 1985), at p.537. 
6 
This conflict broke out into armed conflict between the two countries in 1982. See Report of 
Foreign A ff airs Committee of the House of Commons, Session 1983-4. Reprinted in Harris, D., 
Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London ( 1991 ), at pp.196-
8. see also pp.855-67. 
7 
The Award of this dispute was reprinted in 54 /LR. 
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into between interested neighbours, such as frontier conventions, or by acts of 
recognition of States within fixed boundaries."8 A territorial dispute is ipso facto 
a boundary dispute, because it is meaningless to claim a territorial area without a 
defined boundary line. On the other hand, a claim of a boundary line is ipso facto 
a claim to "'the territory enclosed within it."9 So, if neighbouring states have 
agreed on a boundary line, the territorial dispute will be solved by looking to that 
I. 10 me. 
Whereas it is true that each term involves the other, it does not follow that 
there are no differences between them. Indeed differences can be identified, 
especially with regard to maritime zones. In this context, neighbouring states 
whether adjacent or opposite have in international law "a right to a maritime zone 
which exists independently of, and prior to any delimitation."
11 
A disagreement 
may arise in determining the boundary of such a zone. The North Sea Casess, 
may be cited as an example of a boundary dispute, where the parties were in 
agreement about the other's entitlement to a continental shelf in the North Sea, 
but where they disagreed about the actual location of the boundary for each 
continental shelf. 
To sum up, a territorial dispute involves one state seeking to eliminate another 
state's (or states') claims in regard to a certain area. However, in the case of a 
boundary dispute, there is no complete elimination; rather there is recognition by 
the parties that both have rights in the disputed area, the main task being how to 
determine the exact limits of those rights.
12 
x Island <f Palmas Case, The Hague Court Reports. Second Series, Scott (ed.), Oxford University 
Press. New York ( 1932). at p.92. 
') Jennings. op. cit .. n.5, at p.428. See also Jennings, R. Y ., The Acquisition of Territ01y in 
l111ernational Law, Manchester University Press, Manchester ( 1963), at p.13; Oppenheim 's 
International Law. 9th ed .. vol. I, Peace, Jennings and Watts (eds.), Longman, London ( 1996), at 
pp.668-9: North Sea Case, at para.20. 
10 In the Temple Of Preah Vihear Case of 1962 the International Court of Justice held that it could 
"only give a decision as to the sovereignty over the Temple area after having examined what the 
frontier line" was. See ICJ Reports 1962, at pp.16-7. 
11 Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui's dissenting opinion in the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Arbitration, 83 
!LR, at pp.49-50. 
12 Sharam, S.P., "Boundary Dispute and Territorial Dispute A Comparison," I 0 IJ!l ( 1970), at 
p.159. 
62 
---·--------- Chapter Two 
Maritime boundary delimitation and land boundary determination 
Unlike the distinctions between a territorial dispute and a boundary dispute, 
the differences between a maritime boundary delimitation and a land boundary 
determination are clearly distinguishable. The World Court in the Burkina Faso v. 
Mali Frontier Dispute, I 986, held that: 
the process by which a court determines the line of a land boundary between two States can be 
clearly distinguished from the process by which it identifies the principles and rules applicable 
to the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
13 
The main differences between a maritime boundary delimitation and a land 
boundary determination, 14 are, it is suggested, the following ones: 
(1) The basis of title 15 
In a land boundary a claim of title is based on the traditional rules regarding 
modes of acquisition of title (e.g. Accretion, Occupation, Cession, Acquisitive 
Prescription, Conquest). 16 By way of contrast, in a maritime boundary, the rights 
of a coastal state over maritime zones "exist ipso facto and ab initio by virtue of 
its sovereignty over the land" 17 with regard to territorial sea and continental shelf, 
or by positive claim with regard to the contiguous zone and the EEZ.
18 
So the 
traditional rules of acquisition, except prescription, 19 have no relevance in this 
. 20 
question. 
13 Burkina Faso v. Mali Frontier Dispute, at para. 47. 
14 For fu11her discussion, see Weil, P., "Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation, 
lnlernalional Maritime Boundaries," Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
the Netherlands ( 1993 ). at p.121. 
1
' See in general Fitzmaurice. G .. The Lmv and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1947-59. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge ( 1995), at pp.177-83; Oppenheim 's. op. cit., 
n.9. at pp.679-708. 
1
<' See Brownlie, I.. Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed, Clarendon Press. Oxford 
( 1990), at p.131; Oppenheim 's, op. cil .. n.9, at p.679. See also Post, H., "Adjudication as a Mode 
of Acquisition of Territory?" F((ly Years of /he fn/ernalional Court of Justice, Essays in Honour 
of Sir R. Jennings. Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1996), 
atp.237. 
17 North Sea Cases, at para.43. 
I!! See Chapter One. 
19 See Section Two of this chapter for more discussion on the concept of historic title. 
20 Jennings, R. Y., "The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries," Staal zind 
VMkerrechtsordnung, Feslschr(flfi'ir Karl Doehring ( 1989), at pp.397-8. 
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(2) The role of the court or arbitrator 
Where a land boundary determination 1s concerned, the role of the 
international adjudicative body is to consider all the factors which could help to 
determine which claimant has a better root of title. 21 However, where a maritime 
boundary delimitation is concerned the main task of a court or arbitral tribunal is 
to determine what principles and rules of international law are to be applied in the 
delimitation of the boundaries between two or more states. 
(3) A third state's interest 
In a maritime boundary delimitation a third state's interest has been taken into 
consideration in some cases when the process of drawing a boundary line takes 
place. 22 In contrast, in a land boundary determination a third state's interests are 
of no relevance to the process of determination, except where the court or tribunal 
purports ""to fix a tri-point with binding effect on third state."23 
The similarity between the two concepts 
Although there are clear differences between land boundary determination 
and maritime boundary delimitation, there are, on the other hand, some common 
characteristics.24 Perhaps the most important is the stability and permanence of 
boundaries. This degree of stability is well illustrated in the provisions of 
21 For example, in the Rann Of Kutch case (India and Pakistan) of 1965, the arbitrator stated that: 
''the territorial dispute which the Tribunal is called upon to decide is one in which opposing 
claims have been made with reliance upon conflicting testimony, and where a judgement has to 
be given on the relative strength of the cases made out by the Parties." See 7 IL/vi ( 1968), at 
p.679. 
22 For instance, the ICJ in the lihya v. Malta Case held that: "It cannot wholly put aside the 
question of the legal interest of Italy as well as of other States of the Mediterranean region, and 
they will have to be taken into account." See Libya v. Malta Case, at para.42. For further 
discussion on the relevant of third party interest on the delimitation process, see Chapter 
Three/Section Two. 
2> Monroe. L.. "International Land Boundary Delimitation-Principle of Uti Possidetis-
Distinction Between Determination of a Land Boundary and Delimitation of Continental Shelf," 
81 A.Ill (1987), at p.4I3: Burkina Faso v. Mali Case, at paras.47-50: Naldi, G.J., "Case 
concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali): Uti Possidetis in an African 
Perspective", 36 IClQ ( 1987). at p.896. 
24 For example: (I) The delimitation of both is a legal-political operation, even if the boundary 
line has been described as a natural boundary; (2) "equity enters into both types of delimitation." 
See Weil. P., The law of Maritime Delimitation-Reflections, Grotius Publications Limited, 
Cambridge ( 1989). at p. 92. And see the Gu(( of Maine Case, at para. 56. 
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international law which prevent a treaty establishing a boundary from being 
destabilized in the case of a fundamental change of circumstances, or in a case of 
state succession.25 Moreover, the stability of a treaty establishing a boundary is 
supported in international law by invoking the principle of uti possidetis. For 
clarification these three cases will be discussed in some detail. 
(1) Fundamental change of circumstances 
The general rule is that a treaty in a fundamental change of circumstances 
could becomes destabilized. However, it is a different matter if the treaty 
establishes a boundary. Article 62(2) of 1969 the Vienna Convention reads: 
A fundamental change of circumstan~es may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary ... 
The term "boundary" in the above-quoted Article raises the question of 
whether or not it extends to maritime boundaries. The World Court in the Aegean 
Sea Case answered the question in the affirmative. 26 However, the ILC in its 
thirty-fourth session of 1980 failed to provide full support for the opinion of the 
Court in the Aegean Sea Case, nor was it able to give a concrete answer. The 
members of the Commission were in favour of dealing with the problem in the 
commentary of the Report. 27 The Commentary of the report of the ILC in this 
respect stated that: "Lines of maritime Delimitation ... may in fact have special 
features and it is possible that the stabilising effect of article 62 does not extend to 
certain lines of maritime delimitation, even if, to all intents and purposes, they 
constitute true boundaries. In any event, the commission is not equipped to 
2 ~ However, this is not to suggest that the stability of a treaty establishing a boundary could never 
be challenged. This could occur, for example where the treaty is void ab initio, or where there is a 
material breach by one party, or where there is subsequent conduct by the parties that per se 
contradicts the provisions of the treaty. For more discussion, see Marston, G., "The Stability of 
Land and Sea Boundary Delimitation in International Law," Maritime Boundaries, World 
Boundaries, vol. 5. Blake (ed.). London (1994), at p.148; Brownlie, op. cit., n.16, at pp. 613-6 
and pp.625-6; Taha. op. cit., n.5, at pp. I 00-1: Shaw, M., International law, 3rd ed, Grotius 
Publications Limited ( 1991 ), at pp.589-98. 
2
'' Aegean Sea Case, at para. 85. 
27 See Question of Treaties Concluded between States and International Organisations or between 
two or more International Organisations, !LC Yearbook ( 1980), vol. I, at pp. 8-15. 
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(2) State successum -
In general a newly independent state
30 
could use the "clean slate" rule to free 
itself from any treaty in force at the date of formulation of this new independent 
state.
31 
However, this is not the case if the treaty in question is one establishing a 
boundary.
32 
Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
respect of Treaties, 1978, reads: 
A succession of States does not as such affect (a) a boundary established by a treaty: or (b) 
obligation and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary. 
A similar question to that of the case of a fundamental change of 
circumstances may be raised over whether the term "boundary", in the above 
quoted Article, is confined to a land boundary or whether it also extends to a 
maritime boundary. Marston correctly remarked that: 
If the doctrine of executed treaty provisions applies to lines of maritime delimitation, and there 
seems to be no good reason why it should not, then the successor state or states are obliged, in 
the absence of agreement to do otherwise, to respect the line, since it defines the area of sp~tial 
competence appurtenant to the land territories to which they have respectively succeeded. ·'-' 
28 See /LC Yearbook (1980), vol. I, at pp. 8-15. And the !LC Yearbook (1982), vol. 2(2), at p.61, 
para. 6. 
29 For general discussion on succession of state, see Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.9, at pp.208-44; 
Shaw, op. cit., n.25, at pp.604-28, Brownlie, op. cit., n.16, at pp.654-75; O'Connell, D.P., State 
Succession in Municipal law and International law, two volumes, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge ( 1967). For special reference to state succession to boundaries, see Taha, F., The 
/111ernational Le~al Aspects of the Boundaries of the Sudan with Ethiopia and Kenya, PhD. 
Dissertation, vol. I, Jesus College, Cambridge University ( 1973), at pp.1-16. 
'° For a definition of the term 'newly independent state', see Article 2( I )(f) of the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 1978. 
·' 
1 Article 16 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treati~s. 1978 .. 
12 For a comprehensive discussion, see Tyranowski, op. cit., n.5, at pp.459-540. 
'-' Marston, op. cit., n.25 at p. 158; see also p.159. 
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The idea behind this principle, in the words of the World Court is "to prevent 
the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal 
struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of 
1 d 
. . . .,36 
t 1e a mm1stenng power.· · 
The principle of ut i possidet is appeared for the first time m 1810 in South 
America,
37 
in order to secure respect for the territorial boundaries as they existed 
at the moment when independence was achieved by South American States 
following the Spanish withdrawal from the area.38 However, in Africa the 
principle "has a broader meaning because it concerns both the boundaries of 
countries born of the same colonial empire
39 
and boundaries which during the 
colonial era had already an international character 40 because they separated 
colonies belonging to different colonial empires. "
41 
There can be no doubt about the stability of a land boundary in the light of the 
principle of uti possidetis, because the principle was introduced for this very 
reason. However, doubt may arise in the case of a maritime boundary. The 
Tribunal in the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Award debated this question, and decided 
that the uti possidetis principle does apply to a maritime boundary.42 
:;
4 For a brief history of the uli possidelis principle, see Ratner, S.P., "Drawing a Better Line: Uli 
possidetis and the Borders of New States," 90 A.Jll ( 1996), at pp.592-60 I; Taha, op. cil., n.29, at 
pp. 19-22. 
35 For discussion on the conflict between the principle of uli possidetis and the principle of self-
determination, see Burkina Faso v. Mali Case, at paras.25-6; Frank, T.M., Fairness in 
lnlernalional law and lnslilulions, Claredon Press, Oxford ( 1995), at pp.146-54; Crawford, J., 
"The General Assembly, the International Cou11 and self-determination," Fifty Years of the 
/111ematio11al Court r?f.Justice, Essays in Honour of Sir R. Jennings, Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds.), 
Cambridge University Press ( 1996), at pp.601-3: Ratner, op. cil., n.34, at pp.609-13. 
'"Burkina Faso v. Mali Case. at para. 20. See also Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.9, at pp.669-70. For a 
discussion on practical impediments to uli possidelis principle, see Ratner, op. cil., n.34, at 
PfN·6017d~ 8 · .. ?"' 897· T h . . 5 60· Sh . 25 "'02 "' a 1, op. ell .• n. _ _, at p. , a a, op. ell., n. , at p. , aw, op. c11., n. , at PP·-' -J. 
:;i; Burkina Faso v. Mali Case, at para. 23. 
:;•i I.e. boundaries which resulted from administrative decisions by the colonial power. 
•
111 I.e. boundaries resulting from an international agreement between two colonial powers 
concerning their respective colonial territories. 
•
11 Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Award. at para.61. 
42 Ibid .. at paras. 63-66 and 88. See also dissenting opinion of Mr. Bedjaoui in 83 ILR, at pp.60-2. 
To the same effect, see the Gu(( o_(Fonseca Case, at para. 388. See also Chaney, J. I., "Progress in 
International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law." 88 A.Jll ( 1994), at p.234. 
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However, it does not follow that the possibility of a re-examination of 
boundaries is excluded in toto. The commentary of Article 11 of the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 1978, said: 
This does not, of course, mean that boundary disputes have not arisen or may not arise between 
African States. But the legal ground invoked must be other than the mere effect of the 
occurrence of a succession of States on a boundary treaty. 
43 
A similar view was expressed by the Court of Arbitration 111 the 
Dubai/Shw~jah Award. 44 
In conclusion, it seems fair to suggest that, since the aim of seeking stability 
and permanence is to maintain the status quo and prevent a fundamental change 
of circumstances from being a source of dangerous friction, it makes no 
difference whether the case is one of a land boundary or a maritime boundary.45 
The stability of a boundary must imply: (I) not terminating a boundary treaty on 
the ground of a fundamental change of circumstances or on the basis of the "clean 
slate" rule; (2) using the principle of uti possidetis to assert the stability of a 
boundary established by colonial powers. 
Delimitation of maritime boundaries and drawing of maritime limits 
The drawing of maritime limits is determining the outer limits of maritime 
zones i.e. internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ, and 
the continental shelf of a single coastal state, where these "zones are not 111 
physical contact with those of another coastal state",46 whether opposite or 
adjacent. This determination is a unilateral act in the sense that only one state is 
involved. The validity of this limit "with regard to other states depends upon 
international la\v.''
47 
It should be mentioned here that for the parties to the 1982 
·
1
·' /LC Yearhook ( 1974). vol. 2, part I. at p.199 . 
.i.i The Court held that "the existence of [ the principle of llli possidetis] has not prevented certain 
African States [or any newly independent States] from claiming, after achieving independence, 
territory under various pretexts. such as that the established boundaries did not correspond with 
legal reality." See Duhai/Shw:jah Award. 91 /LR, at p.578 . 
.is A similar view was held by Professor Boyle. See Boyle, A.E., "Maritime Boundaries and 
UNCLOS: Some Current Problems," (unpublished paper) Greenwich forum, 30 May 1996, at p.6. 
See also the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at para. 80; Marston, op. cit., n.25 at p.159. 
•
16 Caflisch, L.. "Maritime Boundaries Delimitation." 11 EPI l ( 1989), at p.212. 
·
17 
The Fisheries Case. at p.132. See also Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n.15, at pp.213-4. 
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Convention there should be no unilateral act to determine the outer limit of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. This outer limit should, according to 
Article 76(8), be established by the coastal state on the basis of the 
recommendations of the commission on the limits of the continental shelf 
provided for in Annex II of the Convention. Indeed, the Court of Arbitration in 
the France/Canada Award rejected the French Government's requests to 
determine the boundary between the two parties in the area beyond 200 nautical 
miles. The Court based its rejection on the ground that such delimitation "would 
constitute a pronouncement involving a delimitation, not 'between the Parties', 
but between each one of them and the international community, represented by 
organs entrusted with the administration and protection of the international sea-
bed area ... that has been declared to be the common heritage of mankind. [The] 
Court is not competent to carry out a delimitation which affects the rights of a 
Party which is not before it." 
48 
By way of contrast, the delimitation of a maritime 
boundary is an operation for establishing lines separating the maritime zones of 
one state from those of another. This operation is bilateral or multilateral in 
character. 
48 
The A ward, at paras. 78-9. See the criticism of Professor Boyle on the Court dictum, ·'Dispute 
Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problem of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction," 46 
ICLQ ( 1997), at pp.46-7. 
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Section Two 
Delimitation of the Territorial Sea 
Although the origin of the concept of territorial sea as noted above 49 goes 
back to the seventeenth century, the history of the delimitation of its boundary 
starts much later.
50 
The rules and principles which were used in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth ce11turies for this purpose had their origins in the 
law of boundary delimitation in rivers and lakes.
51 
This section will commence by 
providing a general idea of early state practice and the first attempts at codifying 
this practice. It will then turn to the work of the ILC and the Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone that resulted from this work. 52 The 
final stage of this section will be devoted to an investigation of the status of the 
delimitation rules as enunciated in the Geneva Convention in customary law. 
Early practice up to 1930 
The classical tendency in discussing the matter of territorial sea delimitation 
is to distinguish between the case of opposite and adjacent coasts. In the case of 
opposite coasts there were two methods in state practice used for the delimitation: 
( 1) the median line "based on the fundamental principle of sovereign equality"~ 53 
and, (2) the rule of thalweg 54 where a channel of navigation secures equal rights 
49 See Chapter One. 
5° For the reason for this delay, see Weil, op. cit., n.24, at pp.135-6. 
'
1 Johnston. D.M .. The Themy and Hislol)' of Ocean BoundG1y-Making, McGill-Queen's 
University Press. Kingston and Montreal ( 1988), at p. 124. 
'
2 As will be seen below. the territorial sea delimitation formula under the Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone has been reproduced in the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention. Therefore, there will be no separate analysis of the territorial sea det°imitation under 
the 1982 Convention. 
5
·' An example of the use of the median line is the UK-US protocol of March 1873 on the 
delimitation of the water boundary between the two states. The protocol "applied the median line 
principle flexibly by ignoring rocks and taking navigational routes into consideration." See Rhee, 
S.M., "Sea Boundary Delimitation between States before World War II," 76 AJ/l ( 1982), at p. 
561: see also p. 556. 
'i·I The term 'thalweg · means "the deepest channel in the riverbed, [and] the most easily navigable 
part of the rivers." The term 'thalweg' has its origins in river law but it is sometimes employed in 
the law of the sea. For more details, see Johnston, op. cit., n.51, at p. 125. 
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of navigation for both states. 
55 
In addition, a common zone between the parties 
involved was sometime suggested to '"preserve equal access and the right of 
navigation in straits and other channels where the 3-mile zones overlapped."56 In 
1895 the International Law Association accepted a proposal that the median line 
should be regarded as the general rule for the delimitation of the territorial sea 
between opposite states in narrow straits or bays. 57 By way of contrast, in the case 
of adjacent coasts, the situation in the nineteenth century suffered from the 
vagueness of state practice. 58 Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the Louisiana v. Mississippi case in 1906 remarked that: 
Whenever it is necessary for two contiguous States to run a water boundary through an 
archipelago of islands off their coasts it is only possible to do so by convention, as international 
law provides no rule upon the subject. 
59 
In 1908 Deszo Darday, at the twenty-fifth Conference of the International 
Law Association in Budapest, suggested that the median line principle could fill 
the gap in international law regarding the delimitation of the territorial sea 
b d
. 60 
etween a Jacent states. 
The Grisbadarna Case 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in 1909 presided over a 
dispute between Norway and Sweden concernmg maritime boundary 
delimitation; the Grisbadarna Case. The parties to the arbitration agreements 
asked the court to decide whether the boundary line was to be considered, either 
55 The US Supreme Court in the Louisiana v. Mississippi Case of 1906 stated in relation to this 
that: "Where there is no necessary track of navigation, the line of demarcation is drawn in the 
111 iddle ... but wherever there is a deep water sailing channel therein ... the rule of the thalweg 
applies ... Quoted from Rhee, op. cit .. n.53, at pp.561-2. 
~<· Ibid .. at p.565. The French-Spanish agreement in March 1879 to establish a common zone in 
the Bay of Figuier may be cited as an example of using a common zone method as a way of 
solving a dispute in cases ''where mere division would not provide convenience and efficiency in 
the use of sea, and where interest in the sea could be exploited more equitably and effectively 
than by dividing them in terms of maritime space.'' See Ibid., at p.585; see also p.562. 
57 Ibid .. at p.563. For general survey of state practice and the opinion of scholars, see Ibid., at 
p.564. 
511 The Mexico-US treaty of February 2, 1848, for example, stated that: "the boundary line 
between the two Republics shall commence in the Gulf of Mexico, three leagues from land, 





wholly or in part_ as being determined by the boundary treaty of 1661; if not, the 
Tribunal "shall have power to determine the [boundary line] taking into account 
the circumstances of fact and the principles of international law."61 
The Tribunal in its award held that: 
in accord with the ideas of the seventeenth century and with the notions of laws prevailing at 
that time ... the delimitation should be made today by tracing a line perpendicularly to the 
. . f I 62 general direction o · t 1e coast. 
However, at the final sector of the boundary line, the perpendicular line had 
been tilted to the south, i.e. to the Norwegian side, to give Sweden a larger share 
of the lobster fishing in the shoal of Grisbadarna bank. This adjustment was 
designed to prevent the inequitable result which would result from using the 
perpendicular line in the Grisbadarna fishery bank. This inequitable result would 
allocate to Norway the larger share of the Grisbadarna fishery bank,63 despite the 
fact that the Swedes had used this bank "much earlier and much more effectively 
than the Norwegians. "64 This adjustment to the perpendicular line had been 
justified on the basis of historical usage.
65 
It is evident from the above that three methods were used in territorial sea 
delimitation in this period. The thalweg and the median line rules in the case of 
the delimitation between opposite coasts, and the perpendicular line and the 
median line for the delimitation between adjacent coasts. State practice reveals a 
tendency to use one method or the other for the delimitation of their territorial sea 
boundary. It is interesting to note that the Grisbadarna decision to use the 
perpendicular line method, "was not so much a victory of [this] method over the 
median line."66 Rather was it a reflection of the methods and the rules prevailing 
in the seventeenth century. 67 The median line, the Tribunal concluded, did not 
<>1 See Article 3 of the Norway and Sweden Agreements of Arbitration of March. 14, 1908. The 
/-/ague Court Report, Scott (ed.), Oxford University Press ( 1916), at p.134. 
"
2 Ibid .. at p. 129. 
"' This was in addition to their control over the whole of Skjotte Grunden fishery banks. 
(i.I The Norwegians had other maritime interest such as navigation, and they were not entirely 
dependent, like the Swedes, upon fishing the Grisbadarna fishery bank. 
<•
5 Ibid., at p. 131. See below for more discussion on the concept of historic title. For the relevant 
of the natural resources on the delimitation process, see Chapter Three/Section Two. 
66 Johnston, op. cit., n.51. at pp. 128-9. 
67 
Grishadarna Case, at p. 129. 
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'"find sufficient support in the law of nations m force in the seventeenth 
century."
68 
By way of contrast, the perpendicular line method, the Tribunal 
found, was the prevailing method at that period. 69 Hence the Tribunal adopted 
this method, and ""spared itself the. pain of choosing between the competing rules 
or principles of international law that had evolved since 1661." 70 
Considerations of equity 
Although there has been diversity and inconsistency in state practice over 
using one method or another, it is possible to trace some considerations of equity 
in these practices. These considerations, in reality, could justify the variety of 
methods used in practice. The median line method, for example, was proposed in 
order to reach an equitable delimitation between the parties. This was done by 
extending the sovereignty of each party to the middle. However, in some 
instances, such a method would not produce the equitable result in the 
delimitation. An example of such an instance is when there are historical rights or 
if there is a navigation channel in the area. 71 Using a strict median line in such 
cases may deprive one party of its historical rights over an area, or place the 
entire navigation channel within one party's jurisdiction. Considerations of equity 
may require adjustment in the median line, or any other line that was chosen 
initially to abate the inequitable result. The Grisbadarna Award to adjust the 
perpendicular line in the Grisbadarna fishery bank may be cited as an example. In 
this Award the adjustment was intended to preserve Swedish historical interests 





70 Johnston, op. cit., n.51, at p. 128. 
71 The presence of islands was not a significant problem due to the narrow limit of the territorial 
sea at that time. See Rhee. op. cit., n.53, at p. 586. 
7
:! For more discussion on equitable considerations in territorial sea delimitation, see Ibid., at 
pp.585-7. 
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Attempts to codify state practice 
The Hague Codification Conference of 1930 was the first international 
attempt to codify state practice under the League of Nations. 73 In 1925 the 
preparatory work for the Conference began. The League of Nations Committee of 
Experts for the Progressive Development of International Law set up a 
subcommittee of three to submit draft articles on the question of territorial sea 
delimitation. A distinction was. drawn between three different cases: ( 1) 
delimitation between opposite coasts~ (2) delimitation between opposite coasts in 
a narrow strait~ and, (3) a de! imitation between adjacent coasts. 
In the first case the matter had not come up for discussion, due to the fact that 
the acceptable breadth of the territorial sea at that period, generally speaking, was 
only three nautical miles. This narrow limit did not cause a major problem in 
delimitation in contrast to the situation which resulted from the subsequent 
general move to a 12 nautical miles limit. Therefore, the matter was not subject to 
debate at that time. In the second case the subcommittee managed to agree and 
formulated a draft article for the delimitation between opposite coasts in a narrow 
strait by using 'in principle' the median line. 74 Later on, the agreed draft articles 
become one of the most controversial matters. The Swedish and Danish 
delegates, for example, expressed doubt about the draft article forming a suitable 
part of a general rule. The US representative argued for the deleting of the words 
'in principle'. This was in order to adopt the median line as a general rule. As a 
result of this controversy the decision was taken to remove the issue in toto from 
r the final draft of the Hague Conference. ) 
ln the final case, i.e. that of adjacent states, there were deeply divergent views 
between the members of the subcommittee of experts. 76 Hence, no draft articles in 
this sphere were formulated. 
T• For general survey of the proposal of other private associations in this matter, see Rhee, op. cit., 
n.53. at pp.574-5. 
n Ibid .. pp.575-6. Using ·in principle' the median line for the delimitation was also adopted in 
Article 9 of Draft Convention on Territorial Waters, See 23 AJIL ( 1929), Special Supplement, at 
p. 281. For more details on Harvard Draft Convention, see Chapter One at p.9, note 52. 
75 Rhee, op. cit., n.53, at pp. 576-7. 
76 Ibid., at p.576. 
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In the period following the Hague Conference there was support for and 
frequent use of the median line system in delimitation. 77 On the other hand, 
"'some of the alternatives to the median line began to drop out of contention. "78 
Not unexpectedly, this support and use was not free from controversy, although 
the argument this time was more to do with the technical question of how best to 
draw the median line.
79 
It was not until 1937 that this question was settled, when 
Boggs, the American Geographer, came up with a new technique to draw the 
median line; namely, a line "every point of which is equidistant from the nearest 
point or points on opposite shores-of the river, lake, gulf or strait." 80 
To sum up, state practice during this period was such that it would be fair to 
say that it failed to establish any ~cceptable general rule on this issue. 81 Indeed, 
the ILC remarked that "international practice is not uniform as far as the 
delimitation of the territorial sea is concerned." 82 
The work of the International Law Commission 
The question of territorial sea delimitation in the ILC was raised for the first 
time in 1953. A distinction was made between the criteria for delimitation 
between adjacent states and that for opposite states. In the case of adjacent states, 
the principle of equidistance was suggested as a basis for delimitation of the 
territorial sea where the states concerned did not otherwise reach an agreement. In 
77 This was because, in the words of Rhee, the "development of technical means of delimitation 
infused states with the desire to determine 'every inch' of their territorial sea. The median line 
principle appealed to this desire for precise delimitation, for no other principle had such certitude 
in application.'' See Ibid., at p.579. 
711 Johnston. op. cit .. n.51. at p.131. Also see Rhee, op. cit., n.53, at p. 580. The support and use of 
the median line more than any other alternative methods in early practice was in fact a reflection 
of the fundamental notion that "the sovereignty of each [party] shall be conceived of as extending 
to the middle." This was in order to divide and share the area of delimitation equally and fairly 
between the parties. See Rhee, op. cit .. n.53. at p. 585. 
n Johnston, op. cit., n.51, at p. 130. 
iw Boggs. S. W., "Delimitation of Seaward Areas under National Jurisdiction," 45 A.Ill ( 1951 ), at 
pp.256-8. For general survey on the different methods used to construct a median line, see Rhee, 
op. cit .. n.53. at pp.580-5. 
81 Ibid. 
8., 
- ILC Report to the General-Assembly, ILC Yearbook ( 1956), vol. 2, at p.256. See also Rhee, op. 
cit., n.53, at p.555. 
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the final report of the ILC in 1956 the principle of equidistance was formally 
adopted for adjacent states under draft Article 14. 83 
In the case of opposite states a distinction was drawn between the case where 
the delimitation was the area of a strait, and instances where the delimitation 
involved a non-strait area. In the case of the former it was suggested that "the 
limits of the territorial sea shall be ascertained in the same manner as on the other 
parts of the coasts, [but] if the breadth of the straits .. .is less than the extent of the 
belt of territorial sea adjacent to the two coasts, the maritime frontier of the States 
which are opposite each other shall be determined in conformity" to the median 
line. 84 In the case of the latter, i.e. delimitation in a non-strait area, the median 
line was suggested as the basis for delimitation, where states did not otherwise 
reach an agreement between themselves. Thereafter the rules in the two cases 
were merged, following a successful proposal from the Norwegian Government, 
into one article, Article 12, of the l'LC final report of 1956. 85 
Delimitation of the Territorial Sea in the 1958 Convention 
The two articles concerning territorial sea delimitation (Articles 12 and 14) 
contained in the final report of the ILC in 1956 were merged, following a 
proposal by Norway's Government in the Geneva Conference of 1958, into 
s:; The commentary of the final report, however, indicated that the delimitation of the territorial 
sea boundary between adjacent states could be achieved by various means; as follows: 
(I) by extending the land frontier out to the sea; (2) by drawing a line at right angles to the coasts 
at the point where the land frontier reached the sea, (perpendicular line); (3) by using the 
geographical parallel to draw a line at the point at which the land boundary meets the sea; (4) to 
draw a line perpendicular to the general direction of the coastline; (5) using the median line which 
should be drawn according to the principle of equidistance. See /LC Yearbook ( 1956), vol.2, at 
p.272. 
x.i Article 13 paras. I and 2 of the ILC Report. See !LC Yearbook (1954), vol. 2, at pp.156-7. 
x:> The Commentary of the I LC final report have said that the combination of the two articles was 
preferable "since the delimitation of the territorial sea in straits did not present any different 
problem from that of the opposite coasts of two States generally." See /LC Yearbook ( 1956), vol. 
2. at p.271: For the Norwegian proposal. see UNCLOS I Official Records, vol. 3, at p. 193 and p. 
239. Moreover, mention must be made here regarding the case of opposite states if the result of 
the delimitation was enclaves of sea not more than two miles across. In such a case the enclaves 
may be. by agreement between the opposite states, assimilated into their territorial sea area, but if 
the width of an area of the sea between two belts of the territorial sea is more than two miles, the 
area should be treated as high seas. See /LC Yearbook (1956), vol. 2, at pp. 257-8. 
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Article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Z 86 _.one. 
The delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent 
coasts can, pursuant to Article 12, be achieved by agreement, whether express or 
de facto, or by applying the median line system; that is, using a line every point 
of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured. It is 
noteworthy that the median line system will be applied, in the case of opposite 
states, where the distance between the opposing coasts is less than twice the 
breadths of two territorial seas. Further, concerning the possibility of a case where 
there are territorial seas of different breadths opposite each other, Article 12 
imposes upon states the obligation not to extend their territorial seas beyond the 
median line. 
However, the application of the median line method could be excluded where 
another line is justified by reason of historic title or special circumstances.
87 
Article 12, it should be noted, has been adopted unchanged into Article 15 of the 
1982 Convention. 
88 
It is worth mentioning here that the Geneva Convention of 1958 regarding the 
delimitation of the contiguous zone justified the departure from the median line 
86 The principle of equidistance, in the case of adjacent states, has been deleted from the final text 
of the Convention. Similarly, in the case of opposite states, the matter of elimination of pockets of 
high seas' enclaves between two belts of the territorial sea, has been omitted from the text of 
A11icle 12 of the Geneva Convention. This omission could be accounted for by the following 
reasons: (a) Among the states who took part in the Geneva Conference of 1958 there was no 
unanimity on the question of elimination of pockets in the high seas. Indeed when the matter was 
put to the vote. it was rejected by 30 votes to 25 with 13 abstentions.(b) The adoption of a straight 
baseline technique has, in practice, solved the problem of the enclaves of the high seas. Moreover, 
the idea of the elimination of pockets in the high seas becomes meaningless after the concept of 
the exclusive economic zone has been introduced, in which the coastal states may extend their 
jurisdiction up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth o.f the territorial 
sea is measured. However. a coastal state's rights in the EEZ, as we saw, are not like its rights in 
the territorial sea. See Chapter One. 
87 Article 12( I) reads: "Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line ... The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, however, 
where it is necessary by reason of hisforic title or other special circumstances to delimit the 
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision." 




only where there was an agreement between the parties. 89 Therefore the concepts 
of 'special circumstances' and 'historic title' have no role to play in the 
delimitation of the contiguous zone. This may be because coastal states possess in 
the contiguous zones only strictly limited power.90 Article 24(3) of the 1958 
Convention reads: 
Where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two states is 
entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond 
the median line .... 
Interestingly, 111 the 1982 Convention the matter of the delimitation of the 
contiguous zone was omitted.91 This is "because the contiguous zone forms part 
of the exclusive economic zone; hence the delimitation of the latter will 
automatically bring about that of the former. "
92 
Exceptions to the median line rule 
In the report of the ILC in 1956 the term 'special circumstances', as 
mentioned above, was adopted to justify a departure from the median line system 
without any elaboration. Indeed, the commission itself considered that ''it would 
be wrong to go into too much detail and that the rule should be fairly flexible. "93 
Consequently, Article 12 did not "provide a general guideline for determining 
89 
It is worth noting here that the issue of contiguous zone delimitation was not mentioned in 1010 
in Article 66 of the I LC final repo11. On March 20, 1958 at the Geneva Conference, the 
Yugoslavian delegate submitted a proposal to modify Article 66 from a different aspect, infer 
alia, to insert a new paragraph 2, and to re-number paragraph 2 as paragraph 3, and at the end of 
this paragraph add the following: "The delimitation of this zone between two states, the coast of 
which are opposite each other at a distance less than the breadth of their territorial seas and 
contiguous zones, or between adjacent states, is constituted, in the absence of agreement, by the 
median line .... " 
The first committee adopted the Yugoslavian proposal under Article 66(3) in document 
A/COMF.13/C.l/L.164. On April 24, 1958 a Drafting Committee "was charged with the task of 
reviewing all articles before the first committee and of making recommendations for the textual 
co-ordination of proposals expressly referred to it.'' 
The Drafting Committee in discussing para. 3 of Article 66 had suggested identical language to 
the first sentence of para. I of Article 12 to be adopted for para. 3 of Article 66. The suggestion 
was accepted and A11icle 66(3) was formally adopted in the final text of the Convention under 
article 24(3). For more details, see UNCLOS I Official Records, vol. 3. at p.257. 
''
11 Caflisch, op. cil .. n.46, at p.214. 
"
1 See Chapter One/Section Two for more discussion. 
n"Problems could nevertheless arise for States which do not claim an exclusive economic zone." 
See Caflisch, op. cil.. n.46, at p.214. 
<>:> The commentary on Article 12. See/ LC Yearbook ( 1956), vol. 2, at p. 271, para. 2. 
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what constitutes special circumstances." 94 To avoid any repetition, and following 
the classical tendency in the literature, the issue of special circumstances will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter entitled "Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf.'' 95 
The second specific issue addressed in Article 12 is the historic title. The idea 
behind the specific recognition of the doctrine of historic title in this context was 
that of maintaining the status quo over an area when the Geneva Convention 
entered into force~ by claiming historic title a state does not lose the rights it had 
prior to the Convention. As has been stated elsewhere, "states could not be 
expected to accept rules which would deprive them of considerable maritime 
areas over which they had hitherto had sovereignty." 96 Furthermore, the World 
Court in the Fisheries Case held. that there could be "historic titles justifying 
situations which would otherwise be in conflict with international law." 
97 
However, before we discuss the doctrine of historic title as a reason in Article 12 
which justifies the departure from the median line system, it is wo11h mentioning 
briefly how a historic title can be established over a sea area. 
94 Chiu, H., ''Some Problems Concerning the Application of the Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
Provisions of the 1982 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea between Adjacent or 
Opposite States", 9 Ma1J1land Journal of International law ( 1985), at p. 7. See also Oppenheim 's, 
op. cit., n.9, at p.614. 
95 However, in the territorial sea context the possibility of navigation interests has been regarded 
as special circumstances. Indeed, in the Beagle Channel Award of 1977, concerning the maritime 
boundary between Chile and Argentina, the Court of Arbitration took account of, inter alia, 
··navigability and the desirability of enabling each party so far as possible to navigate in its own 
waters." (The Beagle Channel Arhitratioi1, at para. I I 0.) This is so in the context of territorial sea 
delimitation, but in the context of continental shelf delimitation, there is no genuine link, in law, 
between the continental shelf on the one hand, and navigation interest on the. other. This is 
because all states enjoy the rights of navigation in the continental shelf area. Hence, there is no 
justification for adjusting a provisional boundary line to give access for either party, since this 
right is already guaranteed under the rules of international law. See Article 78(2) of the 1982 
Convention: France/Canada Award, at para. 88; Brown, E.D., Sea-bed Energy and Minerals: The 
International legal Regime, vol. I, Continental Shelf, 2nd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the 
Netherlands ( 1992), at p.81: Evans, M., Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, 
Claredon Press, Oxford (1989), at pp.179-82: see also Oppenheim's, op. cit., n.9, at p.614. 
% The Secretariat of ILC Study in the Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic 
Bays, !LC. Yearbook (1962), vol. 2, at p.7, para.38. 
97 
Fisheries Case, at p. 13 I. 
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It is generally agreed that there are three elements required for the 
establishment of historic title: 
I. The exercise of sovereignty over a certain area by the state claiming the 
historic title. This exercise must be in proportion to the claim, and be effective 
in displaying state sovereignty.
99 
For example, supposing that a state claims, on 
a historical basis, an exclusive right to fish in a certain area. The effective 
display of state sovereignty, in this instance, would be manifested in preventing 
foreign fisherman from fishing in that area or, if allowed to fish, imposing upon 
1 . d' . 100 t 1em certam con itions. 
2. The acts of the claiming state must be continuous and public over a long period 
f . . 1 1 . . I 0 I Tl .c d h o time wit 1 t 1e mtent1on to own. 1ere1ore, an a oc or secret measure 
bl . 1 1 . . . 1 I 02 cannot esta is 1 a 11stonc tit e. 
3. The exercise of sovereignty by the claiming state must be peaceful and 
unchallenged by other states. In other words, the acts of the claiming state 
should be combined with inacti~n on the part of other states. 103 This is because 
1 . d' . . 1 104 w 1ere protest is necessary, accor mg to state practice, to preserve ng 1ts, 
toleration or acquiescence "is an essential element in the promotion of stability 
98The burden of proof is on the claiming state to prove that the necessary elements of historic title 
have been established, see Sauchez, L.J., The Regime of Bays in International law, A.W. 
Sythoff, Printing Division, Leyden, the Netherlands ( 1964), at pp.281-2. See also Scobbie, I., 
"The !CJ and the Gulf of Fonseca," 18 Marine Policy ( 1994) at p. 259; Clark, W., Historic Bays 
and Wafers, Oceana Publications Inc., New York (1994), at pp.147-50. 
99 Clark, op. cil., n.98, at pp.114-8; The Study, op. cil., n.96, at paras. 85-7. 
100 The Study, op. cit., n.96, at paras. 98-100. It should be mentioned here that the legal status of 
historic waters depends on the type of sovereignty that is exercised over them. If the claiming 
state exercises authority over them similar to the authority which she exercises over the internal 
water, the historic water should be, therefore, regarded as internal water. While, if the claiming 
state exercises a territorial sea sovereignty over the area which she claims on the basis of historic 
title. they. i.e. the historic waters, should be regarded as territorial sea. 
IOI Cl k . 98 I?? .... , ar , op. ell., n. , at pp. ----'-· 
102 Gu(( of Fonseca Case, at paras.39 I. 394 and 405. See also The Study, op. cil., n.96, at p.15, 
paras. 96. I 02-105. . 
ioJ See Fisheries Case. at p.139: Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. I 00; Gulf of Fonseca Case, at 
para.391: and see paras. 394 and 405. See also Clark. op. cil .. n.98, at pp.132-43; The Study, op. 
cil., n.96, at p.16, paras. I 06-30. 
io.i The Court in the Fisheries Case stated, in regard to the Norwegian protest, that: "In any event 
the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always 
opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian Coast." The Fisheries Case, at p. I 31. 
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. . I I . "I OS s . f' I . I 111 111ternat1ona re at1ons. · o 1 · t 1ere 1s a genera opposition from foreign 
states to the claim of the claiming state no historic title can be formed. 106 
These three elements-"immemorial possession accompanied by animo 
domini both peaceful and continuous and by acquiescence on the part of other 
nations"-were described by the Chamber in the Gu(( r~l Fonseca Case 107 as 




In a number of bilateral agreements historic title has been taken into account 
in the delimitation of a maritime boundary. The India-Sri Lanka agreement on the 
delimitation of the historic waters between the two countries, may be cited as an 
example. The agreed boundaries, illustrated below, seem to be a modified median 
line system taking into account the historic waters. Article 6 of the India-Sri 
Lanka agreement granted to the citizens of both countries their traditional fishery 
. l 109 ng 1ts. 
In the Arabian Gulf the notion of historic title only anses m regard to the 
pearl fisheries. 110 However, hitherto, it has not played any role in the actual 
delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
10 ~ Muller and Cotter, "Acquiescence" in R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (1992) vol. I, at pp. 214-5. For 
more discussion on acquiescence and protest, see Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n.15, at pp.158-77 and p 
230, Brownlie, op. cit., n.16, at pp.165-9; Taha, op. cit., n.5, at pp. I 09-13. 
10
" B I . 98 169 ouc lez. op. cit., n. , at P·- . 
107 In his comments on the decision of the Central America Court of 1917 regarding the character 
of the Gulf as a historical bay. 
108 
Cu(lr?fFonseca Case. at para.391; see also paras. 394 and 405. 
io•J Article 6 provides: "The vessels of India and Sri Lanka will enjoy in each other's waters such 
rights as they have traditionally enjoyed therein." For the text of the agreements, see International 
Alaritime Boundaries, Charney & Alexanders (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands 
( 1993 ), at pp. 1416-7. 
11° For discussion on the pearl fisheries' banks in the Gulf, see Chapter One/ Section Three. See 
also Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.9, at pp.784~5. 
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82 
______________ Chapter Two 
Historic title in Article 12 of the 1958 Convention 
In the ILC report of 1953 m~ntion was made of fishing rights as a ground 
which might justify a departure from the median line. 111 However, in subsequent 
I LC reports reference to these rights was omitted. At the Geneva Conference of 
1958 the Norwegian representative submitted a proposal, inter alia, to introduce 
the concept of 'prescriptive usage' or 'historic title' as a ground to justify a 
departure from the median line system. 112 The concept of 'historic title' was 
thereafter adopted into Article I 2 at the sixteenth meeting, by 25 votes to 13 with 
31 abstentions. However, Article 12 does not clarify the meaning of historic title, 
nor does it provide any guidelines which could be helpful in determining the 
scope of historic title or waters. This difficulty in clarifying the meaning of 
historic title has been stressed in the judgement of the Tunisia v. Libya Case. The 
World Court stated that: 
113 
Historic titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long usage. In 
this connection ... there is neither a definition of the concept nor an elaboration of the juridical 
. f I. . 114 I. . · b 115 regime o 11stonc waters or 11stonc ays ... 
111 The report of the Committee of Experts on Technical Questions Concerning the Territorial 
Sea, 1953, answer to question six. The report is reproduced in English in the North Sea Cases 
Pleading, vol. I, at pp.254-8. The French version is in !LC Yearbook (1953), at p.77, et seq. 
112 There are two forms of prescription in the law, extinctive prescription and acquisitive 
prescription. We mean by the former "the loss of a claim by failure to prosecute it within a 
reasonable time"; by the latter "a title to something, e.g. a territory,. .. acquired by prescription, i.e. 
by the lapse of time under certain circumstances." The latter, not the former, is relevant to the 
concept of historic title. See The Study, op. cit., n.97, at para. 62; Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.9, at 
pp. 705-8. On extinctive prescription. see Lauterpacht, H.. The Function of law in the 
lnternatio11al Community. Clarendon Press, Oxford ( 1933), at pp.93-4. 
11
' Tunisia v. Lihya Case. at para. I 00. 
11
•
1 The Cou11 in the Fisheries Case defined the term "historic water" as follows: "By historic 
waters are usually meant waters which are treated as internal waters but which would not have 
that character were it not for the existence of an historic title." See the Fisheries Case, at p.130. 
115 A historic bay is a bay where a general rule o(international law in regard to the bay does not 
apply. In other words, it is a bay in accordance with the notion of historic title and not the general 
rule of delimitation. For a discussion on the relation between historic waters and historic bays, see 
Bouchez, op. cit., n.98, at p.199, Judge Torres Bernardes in his separate opinion in the Gulf of 
Fonseca Case, ICJ Reports 1992, at p.714, para.179. For the rules for regarding an indentation in 
the coast as a bay, see A11icle 7 of the 1958 TSCZ Convention. For analysis of whether the 
concept of historic waters is an exception to the rules laid down in a general convention, see 
Clark, op. cit., n.98, at pp.69-77; The Study, op. cit., n.97, at pp.7-13, paras.42-79. 
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The status of Article 12 in customary law 
Many jurists who have written about the delimitation of territorial sea have 
avoided discussing the issue of the status of Article 12 in customary law. 116 This 
may be due to the fact that there have been few cases in this sphere, in 
comparison with the cases on continental shelf delimitation, which have been put 
before I CJ or international arbitration tribunals. Furthermore, the UN CLOS III 
adopted A11icle 12 of the 1958 Convention almost without change in the 1982 
Convention as Article 15. It is noteworthy that Hungdan Chiu used this as 
evidence of its status as a part of the rules of customary law. He wrote that: 
it may be argued that article 12 of the Convention has received prior acquiescence in the 
international community. This view is confirmed by the absence of challenge to the adoption of 
an almost identical article at UNCLOS 111. 
117 
In a similar manner, Prosper Weil stated that: 
the delimitation of the territorial sea is governed by the equidistance/special circumstances rule, 
[which was established] by Article 12 of the 1958 Convention in the Territorial sea and 
Contiguous Zone and incorporated without any difficulty by UNCLOS 111 in Article 15 of the 
1982 Convention. [This] rule is generally regarded as having become pai1 of customary law for 
f . . I d 1. . . 11s purposes o temtona sea e rrrntat1on. 
Supporting or rejecting this argument requires a consideration of two essential 
questions: was the formula in Artiele 12 in its original a codification of customary 
law? If not, has it entered into customary law since the Geneva Convention on 
Territorial Sea came into force in 1964?
119 
Starting with the first question, we 
noted at an early stage in this chapter that there were no definite pre-1958 rules of 
customary law governing the delimitation of territorial sea boundaries between 
opposite and adjacent states. It follows that Article 12 of the Geneva Convention 
did not. in this view. codify existing rules of customary law regarding the 
11
" Shaw. for example. did not examine the question of territorial sea delimitation as a whole, 
although he analysed the issue of continental shelf boundary delimitation and the status of Article 
6 in customary law. See Shaw. op. cil .. n.25, at pp.380-7. Similarly see Churchill and Lowe, The 
Law <flhe Sea. Manchester University Press, New rev.ed., Manchester ( 1988), Chapter Ten. 
117 Chiu. op. cil., n.94. at p.7. To the same effect. see Degan, V. D., "Equitable Principles in 
Maritime Delimitations," lmernational law al 1he Time of its Codificalion, Essay in Honour of 
Roberto Ago, vol. 2. Milano-Dott.A. Giuffre Editore ( 1987), at p.129. 
118 w ·1 . 14 I "6 et . op. ell .. n._ . at p. -' . . 
119 For a distinction between codification and development of international law, see Oppenheim 's, 
op. cil .. n.9. at pp. I I 0-4. 
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delimitation of territorial sea, and the matter was regarded as an exercise m 
progressive development. 
What remains now is to see whether or not Article 12 has since come to form 
a part of the general corpus of customary law. In order to look at this question, we 
have to consider first the rules and elements required for an article contained in a 
multilateral convention to be transferred into a customary norm of law. The ICJ in 
the North Sea Cases.~· indicated these rules and elements as follows. 120 
Fundamental norm creating character 
In order for a provision to achieve such character, three conditions must be 
fulfilled: 
(1) The priority (primacy) of the rule 
For a rule or a formula in a multilateral convention to be regarded as forming 
the basis for a general rule of customary law, it should have a primacy 
application. If it has no such status, it would be "an unusual preface to what is 
claimed to be general rule of law." 121 As far as the median line is concerned, there 
is a prohibition in Article 12 against the extension of the boundary line beyond 
the median line, save where there is an agreement to that effect, or a special 
circumstance or historic title is present in the area of the delimitation to permit 
such extension. Therefore the general rule in Article 12 is the median line. The 
agreement between the parties, historic title and special circumstance are all 
exceptions to the general rule. 
(2) The faculty of making reservations to the rule 
In the North Sea Cases the Court recalled that the faculty to make 
reservations had been restricted for Articles 1-3 inclusive of the 1958 Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, but had been unrestricted in respect of the rest of the 
articles in the said Convention, including Article 6. The Court, therefore, 
120 North Sea Cases. at paras. 70-81. See also Brownlie, op. cit., n.16, at pp.4-7. 
121 North Sea Cases, at para.72. 
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concluded that ''the convention itself .... would ... seem to deny to the provisions of 
Article 6 the same norm-creating character as ... Articles 1 and 2 possess." 122 
This is not the case for the Territorial Sea Convention, which remained silent 
on the whole question of the faculty of making a reservation. So, for these 
matters, we can derive benefit by referring to Article 19 of the Vienna 
Convention on the law of Treaties of 1969, 123 which was worded as follows: 
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, formulate a 
reservation unless: 
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in 
question, may be made; or 
(c) in cases not falling under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty. 
Therefore, the faculty of making a reservation 111 the Territorial Sea 
Convention is permitted where the reservation is compatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty. 124 So, in tl~e case of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone Convention, one might conclude that at least as a matter of form the articles 
of the Convention in toto are on the same plane. As far as A11icle 12 is concerned, 
there was only one reservation which had been made in regard to Article 12, and 
this by the Government of Venezuela. However, this reservation was not made in 
order to reject the median line system. 125 
(3) The provision which is claimed to be a potential general rule should be free 
from any unresolved controversies 
This, it can be argued, is not the case in Article 12 where the exact meaning 
and scope of the notion of special circumstances is still ambiguous. This 
I~~ Ibid. 
1 ~' For more discussion of the right of a state to make a reservation to multilateral convention, see 
Harris. op. cit .. n.6. at pp. 753-7; Sinclair, op. cit., pp. 55-60; Reuter, P., lntroduc~ion to the law 
rfTreaties. Kegan Paul International. London (1995), at pp.77-84; Brownlie, op. cit., n.16, at pp. 
608-10. 
l:!·I This raises a question about compatibility: whether or not the reservation becomes compatible 
with the "object and purpose of the treaty." The Vienna Convention on the law of the Treaties of 
1969, Brownlie held, seems to have no clear cut answer to this question and the matter is left to 
the appreciation of the individual state. See Brownlie, op. cit., n.16, at p.611. 
125 Venezuela's reservation was solely to assert that the following area "in the Gulf of Paria and 
zones adjacent thereto; the area between the coast of Venezuela and island of Aruba and the Gulf 
of Venezuela" should be taken as involving special circumstances. See Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited with the Sec:retw:)J-General. UN, New York ( 1986), at p. 679. 
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ambiguity ""may raise [some] doubts as to the potentially norm-creating character 
of the rule." 126 However, this weakness is remedied to some extent by the general 
understanding that the presence of one of the three factors mentioned in the 
commentary of the I LC report of 1956, namely "any exceptional configuration of 
the coast, as well as the presence of islands or of navigable channels," 127 may 
constitute a special circumstance. 
Generality of the practice 
The condition which was laid down by the Court in the Nori h Sea Cases for 
examining the generality of state practice, is that it "should have been both 
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked--and 
should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition 
that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved." 128 
To examine state practice in regard to Article 12 in the light of this condition, 
one may recall up the following factors. Thirty-three years have elapsed since the 
Convention came into force in 1964, and around forty-six countries have ratified 
the Convention. Further, the tendency in the national legislation of coastal states, 
since the 1958 Conference, has been to adopt the median line system or the 
equidistance line to determine the boundary line. This tendency is reflected in the 
practice of both states which are, and those which are not, parties to the 1958 
Convention. 129 
1 :.<, /\' I " c· 7" 'ort 1 .1ea ases, at para. L 
1:.'7 /LC >'ear/wok ( 1956), vol. 2, at p. 300. para.37; Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.9, at p.614. 
i:.·::'North Sea Cases. at para. 74. 
i:.•> Example of this legislation are as follows: France: The 1971 Jaw in the extending of the 
territorial waters. Art. 2.- India: The Maritime Zone Act of 1976. Art. 9( I).- Japan: The Law 
no.30 of 1977 on the Territorial Sea. Art. I. - Pakistan: Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone 
Act of 1976. Art. 7( I )(a). - The Former USSR: The 1960 Regulation on Territorial Sea, Art. 3. 
- Guvana The Maritime Boundary Act of 1977, Art.34.- Republic of Korea: The Territorial 
Sea Act of 1977, Art. 4.- Sufiln: The Act no. I 0 of 1977 Concerning The Territorial Sea, Art. 4. 
-Tanzania: The Proclamation of 1973 on the Extent of the Territorial Sea.- Kuwait: Decree of 
1967, Art. 4.- Uruguay: Decree of 1969.- Oman: Decree of 1972, Art.7.- Saudi Arabia 
Decree of 1949, Art. 8.- Iran: The Marine Areas Act of 1993, Act.4.- Emirate of Sharjah 
Supplementary Decree of 1970 Concerning the Territorial Sea of the Emirate, Article 4.- The 
UAE Federal Law no.19 of 1993 in the Delimitation of the Maritime Zone. Art. 23( I). 
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This number of ratifications of the Convention, and the tendency to adopt the 
formula of the median line in national legislation, is sufficient to show that state 
practice has become a "settled practice" in the sense of being extensive and 
uniform, with evidence to suggest that a rule of customary international law has 
crystallized. Moreover, this uniformity and wide range of practice was fortified 
by the adoption of the formula of Article 12 into the 1982 Convention under 
Article 15, which has now entered into force. 130 
Opinio juris 131 
When states apply a provision which is claimed to be a general rule of law (in 
this case the obligation of using the median line), they should believe that this 
practice or action "is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it." 132 The mandatory status of Article 12 is demonstrated by the 
widespread acceptance in the national legislation of coastal states of the use the 
median line system, as the only method in the delimitation process, where the 
. d 1 . 133 parties o not agree ot 1erw1se. 
Do One hindered and twenty two states have hithe110 ratified the 1982 Convention, see Chapter 
One. 
DI For further discussion on opinio juris, see Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.9, at p.28. 
D
2 North Sea Cases, at para. 77. See also·Ibid. 
i:n It is wo11h mentioning here that it is superfluous to cite the treaties which have concluded 
between coastal states concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundaries, if the intention is 
to illustrate the general acceptance of the median line system. This is due to the fact that coastal 
states have the right in Article 12 to agree to be excluded from the obligation of using the median 
line system. This exclusion does not mean that they are rejecting the median line as a general rule 
in the territorial sea delimitation, it only means that they are exercising a right which had been 
given. in Article 12. to the coastal states. Therefore, the treaties of maritime boundary 
delimitation which were concluded between various numbers of coastal states are not the proper 
place to seek the widespread acceptance by states to the formula of the median lin.e in Article 12. 
Nonetheless. states practice, i.e. the maritime delimitation agreements, still have an important role 
to play in the subject of maritime delimitation: "it does provide important evidence of the way in 
which states have dealt with peculiar geographical, historical and other factors. In this sense, 
states practice retains legal and practical relevance. Even though it does not reflect a principle of 
customary international law, it shows that a number of delimitation methods, or combinations of 
methods, may be employed depending on the facts and circumstances of each case." See Bundy, 
R .. "States Practice in Maritime Delimitation," Maritime Boundaries, World Boundaries, vol. 5, 
Gerald Blake (ed.) ( 1994), at p.24. See also Charney, op. cit., n.42 at p.228; Weil, op. cit., n.14, at 
pp.120-2. 
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Conclusion 
Article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea was not in its origins 
or inception declaratory of a mandatory rule of customary law enjoining the use 
of the median line for the delimitation of the territorial sea between opposite or 
adjacent states. However, the subsequent practice of states in using the median 
line should, as we have seen, be regarded as having produced such a norm of 
customary law. This view was accepted in the specific context of the United Arab 
Emirates in the decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Dubai/Shwjah Award 
of 1981. This case, it will be recalled, concerned the land and maritime boundary 
delimitation between two adjacent Emirates' members of the UAE Federation. 
Hence the boundary between the parties does not possess an international 
character. Usually the applicable law in disputes such as this would be the federal 
law, but in the UAE there is no separate federal law on the matter of boundary 
delimitation between the component units of the federation. Therefore, "recourse 
b d . . 1 1 " 134 b . 1 b must e ma e to mternat1ona aw or, to e precise, to customary aw, ecause 
the treaty law was not applicable in the present case due to the fact that the U AE 
had not become party to the Geneva Convention of 1958. 135 The Court of 
Arbitration, nevertheless, constructed a boundary line between the two Emirates' 
territorial seas "according to the principles laid down in Article 12 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone." 136 
D·I Duhai/Shwiah Award, at p.586, see also p. 587. 
1:1:> Ibid .. at p.658. 
1:1<> Jb'd 66"' I ., at p. -'· 
89 

Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
As was noted earlier, this chapter will be dedicated to the examination of the 
rules of continental shelf boundary delimitation. The discussion is of particular 
interest, since it will provide the rules that govern the potential delimitation of the 
UAE continental shelf boundary, which we shall examine in the remaining part of 
the thesis. At first sight, this might suggest that our discussion should be limited 
to the rules of customary law, since the UAE is not party to the 1958 Continental 
Shelf Convention or the 1982 Convention. This is entirely true. However, as we 
shall see, the development in the rules of customary law have not been isolated 
from the rules of the 1958 Convention. Rather are they intimately connected with 
these rules. This association between customary law and the formula in the 1958 
Convention has also had some influence on the formulation of the rules of the 
1982 Convention concerning the delimitation question. Therefore it is not only 
justifiable, but also necessary, to explain the rules of delimitation in the 1958 
Convention and the 1982 Convention when examining the rules of customary law 
on this issue. 
The concepts of special and relevant circumstances have an important role in 
the delimitation process. No single international decision concerning a maritime 
boundary delimitation has been made where such concepts have not been claimed 
by the parties involved. A number of factors and features have been claimed 
before third-party settlement as special or relevant circumstances, so.me of which 
have been accepted. some rejected. We shall examine the most common factors in 
terms of their being accepted or .not by a third-party settlement. This chapter, 
therefore, has been divided into two sections: ( 1) the rules of continental shelf 
boundary delimitation; (2) the concept of special/relevant circumstances. 
Chapter Three 
Section One 
The rules of continental shelf boundary delimitation 
The period prior to the /LC 
We have seen in Chapter One that the Truman Proclamation of 1945 marked 
the beginning of coastal states' rights to claim exclusive jurisdiction over the 
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil area. The boundary of the US continental 
shelf, according to the Proclamation, was to be determined by the US government 
and other states concerned in accordance with equitable principles. 1 A number of 
coastal states followed the Truman Proclamation in asserting jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf area,2 but only a small number, including the UAE,3 copied the 
Truman Proclamation in adopting equitable principles in the delimitation of the 
continental shelf. However, neither the Truman Proclamation nor the subsequent 
proclamations of these states adopted a practical method to be used to achieve a 
delimitation in accordance with such equitable principles. Therefore one may 
describe state practice in the delimitation of shelf boundaries in the period prior to 
the ILC as one characterized by vagueness and uncertainly.4 
The work of the /LC 
The uncertainty of pre-existing state practice was mirrored in the early work 
of the ILC from 1950 to 1953. In 1951, for instance, a draft article was put up for 
discussion suggesting that continental shelf boundaries be determined by 
agreement. Failing agreement, the parties would be under an obligation to refer 
the matter to arbitration to fix the boundary line according to the ex aequo el 
hono5 principle. 6 The suggestion of determining the boundary by agreement was 
acceptable to several members of the ILC. In contrast, the obligation to have the 
1 United Nations Legislative Series, laws and Regulations on the regime of the High Seas, vol. I 
( 1951 ). at pp.38-40. 
2 See Chapter One/Section Three. 
:; Ibid. 
•
1 See Brown, E.D., Sea-Bed EnerpJ' and Minerals: The International legal Regime, vol. I, 
Continental Shelf, 2nd ed, Martin us N ijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1992), at p. 62. 
5 For more discussion on the principle of ex aequo et bono, see Chapter Seven. 
6 !LC Yearbook ( 1951 }, vol.2, at p.143. 
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boundary fixed by arbitration aroused considerable opposition.7 In 1953 a 
distinction was drawn between the treatment of opposite and adjacent coasts. As 
in the case of territorial sea delimitation, the median line system was suggested 
for delimitation between opposite states, and the principle of equidistance was 
suggested for delimitation between adjacent states. 8 Furthermore, the departure 
from the median line system or the principle of equidistance was justified by the 
concept of special circumstance.9 Finally, in the 1956 report of the ILC, the 
formula of the median line and the equidistance principle was adopted as Article 
72.1() 
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf 
The text of draft Article 72 of the ILC final report of 1956 was incorporated 
into Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention without major revision. 
However, the concept of special circumstances, although it was finally adopted 
almost unchanged in the Convention, was one of the most controversial matters in 
the Geneva Conference of 1958. This controversy will be the subject of further 
detailed discussion in a later section of this chapter. 11 
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention provides: 
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose 
coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States 
shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless 
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, 
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. 
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the 
boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement 
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by 
special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of 
cquidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea of each State is measured. 
Article 6 provides the following three rules for determining the continental 
shelf boundary: ( 1) a boundary line may be determined by agreement; (2) a 
7 
/LC Yearbook (1953). vol. I. at p.106. para.38. 
8 Ibid .. at para. 37. 
C) Ibid., at p.131, para.14. 
10 /LC }'earhook ( 1956), vol.2, at p.300, para.37. 
11 See below at pp.129-32. 
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boundary line may be justified by special circumstances; (3) a boundary line may 
be drawn in accordance with the median line or equidistance principle. Each will 
now be discussed in turn (except the concept of special circumstance which will 
be analysed thoroughly in a separate section at a later stage of the present 
chapter). 
(l) A boundary line determined by agreement either express or de facto 12 
Parties, in the absence of rules of jus cogens, have complete freedom 13 to 
derogate from the rules of law. 14 That why Article 6 "does not indicate any 
criteria for determining the boundaries" by agreement. 15 Hence the parties are 
under no obligation to adopt in their agreement the equidistance line or to seek an 
equitable result in the delimitation. 16 However, if the parties-after they have 
entered into negotiations in good faith 17 and "with a genuine intention to achieve 
12 This can be done, the Chamber in the Gu(( of Maine Case said, by "the conclusion of a direct 
agreement, or if need be, by some alternative method, which must, however, be based on 
consent." (para 89) Moreover, the provi..5ion of determining the boundary by agreement would 
mean in practice that "any unilateral claim for the delimitation of the continental shelf would not 
be regarded as valid under international law." (See Judge Oda's dissenting opinion in the Tunisia 
v. Lihya Case. at p.246, para.144; Gu(( of /1,1/aine Case, at para.87; Judge Shahabuddeen 's separate 
opinion in the Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at p.150; see also Chapter Two/Section One above.) 
These principles, the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case held "are principles already clearly 
affirmed by customary international law, principles which ... are undoubtedly of general 
application, valid for all States and in relation to all kinds of maritime delimitation." Gulf of 
Maine Case, at para. 90. See here the remark of Professor Brown on the Chamber interpretation: 
Brown, E.D., The UN Convention on the law of the Sea 1982, A Guide for National Policy 
Making, Book 3: Maritime Zones, II exclusive economic zone and continental she((, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, London ( 1991 ), at p.92. 
D c.f with the situation under Article 83( I) of the 1982 Convention, see below at p. I 18. 
14 
North Sea Casess, at para.72. See also Jimenez de Arechaga, "The Conception of Equity in 
Maritime Delimitation," International law at the Time of its Codification, Essay in Honour of 
Roberto Ago, vol. 2, M ilano-Dott.A. Giuffre Edi tore ( 1987), at p.233; Bundy, R., "States Practice 
in Maritime Delimitation.·· Maritime Boundaries, World Boundaries, vol. 5, Gerald Blake (ed.) 
( 1994 ). at p.24. Interestingly. this complete freedom has lead some scholars to suggest that "the 
reference to delimitation by agreement is, strictly speaking, unnecessary." See Caflisch, L., 
''Maritime Boundary Delimitation." 11 EPll ( 1989). at p.213. 
I'.' See Judge Oda 's separate opinion in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at p. I 03, para.51. 
Elsewhere Judge Oda held that "the rule calling for delimitation by agreement remains simply a 
rule concerning procedure and cannot constitute a principle or rule of delimitation." Judge Oda, 
op. cit .. n.12, at p.194. para. 60. · 
((, Judge Shahabuddeen. op. cit .. n.12. at p.150; Jennings, R.Y., "The Principles Governing 
Marine Boundaries," Staal und Volkerrechtsordnung, Festschrift fur Karl Doehring ( 1989), at 
p.402. 
17 For further discussion of the principle of good faith, see Fitzmaurice, G., The law and 
Procedure of the International Court l?f.Justice 1947-59, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
( 1995). at pp.800-29; Cheng, B., General Principles of law as applied by International Court 
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a positive result" 
18
-fail to reach an agreement, and the matter is thus to be 
referred to judicial settlement, there would be no similar freedom afforded to the 
court or tribunal. Rather its power should, in theory, be limited, in the absence of 
special circumstances, to the median line-equidistance principle that is enunciated 
in Article 6 19-where the 1958 Convention is applicable between the parties-
whether this application would lead to an equitable result or not. 20 However, as 
we shall see, the general tendency. in international decision is to equate Article 6 
with the rules of customary law. This has given the World Court or ad hoc 
tribunal the power to apply equity, and thus to decide an equitable result where 
the application of the formula of Article 6 would produce, in the view of the 
. . bl l ?( court, an mequ1ta e resu t.-
(2) A boundary line drawn in accordance with the median line or 
equidistance principle 
Article 6 distinguished between the case of opposite states and that of 
adjacent states. In the former the boundary line is the median line, whereas in the 
case of the latter the boundary line is a lateral equidistance line. 220n various 
occasions, however, it was alleged that "a median line will normally effect a 
broadly equitable delimitation [but] a lateral eqidistance line ... may not 
infrequently result in an inequitabte delimitation by reason of the distorting effect 
of individual geographical features. "23 Figure 4 below illustrated this distorting 
and Tribunals, Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1994 ), at pp. I 05-
60; White, G., "The Principle of Good Faith," The United Nations and the Principles of 
/111ernu1ionul Luw, Essays in memmy <?l Michael Akehurst, Lowe V. and Warbrick C. (eds.), 
Routledge. London ( 1996), at pp.230-55. 
111 
Cu(( <?f /\1/aine Case. at para. 87. 
1
'' Brown. op. cit .. n.4. at p.343; O'Connell. D.P .. The International law of the Sea, vol. I, Shearer 
(cd.),Clarendon Press. Oxford (1982). at p.700. 
20 
Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at p.157. 
21 Anglo/French Arbitration. at para. 84. See also Brown, op. cit., n.4, at p.355. For a comment on 
the Court view, see Jennings, op. cit .. n.16. at p.400 and p.402. 
22 For the advantages of using the equidistance line, see North Sea Casess, at paras.22-3. 
2 ~ Anglo/French Arbitration. at para.95: North Sea Casess, at paras.58 and 89; Brown, E.D., The 
Legal Regime of Hydrospace, Stevens & Sons, London ( 1971 ), at p.72; O'Connell, op. cit., n.19, 
at pp.684-5. See Whiteman. M.M., Digest of International law, vol. 4, Department of State 
Publication. Washington ( 1965). at p.908. For a different view, see Weil, P., The law of Maritime 
Delimitation-Reflection. Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge ( 1989), at p.247. 
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effect caused by an island belonging to Oceania and situated opposite to 
Australis. 
I 1·n11i1111~ of median lines when nn island belonging to Oceania 1s present 
Ttirm1nus ,,f median 
-- line wt1er. no islands 
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Figure: (5) The distorting effect of an island on the 
equdistance line between two adjacent states. 
Source: Map distributed at Workshop on Geographical 
and Technical Considerations in Maritime Boundary 
Delimitations. University Of Durham. International 




Despite the differences between the median line system and the principle of 
equidistance one may have thought that they both have, in the absence of 
agreement and special circumstances, under Article 6 the status of mandatory 
rules. the former in regard to the delimitation between opposite states and the 
latter in regard to adjacent states.
24 
This mandatory status is to be used as a 
starting point in the delimitation process, which then may be adjusted where 
necessary by special circumstances. 25 This could give the feeling that the median 
line-equidistance principle is the general rule and special circumstances an 
. 1 . 1 26 exception to t 11s ru e. 
However. such an interpretation was not upheld by the Court of Arbitration in 
the Anglo/French Arbitration, where Article 6 was applied for the first time in 
international adjudication. both States (UK and France) being parties to the 1958 
Convention. The Court's own interpretation was that the formula of Article 6 has 
created a combined equidistance-special circumstances rule, which means that 
""the obligation to apply the equid~stance principle is always one qualified by the 
condition 'unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances. "'27 
The differences between the two interpretations are: ( 1) under the first the 
burden of proof falls upon the state alleging special circumstances.28 Under the 
second interpretation, however, there is no burden of proof on the claiming state, 
since special circumstances and the equidistance principle combine to form one 
single rule;29 (2) under the interpretation of the court the equidistance principle 
2
.i Gu({ of Maine Case, at para.118; Libya v. Malta Case, at para. 65; Judge Gros's dissenting 
opinion in the Gu({ of Maine Case, at p.387, para.46; Judge Weeramantry's separate opinion in 
the Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at p.264, para.195; Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at 
p.157. 
_s Judge Shahabuddeen. op. cil., n.12. at pp.144-7 and p.149: O'Connell, op. cit., n.19, at pp.699-
705: Brown. op. cit .. n.4, at p. I 07. 
:!<> Brown. op. cit .. n.4. at p. I 07: O'Connell, op. cit .. n.19, at p. 705. An opposite view was held by 
Judge Fischer in his dissenting opinion in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at pp.305-6, paras.6-
8. 
27 Anglo/French Arhitration, at para. 70 .. In other words, as the tribunal in the France/Canada 
.. hrnrd said. it has not provided "for equidistance 'tout court' but equidistance when there are no 
special circumstances." France/Canada Award, at para. 41. See Judge Shahabuddeen's comment 
on this single rule. Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at p.139. Similarly, see the comment of 
Professor Bowett in his book. The legal Regime of Islands in International law, Oceana 
Publications Inc., New York ( 1979), at pp.149-151. See below for more discussion at pp. I 15-7. 
28 Brown, op. cil., n.4, at p.355. 
29 Professor Briggs's dee laration to the A ward, 54 I LR, at p. 126. 
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has no special status. Its application to any particular case is qualified by the 
condition that there are no special circumstances which may require a departure 
from the equidistance line. Whereas under the first interpretation the equidistance 
principle should be used as a starting point, that may be adjusted at a later stage. 
These differences, O'Connell held, "may appear to be verbal, but psychologically 
it is important because of the. order in which the concepts are arranged 
diplomatically or judicially."30 
Thus, in summary, we can make the following observation about the formula 
in Article 6. We have seen that the treaty obligation to apply the median line or 
the equidistance principle can be excluded in two cases: ( 1) where the parties 
reached an agreement~ (2) where special circumstances are present in the 
delimitation area. Otherwise parties to the 1958 Convention should adapt the 
median line or the equidistance principle as the boundary line between their 
respective continental shelf areas.31 The Court in the Anglo/French Arbitration, 
as noted, added one more condition for the obligation to apply the equidistance 
line; this was, where no other line is justified by special circumstances.32 
Delimitation of the continental shelf in customary law 
A dispute arose in the North Sea region between Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), concerning the delimitation of their 
respective continental shelf boundaries. The Netherlands and Denmark were 
parties to the Geneva Convention of 1958. By way of contrast, the FRG was not. 
The Netherlands and Denmark insisted on the use of the equidistance principle, 
which was expressed in Article 6(2) of the Geneva Convention, on the ground 
that it had come into the general corpus of international law. However~ the FRG 
rejected such an argument and assumed that the delimitation of the continental 
shelf between the parties was governed by "the principle that each coastal state is 
entitled to a just and equitable share."33 The court in the North Sea Cases was 
:w O'Connell, op. cit., n.19, at p.705. 
:;i Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at pp.157-9. 
:;
2 See below for more discussion at pp.11.6-8. 
:;:; North Sea Casess, at para.15. 
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charged with identifying the principles and rules of international law that "are 
applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of the area of the continental 
shelf in the North Sea which appertain to each of them."34 Starting with the 
argument of the Netherlands and Denmark that the equidistance principle had 
become part of customary law, the court concluded that: 
the Geneva Convention was not in its origins or inception declaratory of a mandatory rule of 
customary international law enjoining the use of the equidistance principle for the delimitation 
of the continental shelf areas between adjacent States; neither has its subsequent effect been 
constitutive of such a rule; and that States practice up-to-date has equally been insufficient for 
the purpose .... [Thus] the use of the equidistance method is not obligatory for the 
delimitation ... in the present [case].:;5 
Having stated that Article 6(2) had not passed into the general corpus of 
international law, the Court went on to identify the legal rules and principles of 
customary law that could be said to govern the delimitation of the continental 
shelf, and the method, if any, that could be used in drawing the boundary line.36 
These legal rules and principles are: (a) the parties are under an obligation to 
enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement; (b) the parties are 
under an obligation to take account of all circumstances, and to ensure that 
equitable principles are applied; ( c) the continental shelf of any state must be the 
natural prolongation of its land territory. 37 We shall now go on to examine these 
ideas more closely. 
(1) The obligation to enter into negotiations 
One of the fundamental norms of the Charter of the United Nations is that 
states "shall settle their internatio~al disputes by peaceful means",38 one of these 
being to "seek a solution by negotiations."39 This obligation, in the context of the 
continental shelf. was reinforced by Article 6 of the 1958 Convention, and it was 
'·




-" North Sea Cases.\·, at paras.81-2, see also para.69. Professor Brown, however, criticized the 
Court finding that Article 6 had not been established in customary law. See Brown, op. cit., n.4, at 
p. 74. See also Weil, op. cit., n.23. at pp.143-4. 
><·See the reaction of Sir Report Jennings to the Court decision; Jennings, op. cit., n. I 6, at pp.399-
400. 
'7 " North Sea Cases.\·, at para. 85. 
·
111 Article 2(3) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
·'"Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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confirmed by the World Court in the North Sea Cases. In the latter case, however, 
the obligation to negotiate the boundary was linked with the concept of equitable 
principles.
40 
In addition, the Court in the 1969 case imposed upon the parties the 
obligation that the negotiation should be meaningful and that there should not be 
the insistence, from either side, upon its "own position without contemplating any 
modification of it."41 
Notwithstanding, the obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to 
arriving at an agreement in accordance with equitable principles "should not...be 
taken to mean that delimitation by agreement is the only possible solution, for 
otherwise no settlement could ever be reached in the event of a failure to agree,"42 
nor should it be understood to "imply an obligation to reach an agreement."43 
Rather, the obligation to enter into negotiations, like the case under Article 6, 
means that that obligation is one of the means which, in so far as the case of 
continental shelf delimitation is concerned, has priority of use before any of the 
other methods specified in Article 6 of the 1958 continental shelf Convention. 
(2) Relevant circumstances 
The idea of the uniqueness of each boundary, and that each case, therefore, 
should be considered and judged on its own merits, lead the Court in the Nori h 
Sea Cases to assert that the equitable delimitation for any case could only be 
achieved by the consideration of all relevant circumstances which are present in 
the area concerned.
44 
The Court went on to list some relevant circumstances 
which should be taken into account in order to reach an equitable result. These 
factors include: 45 (1) the general configuration of the coasts of the parties, as well 
·
10 See below at p. I 03. For an observation on the Court linking the obligation to negotiate with the 
concept of equitable principes. see Jennings, op. cit., n.16, at pp.402-3. 
·
11 North Sea Cases.,·, at para.85(a). See also Charney. J. I., "Progress in International Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation Law,'· 88 A.Ill (1994), at p.228. 
·
12 Caflisch, op. cit., n.14, at p. 216 . 
. u The PCIJ Advisory Opinion of 1931 on the Railway Traffic Lithuania and Poland. See World 
Court Reports, A collection of the .Judgements, Orders and Opinions of the Permanent Court of 
International .Justice, Manley Hudson (ed.), vol. 11 ( 1927- I 939), no 34, at p.756. Also published 
in PCIJ Reports Series AIB-N°42, at pp. I 08-23 . 
.i.i North Sea Cases.\·, at para. I 0 I (C)( I). 
•
15 Ibid .. at para. I 0 I (D). See below for more discussion on the concept of relevant circumstances. 
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as the presence of any special or unusual features; (2) the physical and geological 
structure, (3) the unity of any deposit; ( 4) the element of a reasonable degree of 
propo11ionality. 
(3) Equity and equitable principles 
The President Truman Proclamation, as noted earlier, was the first of its kind 
on the subject of the continental shelf. The Proclamation adopted the concept of 
equitable principles to determine the boundary of the US continental shelf. This 
concept, however, was not embodied in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.
46 
In 1969 the World Court in the North Sea Cases reintroduced the equitable 
principles saying that: "delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance 
with equitable principles."47 The Court, in addition, asserted that there is "a rule 
of law that calls for the application of equitable principles."48 Subsequent 
international decisions on maritime boundary delimitation have emphasized the 
important role of equity and equitable principles in the delimitation of a shelf 
49 boundary. 
The characteristics of equity 
In general, rules of law have certain common characteristics. These usually 
include some element of consistency and a degree of predictability.50 In contrast, 
""equity", which has been described on various occasions as a part of the law, is 
46 This is not to suggest that equity has no role in the formula of delimitation in the 1958 
Convention. Indeed the adoption of special circumstances rule, as· "an escape clause", in Article 6 
was to avoid any inequitable result in the delimitation. see Jennings, op. cit., n.16, at p.400. 
·
17 North Sea Cases.\·, at paras. I 0 I (C)( I) and 90. 
H Ibid .. at para.88. For a comment on the Court view, see Jennings, op. cit., n.16, at pp.400-1. 
·l'J The court in the lihya v. Malta Case, for example, held that: "The normative character of 
equitable principles applied as a part of general international law is important· because these 
principles govern not only delimitation by adjudication or arbitration, but also, and indeed 
primarily. the duty of parties to seek first a delimitation by agreement, which is also to seek an 
equitable result." lihya v. Malta Case, at para.46. See also Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras.111-2. 
Moreover, the equitable principles for delimitation had not only been accepted in customary law, 
but also. as we shall see, in Article 83 of the 1982 Convention. 
50 Libya v. Malta Case, at para.45. This predictability, however, would be diminished, where 
there is a rule of law allowing a departure from the legal rules, e.g., the concept of special 
circumstances in Article 6. See Lowe, V., "The Role of Equity in International Law," 12 The 
Australian Year Book of International law ( 1992), at p.75. 
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characterized by vagueness, uncertainty and unpredictability. 51 Moreover, there is 
no clear cut definition of equity, 52 nor are there guidelines on how to use equity 
in shelf delimitation.
53 
For example, in the North Sea Cases, the Court has been 
criticized as having regarded "the inequalities caused by the differences between 
coastal and landlocked states, or between states with long and short coastlines, as 
facts of nature which have to be accepted while the fact that one state's coastline 
is straight or convex, and another's is concave is 'unnatural"',54 and thus it 
requires adjustment to abate the inequity. 
However, having highlighted some negative aspects in the use of the concept 
of "equity", it is necessary to present its positive side. Using "equity" provides 
some kind of flexibility which gives a judge or arbitrator the chance to perform 
more easily a corrective and "a constructive role in the application of the law. "55 
The types of equity56 
The Court in the North Sea Cases distinguished equity, which it is under an 
obligation to apply as a part of international law,57 from a decision ex aequo et 
51 See Brown, op. cit., n.4, at pp.358-9; Judge Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at p.216, para.12. 
52 Equity was said to be synonymous with the meaning of "fair" or "reasonable". See Lauterpacht, 
E., Aspects of the Administration of International .Justice, Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, 
Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, Grotius Publications Limited, 
Cambridge ( 1991 ), at p. 118; Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford ( 1990), at p.62; Oppenheim 's International Law, 9th ed., vol. I, Peace, 
Jennings and Watts (eds.), Longman, London ( 1996), at p.43. See also the Anglo/French Award, 
at para. I 00; Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. 72; Gu(( of Maine Case, at paras.115, 196 and 220. 
Frank suggested the following definition for fairness. He wrote that fairness is " a human, 
subjective, contingent quality which merely captures in one word a process of discourse, 
reasoning, and negotiation leading, if successful, to an agreed formula located at a conceptual 
intersection between various plausible formulas for allocation." See Frank, T., Fairness in 
International Law and Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford ( 1995), at p.14. 
5 ~ It worth noting that a number of judges in the North Sea Case criticised the introduction of the 
notion of equity into the jurisprudence of the World Court. See for example the dissenting 
opinion of vice-president Koretsky to the case, ICJ Reports 1969, at p.166. 
5
·
1 Higgins. R., Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use It. Clarendon Press, 
Ox ford ( I 994 ). at p.226. 
55 Lauterpacht. op. cit .. n.52. at p.117; Jennings. op. cit., n.16, at p. 40 I; Lowe. op. cit., n.50. at 
pp.73-4. 
5
" For further discussion on the types of equity. see Lowe, op. cit., n.50, at pp. 56-67; Akehurst, 
M., "Equity and General Principles of Law,'' 25 ICLQ ( 1976). at pp.801-7; Lauterpacht. op. cit .. 
n.52, at pp.117-8. 
57 Hence, no special authority is necessary for its application. See Lowe, op. cit., n.50, at p.81; 
Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.52, at p.449; Akehurst, op. cit., n.56, at pp.802-5; Schwarzenberger and 
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"8 bono. · The difference between the two notions, says Scheuner, "lies in the 
attitude toward rules of law. The judge who refers to equity stays within the 
borders of existing law [even though the law be modified]. The judge deciding ex 
aequo et hono wins a greater freedom which dispenses him to some extent from 
I 1 1 d 
,,59 
t 1e ega or er. 
This distinction has been endorsed by subsequent international decisions. 60 A 
decision ex aequo el hono is an exercise of discretion which ''permits the judge to 
set aside existing rules of law" to reach an objective justice.61 So it is completely 
outside the applicable law, and the court or tribunal is not allowed to rest its 
decision upon that principle without an agreement from the parties concerned.62 
However, when the parties so agree, they release the adjudicative body "from the 
need to reach a decision on the basis of law."63 The repeated statement by the 
Hague Court and arbitral tribuna'l that the application of equity and equitable 
principles is not a decision ex aequo el bono, had been intended "to make an 
impression that it deals strictly and impartially on law."64 
The application of equity 
It is necessary to examine the issue of who is in charge of applying "equitable 
principles" and '"equity": is it the state or a third-party settlement (a judge, 
Brown, A Manual of International law, 6th ed., Professional Books Limited, Abingdon ( 1976), at 
p.197. 
58 North Sea Casess, at para.88. 
59 Scheuner, U., "Decision ex aequo et bona by International Courts and Arbitral Tribunals," 
International Arbitration Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke, Pieter Sanders (ed.), the 
Netherlands ( 1967), at p.282. See also Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at p.194; Habicht, M., 
The Power <f the International .Judge to Give A Decision Ex Aequo Et Bono, Constable & Co Ltd, 
London ( 1935). at p.68. 
''
0 
Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. 71; Gzi(f of Maine Case, at paras.59 and I 12; Libya v. Malta 
Case. at para. 45. See also Judge Weeramantry. op. cit., n.24. at p.2 I 8. 
<>1 Habicht. op. cit., n.59, at p.88. 
''~ Article 38(2) of the statutes of the International Court of Justice. See also North Sea Casess, at 
para. 88. For further discussion on a decision ex aequo et bono, see Chapter Seven. 
63 O'Connell, op. cit., n.19. at p.695. See also Swiss-French Free Zones Case, PCIJ Reports Series 
A-N° 24, at p. I 0: Tunisia v. Libya Case. at para. 71. 
,,., Degan. V. D .. ''Equitable Principles in Maritime Delimitations," International law at the Time 
<?lits Codffication, Essay in Honour of Roberto Ago, vol. 2, Milano-Dott.A. Giuffre Editore 
(1987). at p.127. See here Professor Miyoshi remark on the Court's distinguishing between equity 
and ex aequo et bono; Miyoshi, M., Consideration of Equity in the Settlement of Territorial and 
Boundw:v Disputes, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. the Netherlands (I 993), at p. I 92. 
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arbitrator or conciliator)? The latter, not the former, is required by international 
law to act in accordance with the "equitable principles" and "equity".65 The 
former, i.e. states, are only required, in law, to enter into negotiations in order to 
conclude an agreement. The Court in the North Sea Cases added that 
"delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable 
. . l ,,66 pnnc1p es. It should not, however, be assumed that the content of the 
agreement is "pre-determined by equitable principles. Such a conclusion would 
run counter to the freedom of States to enter or to decline to enter into treaties and 
freely to determine their content. If it were otherwise, the equitable principles 
referred to previously would have the quality ofjus cogens, which is certainly not 
1 
,,67 
t 1e case. 
To conclude, states, although under an obligation to enter into negotiations, 
are not obliged to apply equitable principles to the elaboration of any resulting 
68 
agreement. 
Reaching an equitable result 
The International Court of Justice and ad hoc arbitration bodies have at all 
times insisted upon the idea that the delimitation should be dealt with according 
to equitable principles, in order to arrive at an equitable result. 69 Two questions 
arise; firstly, what are equitable principles? Secondly, what is an equitable result 
in the delimitation? The former consists of the rules and principles which lead to 
<·~ Lauterpacht, op. cit .. n.52, at p.119. 
"'' North Sea Cases.\·, at paras. I 0 I (C)( I) and 90. See the remark of Sir Robert Jennings on the 
Court dictum; Jennings, op. cit., n.16. at pp.402-3. 
67 Caflisch. op. cit., n.14. at p.216. Judge Oda in his separate opinion in the Greenland v. Jan 
Mayen Case wrote that: ''Agreement between States is simply a result of diplomatic negotiations 
and is reached by the free will of the States concerned ... The deciding factors in such diplomatic 
negotiations are simply negotiating powers and the skills of each State's negotiator as well as the 
position. geographical and other, of each State." See Judge Oda, op. cit., n.15, at p. I 08, para.67. 
68 Judge Gros. op. cit .. n.24. at p.370. para.16. See also Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at 
p.150. 
''
9 The North Sea Casess. at paras. 10 I (C)( I) and 90. It is interesting to note that the term equity 
was invoked to describe the result and the means to be used to arrive at this result. Indeed, the 
Court itself acknowledged this in the Tunisia v. Libya Case, and asserted that it was not entirely 





The latter is a result which comes from examining, in the 
light of equitable requirements, the circumstances in the area concerned. 71 
Because the circumstances in every case are different from the next case, what 
constitutes an equitable result in one case may be inequitable in another. 72 Sir 
Robert Jennings described the concept of an equitable result as "a decision based 
upon nothing more than the Court's subjective appreciation of what appears to be 
a 'fair' compromise of the claims of either side."73 
But how does the court or arbitral tribunal reach an equitable result for the 
delimitation? Through an unexplained operation the court or arbitral tribunal 
appears to start the delimitation process by choosing a "boundary line which they 
believe to be 'equitable' ."74 Then they support that boundary line by selecting 
principles designed to achieve it. The principles used in this process are labelled 
as 'equitable principles' .75 An actual example may be found in the Dubai/Shwjah 
Award. The Court of Arbitration in this award asserted from the beginning that its 
task was to draw a new maritime boundary between the two parties by 
constructing an equidistant line between them. 76 The court however did not 
elaborate on the reasons why its task was to apply, for the delimitation between 
Dubai and Sharjah, the equidistance method, which is expressed in Article 6(2) of 
the 1958 Convention. This was despite the fact that the parties in the dispute were 
not parties to the Geneva Convention, 77 and the fact that the equidistance method 
had been rejected as having the status of customary international law. 78 The 
reasons for this recourse was probably because the two parties were not in dispute 
about the use of the equidistance method. 79 
70 Tunisia v. lihya Case, at para. 70; Libya v. Malta Case, at para.45. See also below for further 
discussion on equitable principles. 
71 Tunisia v. lihya Case. at para.71. 
71 I-'. . . 54 II -11gg111s. op. e1t .. n. , at p.--). 
7 ~ Jennings, R.Y., "Equity and Equitable Principles,'' 42 Ann Suisse De Droit International 
( 1986), at p.30. And see Jennings, op. cit., n.16, at p.404. 
74 Ibid., at p.31. To the same effect. see Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p. 287. 
75 H · · · 54 1r I . . 7" .., I 1ggms, op. ell., 11. , at p. __ .);. ennmgs, op. ell., 11. -'·at P·-' . 
76 
Dubai!Shwjah Award, at p.654. 
77 Ibid., at p.656 and p.658. 
78 North Sea Cases.\·, at paras.69, 81 and 82. 




These are criteria80 or norms in the light of which the various special/relevant 
circumstances in the delimitation area should be weighed and evaluated in order 
to reach an equitable result for the delimitation. 81 Applying these principles a 
judge or arbiter would choose the proper weight that should be given to a factor 
constituting a special/relevant circumstance.82 Hence, equitable principles, in the 
words of Professor Weil, are the filter through which the court can determine how 
much effect should be given to special/relevant circumstances, and how much a 
provisional line needs to be adjusted to reach an equitable result. 83 How this 
evaluation and balancing up can be done is still not completely explained. 84 
Further, international decisions have not laid down any clear rules to determine 
what is constitute an equitable principle and what is not. 85 
In the literature equitable principles have been seen by some writers, e.g. 
Legault and Hankey, as "a means of achieving an equitable result." 86 Higgins 
speaks of equitable principles as "no more than a compendium of somewhat 
disparate principles."87 Further, the factors that are termed equitable principles are 
the tools whereby the court or tribunal "make the choice to achieve justifiable and 
desirable ends;"88 neither the tools nor the ends being articulated. Rather are they 
hidden behind the terms equitable principles and equitable result. 89 Some 
examples of equitable principles, that have been spelt out in certain cases, are: 
80 The Chamber in the Gu(( of Maine Case preferred to use the term "equitable criteria" instead of 
'equitable principles'. See para.89 of the decision. 
81 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.79; Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras. I I 0 and 71. See also 
Judge Jimenez de Arechaga 's separate opinion in the Tunisia v. Libya Case. at p. I 06, para.24; 
Judge Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at pp."247-9, paras.122-8; Jimenez de Arechaga, op. cit., n.14, 
at p.232. 
82 This is because "the problem of the relative weight to be accorded to different considerations 
naturally varies with the circumstances of the case." North Sea Casess, at para. 93. 
8 ~ w ., . ')"' 211 e1 , op. cit., n. _ _,, at p. . 
8
·
1 An example of the balancing process was suggested in five separate steps by Charney, J. I., 
"Ocean Boundaries between Nations: A theory for Progress:' 78 AJIL ( 1984), at pp.596-8. 
85 Gu(( (l Maine Case, at para.157; Degan, op. cit., n.64, at pp.113-20; Lowe, op. cit., n.50, at 
pp.78-9. 
86 Legault and Hankey, ''From Sea to Seabed: The Single Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Case," 79 A.Ill (1985), at p.967. 
87 1--1· . . -4 ?27 1gg111s, op. cit., n.) , at P·- . 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. To the same effect, see Charney, op. cit., n.84, at p.589. 
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"equity does not necessarily imply equality;"90 "there is no question of 
completely refashioning nature;"
91
"all States are equal before the law"92 ; "'the 
principle of non-encroachment on the natural prolongation of the territory of 
l ,,93 anot 1er state. 
An equitable principle, Professor Weil held, does not ""arise from any natural 
or logical necessity; it is the result of a legal choice."94 The court or tribunal 
would choose a principle which appears to be equitable in a particular case.95 This 
equitableness "must be assessed in the light of its usefulness for the purpose of 
arriving at an equitable result."96 Hence a particular principle which is equitable 
in one case might not be in another.
97 
To avoid narrowing the freedom of judicial 
decision-making there has been no attempt made to catalogue equitable principles 
that might be applicable to all cases?~ 
To sum up, equitable principles provide the framework within which 
special/relevant circumstances can play their role in the delimitation process. 
Equitable principles, without special/relevant circumstances, would be seen as ··a 
1)0 
North Sea Cases.\', at para. 91. 
91 Ibid. 
1)1 
- Libya v. Malta Case, paras. 46 and 54. 
9
:; North Sea Casess, at para. I 01(C)(1 ). For more examples of equitable principles, see Gu([ (?f 
Maine Case, at para.157; Kwiatkowska, B., "The ICJ Doctrine of Equitable Principles Applicable 
to Maritime Boundary Delimitation and its Impact on the International Law of the Sea," Forty 
Years International Court of justice: .Jurisdiction, Equity and Equality, Bloed and Yan Dijk 
(eds.), Europa lnstituut Utrecht, the Netherlands (I 988), at pp. I 57-8. 
94 Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p.212. Moreover, Hugh Thirlway suggested that an equitable principle 
"is a principle, [which] need not be directly related to the result in a specific case. Furthermore, it 
can be a principle of international law of a pa11icular category, labelled for convenience 
'equitable'." See Thirlway, H., "The Law and Procedures of the International Court of Justice 
1960-1989, Par1 Six," 65 B YB/ l ( 1994 ), at p. 7. See also Degan, op. cit., n.64, at p.134. 
C):'i Judge Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at p.250, para.137. 
% Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras. 70 and 71. The Court went on to say: "It is not every such 
principle which is in itself equitable: it may acquire this quality by reference to the equitableness 
of the solution. The principles to be indicated by the Court have to be selected according to their 
appropriateness for reaching an equitable result." See North Sea Casess, at paras.90 and 92. It is 
worth mentioning here that a principle may "prove equitable in some way independently of the 
equitableness of the result.'' See Thirlway, op. cit., n.94, at p. I I. 
97 Cu(( of Maine Case, at para.158; Degan, op. cit., n.64, at p.125. See also Goralczyk, W., 
"Maritime Boundary Delimitation-Comments," Forty Years International Court of justice: 
.Jurisdiction. Equity and Equality, Bloed and Yan Dijk (eds.) Europa Instituut Utrecht, the 
Netherlands ( 1988), at p.166. 
98 The Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case stressed in this regard that: "no particular attempt 
should be made here to over-conceptualise the application of the principles and rules relating to 
the continental shelf." See para.132. 
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conceptual framework devoid of content."99 Similarly, special/relevant 
circumstances without equitable principles are silent factors. 100 Therefore, the two 
notions are necessary for each other in order for each to play its role in the 
delimitation. 
Tile role of equity in determing tile boundary line in continental shelf 
delimitation 
There are two distinct roles which have been suggested for equity. Firstly, 
equity has a corrective and a mitigating role in the delimitation, that is to say it 
helps to avoid inequitable results which would occur from the application of 
general rules. 101 Sir Robert Jennings in explaining this role wrote that: 
equity will. .. modify a gross inequality which is the result the gearing of a particular method of 
drawing the line and the particular geographical circumstances; an equality which is not the 
inequality of nature, but the inequality produced by a method which results in what is 
demonstrably a distortion when applied to particular geographical circumstances. And the test 
for such a modificatory role for equity is not judicial discretion but the judicial application of 
known and recognized equitable criteria in order to reach a result in accordance with equitable 
. . I 102 pnnc1p es ... 
To the same effect, Blecher stated that equity "is performing the function of 
correcting the incorrect results obtained from using the wrong tools-or misusing 
the right ones-in effecting a delimitation of continental shelf." 103 However, the 
corrective and mitigating role for equity has been rejected by some international 
jurists. Judge Jimenez de Arechaga, for example, stated that equity has no 
corrective role in shelf delimitation, because there is no "general rule of law 
which is to be moderated or corrected in its concrete application." 104 
99 w · 1 . 2'"' ? 12 et , op. cit., n. _,,at P·- . 
100 Sec below for the role of special/relevant circumstances in the delimitation process. 
101 Judge Gros·s dissenting opinion in the Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras 12-3; Nelson, L.,"The 
Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundary," 84 AJIL ( 1990), at p.839; Shaw, M., 
International law. 3rd ed. Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge ( 1991 ), at p. l l 0: Brownlie, 
op. cit .. n.52. at p. 26; Lowe, op. cit .. n.50, at p. 74. 
102 See Jennings. op. cit .. n. 73. at p.36. In addition, Sir Robert Jennings in more recent article held 
the view that: ··1f equity is not to modify the law. it can have no role to play other than to 
complicate and confuse the justice terminology." See Jennings, op. cit., n.16, p.404; see also 
pp.399-400. 
io:; See Blecher. M.D., "Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf," 73 AJ!l (1979), at p.86. 
io.i Judge Jimenez de Arechaga's separate opinion in the Tunisia v. Libya Case, at p. l 05, para. 21. 
And Judge Jimenez de Arechaga, op. cit .. n.14, at p.230. Also Shabtai Rosenne, wrote that 
''Above all, it is necessary to stop viewing equity as something which is in opposition to the law 
or as supplying a corrective to the Jaw." See Rosenne, S., "The Position of the International Court 
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Secondly, equity should be looked at independently on its own merits, as an 
. 1 f . . 1 1 I OS . mtegra part o mternat1ona aw. · The Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case 
indicated this role by stating that: 
Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose task is by 
definition to administer justice is bound to apply it. In the course of the history of legal systems 
the term 'equity' has been used to define various legal concepts. It was often contrasted with 
the rigid rules of positive law, the severity of which had to be mitigated in order to do justice. 
In general, this contrast has no parallel in the development of international law; the legal 
concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law. 106 
In practice this means that equity has an a priori role: that is, to work towards 
an equitable result by balancing up all the relevant circumstances of each case. 107 
Judge Bedjaoui described the role of equity as: 
les principles equitables se presentent en definitive comme un arsenal juridique dans lequel le 
juge puise les outils permettant d'identifier, d'evaluer, de comprendre et de satisfaire des 
circonstances reconnues juridiquement pertinentes dans une espece determinee. 108 
The difference between the two suggestions is that equity in the first sense has 
a negative role; that is, to avoid a particular outcome resulting from the general 
rules of law. This outcome is equitable in normal cases, but in an abnormal case 
is inequitable. Therefore, equity would have no role to play without the general 
rules of law. Equity in the second sense, i.e. autonomous equity, involves the 
court or tribunal using equity to create principles for each case, and to derive from 
these principles an outcome, which would appear to the com1 equitable in this 
specific case. 109 Hence, autonomous equity would have a positive function-to 
of Justice on the Foundations of the Principle of Equity in International Law," Forty Years 
International Court of justice: .Jurisdiction, Equity and Equality, Bloed and Yan Dijk (eds.), 
Europa lnstituut Utrecht, the Netherlands· ( 1988), at p. I 08. 
105 Nelson, op. cit., n. I 0 I, at p.841; Jimenez de Arechaga, op. cit., n.14, at p.232 and p.238; 
Higgins. op. cit., n.54. at p.221. 
101
' Tunisia v. Lihyv Case. at para. 71. See also the Award of the Tribunal of Arbitration in the 
Norwegian Claims Case between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Nonvay of 
1922. The Hague Court Reports, Second Series, James Scott (ed.), Oxford University Press, Ne\v 
York (1932). at p.65. 
107 J. · d A . I .t 14 t ?'"'8 W ·1 .t ?"' t 172"" J d 1menez e rec rnga, op. c1., n. , a P·--' ; et , op. c1 ., n.--', a pp. -.); u ge 
Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at p.215-8, paras.IO and 20. 
108 "a juridical arsenal from which the judge draws the tools which enable him to identify, 
evaluate, understand and give effect to circumstances recognised as juridically relevant in a 
particular case". Judge Badjaoui in "L"enigme' des 'principes equitables' dans le droit des 
delimitations maritimes." at p.348. Quoted from Judge Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at p.217, 
para.18. 
109 Higgins. op. cit., n.54. at p.225. See also Lauterpacht, op. cit., n 52, at pp.145-7. Interestingly, 
knowing the technique of the court in dealing with continental shelf delimitation may explain the 
108 
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construct an equitable result-not only to avoid an inequitable result. 110 This 
alleged role for equity was considered by some writers as very close to the power 
to decide a case ex aequo et hono. This, in the words of Professor Weil, was 
because '"equity, with this approach, ends up replacing the norm and taking the 
place of the law. It is no use saying that equity remains a legal concept because it 
is the law which determines when it is to be applied. Equity thus conceived 
inevitably drafts from the objectivity of the reasonable and the unreasonable into 
the subjectivity of the just and the unjust." 111 
The position in the case law concerning the rule of equity in maritime 
boundary delimitation is contradictory and confused. A corrective role for equity 
was employed in some cases such as the Anglo/French, 112 Dubai/Shw:jah 113 , 
Lihya v. Malta 114 and Greenland v. Jan Mayen case. 115 In these cases 'a two-stage 
process' was employed. In the first stage a provisional equdistance line was 
constructed as a starting line. In the second stage this line was to be corrected 
where it was necessary to meet the requirement of equity. This correction or 
departure from the equidistance line occurred where special/relevant 
• 116 
circumstances were present. 
By way of contrast, autonomous equity was invoked in others such as Tunisia 
v. Lihya 117 , Guinea/ Guinea-Bissau 118 and France/Canada Award. 119 In these 
cases a court or tribunal starts the delimitation process by seeking '"an equitable 
result based on the balance of all the relevant circumstances of each case." 
120 
The 
method of delimitation should be justified by the equity of the result. This 
various statements from the court that each case is unique and requires its own solution. See also 
Alcxiades. P .. "The Search for a Panacea for Maritime Boundary Settlement: Equity or 
Equidistance?" National and International Boundaries, vol.14, Session 1983, Thessaloniki 
( 1985). at pp.817-26. Similarly, see Judge Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at p.244, para. I 09. 
110 Weil. op. cit., n.23. at pp.165-7; Nelson, op. cit., n.101, at pp.840-1. 
111 w ·1 . ,.., 167 et . op. cit .. n.--', at p. . 
II' - Para.249. 




116 Jimenez de Arechaga, op. cit., n.14, at p.230; Thirlway, op. cit., n.94, at pp.43-4. 
117 Paras. 72, 110, 111 and 139. 
118 Paras.89 and I 02. 
11
'> Paras.62, 65. 69 and 70. See also Professor Weil's dissenting opinion in the Award, at para.28. 
120 J. . d A . h . 14 I.., 8 . 11nenez e rec aga, op. cit., n. , at P·--' . 
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because the result .. is predominate; the principles are subordinate to the goal." 121 
These different positions may demonstrate the difficulty and inconsistency in the 
case law concerning the role of equity in maritime boundary delimitation. 122 
Co11trol/i11g equity 
In using the concept of equity and equitable principles to justify a boundary 
line an important question arises over the need to control the third-party 
l . . f 1 f . 123 sett ement m its use o t 1e concept o equity. Judge Gros in his dissenting 
opinion in the Gu(f"ofMaine Case stated that: 
Controlled equity as a procedure for applying the law would contribute to the proper 
functioning of international justice; equity left, without any element of control, to the wisdom 
of the judge reminds us that equity was once measured by 'the Chancellor's foot'; I doubt that 
international justice can long survive an equity measured by the judge's eye. When equity is 
simply a reflection of the judge's perception, the courts which judge in this way part company 
from those which apply the law. 
124 
It is easy to say that we need to control and monitor the use of equity by the 
third-party settlement, but it is difficult to decide how such control could be 
carried out in practice. 125 Moreover, controlling equity might not be desirable, 
since it may reduce the flexibility of equity. 126 This flexibility is in fact the real 
reason behind the adoption of equity in shelf delimitation. The ICJ or an ad hoc 
arbitration tribunal can with this flexibility cover unexplained processes used in 
choosing the boundary line. 127 
121 
7' . . l "b c 70 , umsta v. 1 ~'a ase, at para. . 
122 See Janis, M.W., "Equity in International Law," 7 EPIL (1989) at p.78. 




1 See Judge Gros. op. cit .. n.24. at p.386, para. 41. Similarly, Judge Jimenez de Arechaga held 
that: a court having the "authority to apply equitable principles does not entitle [it] ... to reach a 
capricious decision in each particular case, but to reach that decision which, in the light of the 
individual circumstances. is just and fair for that case." Judge Jimenez de Arechaga, op. cit .. n.14, 
at p.232. 
125 See here the observation of Lowe: op. cit., n.50, at p.75 and p.78. 
126 Judge Weeramantry in a separate opinion in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case wrote this 
about the flexibility of equity. He said: "Jn the context of maritime delimitation, each case 
presents upon the facts a different shape from every other, and equity adjusts itself around that 
shape in the manner described because it is flexible, where a rigid rule would scarcely do it 
justice." Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at p:250, para.135. 
127 Jennings, op. cit .. n. 73, at p.31. See also Judge Weeramantry, op. cit .. n.24, at p.244, para. I 09. 
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(4) The notion of natural prolongation 
This is the fourth rule that the Court in the North Sea Cases identified as 
governing continental shelf delimitation. It asserted that the continental shelf of a 
• 128 129 state should not encroach upon the natural prolongat10n of any other state. 
This would require that the delimitation avoid any cut-off effect from the 
prolongation of any party. 130 In the France/Canada Award, Canada invoked the 
principle of non-encroachment in order to exclude the application of the 
equidistance line between the French islands of St.Pierre and Miquelon and the 
Canadian coastline of Newfoundland. 131 This was, Canada alleged, because the 
application of the equidistance · method in this case would result in an 
encroachment upon Canada's natural prolongation. This would end in the cutting 
off an area that appertains to Canada's natural prolongation, and attributing it 
thereby to France. Such an outcome should be avoided, because the delimitation 
""must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the territory of 
another State." 132 In the delimitation the Court divided the area 133concerned into 
two sectors: ( 1) The first sector, called the western seaward projection, was where 
the coasts of St.Pierre and Miquelon islands face the Cabot Strait. The presence 
of the French Islands close to the Newfoundland coast caused the Court, and the 
parties as well, to recognize that some degree of encroachment was sometimes 
unavoidable. 134 This inescapable encroachment was to allocate for the French 
Islands a 12-nautical-mile EEZ that was measured from the outer limit of their 
territorial sea. 135 (2) "In the second sector, towards the south and the Southeast 
1211 In fact. as we have seen in Chapter One, this was not the first time that the concept of natural 
prolongation entered into the vocabulary of continental shelf doctrine. 
1 ~ 9 North Sea Cases.\·, at para. I 0 I (C)( I). Sir Robert Jennings in a recent article criticized the court 
for inventing of the notion of natural prolongation as a fundamental concept· of the law of 
continental shelf delimitation; see Jennings, op. cit., n.16, at pp.403-8. 
i:>o North Sea Cases.\·, at para. I 0 I (C)( I); France/Canada Award, at para.58. 
ui France/Canada Award, at para.58. 
Ll:! North Sea Casess. at para.85(C). 
i.:n "The continental shelf in the area [was] agreed to be a geological continuum," and to extend 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the coasts. See France/Canada Award, at para.23. 
D.i France/Canada Award. at para.67, see also Professor Weil's dissenting opinion in this Award, 
at para.17. 
D
5 France/Canada Award. at para.69. 
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[the Court found] the geographical situation is completely different." 136 Its 
treatment of the principle of non-encroachment was also different. The Court, as 
noted, recognized that an element of encroachment was unavoidable in the 
western sector, but in the second sector it asserted that such an element should not 
be allowed to occur. 137 This was why it invoked the theory of coasts projecting 
frontally. 138 "According to this theory, coasts project solely in the direction 
which they face, ... and that projection is effected for a breadth corresponding to 
the breadth of the coastal front." 139 The Islands have a coastline breadth of 10.5 
nautical miles. Consequently, the Court allocated to St.Pierre and Miquelon a 
corridor of 10.5 nautical miles in width and 200 nautical miles in length. 140 This 
decision was criticized by Professor Weil in his dissenting opinion. 141 
Again, subjectivity and inconsistency are manifested m third-party 
engagement in the delimitation of the maritime boundary. This inconsistency 
prevented the detection of any clear guideline regarding the principle of non-
encroachment, and as to when an element of encroachment is allowable and when 
is it not. The position of the Tribunal in this Award may throw some doubt upon 
the usefulness of using the concept of natural prolongation, or its negative 
expression, i.e. the principle of non-encroachment, in the process of delimitation. 
1
'" b"d 0 - I 1 •• at para. 7 . 
1.n Ibid. 
Ds Both "in respect of the sea-bed and of the water column." Ibid., at para.58. 
1 ~ 9 Professor Weil's dissenting opinion in this Award, at pp.1199-200, para.9; see also his 
criticism to the theory of coasts project frontally, at p.1200, para. 11 of his dissenting opinion. 
14° France/Canada Award. at para. 71. 
141 Para.29, see also paras.9-28; Evans. M., "Delimitation and the Common Maritime Boundary," 
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Furthermore, in many cases the continental shelf in the area will constitute the 
natural prolongation of the land territory of both parties to the delimitation.· For 
example in the Dubai/Shw:jah Award, the Court of Arbitration noted that the 
"seabed bounded by Dubai, Sharjah's mainland, and Abu Musa [island] is 
shallow ... and there is no clear geomorphic or geologic delineation of the land 
territories of either Dubai or Sharjah. None of this seabed is indisputably solely 
l l l . f . l S "142 t 1e natura pro ongation o · e1t 1er tate. 
The fact that the continental shelf is a natural prolongation for both parties, 
may prevent the notion from becoming the basis for a satisfactory solution in 
many cases concerning continental shelf delimitation. 143 The Tribunal in the 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award made this fact particularly clearly in a statement 
worth quoting: 
the rule of natural prolongation can be effectively invoked for purposes of delimitation only 
where there is a separation of continental shelves. 144 
Finally, the adoption of a distance criterion in the 1982 Convention, to the 
effect that a coastal state has jurisdiction over the continental shelf up to 200 
nautical miles from its baselines, has deprived the notion of natural prolongation 
of usefulness in the matter of continental shelf delimitation within such a distance 
14"' from the coast. · 
A specific method for continenta.l shelf delimitation in customary law 
The position of customary law in the case of delimitation between adjacent 
states as it is seen in the judgement of the World Court in the North Sea Cases is 
that: 
1 • 1 ~ Duhai/Shw:jah Award, at p. 66 7. 
i.n The Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case, for example, held that: "The principle that the natural 
prolongation of the coastal State is a basis of its legal title to continental shelf rights does not in 
the present case ... necessarily provide criteria applicable to the delimitation of the areas 
appertaining to adjacent States." See Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.48. 
l-14 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para.116. 
145 The court in the Libya v. Malta Case upheld this line of thinking; see para.39 of the Court's 
judgement. See also Oppenheim 's. op. cit., n.52, at pp. 781-2; Jennings, op. cit., n.16, at pp.406-7. 
For further discussion on the notion of natural prolongation as a legal basis of title to continental 
shelf~ see Chapter One/Section Three. 
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the use of the equidistance method of delimitation [is] not. .. obligatory as between the Parties, 
and there [is] ... no other single method of delimitation the use of which is in all circumstances 
bl
. 146 . 
o 1gatory. 
The Court, on the one hand, rejected any mandatory status or priority for the 
principle of equidistance. So the starting point of the delimitation in customary 
law might not necessarily be the principle of equidistance. 147 On the other hand, it 
asserted that there is no single method which it is obligatory. Accordingly, the 
court should feel free to select any method, including the equidistance method, in 
so far as it would lead to the desired goal of an equitable result in the 
delimitation. 148 For example in the Duhai!..'Jhwjah Award, both parties were, in 
fact, members of a federal state: The United Arab Emirates. 149 The Court of 
Arbitration applied the formula of Article 6(2) in determining the continental 
shelf between the coasts of the two adjacent Emirates, despite the fact that the 
UAE had not become party to the 1958 Convention, so that it was customary law 
which was applicable. 150 This was not because the Com1 acknowledged the 
obligatory nature of the equidistance method in customary law. Rather was it 
because it was "satisfied that [the] use of the equidistance method is generally 
appropriate to, and required in, the present case and that the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between the Pai1ies beyond their respective territorial seas 
should properly be based upon this method." 151 
Having analysed the rules of customary law regarding the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between adjacent states, we now turn to the position of 
customary law regarding delimitation between opposite states. This is less 
controversial. The Court in the North Sea Cases held that less "difficulty was felt 
over that of the median line boundary between opposite States, ... The continental 
1
·"• The North Sea Cases.\·, at para. I 0 I (A&B). see also para.85. To the same effect, see Tunisia v. 








North Sea Cases. at para.92: Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.70; Libya v. Malta Case, at 
para.20: Judge Jimenez de Arechaga's separate opinion in Tunisia v. Libya Case, at pp. I 06-8, 
paras.27-3 I. 
149 For more analysis of the Dubai/Shw:jah Award, see Chapter Four. 
150 Dubai/Shw:jah Award, at p.654. 
151 Ibid., at pp.672-3. Interestingly, due to the fact that the 1981 Dubai/Sharjah Award was 
unpublished until late 1993 it was free, therefore, from any comment from subsequent 
international decisions. For illustrative map, see Chapter Four. 
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shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States ... can ... only be delimited by means of 
a median line."
152 
Indeed the ICJ, in the Greenland v . .Jan Mayen maritime 
boundary delimitation Case, 1993, where both parties (Denmark and Norway) 
were parties to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, stated that: 
in the case of opposite coasts ... the tendency of customary law, like the terms of Article 6, has 
been to postulate the median line as leading primafacie to an equitable result. 153 
Single rule for the delimitation 
It was submitted by the Court of Arbitration, in the Anglo/French Award, that 
Article 6 should be regarded as having created a combined ""equidistance-special 
circumstances rule." This is to say, that states would only be under a treaty 
obligation to apply the median line or the equidistance principle, if no other line 
was justified by special circumstances. 154 This rule, the Court concludes, is 
indistinguishable from the single rule of ""equitable-relevant circumstances" under 
customary law, because they both seek an equitable result for the delimitation. 155 
Hence, the differences between them "'reflect differences of approach and 
terminology rather than of substa~1ce." 156 Furthermore, the Court in minimizing 
the difference between Article 6 and customary law went on to hold that: 
152 North Sea Cases, at para.57. Moreover, the court emphasized that the presence of islets, rocks, 
and minor coastal projections should be ignored in the process of delimitation, whereas the 
presence of islands, geological factors or general uneven configuration in the coast, should be 
taken into account and the median line should be modified, where it was necessary to produce an 
equitable result. 
153 Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at para.56. 
15
.i Anglo/French Arbitration, at paras. 70 and 75; To the same effect, see Greenland v. Jan Mayen 
Case. at para.46. Similarly. the ICJ in the Libya v. Malta Case stressed the role of the 
circumstances of the area as a qualifying role for using the median line; see para.77. 
1 ~~ Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.148. In this Award the median line was not applicable, 
under Article 6, against France in the Channel Islands region by virtue of its reservation on the 
date when it acceded to the Convention. French reservation was, inter alia, ·to prevent the 
application of the equidistance principle against France in some areas where there were special 
circumstances within the meaning of Article 6. The Channel Islands region was among these 
areas. Therefore the equidistance-special circumstances rule in Article 6 is not applicable between 
the two parties in respect to the Channel Islands. (para. 75). However, by equating the formula of 
Article 6 with the rules of customary law, the Court was allowed to apply the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule between the two parties in the Channel Islands region, not as a rule of Article 
6. but as a rule of customary law: see para.33 of the Award. See also Brown, op. cit., n.4, at p.91. 
156 Anglo/French Arbitration. at para.148. The position of the Court of Arbitration was 
acknowledged by the ICJ in the Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, see para. 56 of the judgement. 
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the rules of customary law are a relevant and even essential means both for interpreting and 
completing the provisions of Article 6. [This is because] the provisions of Article 6 do not 
define the condition for the application of the equidistance-special circumstances rule. 157 
The result is that the equidistance method in Article 6 has, as in customary 
law, no special place in the delimitation. 158 It can be applied, where it is 
appropriate to the area concerned, but there is no obligation on the court or 
tribunal to do so. Indeed, the World Court in the Libya v. Malta Case stressed that 
it "is unable to accept that, even as a preliminary and provisional step towards the 
drawing of a delimitation line, the equidistance method is one which must be 
used ... " 159 Such a view found sympathy in the Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case 
where the formula of Article 6 was applied for first time by the World Court. The 
Court in this case did not make a clear pronouncement on the compulsory status 
of the equidistance method. Rather it repeated in several paragraphs of the 
judgement that "it is appropriate to begin", and "it is in accord with precedents to 
begin" 160 rather than that it is obligatory to begin with the median line. The Court 
in this regard followed the path taken in previous decisions concerning maritime 
boundary delimitation. 
This finding, however, is arguably contrary to the ordinary meaning of the 
words of Article 6. 161 A number of writers have expressed their disappointment at 
the court's dictum. Professor Weil for example wrote that: 
Instead of relying, as one would have expected, on the treaty provisions for the definition of the 
customary regime, the 1977 award followed the opposite course. It used the customary regime it 
was defining to take the heart out of the treaty regime and force it into the confines of the 
• 162 customary regime. 
In a similar manner Churchill has criticized the court's position and stated 
that it is unwarranted and undesirable to equate Article 6 with customary law. 
This is so in his view, first because the concept of relevant circumstance in 
customary law is unlimited. Secondly, "the equation of Article 6 with customary 
157 Anglo/French Arbitration. at para.75. See also Gilmore, W., "Sea and Continental Shelf." 21 
The laws r?fScotland ( 1994). at p. 24. para.28: Weil. op. cit., n.23, at p.149. 
158 Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. I I 0. 
15'> l 'I M I ,. 4"' 1 Jya v. a ta 1.._,ase. at para. -'· 
I Mi See for example paras.49 and 51 of the judgement. 
1<i1 Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at p. 144. 
1
''
2 w ·1 . ?3 147 et . op. cit., n._ , at p. . 
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law is undesirable because Article 6 offers a reasonably precise rule, 
whereas ... customary law is characterised by its generality and lack of 
. . "163 
prec1s1on. 
Delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ in the 1982 Convention 
The 1982 Convention provides three main elements in addressing the problem 
of the continental shelf boundary delimitation. Firstly, it supplies a new formula 
for the delimitation. Secondly, it introduces procedures for the settlement of the 
dispute where agreement cannot be reached in a reasonable period of time.
164 
Thirdly, it provides provisional arrangements during the transition period. 165 
However, because of limitations of time and space and because the UAE is not a 
party to the Convention we wilt" focus our attention only on the delimitation 
criteria. 
Article 83( 1) of the 1982 Convention provides that: "The delimitation of the 
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected 
163 Churchill, R.R, "The Greenland-Jan Mayen Case and its Significance for the International Law 
of Maritime Boundary Delimitation," 9 J.JMCL ( 1994-1 ), at p.15. Furthermore, Churchill, in 
supporting his argument referred to the statement of the Chamber in the Gulf qf Maine Case that 
"customary international law merely contains a general requirement of the application of 
equitable criteria and the utilisation of practical methods capable of implementing them. It is 
therefore special international Jaw that must be looked to, in order to ascertain whether that 
law ... does or does not include some rule specifically requiring the Parties, and consequently the 
Chamber, to apply certain criteria or certain specific practical methods to the delimitation that is 
requested." See Gu(f of Maine Case, at para.114, see also para.81. 
164 Article 83(2) reads: "If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the 
States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Pait XV." See also Brown, op. cit., 
n.4, at pp.74-5. For the effectiveness of the system for dispute settlement in 1982 Convention on 
maritime boundary dispute, see below at pp.265-6. 
\(,'\ A11iclc 83(3) reads: ·'Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, 
in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardise or hamper 
the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final 
delimitation." 
Accordingly. states, before reaching a final agreement in the boundary question are encouraged to 
enter into "provisional arrangements of a practical nature." Such arrangements can be found in 
state practices. The Japan/South Korea agreement of 1974 is an example of the establishment of a 
joint development zone for fifty years at least. Article 31 (2) of the Japan-Korea agreement of 
1974 concerning joint development zone. For the text of the agreement, see International 
Maritime Boundaries. Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the 
Netherlands ( 1993), at p. I 086. See also United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea 1982: 
A co111111enta1:}J, vol. II, Nandan S. and Rosenne S. (eds.), Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993), at p.984. 
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by agreements on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the 
statue of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution." Muta tis mutandis, the p1:ovisions are the same, under Articles 74(1 ), for 
the delimitation of the EEZ boundary. 
Interpretation of the delimitation criteria in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
The obligation to negotiate an agreement, as enunciated in Article 6 and 
stressed in the decision of the ICJ in the North Sea Cases, has been repeated in 
Articles 74( 1) and 83( 1 ). The difference, however, is that under A11icle 6 this 
obligation is not linked to any specific criteria, whereas it is linked to the 
equitable principles in the decision of the ICJ. 166 Under the new formula this duty 
should be exercised on the basis of the rules governing delimitation, which 
'"would be determined by reference to the generally recognised sources and forms 
of evidence of international law laid down in Article 38." 167 The result is that the 
parties are not ""free to reach an agreement on the basis of whatever 
considerations they please." 168The object of the negotiation of a boundary 
agreement on these bases, according to the Articles, is to reach an equitable result 
for the delimitation. In this regard, the new formula for the delimitation ""does not 
furnish any practical assistance towards [that] solution." 169 
Not unexpectedly, the formula of continental shelf and EEZ delimitation in 
the 1982 Convention has been the subject of strong criticism among international 
jurists. Judge Gros, for example, in his dissenting opinion in the Gu(( of Maine 
Case, expressed his hostility toward it. He described it as an empty formula, and 
pointed out that it was difficult to extract any practical rules from it. Moreover, 
the effect of these two Articles had been to distort the legal edifice of the 1958 
16




Brown. op. cit., n.4. p.344. See also the observation of Degan on this formula; Degan, op. cit., 
n.64, at p.127. 
l6R B . 4 '"'4'"' rown. op. cit .• n. , at P·-' -'· 
169 
Judge Oda, op. cit .. n.12, at p.246, para.144. See also the judgement in the Tunisia v. Libya 
Case. at para. 49. and see Oda, S., "Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea," 44 ICLQ 




Convention, the 1969 Judgement and the 1977 Decision. 170 The US delegation to 
the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea expressed its reaction to the new 
formula by stating that it "might have the effect of adding confusion to the 
law." 171 The adoption of this empty formula can hardly be understood without 
examination of the negotiating history. 172 To this we shall now turn. 
The history of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the 1982 Convention 
Interestingly enough, the formula detailed in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) reveals 
almost nothing from the negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. This is because the said Articles were drafted at the last 
minute by the President of UN CLOS III, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, 
after the failure of negotiations at the Conference. 173The precise reason for this 
last-minute draft was to secure a consensus for the two Articles and to avoid any 
obstacle which might have jeopardized the acceptance of the Convention as a 
whole. Reservation to the Convention, it must be noted, was not to be 
permitted. 174 Thus, it was necessary to formulate an elastic or flexible formula for 
a delicate and controversial matter such as the delimitation of the continental 
shelf and EEZ boundaries. Indeed~ Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion in the 
Tunisia/ Libya Case described the formula of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) as a 
formula which forms a catchall pr~wision "that would be satisfactory to delegates 
with not only different but sometimes contradictory views on the delimitation of 
the continental shelf and of the exclusive economic zone." 175 
At UNCLOS III there were various proposals submitted from a number of 
states who participated in the Conference. Not surprisingly, each proposal 
reflected the interests of the state or states which submitted it. Each one thus 
reflected a desire to adopt a rule which would strengthen its legal position in any 
170 
See Judge Gros, op. cit., n.24, at p.365, para.8; see also p.382, para.37. 
111 S B . 11 ..., ..., ee rown, op. cit., n. -, at P·-'-'· 
172 
For the influence of this formula on one of the UAE boundary agreements, see below at p.197. 
i1~ B . 4 ...,,., rown, op. cit., n. , at P·-'-'· 
174 Articles 309 and 310 of the 1982 Convention. 
175 See Judge Oda, op. cit., n.12, at p.246, para.143. 
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possible future delimitation with neighbouring states. 176 Kenya, Tunisia, 
France 
177 
and Romania, for example, suggested that delimitation should be 
effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles and take account of 
all relevant/special circumstances which may be present in the area of 
delimitation. The median line or equidistance line, therefore, would not be the 
only method for the delimitation. Turkey 
178 
and the Netherlands 179 supported a 
similar proposal, without making any reference to particular methods. By way of 
contrast, Australia and Norway submitted a joint proposal in which they repeated 
the formula of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention.
180 
Japan asserted that the 
delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ ''shall be effected by agreement 
taking into account the principle of equidistance." 181 China suggested that states 
should determine their continental shelf and EEZ boundary "'through 
consultations on an equal footing ... [and] on the basis of safeguarding and 
respecting the sovereignty of each other." 182 In the negotiating groups which were 
set up during the seventh session in 1978, two schools of thought emerged: the 
median line school and the equitable principle school.
183 
On May 17, 1978 Mr. E.J. Manner, the Chairman of the negotiating group, 
stated in his report that: 
Like before, the positions of the delegations differed markedly between those in support of the 
equidistance solution and those favouring delimitation in accordance with equitable principles .. 
176 Moreover, if a state had "a poor case by reference to the Geneva formula, it was better to 
support the new formula" See Brown, op. cit., n.4, at p.333. 
177 UNCLOS Ill Official Record'i, vol. 3, at pp.215 and 237. 
178 Ibid., at p.190. 
179 • "' Ibid., at p.21-'. 
11
w Judge Oda, op. cit .. n.12, at p.234. para.131. 
181 UNCLOS Ill Official Records. vol. 3. at p.211. 
182 Quoted from Judge Oda. op. cit., n.12, at para.131. The UAE position was to support the 
median line school; see also Chapter Five below. 
18
·' The median line school suggested that: "The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone/Continental Shelf between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement 
employing, as a general principle, the median line or equidistance line, taking into account any 
special circumstances where this is justified." 
Whereas the equitable principle school suggested that: "The delimitation of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (or Continental Shelf) between adjacent or/and opposite States shall be effected 
by agreement, in accordance with equitable principles taking into account all relevant 
circumstances and employing any methods, where appropriate, to lead to an equitable solution." 
Quoted from Judge Oda, op. cit., n.12, at p.238, para.135. For further details on the various 
proposal before the Conference, see United Nations Convention, op. cit., n.165, at pp.954-67. 
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[So] no approach or formulation [has] received ... widespread and substantial support that would 
ft. b . 11 . d f' . 184 o er a su stantia y 1m prove prospect o · a consensus tn the plenary. 
The Chairman repeated his evaluation of the situation at the Conference in his 
various reports dated September 14, 1978, April 24, 1979, and August 22, 
1979.
185 
At the ninth session the Chairman suggested a neutral formula in order to 
secure a consensus. It was worded as follows: 
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international law. Such an 
agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, employing the median or 
equidistance line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circumstances prevailing in the 
areas concerned. 186 
This formula was incorporated in the Informal Composite Negotiating 
Text/Revision 2. 187 The Chairman stated at the general committee meeting on 
August 28, 1980 that, "the two main interest groups had shown a genuine 
·11· . 11 bl . d " 188 H w1 mgness to arrive at a mutua y accepta e compromise text. owever, 
some countries had stressed the importance in giving states time to examine the 
President's proposal. Thereafter, Ambassador Tommy Koh, the President of the 
Conference, undertook direct negotiation with the representative of the equitable 
principles school and the representative of the median line school, and with the 
assistance of the Fijian Ambassador. On the basis of the negotiation the President 
revised the delimitation formula that was adopted at the ninth session. The new 
text for Articles 74(1) and 83(1) was finally adopted into the draft Convention on 
August 28, 1981, the very last day of the tenth session, worded as follows: 
I. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/the continental shelf between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law as 
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Cou11 of Justice, in order to achieve 
. bl I . is9 an equ1ta e so utton. 
111
·
1 UNCLOS Ill qfficial Record,·, vol. 10, at p.124. 
111 ~ Ibid .. vol. I 0. at p.171; and vol. I I, at p.59. para.27: and vol. 12, at p. I 07 and p. I 09. 
111
<' Ibid .. vol. 13. at p.77. See also United Nations Convention, op. cit., n.165, at p.976. 
1117 
United Nations Convention. op. cit .. n.165. at p. 978. The delegate of Ireland, the leader of the 
equitable principle group, deposited a letter dated May 30, 1980, signed by the countries 
sponsoring the equitable principles formula to the President of the UNCLOS III, stating that: 
''The new formulations as they appear in Articles 74( I) and 83( I) of the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text/Revision 2 'did not emerge from negotiations themselves' nor did those 
formulations receive the widespread and substantial support' required in plenary to offer a 
substantially improved prospect of consensus." See Judge Oda, op. cit., n.12, at pp.244-5, 
paras.141-2. See also United Nations Convention, op. cit., n.165, at p.979. 
188 Judge Oda, op. cit., n.12, at pp.244-5, para.141. 
I~ • ? Ibid., at p.246, para.14-. 
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However, as Professor Brown has remarked, the cost of this adoption was 
high. The result "was to burden the international community with a formula 
which is virtually meaningless in itself and very difficult to interpret even when 
the reference to 'international law' is followed up." 190 
A single maritime boundary 
As was mentioned in Chapter One, the emergence of the EEZ into 
international law raises several issues regarding the relationship between the EEZ 
and the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines. Among 
these issues is the question of whether the EEZ and the continental shelf may 
have different boundary lines, or whether they should have one single line. 191 
This argument resulted from two factors: 
(I) An identical formula, as we have seen, had been adopted m the 1982 
Convention for the delimitation of the two areas. 192 
(2) If the boundary lines of the two zones are not necessarily coincident, there 
could be cases where the sea-bed and subsoil of an area fell within the 
jurisdiction of one state, while the water-column was under the jurisdiction of 
another. 193 
Practicality makes the adoption of a single boundary line desirable. 
Nonetheless, international law has provided no rules for using such a line. We 
shall trace the question of a single line in state practice and in case law. This is in 
order to identify where the doctrine of a single line stands in this practice. 








:! However, Oda in this regard wrote: ''In spite of the practical identity between Article 74 and 
Article 83, there is, of course, no guarantee that the delimitation of the EEZ and the delimitation 
of the continental shelf will necessarily be identical." See Oda, S., "The International Court of 
Justice Viewed from the Bench," 244 Academie De Droit International (1993-Vll), at p.139. A 
similar view was held by Professor Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p.132; O'Connell, op. cit., n.19, at 
p.728. 
193 Judge Oda, op. cit., n.12, at pp.231-3, paras.126-8. See also Churchill, R.R., "Maritime 
delimitation in the Jan Mayen Area,'' 9 Marine Police ( 1985), at p.28; O'Connell, op. cit., n.19, at 
p.729; Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.52, at p.805. For some useful comments on the case of vertical 




Since 1975, when the doctrine of the EEZ began to receive significant support 
in the international community, 194 state practice in majority cases was to prefer 
one single boundary for all purposes of maritime jurisdictions. 
195 
The Dominican 
Republic-Venezuela maritime boundary agreement of 1979 may be cited as an 
example of establishing one single maritime boundary between two countries.
196 
This line is illustrated in a map reproduced below . 
. \.Uritinw 8ound.uW. 
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Figure: (7) Dominican-Venezuela maritime boundaries 
Source: /11temlllio11al Maritime Bou11daries. at p.587. 
194 For more dissection on the doctrine of EEZ, see Chapter One. 
195 Charney, op. cit., n.41, at p.246. 
196 See Article One of the agreement in Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.165, at p.588. In 
addition to this agreement, there were a number of boundary agreements where the parties 
adopted a single line for the shelf and EEZ boundaries. such as: Cuba-US agreement of 1977; 
Mexico-US agreement of 1978; USSR-US agreement of 1990; Colombia-Costa Rica agreement 




Furthermore, there were at least four cases where the boundary of an EEZ (or 
EFZ) has been accepted as corresponding to the boundary of the continental shelf. 
The first case is the Finland-USSR agreement of 1985. The parties agreed to 
replace the boundary lines between their continental shelves and their fishery 
zones; these had been defined on in 1965, 1967 and 1980 respectively, with one 
single boundary line for all purposes of maritime zones. 197 The second example is 
the 1987 Turkish-USSR exchange of notes. The two parties agreed to regard the 
continental shelf boundary line, agreed upon in 1978, as the boundary line 
between their EEZs. 198 The third case is the announcement of the Iranian delegate 
at UN CLOS III that "the limits of the exclusive fishery zone corresponded to the 
outer limit of the continental shelf." 199 The final instance is the assertion of the 
UAE in 1981 that the boundary of the EEZ should be "determined in accordance 
with the provisions of the agreements concluded by the Emirates members of the 
Union in connection with their continental shelf." 
200 
However, this growing tendency of adopting a single boundary line has not 
been followed by some states. Spain, for instance, rejected the French offer to use 
the continental shelf boundary line in the Bay of Biscay agreed upon in 1974 as 
the boundary line between their EEZs.201 Spain insisted instead on adopting a 
different line.202 A clear example of using separate lines for each zone can be 
found in the Australia-Papua New Guinea agreement in Torres Strait.203 The two 
parties agreed on a line for the shelf boundary and another for the fishing zones 
boundary.204 Another example is the Australia-Indonesia fisheries agreement of 
197 Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.165, at p.1995. 
l'lR • Ibid .. at p.1706. 
I~ d Sec UNCLOS Ill Official Record\·, vol. I. at p.72, para.22, an the 1973 Iranian EFZ 
Proclamation. 
200 Article 3 of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs Declaration Concerning the EEZ and its 
Delimitation of 25 August, 1980, reprinted in The law of the Sea, National Claims to Maritime 
.Jurisdiction. UN Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, New York ( 1992), Article 3, at 
p.135. For further discussion on the Iranian and the UAE marine laws. see Chapter Five. 
201 . • For the text of the agreement, see Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.165, at p.1727, Article 6 
in particu tar. 
202 W · 1 . I 3 t I 1 8 9 et . op. c11 .• n.- . a pp. - . 
203 Additional example is the Malaysia-Thailand continental shelf agreement of 1979. 
2W . For the text of the agreement, see Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.165, at pp.937-75. For a 
comment on the agreement, see Burmester, "The Torres Strait Treaty: Ocean Boundary 
Delimitation by Agreement," 76 AJ/l (1982), at pp.321-49. In addition, the agent of Libya in his 
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1981. The two parties agreed upon a boundary line between their fishing zones 
different from the shelf boundary line, which they had agreed upon in 1972.205 
The Australian-Indonesian boundary lines are illustrated below. 
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Figure: (8) Australia-Indonesia maritime boundaries. 
Source: Jntemational Maritime Boundaries, at p. l 237. 
answer to Judge Schwebel in the Tunisia v. Libya Case asserted that the case where two states are 
"exercising sovereign rights over different resources in the same area" is not unknown in practice. 
See the /CJ Pleadings, Tunisia v. Libya Case, vol. 5, at p.503. 
205 For the text of the agreement, see Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.165, at p.1238. It is worth 
mentioning here that in 1974 Australia recognized the operations of the Indonesia traditional 
fisherman in areas of the Australian EEZ. See Ibid., at p.1239. 
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An explanation for these differences in state practice may lie in the issue of 
how far the parties are satisfied by the existing agreement. If one of them in a 
shelf agreement, for instance, was not entirely satisfied, he would reject any offer 
from the other party to accept the continental shelf boundary line as the boundary 
line between their respective EEZs. However, if the two parties were satisfied by 
their shelves' boundary line, there would be no reason why they should not regard 
this line as valid for their EEZs.
206 
This inconsistency in state practice led 
Professor Weil to disregard state practice, and to suggest that the question of a 
single line or separate lines ""has to be treated on its own merits."207 
Case law 
The ICJ was seized for the first time with the task of drawing a single line for 
the shelf and EEZ (or EFZ) in the Gu(f of Maine Case. 208 The Chamber of the 
World Court acknowledged the general demand in state practice for a single 
delimitation for shelf and EEZ or EFZ boundary. This was "to avoid as far as 
possible the disadvantages inherent in a plurality of separate delimitations. "209 In 
addition, the Chamber found that it would be possible, both legall/ 10 and 
. 11 211 d . l b d c: d"f'C'. . . d. . ') P I matena y to raw a smg e oun ary 1or two I ierent JUns ict10ns. - - n 
drawing such a line the Chamber went in search of criteria, and a method for 
delimitation not linked typically and exclusively to either of these two zones and 
""which does not give preferential treatment to one of these two objects to the 
detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the 
division of either of them." 213 Judge Gros criticized the Chamber's decision in 
adopting a single line between two different zones, without seeking to establish 
20
'' W· ·1 . !"' 118 c1 . op. cit .. n __ _,, at p. . 
207 . .., 
Ibid .. at p. I _,2. 
208 This is not to suggest that the question had never been raised before; see Ibid., at p.120. 
20
'> Gu(l<f Maine Case, at paras.194 and 161. 
210 Because "there is no rule of international law to the contrary." See para.27. 
211 Because there is ''no material impossibility" in the Gulf of Maine. See Ibid. 
212 Ibid. Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Chamber held, was not 
applicable, although the parties were both parties to the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, in this case. To hold the opposite, it would "make the maritime water mass overlying the 
continental shelf a mere accessory of the Shelf." See para. I 19. 
2
i:; Ibid., at paras.193-4. See also the comments of Judge Gros, op. cit., n.24, at pp.368-9, para.14. 
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"whether there existed in international law any rule prescribing or authorising the 
use of a single line for the continental shelf and the fishery zone." 214 
The next case where a third-party settlement was charged with drawing a 
single line was in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Arhitration.215 However. the 
Tribunal did not raise the question of the legality of a single line or drawing such 
a line through reliance on the parties or on the rule of law. The Tribunal was not 
presented with any of these questions. So, it is right to say that the Tribunal added 
nothing to our understanding of the concept of a single boundary line. 
In the 1992 Arbitration between France and Canada, the Tribunal also had 
the task of drawing a single line. In doing so, it adopted the same approach as the 
Chamber in the Gu(( of Maine Case. Therefore, the Tribunal in 1992, like the 
previous two cases, added nothing further in the formulation or explanation of the 
f . 1 l" 216 concept o a smg e me. 
Finally, and more recently, in the 1993 case concernmg the maritime 
delimitation between Jan Mayen (Norway) and Greenland (Denmark), Denmark 
asked the Court to draw a single line, while Norway requested the Court to draw 
two different lines for the continental shelf and fishery zones. Although, these 
two lines would coincide, the two boundaries, according to Norway, would 
remain conceptually distinct. The Court rejected Denmark's request to draw a 
single line due to the lack of a joint request from the parties to do so.217 The 
Court did not elaborate upon the basis for its decision to reject the task of drawing 
. 1 l" 1 h . b 1 . 218 a smg e me w 1ere t ere is no agreement etween t 1e parties. 
The idea of a single boundary line has been rejected by some writers. Judge 
Gros, for example, held that: 
A single boundary will establish a unity between the sea-bed and the exploitation of the subsoil 
on the one hand. and the water column with its resources on the other; it cannot be assumed 
~ 1 •1 Judge Gros. op. cit .. n.24. at p.363. para.5: p.367. para.12; pp.3 70-1, para.17; pp.3 72-3, 
para.19; and pp.376-7. para.25. 
21
'\ Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para. 86; see also para.42. 
216 France/Canada Award, at para. 47. 
217 Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case. at paras.40-5. 
21
R The ICJ in this case provided a further explanation that the phrase of special and relevant 
circumstances has a role to play in the concept of a single boundary line, similar to its role in the 




that this unity is pre-existent. The two elements have always been treated separately. In 1958, 
there was one convention on the continental shelf and another on fishing. 219 
Judge Oda has on various occasions asserted the desirability and the 
practicality of having a single boundary line for the continental shelf and the 
EEZ. Nevertheless, he has stress;ed that '"the concept of a 'single' maritime 
boundary cannot be taken for granted. Whether the continental shelf or the EEZ 
should be given priority should have been agreed by both parties in advance. This 
is an important distinction, and one which cannot be over-emphasised. Indeed the 
Judgement in the Jan Mayen case is open to criticism for minimising it."220 
It seems fair to conclude that the task of drawing a line for each zone is the 
general rule, while the task of drawing a single line for different jurisdictions is 
dependent upon a joint request from the parties, since the notion of a single line 
has not been "established in either customary law or treaty."
221 
:!\') Sec Judge Gros. op. cit., n.24, at p.367, para.12 and p.370, para.16. See also Attard, op. cit., at 
p.144. and pp.214-5: Professor Weil made an interesting distinction between three cases. First, 
where the continental shelf does not extend beyond the 200 nautical miles, there is no legal reason 
why a single line should not be adopted. Secondly, where the shelf extends beyond the 200 
nautical miles, (the maximum limit for an EEZ), and the delimitation is between opposite coasts, 
there would be no question of an EEZ boundary, since the two opposite zones could not overlap, 
due to the fact that the distance between the two coasts is more than 400 nautical miles. 
Consequently, the delimitation would be limited to the shelf boundary. However, if the case is a 
delimitation between adjacent coasts. a single line will be invoked to determine the boundary up 
to 200 nautical miles. See Weil, op. cit .. n.23, at p.134. 
220 See Oda, op. cit .. n.192, at pl39. See also Judge Oda, op. cit., n.15, at p.109, para.70. 
221 Judge Oda's question to Denmark in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case. Quoted from 
Kwiatkowska, B., "Judge Shigeru Oda's Opinions in the Law-of-the-Sea Cases: Equitable 




Special/Relevant Circumstance in Maritime Delimitation 
The phrase "'special circumstances" is introduced in Article 12 of the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention of 1958, and Article 6 of the 
Continental Shelf Convention of 1958; whereas the phrase "relevant 
circumstances" is introduced into customary law by the Court in the North Sea 
Cases. 222 The former could be defined as a circumstance which excludes the 
application of the equidistance line,223while the latter could be defined as a "fact 
to be taken into account in the delimitation process."224 Some writers believe that 
the category of special circumstances is limited, while the category of relevant 
circumstances is open-ended.225 Moreover, that relevant ""circumstances exist in 
all cases; special circumstances exist only in some. "226 The matter of 
special/relevant circumstance can best be analysed in two parts: 
Part one: Special/Relevant Circumstances in General 
A: Special Circumstances 
The work of the /LC 
Mr. Frarn;ois, the Special Rapporteur, made no reference to the concept of 
special circumstances in his initial draft for Article 7 of the 1953 Report. But 
Professor Sandstrom in his comment on Article 7 drew attention to the case 
where a departure from the general rule is necessary when, for example, the 
presence of a small island though opposite one state's coast belongs to another 
state.227 Frarn;ois agreed with the view of Professor Sandstrom, that it was 
222 Norlh Sea Cases, at para. I 0 I (C)( I) and para. I 0 I (D). 
22
:; The Court in the Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case defined the concept of special circumstances 
as "circumstances which might modify the result produced by an unqualified application of the 
cquidistance principle.'· See para.55. See also the comment of Churchill on this definition. 
Churchill, op. cil., n.163, at p.18. 
22
·
1 Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at para.55. 
225 See, for example, Churchill. op. cit .. n.163, at p.15, and pp.18-9; Brown, op. cit., n.4, at pp. 
74-5: Judge Shahabuddeen. op. cit., n.12, at p.147. 
'l1( 
-- 'Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cil .. n.12. at p.148. 
227 /LC Yearbook ( 1953). vol. I. at p.128. para.37. 
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necessary to provide both a general rule and exceptions to it.228 Fran9ois therefore 
asserted that the median line, as a general rule and unless otherwise agreed, is the 
boundary line between the continental shelf area that appertains to two or more 
. 229 
states whose coasts are opposite each other. However, Lauterpacht refused to 
accept the formula of a general rule on the ground that it "would deprive the rule 
f . 1 l " 230 1-1· b' . 1 M F . ' 1 . o · its lega c 1aracter. is o ~ect1on was t 1at r. ran901s s proposa , m 
Lauterpacht's opinion, contained only a "half-way-house formula." In this 
formula, which is difficult for any judge to interpret, "any party to a dispute could 
always argue that its case did not fall within the general rule, but formed an 
exception to it." 231 Therefore, he declined to vote for this formula unless "the 
words 'as a general rule' were omitted, or [unless] the commentary was to contain 
a full explanation of them, giving specific instances of cases where a departure 
from the rule was permissible."232 Mr. Spiropoulos suggested the replacement of 
the "words 'as a general rule' by the words 'unless another boundary line is 
justified by special circumstances. "'233 The Chairman expressed his support for 
this suggestion and asked Mr. Franc;ois if he could accept Mr. Spiropoulos's 
proposal. The Rapporteur showed that he would be prepared to accept such an 
amendment.234 The Fran9ois formula was adopted, by 8 votes to 5, and was 
embodied in Article 7(2) of the ILC Report of 1953.
235 
The Commentary on the 
said Article indicated that: "As in the case of the boundaries of coastal waters, 
provision must be made for departures necessitated by any exceptional 
configuration of the coast, as well as the presence of islands or of navigable 
channels."236 Article 7(2) (and its commentary) was adopted, in identical 
language, into A11icle 72 of the ILC final Report of 1956. However, where the 
228 Ibid .. at p. 128. para.40 and p.131. para.14. 
22
'> Ibid .. at p.128. para.40: p.13 I. para.14, and p.134. para.53. 
:no lb'd I '8 47 · 1 .• at p. _ . para. . 
2
·'
1 Ibid .. at p.131, para.IO. 
:m Ibid .. at p.130. para.61, and see pp.128-30, paras.4 7 and 60; p.133, paras. I 0, 15 and 17; p.132, 
para.23. See also Brown, op. cit., n.23. at p.55. And Grisel, E., "The Lateral Boundaries of the 
Continental Shelf and the Judgement of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case," 64 A.Ill ( 1970). at p.580. 
:!:n /LC }'earhook ( 1953). vol. I. at p.130. para.62. 
,,
4 lb'd I'"''"' '"'8 d 4'"' -· 1 •• at p. -'-'·paras.-' an -'· 
,~~ 
-·'· Ibid .. at pp.133-4. 
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phrases "the presence of islands' or 'navigable channels' 237 are clear enough on 
their own, in contrast the phrase 'any exceptional configuration of the coast' is 
not. Consequently, an attempt to clarify its meaning will be made below. 238 
The Geneva Co11fere11ce of 1958 
The concept of special circumstances was one of the most controversial 
matters in the above Conference. This controversy reflected the fact that states 
were worried about the vagueness and uncertainty which the concept of special 
circumstances contained. The delegate from Yugoslavia, for instance, said that 
the concept of special circumstances is "'both vague and arbitrary, and likely to 
give rise to misunderstanding and disagreement. The question was where and 
how such special circumstances were enumerated in international law and who 
could be charged with interpreting their application."239 For that reason he 
proposed the deletion of any reference to special circumstances in Article 72. 
Similarly, Venezuela and the United Kingdom both submitted proposed 
amendments for Article 72, whi~h contained no reference to the concept of 
special circumstances.240 Iran, to the contrary, accepted the formula in Article 72 
on condition that the equidistance line should be measured, where special 
circumstances exist, from the high-water mark instead of the low-water mark. 
Similarly, Italy accepted in principle the formula of Article 72, but with the 
additional provision that specific mention of islands should be added. 241 The 
United States rejected the Italian and Iranian amendments.242 Indonesia accepted 
243 the formula of Article 72 and opposed any attempt at amendment. In the 
2'<· 11,C >'earhook (1956), vol. 2. at p.300. para.37. 
217 
Because, as we have seen, navigation interests have no genuine link with the doctrine of the 
continental shelf, (rather are they connected with the concept of the territorial sea), there is a 
strong argument for examining navigation interests (as special circumstances) in the course of our 
discussion on the territorial sea delimitation. See the opinion of Mr. Franc;:ois, /LC Yearbook 
( 1953), vol. I, at p. 134, para. 53. And see above in Chapter Two at pp.78-9. 
,,K 
-·· See below at pp.139-41. 
239 UNCLOS I Oj)icial Records, vol. 6, at p.91, para.4. 
2
.io Ibid., at pp.134 and 138. Interestingly·, Italy expressed its objection by not voting in favour of 
either the UK proposal or the Yugoslavian proposal. See Ibid., at p.93, para.5. 
2
.i
1 For the Iranian proposal, see Ibid., at p.142. For further discussion on the Iranian position on 
the UNCLOS I. see Chapter Five/Section One. For the Italian proposal, see Ibid., at p. 133. 
242 lb"d 95 ,,.., 4 r ., at p. . paras._.)- . 
241 Jb'd 98 ,..,9 · r ., at p. , para . .) . 
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subsequent vote the Yugoslavian and Venezuelan proposals to omit any reference 
to special circumstances were rejected. The Iranian and Italian proposals also 
failed to be approved.
244 
Interestingly, despite this high level of controversy the 
concept of special circumstances was approved and finds reflection in the two 
Geneva Conventions on the TSCZ and the Continental Shelf of 1958.245 
B: Relevant circumstances 
The concept of relevant circumstances was, as mentioned above, introduced 
by the Court in the North Sea Cases. The Court in this case was, as we have seen, 
charged with identifying the applicable rules and principles of international law 
that the parties could use to draw their respective shelf boundaries. Therefore, the 
Court addressed the following statement for the parties on determining the limit 
of relevant circumstances. It held that: 
In fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the 
purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures. ·246 
In contrast the Court in the Libya v. Malta Case, had the task of drawing the 
boundary line. It therefore added the following caveat: 
Yet although there may be no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account 
of. this can hardly be true for a court applying equitable procedures. For a court, although there 
is assuredly no closed list of considerations, it is evident that only those that are pertinent to the 
institution of the continental shelf as it has developed within the law, and to the application of 
equitable principles to its delimitation,. will qualify for inclusion. Otherwise, the legal concept 
of continental shelf could itself be fundamentally changed by the introduction of considerations 
. "47 strange to its nature. -
Therefore, while the matter of relevant circumstances had been left totally to 
the freedom of the states during their negotiations, it had been limited to the 
circumstances which fit in with the theory of the continental shelf in any third-
14x . . 





1 See here Professor Bowett's comments on the rejection of the Iranian and Italian proposals in 
the Conference: Bowett, op. cil., n.27, at p.153. See also Chapter Five for further discussion on 
the Iranian position before the UNCLOS I. 
245 The two 1958 Conventions did not "define 'special circumstances' nor lay down the criterion 
by which it is to be assessed whether any given circumstances justify a boundary line other than 
the equidistance line." Anglo/French Arbitration. at para.70. 
2
·
16 N I c- C' 9'"' ort 1 .)ea ases, at para. _,. 
247 Libya v. Malta Case, at para.48. 
2'18 w ., . ,.... 214 et . op. cit .. n.--', at p. . 
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for factors which constitute relevant circumstances. Hence international decisions 
are the only places where we can identify the factors which have been accepted 
and those which have been rejected as relevant circumstances. 249 
The difference between the two concepts 
The difference between the concept of special circumstances and the concept 
of relevant circumstances is twofold: they are different both in scope, and in the 
role which has been attached to them. 
(1) The scope of special and relevant circumstances 
The commentary on Article 7(2) of the ILC Report of 1953, as we have seen, 
specified as special circumstances the following factors: "exceptional 
configuration of the coast and the presence of islands or of navigable 
channels. "250 These factors, with the exception of navigable channels (which, as 
noted, have no role in continental shelf delimitation)251 might be categorized as 
geographical factors. It might be suggested that non-geographical factors, such as 
security and economic factors, cannot be categorized as special circumstances 
within the meaning of Article 6. However, under customary law, these non-
geographical factors together with geographical factors may be categorized as 
relevant circumstances. In short, relevant circumstances may include 
geographical and non-geographical factors, whereas special circumstances may 
include only geographical factors. Moreover, factors which constitute special 
circumstances would also constitute relevant circumstances. The converse, 
1 . 252 1owever, ts not true. 
:!-I'> In addition, the acceptance of some factors as relevant circumstances has not ruled out the 
possibility of acceptance of new factors, which have not as yet been claimed before a third-party 
settlement. See O'Connell. op. cit., n.19, at pp.708-9. See also Judge Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, 
at p.220. para.27~ Weil, P., "Geographic Consideration in Maritime Delimitation," International 
Maritime Boundaries, vol. I Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the 
Netherlands ( 1993), at p.121. 
:!So /LC Yearbook (1956), vol. 2, at p.300, para.37. 
,51 
- See above at p.79, note 95. 
252 Brown, op. cit., n.4, at p. I 04. See also below, where some relevant circumstances have been 
attributed a role similar to the role of special circumstances. 
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(2) Tiie role of the two concepts 
(a) The role of special circumstances in the delimitation process 
Special circumstances have a corrective role to play.253 The court or tribunal, 
by using the phrase "'special circumstances", can justify the exclusion of the 
application of the equidistance principle in toto, or adjust the equidistance line in 
some sector where special circumstances are present. This exclusion or 
adjustment is dependent upon the weight which is given to the special 
circumstances in the light of the equitable principles. The court or tribunal can 
decide, in order to reach an equitable result, how much effect should be given to 
the special circumstance which is present in the area. The Court of Arbitration in 
the Anglo/French Award, for example, gave half effect continental shelf to the 
Scilly Isles, because the equitable principles had suggested the inappropriateness 
of giving full effect to them. 254 
(b) The role of relevant circumstances in the delimitation process 
Whereas special circumstances can have only one role to play in the formula 
of Article 6, relevant circumstances can have under customary law three different 
roles to play in the delimitation process. This is because the scope of relevant 
circumstances includes three factors, namely geographical configuration of the 
coasts, special geographical features and non-geographical factors. The roles of 
each of these different factors are as follows: 
25 ~ Evans, M., Relevant Circumstances. and Maritime De/imitation, Claredon Press, Oxford 
( 1989). at p. 79. The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo/French Arbitration suggested a slightly 
different role for special circumstances. This role was a qualifying one to ensure the equitable 
character of the equidistance principle in each case. See Anglo/French Arbitration, at para. 70. A 
similar role seems to be suggested by the World Court in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at 
para.55. See also above for more discussion on the court interpretation of the formula of Article 
6. 




An indicative role 
This role is exercised at the early stage of the process to indicate the proper 
method for the delimitation. This method should be determined by reference to 
the geographical configuration of the two parties' coastlines.255 
A corrective role 
At the second stage of delimitation the com1 or arbitral tribunal may be faced 
with a special geographical feature in the delimitation area. This feature, such as 
an island, may require an adjustment in the boundary line that constructed by 
reference to the coasts of the parties. Such an adjustment might be necessary in 
order to reach an equitable result in the delimitation. How much adjustment is 
required is a matter to be assessed, as with the case of special circumstances, in 
the light of equitable principles. The Tunisian islands of Kerkennah in the Tunisia 
v. Libya Case may serve as a good example. Here, the Court adjusted the 
perpendicular boundary line between the two parties towards Libya to give half 
effect continental shelf to the Kerkennah islands.256 The Court here attributed to 
relevant circumstances a role of melioration or correction similar to that 
suggested for special circumstances, where Article 6 is applicable. Subsequent 
international decisions followed,· taking a similar position where an unusual 
geographical feature was present in the delimitation area. 257 
Checking and confirming the equitableness of the result 
At the final stage of the delimitation, international adjudication may use non-
geographical considerations to confirm or test the equitableness of the line drawn 
initially by reference to geographical factors. 258 In the Gu(f of Maine Case, for 
255 North Seu Cases, at para. 96: Anglo/French Arbitration, para. 248: Tunisia v. Libya, paras. 74 
and 63: Gu(( of Maine, at paras. 59, 195, 205 and 231. See also Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p. 71. It is 
interesting to note that the World Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case depended on the conduct of 
the parties in adopting a de facto boundary line between them and on "the factor of 
perpendicularity to the coast and the concept of prolongation of the general direction of the land 
boundary'', in drawing the boundary line between Tunisia and Libya. See paras.118 and 120 of 
the judgement. 
25
" Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.129. 
-iq I . .... 80 -- For more examp es. see Evans, op. ell., n.25_,, at p. . 
258 Judge Weeramantry, op. cit .. n.24. at p.269, para.219. Similarly, see Weil, op. cit., n.23, at 
pp.261-3, and 266. Interestingly, there is no parallel role for special circumstances in the formula 
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example, the Chamber tested the overall result against economic factors to avoid 
catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the 
population of the two parties as a result of the delimitation.259 In a similar 
manner, the ICJ in the Greenland-Jan Mayen Case, used security interest as one 
criterion, among others, to confirm the equitable character of the result.260 Hence, 
non-geographical considerations cannot be regarded ""as exercising a decisive 
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of Article 6. This is because there is a presumption in favour of the equidistance method as 
leadingprimafacie to an equitable result; see above at p.96. 
259 Gulf of Maine Case, at para.23 7. 
260 The Court in this respect stated that: "While courts have been unwilling to allow such 
considerations of security to intrude upon the major task of establishing a primary boundary in 
accordance with the geographical criteria, they are concerned to avoid creating conditions of 
imbalance." Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at para. 81. See also Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p.265. See 
also below. 
261 Anglo/French Arbitration, para. 188. See also Charney, J. I., "The Delimitation of Ocean 
Boundaries," 18 ODIL (1987), at p.508; Charney, op. cit., n.41, at p.240. 
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It seems right to conclude that a corrective and a meliorating role has been 
played by exceptional geographical circumstances, of which islands are a clear 
example. These circumstances may be characterized as special, where Article 6 is 
applicable, or as relevant, where Article 6 is not. Geographical configuration of 
the coasts has been used under the guise of relevant circumstances to indicate the 
proper method for delimitation in a particular case. 262 Finally, it seems correct to 
suggest that there is a hierarchical relationship within the concept of relevant 
circumstances between geographical and non-geographical considerations. The 
former, usually, have been utilized at an early stage of the delimitation process, 
whereas the latter have usually been used in the final stage as a test of the 
equitableness of the result.263 The result of this hierarchical relation is that the 
burden of proof for the inequitableness of the result on the basis of some non-
geographical considerations is placed "on the party seeking to adjust or displace 
the line initially determined on the basis of geographical factors and criteria." 264 
Having said that special circumstances and relevant circumstances are 
different, the Court in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, nevertheless assimilated 
the two categories in the case of opposite states. The Court stated that: 
Although it is a matter of categories which are different in origin and in name, there is 
inevitably a tendency towards assimilation between the special circumstances of A11icle 6 of 
the 1958 Convention and the relevant circumstances under customary law, and this if only 
because they both are intended to enable the achievement of an equitable result. 265 
However, the Court was criticized for its position by Judge Shahabuddeen in 
his separate opinion.266 His view was that the expression "special circumstances" 
is useful only where such circumstances are present, to exclude the obligation of 
applying the equidistance method. Whereas the expression "relevant 
2
''
2 The reason why special circumstances cannot play an indicating role is that Article 6 has 
already provided the applicable method for the delimitation. 
2
''·' In the Tunisia v. Lihya Case the Court invoked proportionality to test the equitableness of the 
overall result, despite the fact that proportionality fell into the geographical category. See paras. 
I 03-4 of the judgement. For more discussion on proportionality, see below. 
26
.
1 Legault and Hankey, op. cit., n.86, at p.971. Similarly, see Charney, op. cit., n.261, at pp.519-
20. 
265 Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at para. 56. 
266 Judge Shahabuddeen, op. cit., n.12, at p.144. In addition, the court is still open to criticism for 




circumstances" is useful in choosing the most suitable method, amongst many, to 
be applied to arrive at an equitable result in the delimitation. Therefore, the 
presence of the former will prevent, in most cases, the application of the 
equidistance method. By way of _contrast, the presence of the latter, which are 
always present because they in themselves characterize the area of delimitation, 
would necessitate the application of the equidistance method if this was the most 
equitable method for delimitation, or could, on the other hand, prevent its 
application if it was not. Therefore, he continued, it is inapt that special 
circumstances should be "'read as a reference to all relevant circumstances in the 
light of which a choice is to be made among any of a number of possible methods 
(including equidistance) with a view to producing the most equitable 
delimitation. "267 
Part two: Specific Special/Relevant Circumstances 
In maritime boundary delimitation, litigants in order to strengthen their cases 
may address a number of factors as special or as relevant circumstances. These 
factors may be classified in two .main categories: ( 1) geographical factors; (2) 
non-geographical factors. The remainder of this Chapter will focus on these 
f b . d ?68 . l ?69 l factors in terms o emg accepte or not - as specia - or as re evant 
. 270 
circumstances. 
A: Geographical Factors 
The principle that the land dominates the sea, or that "'the land is the legal 
source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial 
extensions, "271 makes the geographical features of an area the primary element 
which governs the bearing of a boundary line. It is not surprising, therefore, to 
find that geographical features have been regarded as a special circumstance, as 




For a possible reason why states invoked before third-party settlement as special or relevant 
circumstances factors that were not truly ·connected with the continental shelf doctrine, see Lowe, 
op. cit., n.50, at p.69. 
269 
As suggested above, the scope of special circumstances is limited to geographical factors only. 
270 
Relevant circumstances as noted contain geographical and non-geographical factors. 
"71 - North Sea Cases, at para. 96. 
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well as a relevant circumstance. The Tribunal in the France/Canada Award stated 
that "'~geographical features are at the heart of the delimitation process. "272 
In the commentary of the ILC to its Report of 1956, geographical features 
were listed as a special circumstance if they constituted an ''exceptional 
geographical configuration." The commentary did not, however, elaborate on the 
meaning of "exceptional geographical configuration." In the North Sea Cases, 
Germany made an attempt to explain its meaning by invoking the concept of 
abnormal geographical features. Germany argued that "the normal [geographical 
feature ] ... is a more or less straight coastline. "273 A coast would be characterized 
as abnormal if it were not straight. A concave or convex coastline is, 
consequently, an exceptional geographical configuration, which constitutes a 
special circumstance, and requires a departure from the equidistance principle.274 
The Court which not agreeing with the German interpretation, did not give its 
own. 275 In addition, Grisel found that the phrase "any exceptional configuration 
of the coastline" to be obscure, because "there are not two identical shores on the 
globe, and it therefore is hard to establish what is the rule and what is the 
exception in that matter."276 Professor Brown, however, held that "the most 
frequent cause of such exceptional configuration is the presence of islands on the 
. I I If " 277 contmenta s 1e . 
In customary law the Court in the North Sea Cases introduced the phrase "the 
geographical configuration of the coasts" as a relevant circumstance for 
delimitation purposes.278 Subsequent international decisions have stressed the 
importance of the geographical configuration of an area as a relevant 
circumstance. In the Anglo/French Arbitration, for example, the Com1 of 
Arbitration stated that "it is the geographical circumstances which primarily 
determine the appropriateness of equidistance or any other method of delimitation 
:!7:! France/Canada Award. at para.24. 
m Federal Republic of Germany Memorial, ICJ Pleadings 1969, vol. I, at pp.68-9, para.70. 
m Denmark and the Netherlands rejected this interpretation. North Sea Cases, at para.13. 
:!
75 This was because the court found it was pointless to go into a detailed discussion regarding 
Article 6 when the article itself was not applicable. See Ibid., at para.82. 
:! 7<' G . I . ?"'2 58? nse, op. cit., n.--' , at p. -· 
277 B . 4 76 rown, op. cit., n. . at p. . 
~7x 
- North Sea Cases. at para.96. 
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in any given case."
279 
This being so, no further details were given on the content 
of geographical considerations, except the fact that some geographical features, 
like the coastline being convex or concave and the relationship of the coastline as 
opposite or adjacent, have frequently been stressed as '"special/relevant 
circumstances." For example, the Court in the North Sea Cases accepted the 
convexity and concavity of the parties' coastline in the North Sea regime as a 
relevant circumstance. Similarly, the Tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
Award, and in the France/Canada Award accepted this too.280 
In addition, there are a number of geographical factors which have played 
some role in the delimitation process. These include the presence of islands and 
proportionality. In the interests of clarity we shall discuss a number of these 
factors which have often been raised in the context of third-party adjudication. 
Islands 
As noted m Chapter One of the present work, the coastal state, generally 
speaking, has the right to claim for an island all the maritime zones which are 
recognized in international law. However, the matter is quite different where the 
entitlement of an island has arisen in the context of maritime delimitation. In 
Chapter Six we shall examine in some detail the effect of islands in territorial sea 
and continental shelf delimitation. This discussion is necessary in order to 
provide a proper legal context for our analysis of the possible effect of certain 
islands on the boundary line between Iran and the UAE. In the present context it 
is sufficient to make the point that the presence of islands has in many instances 
been the cause of disputes in the drawing of boundary line.281 In delimitation, 
27
'
1 An~lo!French Arhitration, at para.96. The difference between the concept of "any exceptional 
configuration of the coastline'' in the treaty law and "the geographical configuration of the coasts" 
in the customary law, on first impression, is that the former is limited whereas the latter is not. 
280 North Sea Cases, at paras.56, 89 and 91; Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para.103; 
France/Canada Award. at paras. 26, 28 and 34. 
281 Gutteridge, J.A.C., "The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf," 35 BYBIL 
( 1959), at p.120; Boyle, A.E., "Maritime Boundaries and UNCLOS: Some Current Problems," 
(unpublished paper) Greenwich Forum, 30 May 1996, at pp. I and 2. A number of examples of 
continental shelf boundaries delimitation complicated by the presence of islands have been cited 
in Boyle's paper, Ibid., at pp.2-4, and in Symmons, C., The Maritime Zones of Islands in 
International law, vol. I, Martinus Nijhoff, the Netherlands ( 1979), at pp.183-9. 
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islands situated between two mainlands do not generate maritime zones to their 
full extend, if the outcome of such an extension would be to cause an inequitable 
result in the delimitation. 
282 
Consideration of equitable principles may lead to 
giving islands full, or half or no effect at all. 
T.'I • • I if . , . 283 11e prmctp e o proport1011a tty 
What is the role of proportionality in continental shelf delimitation?284 Is it a 
source of title? Or is it a fact that constitutes a special circumstance? Or is it a 
criterion to be used to test ex post facto the equitableness of an equidistance line 
(or any provisional line determined by another method) or a line resulting from its 
adjustment? Or, finally, is it an element to be used to determine how much a 
provisional line needs to be tilted, or how much effect needs to be given to an 
incidental geographical feature in order to reach an overall equitable result for the 
delimitation? 
Before we proceed to answer these questions, it would be valuable to 
determine the meaning of proporti'onality. The concept of proportionality in shelf 
delimitation has been considered as "a correlation between the ratio of coastal 
1 l d 1 . f J:: "285 engt 1 an t 1e ratio o sur1ace areas. 
282 Politakis. G., "The 1993 Jan Mayen Judgement: The End of Illusions," 41 NILR ( 1994), at 
p.27. 
28
.:; The idea of proportionality was introduced for the first time in the context of continental shelf 
delimitation by Vallat in his comment in 1946 on a possible method of resolving the continental 
shelf boundary problem, in which he said: 
··where a large bay or a gulf is bounded by several states the problem is more complicated. 
Perhaps the most equitable solution would be to divide the submarine area ... among the 
contiguous states in proportion to the length of their coast lines." See Vallat, "The Continental 
Shelf.'' 23 B >'Bil ( 1946), at pp.335-6. For some historical discussion on the relationship between 
the concept of proportionality and maritime boundary delimitation, see Rhee, S.M., "Sea 
Boundary Delimitation between States before World War II," 76 AJIL ( 1982), at pp.556-7. 
28
'
1 This examination is limited, as mentioned earlier, to the position in the case law. For a 
discussion on proportionality in state practices, see Legault and Hankey, "Method, Oppositeness 
and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation," International Maritime 
Boundaries, vol. I. Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands 
( 1993), at p.219. See also Schulte H Nordholt, "Delimitation of Continental shelf in the East 
China Sea," 32 NILR ( 1985), at pp.155-6. 
285 Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p.236. See also Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. I 04. 
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( 1) Proportionality as a source of title 
Despite the fact that the coastal front gives a state the right to maritime 
jurisdiction, it should not be used as an independent principle of delimitation. 286 
In this sense, the length of the coastline could not be regarded as a source of title 
nor could it dictate the total area of shelf to which a coastal state is entitled. 
Otherwise, states which have equal coastlines should have an equal area of shelf. 
This, however, is not true in practice. The case of the Anglo/French Arbitration 
may serve as a good example. The Court in this Award found that the lengths of 
the English and the French coasts were approximately equal in the Channel 
area. 287 Nevertheless, in the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary 
between them the Court allocated to the English coast a larger area. This was 
because the presence of the British islands in the area gave the English coast 
additional area of the continental shelf. Thus, the overall area of the continental 
shelf which had been attributed to Britain became larger than that which had been 
. F 288 given to ranee. 
This may demonstrate the fact that the length of a state's coastline is not the 
source of title. The Court in the above mentioned Award put this conclusion 
particularity clearly by holding that "proportionality is not in itself a source of 
title."289 The result is that "a ·maritime delimitation can certainly not be 
established by a direct division of the area in dispute proportional to the 
. 1 1 f 1 b I . 1 . . 1 1 "290 respective engt 1s o t 1e coasts e ongmg to t 1e parties m t 1e re evant area. 
(2) Proportionality as a special/relevant circumstance 
There have been three cases to date where proportionality has been attributed 
a meliorating role to correct a provisional equidistance line ( or any other line 
resulting from applying another method). These three cases are the Gulf of Maine 
28
" Culf of Maine Case, at para.218. See also Brownlie, op. cit., n.52, at p.228. 
m Anglo/Frenc:h Arhitration. at paras.181, 196 and 20 I. 
288 
Ibid., at para. 202. 
289 
Ibid., at para. I 0 I. Similarly the Court in the Dubai/Shwjah Award emphasized that: 
"proportionality, although not a source of title, was a 'valuable indication of what is equitable'." 
Duhai/Shmjah Award, at p.665; France/ Canada Award, at para. 45. See also Brownlie, op. cit., 
n.52. at p.228. 





the Libya v. Malta Case292 and the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case. 293 In 
these cases the World Court considered the disparity in length between the two 
coastlines of the parties as a special/relevant circumstance calling for adjustment 
of the equidistance line to the advantage of the state with the longer coastline. 294 
Hence, states with a long coastline were attributed a large share of the 
delimitation area.
295 
This role is, however, contrary to the submission that proportionality is not a 
source of title, and thus it should have no decisive role in the delimitation 
whereby a state with a long coastline should have the lion's share of the shelf area 
in proportion to the ratio of the length of its coastline. Otherwise there is no room 
for any other rules of maritime delimitation, since the delimitation operation 
would be "based only on figures reflecting the length of the coastline."296 
It was not surprising, therefore, that the decision of the World Court in the 
Gu(((~( Maine, the Libya v. Malta and the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Cases to give 
proportionality a decisive role was subject to strong criticism from a number of 
international writers. Weil, for example, condemned the Court's position in the 
Libya v. Malta Case stating that: 
the equality of coastal lengths cannot be regarded as the sine qua non of the equity of an 
equidistance line ... The recognition in Libya/Malta that the comparison of coastal lengths is a 
291 Paras. 184 and 218. 
292 Paras. 68, 66-7. 
29
:; Paras. 68-9. See Judge Schwebel's criticism of the Court decision, ICJ Reports 1993, at p. 126-
7. See also Judge Oda's separate opinion in this Case, at p. I 15, para.92. Similarly, the remark of 
Professor Kwiatkowska in: "Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation," Essay in Honour of Sir 
R. Y. Jennings, F{fty Years of the International Court of Justice, Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1996), at p.286; and finally see the comment of 
Charney, op. cit., n.41, at pp.242-4 
2
'J.i The disparity between the coastal length of the two states should be so great that it is able to be 
understood by a simple glance at the map and not by exact mathematical calculation. In other 





Lihya v. Malta Case, at para.68. See also Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and Arechaga, their joint 
separate opinions in the Libya v. Malta Case, in which they supported the correction role for 
proportionality, at pp.82-4, paras.20-1: and see also Weil in his answering of the position of the 
three judges. Weil, op. cit., n.23, at pp.75-9. 
2
% Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para.120. See also Professor Weil's argument before the ICJ 
in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case: summarized in Politakis, op. cit., n.282 at p.13. 
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relevant circumstance is incompatible with the doctrine professed in this same judgement on 
the link between title and delimitation, ·and with its definition of legal relevance. 297 
(3) Proportionality as a test for the equitableness of the result 
In this sense it would mean that the court or tribunal would check the 
outcome of the delimitation ex post facto to ensure that the boundary line that has 
resulted "does not involve an unreasonable disproportion between the ratio of the 
areas and that of the coastal lengths."
298 
This evaluative role for proportionality 
was said to be its classic function, which was suggested in the North Sea 
( , 
299 d di d b 1 C . I T . . L ·1 C 300 . I .ases, an was a 1ere to y t 1e ourt m t 1e umsza v. 1 'Jya ase, 111 t 1e 
Lihya v. Malta Case 301 and in the France/Canada Award. 302 
Using proportionality as a test, however, is not always easy. This may 
sometimes be due to the difficulty of identifying the relevant coast and the 
relevant area of delimitation.303 This difficulty usually arises where one or both 
parties have a boundary with a third state which is yet to be determined. 304 The 
Channel ls·lands· Award and the Libya v. Malta Case may be cited as examples; 
where the calculation of the length of the relevant coastline would inevitably 
entail calculating an area of the coast of one or both parties, which itself may be 
affected in any future delimitation between that party and a third state. This 
297 Weil, op. cil., n.23, at p. 243. Similar criticism was expressed by Judge Oda in his dissenting 
opinion in the Libya v. Malla Case, at p.138, para.26, and Judge Schwebel in his dissenting 
opinion of the same case, at p.183, note 145. See also Frank, op. cil., n.52, at p.72. 
298 s w ·1 . 2"' ?"'6 ee e1 , op. c11., n. _,, at P·--' . 
299 The World Court in this case said that the role of proportionality is "to establish the necessary 
balance between States with straight and those with markedly concave or convex coasts, or to 
reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions." Norlh Sea Cases, at para. 98. It should 
be noted that the court in this case was in charge only of identifying the rules that govern the 
delimitation. 
)oo Tunisia v. lihya Case, at paras. I 03, 104 and 130. 
·wi Although proportionality had been invoked in this case as a special circumstance, it was used 
in the final stage of the delimitation process as a test ex-posl faclo to test the equidistance of the 
boundary line. This test was based on a.broad assessment, rather than an exact calculation. See 
paras.174-5. The Court's conclusion was that "there is certainly no evident disproportion." See 
para. 75. Interestingly, the outcome of the test was usually to affirm that the result did not contain 
disproportionally distorting effects. This is, in the words of Professor Weil, because "the data on 
which the arithmetical test is based are in reality selected so as to confinn a predetennined result." 
See Weil's dissenting opinion in the France/Canada Award, at p.1207, para.25. 
>
02 France/Canada Award. at para. 45. See the comment of Charney, op. cil., n.41, at pp.241-2. 
:1o.• Weil's dissenting opinion in the France/Canada Award, at para.24. 
)o
4 Or where the parties agreed to limit the task of the court or tribunal to draw the boundary line 
between some parts of their boundary. See, for example, the task of the Chamber in the Gulf of 
Maine Case, at para. 23. For an example of such a case in state practice, see Chapter Five. 
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possible effect would probably overthrow the figures and ratios arrived at in the 
. d t 305 JU gemen. 
(4) Proportionality as an equitable consideration 
This is to say that proportionality is an element, among others, in determining 
whether giving an effect for an incidental geographical feature would produce an 
inequitable result. This role, which was suggested by the Court of Arbitration in 
the Anglo/French Arhitration, is to avoid the inequitable outcome which would 
result from giving a certain feature an excessive weight in the delimitation.306 
Professor Brown, in his comment on the Court's reinterpretation of the role of 
proportionality, wrote that the Court viewed proportionality as an aid that may be 
used '"to help in establishing whether a particular feature does constitute special 
circumstances because of its unjust distorting effects."307 Brownlie, however, 
considered this role of proportionality, as suggested in the Anglo/French 
Arbitration, as the general form of '"'"ex post facto verification of a line arrived at 
on the basis of other criteria. "308 
In contrast to the previous roles suggested above, this role for proportionality 
might be seen as reasonable, because it would not attribute a decisive role for 
proportionality, and it is free from the difficulty that may arise in using 
proportionality as a test of equity. Moreover, this suggestion role is similar to the 
equitable principles role in maritime delimitation, where the effects of special or 
relevant circumstances need to be determined in the light of these principles.309 
305 Libya v. Malta Case, at para.74. See also Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p.24 l. 
306 The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo/French Award regarding the role of proportionality held 
that: '"ln the present case, the role of proportionality in the delimitation of the continental shelf is, 
in the view of this Court, a broader one. not linked to any specific geographical feature. It is 
rather a factor to be taken into account in appreciating the effects of geographical features on the 
equitable or inequitable character of a delimitation, and in particular of a delimitation by 
application of the equidistance method.'' See para.99, see also para. I 00. And see Frank, op. cit., 
n.52. at p.65. 
307 B . 4 I I? rown, op. cit., n. , at p. -· 
308 The exceptional form in his view is the ·•form of a ration loosely based on the length of the 
respective coastal line." Brownlie. op. cit., n.52, at pp.228-9. 
30
') A similar view was held by Belcher. Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa. He held 
that: "proportionality, in my view, is an _equitable principle, even if it does not approximate the 
status of a rule of treaty or customary law, as does the equitable principle of equidistance. Like 
the principle of equidistance, proportionality will not necessarily govern a delimitation of 
continental shelf, but a gain like equidistance, that does not make it any the less an equitable 
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The delimitatio11 and the interests of other states in the region 
There is no doubt that the effect of any agreement or international decision 
"'has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
[area]. "310 However, on several occasions the parties m an international 
adjudication claimed, and the court or tribunal admitted, the relevance of the 
other states' delimitation practice as a relevant circumstance. The Tribunal in 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau A1vard, expressed this clearly: 
A delimitation designed to obtain an equitable result cannot ignore the other delimitations 
already made or still to be made in the region. 311 
The relevance of regional practice is not because it has any effect beyond its 
parties, but merely because it constitutes a geographical feature, which the court 
or tribunal is required to take into account. 312 Further, another reason which may 
justify the relevance of other state practice in the area is that it is desirable that the 
present delimitation fits together with pre-existing delimitations in a unified 
whole. The Court of Arbitration in the Dubai/Sharjah Award admitted the need 
for the delimitation to "be consistent...with comparable regional practice."313 
This is the case where there is an existing regional practice. However, there 
may be a case where other states have potential claims in the delimitation area. 
The Court in the Libya v. Malta Case, faced with such a situation, solved the 
problem by limiting its jurisdiction to the area where a third state had laid no 
claim to it. 314 The Court stated in this context: 
The present decision must...be limited in geographical scope so as to leave the claims of Italy 
unaffected, that is to say that the decision of the Court must be confined to the area in which, as 
the Court has been informed by Italy, that State has no claims to continental shelfrights.
315 
principle." See Blecher, M.D., "Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf," 73 AJ!l ( 1979), at 
p.77. And also held by Legault and Hankey, op. cit., n.284, at p.222. For the role of the equitable 
principles, see Section One above. 
~ 10 Article 59 of the statute of the ICJ. See also the world Court Judgement in Application by Italy 
to intervene in lihya v. Malta Case, at para.42~ Burkina Faso v. Mali Case, at para.46. 
'
11 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para.93. In addition, the Tribunal said: "in its assessment, the 
Tribunal could not take into consideration a delimitation which did not result from negotiations or 
an equivalent act in accordance with international law." See para.94. 
312 . ') ..., , .... Evans, op. cit., n._5_,, at p.-J4. 
rnDuhai/Shw:iah Award, at p.677. See also Evans, op. cit., n.253, at p.235. 
:-;
14 For an example of such a problem in state practice, see Chapter Five. 
315 Libya v. Malta Case. at para.21. See also Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras.42, 75 and 81; 
Burkina Faso v. Mali Case, at para.4 7. 
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The Court position, however, was criticized by some writers. Weil, for 
example, wrote that the restriction which the Court imposed upon· the 
geographical scope of the delimitation area was hardly justifiable. This was 
because the principle of res in/er alios judica/a 316 would reserve the third state 
interest. 
317 
As a result, he continued, there is no reason why the interest of other 
states should be regarded as a relevant circumstance in the delimitation 
318 process. 
Land mass 
The idea that the land dominates the sea~ and that the geographical 
configurations of the coast have an important role in the delimitation should be 
distinguished from the land mass behind the coast. The latter has been rejected by 
third parties as constituting a relevant circumstance. The Tribunal in Guinea v. 
Guinea-Bissau A 1-vard stated that: 
As for proportionality with relation to the land mass of each State, the Tribunal considers that 
this does not constitute a relevant factor in this case. The rights which a State may claim to 
have over the sea are not related to the extent of the territory behind its coasts, but to the coasts 
themselves and to the manner in which they border this territory. A State with a fairly small 
land area may well be justified in claiming a much more extensive maritime territory than a 
larger country. Everything depends on their respective maritime facades and their 
formations. 319 
However, the rejection of the disparity between the land mass of the parties as 
a relevant circumstance should be, again, distinguished from the difference in the 
length of the coastlines of the parties. This, as we have seen, is acceptable as a 
relevant circumstance though with some controversy as to its role in the 
d l
. . . 3?0 
e 11mtatton process. -
>i<i For further discussion on this principle, see Cheng, op. cit., n.17, at pp.340-3 . 
. ~I? s w ·1 . 2... 255 ee e1 , op. ell., n. -'· at p. . 
m A similar position was held by Weil in regard to the relevance of other states delimitation in 
the region. See Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p. 256. For further criticism, see Judge Schwebel dissenting 
opinion in the Libya v. Malta Case, at pp. 172-8. 
31'J Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para.119: Libya v. Malta Case, at para.49: France/Canada 
Award, at paras.44-5. 
"
20 See above at pp.142-6. 
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B: Non-Geographical Factors 
The conduct of the parties321 
The conduct of the parties m regard to maritime delimitation can take the 
following forms:-
( 1) Activity 
The parties may conduct two types of activities within the area involved: 
(a) Fishing: Whether or not the fishing activities are relevant depends on the kind 
of boundary in question. If it is a territorial sea boundary delimitation, the fishing 
activity may fall under the concept of historic title which, in this sense, requires a 
departure from the median line.322 But, if the question is a continental shelf 
boundary delimitation, it has no role to play. This is because coastal states only 
have jurisdiction over the sea bed and subsoil, and not over the water column. 
Finally, if the question is related to the EEZ the first impression is that fishing 
activities do constitute a relevant circumstance. This is because the coastal state 
in the EEZ has sovereign rights o:'er, inter alia, fishing activity. 323 Indeed, in the 
Libya v. Malta Case, Libya accepted Malta's argument that ~~the Maltese fishing 
activities might...have relevance to the EEZ of Malta."324 
(b) Arrangements: These may include those for navigation aids, pollution control, 
security and other administration arrangements. Such activities have no role to 
321 The conduct of the parties may be understood from a number of sources. These are: 
a) Formal sources which include: "international treaty, constitutional provision, executive decree, 
statute, or subordinate legislation." 
b) Less formal sources which include: "unilateral declarations by governments or individual 
officials: official press releases: ministerial statements; archival materials; reports of lands and 
surveys departments: monographs. memorial, unofficial maps and charts." See Johnston, D.M., 
The TheOJJ' and HistOJJ' o.f Ocean BoundGJJ'-Making. McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston 
and Montreal ( 1988), at pp.32 and 34. On subsequent practices in general, see McNair, The law 
f?( Treaties, Oxford University Press, London ( 1961 ), at pp.424-9; Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n.17, 
pp.386-7. For the effect of practices on the parties respective legal position, see The Beagle 
Channel Arhitration, 52 /LR, at p.198, para.129: Taha, F., The International legal Aspects of the 
Boundaries of the Sudan with Ethiopia. and Kenya, PhD. Dissertation, vol. 1, Jesus College, 
Cambridge University ( 1973 ), at pp.44-172. 
:m See Chapter Two above for a dissection on the concept of historical title. 
323 See Chapter One/ Section Four above. 
>1-' Libyan Counter Memorial, IC.I Pleadings: Libya v. Malta Case, vol. 11, at p.64, para.3.14. See 
also Evans. op. cit., n.253, at pp.210-1. 
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play in the delimitation process as relevant circumstances. Any other view would 
obstruct the making of such arrangements in the area which is not yet 
de! imited. 325 
(2) A unilateral claim 
A unilateral claim by a state to a particular line as the boundary line with an 
other state cannot be taken as a relevant factor by a third-party settlement. The 
Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case, for example, rejected the Tunisian claim of 
the Zenith Vertical 45° from Ras Ajdir as its boundary line with Libya.326 This 
was because the said line was established by unilateral action,327 and it was 
"'originally intended only as the limit of an area of surveillance in the context of 
specific fishery regulation. "328 Hence, it was unable to accept the Tunisian claim 




(3) The demonstration of de facto agreements between the parties 
Here a distinction needs to be made between 
(a) A de facto agreement accepting an applicable method 
If the conduct of the parties provides evidence of acceptance of a specific 
method for the delimitation between them in the area involved, the conduct of the 
parties, in this case, constitutes a· relevant circumstance, which should be taken 
into account in the delimitation process.330 However, it does not follow that either 
party could be under a legal obligation by virtue of this acceptance in regard to its 
325 Gu(l <?f Maine Case. at para.237. This is because the acceptance of these arrangements as 
relevant circumstances would result in a situation where one party could attempt to construct and 
exercise some administrative simply to strengthen its legal position. vis-a-vis neighbouring states, 
in claiming a title over the disputed area. The natural reaction of a neighbouring state would be to 
challenge this ambition by preventing the state in question from exercising such activities. This 
would. most likely, result in a hostile relationship between the countries concerned . 
. n<> Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras.88-90. See also above at p.93, note 12. 
m For general discussion on different kind of unilateral acts, see Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.52, at 
pp. I 187-96. 
'')8 
·'- Tunisia v. lihya Case, at para.90. 
:;
29 Ibid. A similar view was held by the Tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para. 94. 
See also Brown, op. cit., n.4, at p.151. 
:•:w Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case. at para.82; Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras. I 17-21; Gulf of 
/\1/uine Case. at paras.152-4. and Libya v. Malta Case, at paras.24-5. 
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relationships with a third state or in respect of a different area.331 This limitation 
upon the effect of the conduct of the parties is necessary, because adopting a 
different approach would result in a situation where "a state which had to 
negotiate maritime boundaries with two or more neighbouring states would be 
inhibited in its negotiations with one neighbour lest it give hostages to fortune in 
its negotiations with other neighbouring states."332 
(b) A de facto agreement accepting a boundary line 
The conduct of the parties may demonstrate respect for an appropriate line as 
the boundary line for some sovereign activities. The Court in the Tunisia v. Libya 
Case, for instance, found that each party, unilaterally, had bound its petroleum 
concessions to the 26° line, although their actual claims were beyond this line. 
The Court, in regard to this unilate.ral practice by both parties, stated that: 
The result was the appearance on the map of a de facto line dividing concession areas which 
were the subject of active claims, in the sense that exploration activities were authorized by one 
Party, without interference, or (until I 976) protests, by the other. 333 
Strictly speaking, the Court in this case accepted this de facto boundary line 
between the petroleum concessions of the parties as a relevant circumstance in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between Tunisia and Libya. 
However, the said line, in the Court's view, did not act per seas a tacit agreement 
between the parties, since their respective claims showed that they were never in 
agreement on that line. Rather it acted as evidence to indicate that the line "which 
-'·'
1 The Court in the Greenland and .Ian Mayen Case stressed this limitation by saying that: "the 
court would observe that there can be no legal obligation for a party to a dispute to transpose, for 
the settlement of that dispute, a particular solution previously adopted by it in a different context." 
See para.85 of the decision. 
:n:! Churchill. op. cit .. n. I 63, at p.24. 
:i:i:i Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. I I 7. It should be noted here that there is no agreement about the 
length of time over which the conduct of the parties should be extended in order to be relevant. 
The Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case was satisfied with the practice of the parties from I 966 to 
I 974 in regard to Tunisia, and from 1968 to I 974 in regard to Libya. By way of contrast, the 
Chamber in the Gulf of Main Case considered the practice of Canada from 1965 to 1972 (for 
seven years) as a short period too brief to have any legal effect. Tunisia v. Libya Case, at 
para. I 17, and Gu({ of Maine Case. at para. I 51. 
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the parties themselves may have considered equitable or acted upon as such-if 
only as an interim solution affecting part of the area to be delimited."334 
Natural resources 
Natural resources (or the unity of deposit) are ""the essential objective 
envisaged by States when they put forward claims to sea-bed areas containing 
them."335 Therefore they have played a significant role in determining the bearing 
of the boundary line in delimitation by agreement. The practices of the Arabian 
Gulf States could provide practical examples in this regard. 336 However, as far as 
third-party settlement is concerned, the role of economic factors is less certain. 
In the Grishadarna Arbitration the Permanent Court of Arbitration accepted 
the natural resources in Grisbadarna bank to be a relevant circumstance requiring 
the adjustment of the boundary line.
337 
The ICJ in the North Sea Cases accepted 
the unity of deposits as a relevant circumstance in the question of continental 
shelf delimitation.338 Similar support for this position is found in, inter alia, the 
:;:;
4 Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para. I 18. The acquiescence, either tacit or expressed, of one state 
over a particular issue, may give other state the rights to invoke the estoppel doctrine against the 
accepting state, if its claims are contrary to what it had already acknowledged. For fu11her 
discussion on estoppel, see the World Court Judgement in the land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute Case (El Salvador v. Honduras~ Application by Nicaragua Intervene, at p.118, para. 63; 
Switzerland Federal Tribunal decision in the Canton of Vala is v. Canton of Tess in Case, 75 I LR, 
at pp.114-21. Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.52, at p.527; MacGibbon, I.C., "Estoppel in International 
Law,'' 7 ICLQ ( 1958), at pp.468-513; Thirlway, H., "The Law and Procedures of the International 
Court of Justice 1960-1989, Part One," 60 BYBIL ( 1989), at pp.29-48; Taha, op. cit .. n.321 at 
pp.119-44. 
m Lihya v. Malta Case. at para. 50; Gulf of Maine Case, at paras.48 and 232. See also Bowett, 
D .. "The Economic Factor in Maritime Delimitation,'' International law at the Time of its 
Cod(fication. Essay in Honour of Roberto Ago. vol. 2. Milano-Dott. A. Giuffre Editore ( 1987), at 
p.45 . 
. ~:;" See. for example. Saudi Arabia-Bahrain's agreement of 1958, and Qatar-Abu-Dhabi's 
agreement of 1969. For further details on the effect of natural resources in boundary delimitation 
on state practice in general and in the UAE's in particular, see Chapter Four at pp.168-70. 
337 See Chapter Two for more detail abou.t the Grisbadarna Arbitration. 
mi Para. 97. It should be noted that the Court in this case was not charged with drawing an actual 
boundary line between the parties. Moreover, Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion in the North 
Sea Cases denied the relevance of natural resources to the continental shelf delimitation, and 
argued that: "if the preservation of the unity of deposit is a matter of concern to the Parties they 




Tunisia v. Lihya Case,
339 
the Lihya v. Malta Case, 340 and the Greenland v. Jan 
A,( /' 341 /Vlayen L-llSe. 
However, this was not true in the Gu(/' of Maine Case. The Chamber in this 
instance rejected the potential resources in the Gulf of Maine as a criterion to be 
applied in the delimitation process. Nonetheless, it does not follow that the 
Chamber overlooked the potential resources in toto. Rather it viewed these 
resources as relevant "in assessing. the equitable character of the result."342In 1992 
the Tribunal in the France/Canada Award upheld the view of the Chamber in the 
Gu(f qf'Maine Case regarding the question of natural resources.343 
The difference between the two directions is that the former takes the view 
that natural resources are relevant circumstances similar to other acceptable 
circumstances, e.g. geographical configuration, to be taken into account in the 
early stage of the delimitation process. However, in the case of the latter the 
natural resources were seen as a criterion, amongst others, to be taken into 
account in the final stage of the delimitation process, in order to ensure the 
equitable character of the result. 
So much for the third-party settlement stand in respect to the natural 
resources. Now we must examine the position of some international writers on 
this matter. Professor Mouton in his Hague Lectures in 1954 enumerated the 
existence of common deposits as a special circumstance that, like the exceptional 
configuration of the coasts, the presence of islands or navigable channels, 
necessitated a departure from the principle of equidistance. However, he asserted 
that the problem of common deposits is one which we "can only solve by 
:i:w Para. I 07 . 
.-.w Para.50. 
w The ICJ in this case took account of the fishing resources in the area, and therefore adjusted 
the median line to give equal access to fishing resources in the area of overlapping claim. 
Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case. at paras.72-76 and 92. Churchill criticized the court decision in 
"attaching too much significance to fishery resources as a relevant factor." See Churchill, op. cit., 
n.163. at p.22. See also the remark of Judge Oda in his separate opinion in this Case, at pp.115-7, 
paras.94-100, and that of Judge Schwebel in his separate opinion in the case, at p.120, and finally 
see Charney, op. cit., n.41, at pp.236-40. 
>42 Gu(( of Maine Case, at para. 232. 
:>
4
:> France/Canada Award, at paras.83-5. See also Weil's dissenting opinion m the 
France/Canada Award, at p.1211, para. 34. 
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agreement and for which it would be difficult to lay down a general rule."344 
Brown and O'Connell held that natural resources should not be invoked to justify 
a departure from the equidistance line, except in the case where a state established 
historical rights over the area where these resources are located. Otherwise the 
states concerned should solve their differences over these resources through 
bi lateral negotiations. 
345 
Churchill quite recently stated a similar view m general to Brown and 
O'Connell, but in addition he claimed that: 
The present trends in the case law suggest that, when determining mant11ne boundaries, 
international courts and tribunals are likely to take very little, if any, account of fisheries factors 
when determining a continental shelf or a single continental shelf and EFZ/EEZ boundary, 
though possibly somewhat more account may be taken when determining a territorial sea 
boundary. Even when fisheries questions are taken into account, it is impossible to say what 
influence they will have on the drawing of a boundary line. This will depend on all the other 
circumstances of the case and what weight a court or tribunal attaches to other relevant 
factors. 346 
In conclusion it is hard to accept that the presence of natural resources, on its 
own, can be used articulately in international adjudication to justify the departure 
from the equidistance line.347 Their role should be limited to the course of 
negotiation between the states concerned. 348 This argument can be supported by 
the following factors: 
1. The adjustment of the boundary line in the Grisbadarna Arbitration was based 
on the historical factor of Swedish fishermen long utilizing the fishing bank, 
and not on the existence of fishing in itself 349 
2. In the Commentary of the ILC Report of 1953 the presence of natural resources 
was not specified as being a special circumstance.350 Indeed Mr. Franc;ois, the 
;.i.i Mouton. M. W. ''The Continental Shelf.'' 85 Academie De Droit International ( 1954-1), at 
p.420. 
,.,~ Brown, op. cit., n.4, at p.80, See also Brown, op. cit., n.12, at p. 44; O'Connell, op. cit., n.19, 
at p.711. 
.w, Churchill. R.R .. ''Fisheries Issues in Maritime Delimitation," 17 Marine Policy ( 1993), at p.53. 
H? Weil. op. cit., n.23. at p.264. See also Judge Gros, op. cit., n.24, at p.385 para.40. An opposite 
view was stressed by Kwiatkowska, B., "Economic and Environmental Considerations," 
International Maritime Boundaries, vol. I, Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993), at pp. I 07-10. 




9 See Chapter Two above. 
350 !LC Yearbook (1956), vol. 2, at p.300, para.37. 
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Rapporteur, in answering an argument put forward by Mr. Zourek that the rules 
of continental shelf should be linked with the rules of territorial sea 
delimitation, stated, inter a/ia, that the actual method for the territorial sea 
delimitation "might be affected by certain consideration, particularly, as regards 
navigation's and fishing interests, which would not apply in the case of 
. I I If'' 3" 1 contmenta s 1e . · 
3. The Court in the North Sea Cases enumerated the unity of deposits as a 
relevant circumstance, that is, one to be taken into account in the course of 
. . 352 
negotiations. 
4. Although the Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case accepted that "the presence of 
oil-wells in an area to be delimited, ... may, depending on the facts, be an 
element to be taken into account in the process of weighing all relevant factors 
to achieve an equitable result" ,353 it relied entirely on the de facto boundary line 
between Libyan and Tunisian oil concessions, and the geographical factors of 
the area, to reach an equitable solution. Similarly, the Court in the Libya v. 
Malta Case accepted natural resources as constituting relevant circumstances, 
albeit declining to take them into account in the case. This was because the 
parties had not furnished the Court with any indications at the natural resources 
r4 of the area concerned. :i 
To sum up, for a factor to be relevant in continental shelf delimitation, it 
should have a role to play in the legal title to the shelf area. 355 Since the issue of 
mineral deposit has exercised no such role,356 why then should it have any role in 
the delimitation process?357 Moreover, the fact that natural resources are 
'
51 
!LC Yeurhook ( 1953). vol. I. at p.134. para.53. 
' 5 ~ Sec also Bowctt, op. cit .. n.335, at pp.49-50. 
·~:; Tunisia v. Lihyu Case, at para. I 07. 
:;~., Para.50. In fact the court did not appear to be certain about accepting these factors as a 
relevant circumstance. The Court said that natural resources "might well constitute relevant 
circumstances." See para.50. 
:;
55 Libya v. Malta Case, at para. 46. 
:;<;<> A state is entitled to sovereign rights over the continental shelf area by virtue of its sovereignty 
over the coastal front. See Ibid., at para. 49. 
>
57 
A consideration based on natural resources contains a consideration of a political and 
economic character. Third-party settlement should not take into account such consideration, in the 
early stage of the delimitation process, except where the parties asked for a decision ex aequo et 
bono. Gu(( of Maine Case, at para.59. See also Brown's comments on the Court judgement. 
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changeable factors, in the sense that "a particular resource which is of a great 
worth today may have no economic value tomorrow, and vice versa,"358 could 
lead to the conclusion that ""it would be neither just nor equitable to base a 
delimitation on the evaluation of data which changes in relation to factors that are 
. . ,,359 
sometimes uncertam. 
Economic and socio-economic factors 
Economic and socio-economic factors and the needs of states to develop or to 
preserve their economic livelihood have been advanced before third-party 
settlement in almost all the cases. This has been especially so when the parties 
were underdeveloped, e.g. Guinea and Guinea-Bissau; or in instances where one 
of them was significantly less wealthy than the other, e.g. Malta and Libya. 
By economic and socio-economic factors, we mean the economic dependence 
of the parties for their livelihood on the natural resources in the area concerned, as 
with fishing. 360 Also included would be such factors as the difference in size of 
population between the parties in the area, their comparative wealth, and their 
need for economic development.361 These economic factors have an obvious 
connection with the issue of the unity of deposit examined above. However, it is 
possible to make a distinction between them. The former are the needs of the 
people of the parties. and the dependence for their livelihood on the natural 
resources (fishery activity in most cases), which are located in the area of the 
delimitation. Moreover, in some cases one of the parties is less wealthy than the 
other. This difference between the two states might be alleged by the less rich 
state as a factor to be taken into account. Thus ""the area of continental shelf 
regarded as appertaining to the less rich of the two states would be somewhat 
Brown, op. cit .. n.4, at p.233. For further discussion on a decision ex aequo et bona, see Chapter 
Seven. 
358 Weil's dissenting opinion in the France/Canada Award, at p.1211, para.34. cf Bowett, op. cit., 
n.335. at p.60. 
·
159 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at para.122. For a different view, see Judge Weeramantry, op. 
cit., n.24, at pp.267-8, para.211. 
360 K . k k . "47 78 9 W 'I . 2" ?62 .... E . wiat ows a, op. cit., n.-' , at pp. - . e1, op. cit., n. _,, at PP·- -.). vans, op. cit., 
n.253, at p.188. 
3
''
1 Judge Oda, op. cit., n.297, at p.159, para.66. 
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increased 111 order to compensate for its inferiority in economic resources."362 
However. in the case of the unity of deposits, the matter is centred oh the 
potential natural resources themselves, like an oil field or fishery bank, and 
whether, as we have seen, it is justifiable to shift the boundary line to take 
account of these resources. 
Economic and socio-economic factors in this sense have been definitively 
rejected as having any relevant role to play in selecting the method of 
delimitation, or in generating a boundary line. The Court in the Tunisia v. Libya 
Case stated. "''that economic considerations cannot be taken into account for the 
delimitation of the continental shelf areas appertaining to each Party. They are 
virtually extraneous factors since they are variables which unpredictable national 
fortune or calamity, as the case may be, might at any time cause to tilt the scale 
one way or the other. A country might be poor today and become rich tomorrow 
as a result of an event such as the discovery of a valuable economic resource. ":;6:; 
A similar position has been adopted in a number of other international judicial 
and arbitral decisions. 364 
To sum up, it is true that a third-party settlement applying law has no role in 
distributing justice, or ""the task of establishing a regime of equitable" share,365 
nor has it a role in giving one party preference because it has fewer resources than 
the other. The role of the third-party settlement in the delimitation process is to 
draw a boundary line in an area wl~ere there is an overlapping of legal claims. It is 
also true, on the other hand, that the third-party settlement should not increase the 
hardship or the pove11y of either party. Therefore it is necessary to verify that the 
result of the delimitation is not radically inequitable, that is to say '"as likely to 
entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of 
.H•:! Lihya v. Malta Case. at para 50. 
1
'':; Tunisia v. Libya Case. at para. I 07. A different view was stressed by Judge Weeramantry, op. 
cit .. n.24. at pp.267-8, para.211. See also Bowett, op. cit .. n.335, at pp. 61-2. 
·
1
M Gu(f of Maine Case. at paras.59, 232 and 237; Libya v. Malta Case, at para.50; 
Ciuinea/Guinea-Bissau Award. at para.122: Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at para.SO. 
Interestingly, Evans indicated the difficulty which would result if the economic and socio-
economic factors were accepted as relevant circumstances. See Evans, op. cit., n.253, at p.186. 
And See Charney, op. cit., n. 41, at pp.236-40. 
:;c,s B . ""5 60 owett. op. elf .. n .. '-' . at p. . 
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the population of the countries concerned. "366 This concern is clearly influenced 
the World Court in the AnKlo-Norwef{ian Case,367 and which subsequently had 
been reflected into Article 4( 4) of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
Convention of 1958, which reads: 
Where the method of straight baselines is applicable ... account may be taken, in determining 
particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the 
importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage. 
Security interests 
Security interests, as a relevant circumstance in maritime delimitation, means 
that the court or tribunal should avoid, as far as possible, drawing the boundary 
line too close to the shore of either party in a way which may threaten it's 
national security or "imply an inequitable displacement of the possibility of [one 
party] to protect interests which. require protection."368 Within this context 
security interest have been accepted in international adjudication as having a 
limited role in the delimitation process. This role is to suppo11 and strengthen 
other factors and principles when deciding upon a result for the delimitation. In 
addition, security interests may be used in the assessment of the equitableness of 
the result. 369 However, security interests could not on their own be a decisive 
influence, or suggest a boundary line. 370 Security interests, finally, are 
distinguishable from defence arrangements which have been rejected as a relevant 
circumstance for determining the boundary line. The chamber in the Gu([ of 
Maine Case held that: "the respective scale of activities connected 
with ... defence ... can not be taken into account as a relevant circumstance." 
371 It 
might be suggested that the idea behind the rejection of defence arrangements as a 
-'''" Ciu(l r?f· Maine Case, at para.237. See also Judge Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at pp.267-70, 
paras.211-9. See also Weil, op. cit., n.23, at p. 263. 
1(,7 A I V . C~ I ......... · ng 0-1 orwegwn ase. at p. _,_,. 
:;i,x Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at para.81. To the same effect, see Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
A ward, at paras.92, 98 and 124: Libya v. Malta Case, at para.51. See also Churchill, op. cit., 
n.163. at p.23. 
11'
9 w ·1 . ')'"'I 165 · e1 • op. ell., n.--', at P·- . 
:no Anglo/French Award, at para.188; Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.51; Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
Award. at para.124; Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at para. 81. See also Evans, op. cit., n.253, at 
p.177-8 . 
.ni Gu((<?( Maine Case. at para. 23 7. 
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relevant circumstance ts that the acceptance of these activities as relevant 
circumstances would encourage states to build such installations and 
arrangements to affect the delimitation of its boundary with its neighbouring 
states. 
Conclusion 
It seems right to conclude that, in the law of maritime boundary delimitation, 
states are under an obligation to enter into negotiations before they have recourse 
to any other formula to determine the boundary between them. This obligation 
should be undertaken in good faith with the intention of reaching an agreement. 
This can be done, as we shall see in Chapter Four, by working out an acceptable 
solution to a sensitive problem, such as the presence of an island or oil field. 
However, where no agreement can be concluded, the states concerned may 
invoke the rule of equidistance/special circumstances, which is enunciated in the 
1958 Continental Shelf Convention. Where the Convention is not applicable they 
may apply the rule of equitable/relevant circumstances. Such rules, whether in 
customary law or in the convention based law, may be used as bases for 
negotiations between states concerned. Nevertheless, if they are still far from 
reaching an agreement, they may have recourse to some form of a third-party 
settlement to resolve the differences between them on the basis of international 
law or on the basis of the principle of ex aequo el bono.372 As far as international 
law is concerned a third-party settlement would apply the rule of equidistance-
special circumstances where Article 6 is applicable, or the rule of equitable-
relevant circumstances where it is not applicable. It was submitted that there are 
no practical differences between these two rules, since they both seek to produce 
an equitable result for the delimitation.373 
m For more discussion on this principle. see Chapter Seven. 
:n.• Moreover, Professor Brown after examining the bilateral treaty practice of the states not party 
to the Geneva Convention, the agreem~nt signed between 1969 and 1982, concluded that: "it 
remains true that, invariably. the boundary-making process can be regarded as compatible with, if 
not actually the application of, the three-point formula of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. 
Equidistance remains the predominant principle of delimitation and departures from the 
equidistance line are based on the agreement of the parties-either as a matter of mutual 
acceptability or to accommodate some special circumstances." Brown, op. cit., n.4, at p.215. 
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The notions of equity and equitable principles have been widely invoked by 
third-party settlement to justify a particular boundary line, or to disregard or 
reduce the effect of some special or relevant circumstances present in the area. 
Despite these wide uses judicial and arbitral settlements have not spent enough 
time elaborating on the notion of equity and how it works in the delimitation.374 
Special circumstances and relevant circumstances have been used to indicate and 
to justify a particular boundary line as constituting an equitable result for the 
delimitation of a particular area. If has been suggested that the concept of relevant 
circumstances is wider both in scope and in role attached to them than is the 
concept of special circumstances. Certain factors, as noted, have been accepted, 
whereas other have been rejected, as constituting special or relevant 
circumstances. The presence of islands and the difference in the length of the 
coastlines of the parties are among the factors which have been consistently 
accepted as special or relevant circumstances. The exact weight and effect to be 
given, however, is far from been consistent. Moreover, the process of balancing 
up and evaluating these factors have never been fully explained. This attitude has 
caused the law of maritime boundary delimitation to be regarded as incomplete
375 
and unpredictable.376 These characteristics are likely to increase the differences 
between states in their interpretation of the rules of delimitation, and it is very 
likely that this would cause an ~xpansion in states' recourse to international 
adjudication to solve their disagreements.
377 
:rn Charney, op. cit., n.84, at p.588. See also Judge Gros, op. cit., n.24, at p.383, para 39; Judge 
Weeramantry, op. cit., n.24, at pp.254-8, paras.156-65; 
375 w ·1 . ?" 14 et , op. cit., n.- .. >, at p. . 
m Ibid .. at p. 284. Regarding the predictability in maritime boundary delimitation, Sir Jennings 
stated that if the parties could predict the decision of the court, and nevertheless came to the court, 
then it would become clear that one of them at least had been badly advised. Sir Robert Jennings. 
"The Proper Role of International Adjudication,'· lecture in International litigation and the 
Fragmentation of International law, 10-11 May 1996, University of Edinburgh. See also 
Jennings. op. cit., n. 73, at p.38. To the same effect, see Bowett. D. W., ''The Arbitration between 
the United Kingdom and France Concerning the Continental Shelf in the English Channel and 
South-western Approaches." 49 BYBll ( 1978), at p.14; Bilder, R.B., "International Dispute 
Settlement and the Role of Adjudication," The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, 
Damrosch L.F. (ed.), Transnational Publishers, Inc. New York ( 1987), at p.167; Schachter, 0., 
International law in TheOl:v and Practice. Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1991 ), 
at p.59. 
-:.n Since 1969 at least fifteen cases have been referred to judicial settlement: These are North Sea 
Case (I 969);Anglo-French Award ( 1977); Aegean Sea case ( 1978); Sharjah/Dubai Award ( 1981 ); 
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The adoption of the EEZ into the law of the sea, as far as the delimitation of 
the continental shelf is concerned, had two results: 
1. An identical rule was adopted for the continental shelf and EEZ boundary 
delimitation. This rule, as we have seen, was subject to strong criticism by 
international scholars. 
2. There began to be a tendency towards having a single boundary line for the 
continental shelf and the EEZ boundary. This single boundary line, although 
both desirable and logical, has not been established as a general rule in 
customary international law. Third-party settlement, therefore, should decline to 
draw a single boundary line without a prior joint request from the parties 
concerned. 
Tunisia-Libya case ( 1982); Gulfof Maine Case ( 1984); Libya-Malta Case ( 1985); Guinea/Guinea 
Bissau Award ( 1985); Guinea Bissau/Senegal Award ( 1989); France/Canada Award of 1992; 
Gulf of Fonseca Case ( 1992); Jan Mayen Case of 1993; Qatar-Bahrain Case maritime delimitation 
case (Jurisdiction) ( 1995); Cameroon-Nigeria Case (Interim Measures) ( 1996). See also Bowett, 
op. cit., n.376, at p.14; Charney, op. cit., n.41, at p.227. 
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Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries 
of the UAE 
The World Court and international tribunals have de-emphasized the value of 
the equidistance method in Article 6, and placed a great emphasis on equitable 
principles to achieve an equitable result in the continental shelf delimitation. 
Relying on equitable principles gives the court or tribunal the necessary 
flexibility to adjust or exclude the equidistance method. In order to achieve such 
flexibility, Article 6 has been equated into customary law. It has been submitted 
that in effect Article 6 adopted, in the absence of agreement, a single rule of 
'equidistance/special-circumstances'. This rule was said to be similar in effect to 
the rule of 'equitable/relevant-circumstances' under customary law. We will now 
examine more closely UAE practice on the delimitation of its maritime 
boundaries, internal and external. This will permit both the identification of the 
common elements of this practice, and the extent to which it accords with the 
norms of delimitation in international law identified above. Such an examination 
is necessary for our discussion in Chapter Five, where we compare the practice of 
UAE with that of Iran. This comparison will help us to determine the 
compatibility and the contrast between the Iranian and UAE positions regarding 
maritime boundary delimitation. The value of this is that it sheds light on the 
difficulty which prevents the two states from finalising the offshore boundaries 
between them. The UAE's practice can best be discussed in two sections: (1) The 
International Boundaries; (2) The Inter-Emirates' Boundaries.' 




The UAE International Boundaries 
The UAE is a federal state encircled by four neighbouring countries, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Oman.2 The Federal State has boundary agreements with 
three of these countries, namely Qatar, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Now we shall 
discuss each of these agreements in turn. 
A: Qatar-UAE [Abu-Dhabi] Agreement of 1969 
Qatar and Abu-Dhabi are two adjacent states sharing a concave coastline on 
the Arabian side of the Gulf. The parties, it will be recalled, were in dispute over 
the ownership of a group of islands.3 This dispute led the British Government, 
which was in a special treaty relationship with Abu-Dhabi and Qatar,4 to arrange 
in 1960, for two experts to act as 'referees'. 5 Mr. Gault and Professor Anderson 
were thus appointed by the British Government, with the approval of the parties. 
Their mandate was to study the rival claims and to examine the evidence which 
the parties would present, either themselves or through lawyers. 6 In April 1962 
Gault and Anderson recommended that; the island of Halul 7 belongs to Qatar and 
that several smaller islands to Abu-Dhabi. 8 As the report of the work of Mr. Gault 
and Professor Anderson is not yet published, although more than thirty years 
have elapsed, it is difficult to determine whether their recommendations 
constituted conclusions of law or suggestions to the parties ex aequo et bona. 
2 For a discussion on the UAE's federal system, see the introduction to this work. 
3 Including Halul. Das. Shira'uh, Diyenah, 'Arzanah, Dalma, Sir Bani Yas, Ghaghah, al-Qaffay, 
al-Mihayyimat. Makasib and al-Ashat. See Arabian Boundary Dispute, vol. 17, Archive editions, 
Schofield R. (ed.), Redwood Press Ltd., England ( 1992), at pp.634-9, 903-4 and pp.601-2 . 
.i For a discussion on this relationship, see the introduction to this work. 
5 See a letter from the British Residents in Bahrain to the Rulers of Qatar and Abu-Dhabi dated 21 
December 1960, reprinted in Arabian Boundary Dispute, vol. 16, Archive editions, Schofield R. 
(ed.). Redwood Press Ltd., England ( 1992), at pp. 879-99. 
6 Qatar was represented, according to Sir Norman Anderson, by lawyers from Egypt, but Abu-
Dhabi was not. Sir Norman Anderson's letter to the writer, I 0 February 1994. 
7 The largest of the disputed islands, lying 55 miles off the Qatari mainland and I 06 off the Abu-
Dhabi mainland. 
8 Their findings have been endorsed by the British Government. See the Daily Telegraph, 24 
April ( 1962), at p.19. 
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A characterisation of the work of Mr. Gault and Professor Anderson 
The Ruler of Qatar in his letter ( 6 December 1960) to the British Government 
suggested international arbitration to examine the dispute with Abu-Dhabi over 
the ownership of Halul island.
9 
The British Government declined to accept such a 
suggestion 
10 
and proposed, as ~n alternative, the appointment of Gault and 
Anderson as experts to examine the dispute between the two Emirates. 11 It is 
interesting to consider what category of international dispute settlement the 
Gault-Anderson process represents. The starting point must be Article 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, where the methods of international dispute 
settlement are I isted as follows: ·~negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conci I iation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice." 
There are some similarities between Gault-Anderson's work and the method 
of conciliation. The similarities are threefold, and can best be examined 
separately. However, it is of value to give a definition of conciliation before we 
go on to such an examination. 12 Article 1 of the Regulation on the Procedure of 
International Conciliation defined conciliation as: 
A method for the settlement of international disputes of any nature according to which a 
Commission set up by the Parties, either on a permanent basis or an ad hoc basis to deal with a 
dispute, proceeds to the impartial examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of 
a settlement susceptible of being accepted by them or of affording the Parties, with a view to its 
settlement, such aid as they may have requested. 13 
9 See Arabian BoundW)J Dispute, op. cit., n.5, at p. 896. 
w There were a number of reasons for this. which can be detected from letters that passed 
between officials in the British Government. The most notable one was that: Abu-Dhabi declined 
to sign a special agreement with Qatar to refer the Halul question to international arbitration. For 
other reasons, see Mr. A.C. Samuel's note on the ownership of Halul island, 22 September 1955, 
reprinted in Arabian BoundGJ)J PrimGJ)J Documents 1853-1960, vol.13, Archive Editions, 
Schofield and Blake (eds.), Redwood Press Ltd., England ( 1988), at p.342; Letters from Sir 
B.A.B. Burrows, The British Resident in the Persian Gulf in Bahrain, to Mr. L.A.C Fry, Eastern 
Department, Foreign Office. Dated 2 March 1955, and 3 May 1955. Reprinted in Ibid., at p.333, 
para.9(a) and p.337; Foreign Office proposal for Halul island award, 22 June 22 1960. Reprinted 
in Arabian Boundary Dispute. op. cit., n.5, at p.831. 
11 See Arabian BoundGJJ' Dispute. op. cit.", n.5. at p.896. 
12 For further discussion on conciliation, see Chapter Seven. 
13 Quoted from Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Se11/ement, 2nd ed, Grotius Publications Ltd, 
Cambridge ( 1993), at p.59. 
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The similarities between the work of Gault and Anderson and conciliation 
(I) In terms of being binding upon the parties 
The opinion of conciliators is not binding upon the parties, since their task is 
to give a recommendation or opinion that is susceptible of being accepted by the 
parties. This was true in respect of the Gault-Anderson commission. The British 
Political Resident in Bahrain, m his letter to the Ruler of Qatar dated 21 
December 1960, said that: 
on the conclusion of their visit Mr. Gault and Professor Anderson would give an opinion on the 
basis of which Her Majesty's Government and Your Highness and the Ruler of Abu-Dhabi 
would seek to arrive at an acceptable solution to the problem. 
14 
(2) In terms of the function of a conciliation commission 
Conciliation commissions in general have two common functions: namely "to 
investigate the dispute and to suggest the terms of a possible settlement." 15 Again 
this exactly matches the task of the Gault-Anderson commission. In the letter of 
the British Political Resident, mentioned above, this task was outlined as follows: 
it is the intention that Mr. Gault and Professor Anderson should visit Your Highness and the 
Ruler of Abu-Dhabi in order to hear your views and those of Shaikh Shakbut on the subject of 
Halul, and to take note of and examine all the evidence, historical, legal or customary, which 
Your Highness and Shaikh Shakbut may wish to put forward. On the conclusion of their visit 
Id 
. . . 16 
Mr. Gault and Professor Anderson wou give an op1111on. 
(3) In terms of conciliation commission membership 
According to Merrills a conciliation commission "has usually been made up 
of lawyers, though diplomats, ... and individuals with technical expe11ise have also 
been employed." 17 The Gault and Anderson Commission consisted of two British 
experts, Mr. Gault, former British Political Resident in Bahrain, and Professor 
Anderson, Professor oflslamic Law at the University of London. 18 
i.i An identical letter was sent to the Ruler of Abu-Dhabi on the same date. See Arabian Boundary 
Dispute. op. cit., n.5. at p. 898 and p.900. 
15 Merrills. op. cit., n. 13, at p. 67. 
I<• See Arabian Boundary Dispute, op. cit., n.5, at p.898 and p.900. 
17 Merrills, op. cit., n.13. at p.69. 
18 See Arabian Boundary Dispute, op. cit., n.5, at p. 898 and p.900. 
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To sum up, the Gault-Anderson Committee, although it had not been given 
entirely clear definition by the British government, had the form, the task, and the 
character of conciliation. 
Conclusion of the 1969 Agreement 
Abu-Dhabi and Qatar accepted the recommendation of Gault and Anderson 
and concluded on this basis an agreement in 1969 to determine the boundaries of 
their respective continental shelves.
19 
The relevant articles in the said agreement 
will now be discussed. Articles 1 and 2 have designated the ownership of Abu-
Dhabi over the island of Diyenah, and the ownership of Qatar over the islands of 
al-Ashat and Shira' uh. Article 3 consequently stressed that: "Neither country now 
has any territorial claim upon the other with respect to the islands or offshore 
areas falling outside its agreed offshore boundary." 
Article 4 described the continental shelf boundary as a straight line, except for 
a 3-nautical-mile arc around the island of Diyenah, extending for 115 nautical 
miles. There are four connected points (A,B,C,D). Point A is the tri-section point 
which is equidistant from the mainland of Iran, Qatar and Abu-Dhabi. This point 
is binding upon the Iranian side by virtue of their agreement of 1969 with Qatar. 
20 
Point A on the Qatar-Abu-Dhabi boundary line is the terminal point on the Qatar-
Iran continental shelf boundary line. Moreover, this point could be the originating 
point of a possible boundary line between Iran and Abu-Dhabi.
21 
Point B, which 
is 35 nautical miles from point A, was selected to coincide with the location of 
the al-Bunduq oil field. Point C is the intersection of line B-D, and, like point B, 
not an equidistant point. The distance between points B and C is 35 nautical 
miles. The boundary line between Abu-Dhabi and Qatar terminates at point D 
which "'is situated at the intersection of the Parties' 3-nautical-mile territorial sea 
19 For the text of the agreement, see US. Department of Series, limits in the Seas, Series A, 
No.18. 
20 Article I of the Qatar-Iran agreement defined point 6, the terminal point, as the point located at 
25° 31' 50" Latitude N. and 53° 02' 05" Longitude E. Point A in Qatar-Abu-Dhabi was located at 
the same geographical location. For the text of the agreement, see International Maritime 
Boundaries. Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993), 
at p.1516. 
21 For further discussion. see Chapter Five. 
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limit, and is therefore also an eql\idistance Point."22 Point D, finally, is situated 
45 nautical miles from point C.
23 
Thus the two parties still needed to determine 
the boundary line between their respective territorial sea limits. As we shall see, 
however, this became impossible after the conclusion of the UAE-Saudi Arabia 
24 Agreement of 1974. 
Besides its importance in determining the continental shelf boundary line and 
in resolving the question about the sovereignty of certain islands in the Gulf, the 
Abu-Dhabi-Qatar Agreement of 1969 had two significant additional elements: ( 1) 
Its treatment of Diyenah island; (2) Its treatment of cross-boundary resources. We 
shall now examine these two elements more closely. 
(1) The treatment of Diyenah island in the delimitation 
The Abu-Dhabi island of Diyenah lies in the equidistance zone between Abu-
Dhabi and Qatar.25 The parties decided to restrict the influence of Diyenah to a 3-
nautical-mile territorial sea limit. The result was an arc in the boundary line 
around Deyinah island. The 3-nautical-mile limit was chosen because the pa11ies, 
at the time of the conclusion of their agreement, were known to have the 3-
nautical-mile limit for their territorial sea.26 It is important to note that the 
extension of the UAE territorial sea to a 12-nautical-mile limit 27 would not effect 
22 A11icle 4(3) of the Agreement reads: 
"A straight line from point 'C' as defined above, to point 'D' at the mouth of the Khaur al-Ad id 
(Khor al Udayd) on the territorial waters' boundary, with geographic coordinates. Latitude North 
24° 38' 20" and Longitude East 51° 28' 05"." The distance between the two parties' respective 
land boundary and point 'D' is 3 nautical miles. See Charney and Alexander op. cit., n.20, at 
~1.1543. . . . . . 
-· According to the US Department Geographer, pomt B 1s not precisely on the al-Bunduq ml 
well, but rather at a site of 0.5 nautical mile south-west. Similarly, point D was placed 2 nautical 
miles from the mainland. The discrepancy in the location of points B&D was referred to an 
inaccurate map for the area. See US. Department of Series, limits in the Seas, Series A, No.18, at 
pp.2 and 3. 
2
"' See below in latter stage of this chapter. 
25 For further discussion on the effect of islands in boundary delimitation, see Chapter Six. 
26 See Qatar and Abu-Dhabi offshore concession agreements of 1952 and 1953 respectively, in 
which the territorial sea was limited to 3 nautical miles. For the text of the agreement, see 
Arabian Boundary Dispute, op. cit., n. 5, at pp.793 and 797. See also Chapter One/Section One. 




the 3-nautical-mile limit around the UAE island of Diyenah. 28 This is because 
Article 14 7 of the UAE Constitution stressed that the establishment of the 
federation of the UAE, of which Abu-Dhabi is a member, had no impact upon 
pre-existing agreements which the member Emirates had concluded with other 
states or international organizations.29 Therefore, the treaties of the component 
territories continue in force within territorial limits. 
(2) Sharing cross-boundary hydrocarbon resources 30 
The 1969 agreement resolved the question of ownership over the al-Bunduq 
oil field, which is situated between the parties. According to Article 6. aal-
Bunduq field is to be equally shared by the parties." 31 Moreover, in order to 
simplify the operation at the oil field, the agreement stated that exploitation 
should be carried out by Abu-Dhabi Marine Areas Corporation. 
It is worth mentioning here that the treatment of the al-Bunduq field in the 
Abu-Dhabi-Qatar agreement is not unique in dealing with the problem of natural 
resources. There were various ways in state practice for dealing with this 
question. The Abu-Dhabi-Qatar agreement to share the field equally was one 
possible solution. Another was to agree on a equal sharing of income, but with 
the field being under the sovereignty of one party, e.g. the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain 
agreement of 1958.32 A third was to create a joint development area between the 
28 "This may be thought merely to reflect the position resulting from the law of the treaties: 
however, it demonstrates the importance of concluding agreements at the right time" See 
Anderson, D.H., "Recent Boundary Agreement in the Southern North Sea," 41 ICLQ ( 1992), at 
p.421. 
29 Article 147 reads: "Nothing in the application of this Constitution shall affect treaties or 
agreements concluded by member Emirates with states or international organisations unless such 
treaties or agreements are amended or abrogated by agreement between the parties concerned." 
30 Sharing the ownership of resources or joint development has been defined as: "an agreement 
between two States to develop so as to share jointly in agreed proportions by inter-State co-
operation and national measures the offshore oil and gas in a designated zone of the seabed and 
subsoil of the continental shelf to which both or either of the participating States are entitled in 
international law." See Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas: Model Agreement for States 
for .Joint Development with ExplanatolJ' CommentaJJJ, vol.I, the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, London ( 1989), at p.45. 
~ 1 Consequently, "all royalties, profits and other government fees ... shall be equally divided 
between the Government of Qatar and Abu-Dhabi." Article 7 of the Agreement. See also the 
work of British Institute, Ibid., at p.56. . 




two states. The designated area is divided in two parts. Each state then exercises 
jurisdiction in the part that is opposite its maritime zone. The other state is 
entitled to participate in that part with a share of a certain percentage in any 
petroleum activities, e.g. the Norwegian-Icelandic agreement of 1981.33 A fourth 
was to designate an area for provisional co-operation activities in relation to the 
exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources; e.g. the Australia-
Indonesia (Timor Gap) agreement of 1989.34 These are among the models or 
possible solutions for addressing the problem of common deposits. State practice 
in addition can provide further examples in dealing with common deposits in the 
area of delimitation.35 
The Treatment of the al-Bunduq oil field and the Doctrine of Unity of Deposit 
It might be argued that the doctrine of unity of deposit,36 which was 
suggested in the decision of the North Sea Cases, was not fully observed in the 
Qatar-Abu-Dhabi agreement in dealing with al-Bunduq oil field. The two parties, 
as mentioned above, agreed on dividing the oil field equally between them. 
However, if the intention of introducing the doctrine of 'unity of deposit' was to 
avoid "'the risk of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of the States 
concerned,"37 Abu-Dhabi and Qatar in their agreement were aware of this risk. 
That is why they agreed that one party only would carry out the exploitation of 
the oil field, albeit the profits would be distributed equally between them. 
Therefore the two parties have actually preserved the unity of the al-Bunduq oil 
field, in spite of the fact that they agreed to draw the boundary line through it. 
38 
'' Sec Articles 5 and 6 in Ibid., at p. 1763. 
~.i See Articles 2 and 32 in Ibid., at p.1260 and pp.1275-6. 
~ 5 O'Connell, The International law of the Sea, vol. 2, Shearer (ed.),Clarendon Press, Oxford 
( 1982), at p. 712. 
16 For further discussion, see Chapter Three. 
\7 · North Sea Cases.,·, at para. 97 . 
.ii; Lo Yoni, the Rapporteur of the ILA International Committee on the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
in this regard has stressed that: it is "through joint development agreements that the States have 
the possibility to preserve the unity of the exploitation of the deposit." Quoted from 
Kwiatkowska, 8., "Economic and Environmental Considerations," International Maritime 
Boundaries, Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands (1993) 
at p.90. See also the British Institution, op. cit., n.30, at pp.33-5; Churchill, R.R., "Joint 
Development Zones: International Legal Issues," Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas, 
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The effect of the al-Bunduq oil field upon the boundary line 
The presence of the oil field in the delimitation area had some influence on 
the boundary line, since the agreement contained some arrangement to share the 
ownership of the field.
39 
The effect of the oil field on the boundary line takes the 
form of designating point B in the boundary line to coincide with the location of 
the al-Bunduq field. 
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Figure: ( 10) Qatar-UAE boundary. 
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Source: International Maritime Boundaries, at p. 1546. 
vol. 2, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Fox H. (ed.), London (I 990), at 
pp.55-71, see in particular pp.61-2. See also North Sea Case, at para.99. 
39 
This might suggest that the oil field has played a role in the process of negotiating the boundary 
line between Abu-Dhabi and Qatar. See also Kwiatkowska, op. cit., n.38, at p.94. 
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B: Iran-United Arab Emirates Agreement of 1974 
This agreement is sometimes cited as an agreement between Iran and Dubai,40 
despite the fact that the preamble to the Jran-UAE Agreement of 1974 stated that: 
The Government of the State of UAE and the Imperial Government of Iran desirous of 
establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between the respective 
areas of continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance with 
. . 11 41 111ternat1ona aw. 
Interestingly, m the Dubai/Sha1~jah A1vard, Sharjah argued that "the 
agreement of 13 August between Iran and UAE was in reality an agreement 
between Iran and Dubai."42 The Court of Arbitration did not comment on the 
Sharjah argument, and continued to refer to the 1974 Agreement as an agreement 
43 
between Iran and UAE. 
Having said that the 1974 Agreement should be considered as an agreement 
between the Federal authority of the UAE and Iran, it is important to stress that it 
only considered a part of the continental shelf between the two states; viz., that 
which is adjacent to the Dubai Emirate coastline.
44 
This was because the dispute 
between Iran and the UAE about the sovereignty over three islands to the north-
east of this area "had precluded the extension of the median line boundary ... into 
the shelf area that might be affected by the islands."
45 
To the west it was 
unnecessary to proceed further, since the continental shelf boundary line between 
Iran and Abu-Dhabi had already been determined.
46 
The agreed boundary is described in Article 1 as a line extending from the 
east to the north-east for a distance of 39 .25 nautical miles. There are three 
turning and two terminal points ( 1,2,3,4,5) in the boundary line. The agreement 
.w See Limit in the Seas, Series, No.63. In which the agreement was cited as 'Iran-United Arab 
Emirates (Dubai)'. Others' publications cited the agreement as the 'Iran-Dubai agreement'; see 
for example Bundy, R .. ''Maritime Delimitation in the Gulf," Territorial Foundations of the Gulf 
States. Schofield R. (ed.), University of London, UCL Press, London ( 1994), at p. 183. 
41 See Limit in the Seas, Series No.63. 
·
12 Duhai/Sharjah Award. at p.668. 
4 ~ Ibid .. see for example at pp.677-8. 
44 This may be the reason why the agreement was cited as an agreement between Iran and Dubai. 
45 Dubai/Sharjah Award, at p.665. See Chapter Six for full discussion on the effect of these 
Islands upon a possible boundary line between Iran and the UAE. 
46 Though the text of Abu-Dhabi-Iran continental shelf agreement has never been released to the 
public. For further discussion on Abu-Dhabi-Iran boundary, see Chapter Five. 
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did not specify a particular method. Nevertheless, the boundary line can be 
described as a median line, except in points 3 and 4 which follow the Sirri 
island's 12 nautical miles arc.
47 
The significant clements in the Iran-UAE agreement 
(1) Sovereignty over the Sirri island 
The island of Sirri lies about· 52 and 40 nautical miles from the UAE and 
Iranian coastlines respectively. Thus it lies on the Iranian side of the median line, 
but only I 0 nautical miles from that line. It was inhabited by a permanent 
population most of whom were Arabs sharing language, traditional and tribal 
links with the Arabs in the Emirates.
48 
Sirri island was subject to rival claims 
from Persia (Iran) and from the Emirate of Sharjah. In 1887 the Persian 
Government claimed the Island for the first time. Shortly afterwards, it occupied 
the Island by sending armed forces who removed the Sharjah flag and hoisted 
that of Persia.49 The British Government's reaction was to "regard Sirri as 
belonging de jure to the Ruler of Shaijah but have tacitly acquiesced in its de 
facto occupation by Iran since 1887, though they have never formally admitted 
the Iranian claim."50 The Government of Sharjah on the other hand expressed its 
opposition to the Iranian occupation. Iran thereafter retained its de facto control 
over the Island. In the 1974 agreement between Iran and UAE the island was 
taken into account by the parties and, in the delimitation, Sirri was given an arc of 
a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit between points 3 and 4. This resulted in an 
adjustment of the median line between the two countries of about 2 nautical miles 
towards the UAE coastline. 
·
17 See the map below. 
'
18 See Arabian BoundG1JJ Prima/)' Documents, op. cit., n. I 0, at p.157 . 
.i•> See Arabian Bounda1:v Dispute, op. cit .. n.5, at p.676. and Arabian Boundary PrimGJ)' 
Documents, op. cit., n. I 0, at pp.80-3. 
50 
See Annual Records of the Gulf, United Arab Emirates, vol. 4, Archive Editions, Redwood 
Press Ltd., England ( 1992), at p.141. 
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(2) Cross-boundary resources 
It has been seen how in the Qatar-Abu-Dhabi Agreement of 1969 the parties 
dealt with the existence of the al-Bunduq oil field. It will be recalled that point B 
in the Qatar-Abu-Dhabi boundary line was designated to coincide with the 
location of the oil field. The situation is differently addressed in the Iran-UAE 
- I 
agreement.) The parties in this agreement contemplated the possibility of 
discovering an oil field across the boundary line, which they had agreed upon. 
Article 2 prohibited the parties from drilling on either side of the agreed boundary 
line for 125 metres from that line, "except by mutual agreement between the two 
governments." Moreover, the parties shall "endeavour to reach agreement as to 
the manner in which the operations on the both side of the Boundary line could 
be co-ordinated or utilised."52 
The legal status of Iran-United Arab Emirates unratified treaty 
The UAE has not ratified its 1974 agreement with Iran,53 though Iran did so 
m 1975.
54 
There are two possible reasons why the UAE has refrained from so 
doing: 
1. The dispute over the sovereignty of Abu Musa island, which lies just 14.54 
nautical miles from point 5 on the agreed boundary line. Any decision 
regarding its ownership might possibly effect this boundary line. 
2. UAE ratification of this agreement would mean that it would drop its historical 
claims to the ownership of Sini island. 
Nonetheless, the two parties have fully respected the boundary line that was 
set out in the said agreement. Three questions arise here: ( 1) is the need for 
ratification in this instance a matter of international law or domestic law? (2) 
51 Since no oil field had been discovered in the median zone, which might have become subject to 
dispute over ownership between the parties. 
52 It is worth mentioning here that Article 2 of the lran-UAE agreement is similar to the other 
Iranian agreements with Qatar, Bahrain and Oman of 1969, 1971 and 1974 respectively. For 
more discussion, see Colson, D., "The Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements," 
International Maritime Boundaries, Charney and Alexander (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
the Netherlands ( 1993 ), at pp.54-6. 
5
:; On the effect, if any, of the delay in ratification a treaty, see Oppenheim 's International Law, 
9th ed., vol. I. Peace, Jennings and Watts (eds.), Longman, London ( 1996), at p.1230. 
5
·
1 Limit in the Seas, Series No.94, ( 1981 ), at p.8. 
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what is the status of an unratified treaty? (3) what is the legal explanation for the 
UAE respecting the boundary line~ although it has not ratified the agreement? We 
shal I now discuss each of them in turn. 
Starting with the first issue, it is permissible to say that ratification in the 
international sense is different from ratification in the constitutional sense. The 
former has been defined as "the international act...whereby a State establishes on 
the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty."55 Whereas in the case 
of the latter, ratification--as a matter of domestic law-is considered "the 
internal constitutional act whereby some organ other than executive (usually the 
legislature), approves of, and authorizes, the treaty from the domestic 
constitutional point of view."56 If a treaty requires ratification as a matter of 
international law to be regarded in force between the parties, then logically either 
party would not be bound by the treaty before the ratification took place. 57 
In the light of this distinction yve shall now examine whether the requirement 
of ratification in the 1974 agreement between Iran and UAE was a matter of 
international law or domestic law. 
Article 5 of the Iran-UAE agreement of 1974 reads: 
(a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged ... as 
soon as possible. 
(b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 
According to this Article, two conditions must be fulfilled for the agreement 
to enter into force between the parties. These conditions are the ratification of the 
55 Quotation from Article 2( 1 )(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Ratification, 
nevertheless. is not the only way in which a state can express its consent to be bound by a treaty. 
Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enumerated, in addition to 
ratification. the following means of consensus: signature. exchange of instruments constituting a 
treaty. acceptance, approval or accession. or by any other means if so agreed. However, the treaty 
or the attending circumstances would det.ennine which of the above-mentioned means is required 
for a treaty to come into force between the parties. For more discussion on the requirement of 
ratification, see Bl ix, H., "The Requirement of Ratification," 30 BYB/l ( 1953), at pp.357-80. 
56 Fitzmaurice, G., "Do Treaties Need Ratification?" 15 BYB/l ( 1934), at p.114. In addition, he 
asserted that this is an incorrect use of the term. Also see McNair, A., The law of Treaties, 
Oxford Clarenden Press, Oxford ( 1961 ), at p. l 30; Sinclair, I., The Vienna Convention on the law 
(~f Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester University Press, Manchester ( 1984 ), at p. 41. 
57 Article 24 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty. See also Fitzmaurice, Ibid., at 




agreement and the exchange of the instruments of ratification. Ratification in this 
sense is a matter of international law; nonetheless, in accordance with Article 5 of 
the 1974 agreement, it cannot per se bring the agreement into force between the 
parties. This will take place only after the parties exchange the instruments of 
ratification. Therefore, the agreen}ent under discussion has no mandatory status 
for the UAE since it is not formally in force. This is because the latter has not 
expressed its consent on the international plane to be bound by it. Such consent 
according to Article 5 of the agreement, must be expressed by the act of 
ratification. Hitherto the UAE has not taken this step. In addition, the UAE is 
required, according to its internal law, to ratify a treaty before it becomes 
constitutionally bound by it. 58 
Notwithstanding this fact, the UAE, according to an informal source in the 
UAE government, is observing and respecting the boundary line that was 
determined in the 1974 agreement with Iran. This observance may be referred to 
the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, during the period 
between signature of a treaty and ratification, where a treaty requires ratification. 
The justification for this, as McNair wrote, is that states by putting their signature 
on a treaty requiring ratification· "have ... placed certain limitations upon their 
58 Ratification according to Articles 47(4) and 115 of the UAE Constitution is the only act 
whereby the UAE, constitutionally, can establish its consent to be bound by a treaty. To avoid 
any embarrassment, the UAE should not express its consent in a different way to be bound by a 
treaty on the international plane. Otherwise, this consent would cause a violation of a rule in the 
Constitution. Moreover, it is interesting that within the UAE, we can distinguish between the case 
where a treaty requires a necessary legislative measure to enable the treaty to be carried out, and 
the ratification of the treaty as a matter of internal law. (The two legal measures are distinct, 
though in practice they are passed by the same legislative body and often at the same time.) We 
mean by the latter the act whereby the UAE expresses its consent, in accordance with the UAE 
constitution. to be bound by a treaty. However, we mean by the fonner the necessary legislative 
measure. the act whereby the treaty is implemented within the UAE territory. Therefore treaty or 
treaties have no direct "statute-like" application in the UAE. The legislature may enact laws that 
incorporate (transform) treaties or treaty nonns into domestic law. Article 125 of the Constitution 
reads: "The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake the appropriate measures to implement 
the laws promulgated by the Union and the treaties and international agreements concluded by 
the Union. including the promulgation of the local laws, regulations, decisions and orders 
necessary for such implementation." For' further discussion on the UAE constitution requirement 
to be bound on and within the UAE, see the House of Lords' decision on 21 February 1991 on 
A rah Mone!WJJ Fund v. Hashim and others Case, 85 !LR, at p.5. 
175 
Cllllpter Four 
freedom of action during the period which precedes its entry into force. "59 This 
obligation, which has embodied in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, has been 
considered as constituting a progressively developing rule,(10 and so it is only 
binding on the parties to the Convention. The UAE has not yet become a party to 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Hence, it is not bound by the 
obligation of Article 18. Therefore, we could hardly refer to the UAE's 
observance of the boundary line as its compliance with the requirement of Article 
18 in this regard. 
An alternative explanation for the UAE's observance at the boundary line in 
question may be the creation of a new obligation between the two states. Indeed, 
if the practice of Iran and the UAE proved a common respect for a particular 
boundary line, this might be evidence of the creation of a new de.facto agreement 
between the two states. Their mutual practices would be the main source of this 
new agreement. This argument can be supported by the judgement of the World 
Court in the Tunisia v. Libya Case. The Court in this case, as mentioned in 
Chapter Three, accepted the unilateral practice of the two parties in binding their 
petroleum concessions to the 26° line, as constituting a de facto boundary line 
between their respective continental shelf boundaries. 61 
However, it does not follow that the new de facto agreement between Iran and 
the UAE, which may be created by their practices, would cause the actual 
unratified agreement of 1974 to be regarded as in force between them. Rather it 
would mean that a new agreement has been created to respect a pa11icular line as 
the boundary line for their respective continental shelf boundaries. Hence the 
I 97 4 agreement is still not in force between Iran and the U AE. 
59 
McNair, op. cit., n.56, at p.199; Fitzmaurice, G., The law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice 1947-59, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1995), at pp.426-7. 
60 
O'Connell, D.P., International law, vol. I, 2nd ed., Stevens and Sons, London (1970), at 
pp.223-4; Sinclair. op. cit., n.56, at p. 43; Shaw, op. cit., n.57, at p. 561. 
61 Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.117. See also Paul Braveder-Coyle, "The Emerging Legal 
Principles and Equitable Criteria Governing the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries Between 
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C: United Arab Emirates-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement of 1974 
The dispute over the boundary. between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE dominated relations between the two countries for many years. This 
dispute, it will be recalled, centred, inter alia, on the Saudi demand: (a) to obtain 
access to the sea in the area of Khor al-Udayd; and (b) to be able to control the 
smuggling which, Saudi Arabia contended, was carried on from that area.62 These 
Saudi demands could not be met without the control of the area of Khor al-
Udayd-an area offering a window on the Arabian Gulf coast between Abu-
Dhabi and Qatar. The area of Khor al-Udayd was under the sovereignty of the 
Emirate of Abu-Dhabi. The British Government recognized Abu-Dhabi's 
sovereignty over the area in 1878.63 In 1922 Ibn Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia, 
laid claim to sovereignty for the first time over the area. 64 This claim was, in turn, 
based on historical arguments and on tribal alliances. 65 
62 Foreign Office Note no. E.411/150/91..3 February 1938, at p. 5, reprinted in op. cit., n. 3, at p. 
255. See also Al-Ulama, H, The Federal Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates, Thesis 
submitted for the degree of Ph.D., Department of Geography, University of Durham ( 1994), at 
pp.179-81. The area of Khor al-Udayd was described, in terms of suitability for navigation, as 
follow: "The Khor itself is out of the question for steamers owing to its long, winding, narrow 
entrance (unless even if practicable vast dredging works were undertaken). Parts of the banks are 
low 'sabaknah' which flood at high tides or after heavy rain and parts are low sand hills. The heat 
from these hills is terrific. It is possible for steamers to anchor some distance off the mouth of the 
Khor. .. but the navigation to get there is very difficult (though I suppose that a passage could be 
buoyed, if it were a question of an oil terminal." See Foreign Office Paper no. C/1571.a/38. Dated 
19 February 1937. See Arabian Boundary Dispute, op. cit., n.3, at p.212. 
63 I bid., at p.258. Qatar challenged Abu-Dhabi sovereignty over the Khor al-Udayd area. The 
challenge resulted in some hostility between Qatar and Abu-Dhabi. The British Government 
nevertheless upheld its support for Abu-Dhabi. See Morsy, M.A., The United Arab Emirates: A 
Modern History, Hurtwood Press Limited, Silversted Westerham Hill, UK ( 1994), at pp.162-8. 
64 Summary of historical background to the dispute over the Khor al-Udayd area by D.M.H 
Riches. December 19. 1958. Reprinted in Arabian BoundaJJ' Dispute, op. cit., n.3, at p.419. For 
more discussion. see Murad Nasrin A. Territorial Disputes in the United Arab Emirates, Thesis 
submitted for the degree of Ph.D .. Department of Politics, University of Lancaster ( 1990), at pp. 
164-95: Al-Ulama H .. op. cit., n.62. at pp. 156-185; Al-Alkim. H .. The Foreign Policy of the 
UAE. Saqi Books. London (1989). at pp.107-36. 
''
5 Foreign Office Memorandum on Saudi claims, 30 June 1940, Foreign Office Paper no. 
E2203/2203/25. Reprinted in Arabian Boundary Dispute, op. cit., n.3, at p.307. The British 
Government, representing Abu-Dhabi. resisted the claim of Ibn Saud. There were two reasons 
behind UK enthusiasm in opposing Ibn Saud's ambition over Khor al-Udayd. Firstly, the Khor 
could be used as a naval base in wartime. Secondly, the interest of the British Government was 
"to maintain unbroken the chain of British Protected States extending from Qatar to Musect and 
thus to ensure that the coastal route which forms the only line of communication between the 
'Trucial' coast and Qatar should nowhere pass through foreign territory." See Arabian Boundary 
Dispute, op. <.:ii., n.3. at p.256. 
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Saudi Arabia and the British Government, representing the Emirate of Abu-
Dhabi, agreed to enter into negotiations in order to find an acceptable solution to 





During World War II the boundary question 
remained in abeyance. However, negotiations resumed in 1949 and took place 
again in 1951 and 1952. 
68 
The two negotiating parties agreed in 1954 to refer the 
dispute to International Arbitration. A special agreement therefore was signed 
between them.
69 
Unfortunately the Tribunal failed due to the fact that the Saudi 
member of the tribunal, Sheikh Yusuf Yasine, was representing the government 
of Saudi Arabia in the tribunal rather than acting as an impartial arbitrator. 70 The 
gap between the parties thereby remained wide with little chance of a bridge 
between them. 
The Union authorities in the UAE took over from the British Government in 
dealing with the boundary question after the formulation of the UAE and the 
withdrawal of the British presence in the region in 1971. Saudi Arabia failed to 
recognize or have normal diplomatic relations with the Federation of the UAE 
until it solved the dispute over the boundary. 
71 
66 The first meeting was held between the negotiators of the parties in London on 24 June 1935. 
See Foreign Office Paper No. E 394417711, reprinted in Arabian BoundatJJ Dispute, op. cit., n.3, 
at pp.190-274. For a summary of the relationship between Abu-Dhabi and the British 
government, see the Introduction to this work. 
67 Foreign Office Note on the south-eastern frontiers of Arabia, no. E/575/605/91, 2 February 
1948, reprinted in Arabian BoundatJJ Dispute, op. cit., n.3, at p.328. 
68 See a note from British Embassy at Juddah to Saudi Arabia Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Foreign Office Paper no. E 14598/1081 /25 reprinted in Arabian Boundaty Disputes, vol. 18, 
Archive editions, Schofield R. (ed.) ( 1992), at pp. I 08-1 I. See also 'Anglo-Saudi' discussions on 
territorial issues, London, August, 1951, Ibid., pp.645-60 Moreover, An 'Anglo-Saudi' Frontier 
Conference. Dammam between January 28-February 14, 1952. For the record of the Conference 
see Foreign Office Paper no. ES I 081 /63, reprinted in Ibid., pp.128-4 7. 
''''The Arbitration agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom (Acting on behalf 
of the Abu-Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman) and the Government of Saudi Arabia was 
concluded in Jedda, on 30 July 1954. For the text of the agreement, see Ibid., at pp.163-7. 
70 See Sir Reader Bullard, the British member of the tribunal, statement of resignation, 17 
September 1955, reprinted in Ibid., at pp.819-21. Additional example of Saudi unexpected 
behaviour was that ''bribery and intimidation on a wide scale [had] taken place[from the Saudi 
Arabia employees] in the disputed area, with the result that it was no longer possible to estimate 
where the loyalties of the inhabitants lay." Sheikh Yusuf Yasine openly admitted before members 
of the tribunal the fact that he ''himself was the Saudi Arabian official in charge" of these 
activities. See Ibid., pp. 864, 819 and 822. See also Merrills, op. cit., n.13, at p.99. 
71 The representative of Saudi Arabia at the Arab League said, when the UAE registered for 
admission to membership, that his country had certain demands on the territory of the new State, 
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On 21 August 1974 an agreement was concluded between the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia to solve their boundary dispute. 72 The parties bound themselves to the 
agreement by signature. 
73 
The text of the agreement remained secret until it was 
registered recently with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The agreed land boundary line between the two States extends for about 270 
miles, from point "A' on the coast of the Arabian Gulf to where a possible tri-
section point between the land boundaries of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the 
Sultanate of Oman may be selected.
74 
There are 14 connecting and turning points. 
On the Arabian coast, Saudi Arabia by this agreement gained a strip of land about 
30 kilometres in width between Qatar and the UAE.75 Saudi Arabia would 
consequently separate Qatar from the UAE, and Qatar as a peninsula would be 
cut off from any landward approach save through the territory of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. 76 In the Umm al-Zamul area, where a possible tri-section point 
between the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman may be designated, the UAE 
recognized the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia over three villages, located close to 
the boundary with Oman, by accepting the placing of these villages on the Saudi 
side of the boundary line. 77 The government of the UAE in 1975 notified the 
which needed to be addressed before they could recognize it. See The Political, Kuwait daily 
newspaper 11 September ( 1974). 
72 Interestingly, the two parties agreed on normal diplomatic relations immediately following the 
conclusion of the 1974 agreement. Riyad radio said that "during the visit to Saudi Arabia by the 
UAE President the two Rulers had signed the final text of a border agreement; and agreed to 
exchange diplomatic relations al ambassadorial level." Riyad radio 11 GMT, 22 August ( 1974). 
See also a joint statement by the two parties, republished at Saudi daily newspaper Albe/ad, 22 
August ( 1974). Moreover, the first Saudi Arabian ambassador to the UAE arrived on 29 May 
1975. See Gu(( and the Arabian Peninsula Studies, Quarterly Journal, Kuwait ( 1975), at p.239. 
n Article 9 of the agreement. It is worth mentioning here that the method of entering into force 
specified for the 1974 agreement appears to be inconsistent with the UAE Constitution. This 
specifies the necessity of ratification of a treaty, as noted, in order for the UAE to be bound by a 
treaty. This may open the question of what violation the agreement contained that can be 
discussed in the light of Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaty of 1969. 
This is indeed an interesting area where further research may need to be done. However, such a 
task is beyond the scope of this work. 
74 This possible tri-section point, Article 2 provides, shall be detennined by agreement between 
the three States. 
75 Article I of the agreement. 
76 In reality, this was a direct result of the Qatar-Saudi Arabia land boundary agreement of 1965. 
Qatar, in this agreement, accepted Saudi Arabian sovereignty over Khor al-Udayd area. 
77 Article 2 of the agreement. 
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government of Saudi Arabia that this recognition was "in conflict with two 
agreements concluded between the Emirate of Abu-Dhabi and the Sultanate of 
Oman in 1959 and 1960 delimiting the boundary between them from east of 
Uqaydat to Umm al-Zamul."78 
Moreover, in the last few years UAE officials have expressed to their 
colleagues in Saudi Arabia their .unhappiness with this agreement.79 The UAE 
Government in a note to the Secretariat of the United Nations stated that on the 
third of November 1993 it proposed to Saudi Arabia that the 1974 agreement 
""should be amended so as to bring it into line with the International Boundary 
Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman .... 
[And] bilateral negotiations should be conducted with a view to arriving at 
agreement on other questions raised by ce11ain articles of the Agreement of 21 
August 1974." 80 Saudi Arabia, the UAE's note show, expressed its willingness to 
review the terms of the agreement. 81 Interestingly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
registered the text of the agreement in April 1994 with the Secretariat of the 
United Nations. The Government of the UAE responded by registering a note 
with the Secretariat of the United Nations in respect to the Saudi act. In this note 
the Government of the UAE through its Permanent Mission to the United 
Nations, stated that: "the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates 
would like to point out that the Agreement of August 1974 should have been 
amended and agreement reached on the other questions raised by ce11ain of its 
articles before a request was submitted for its registration under Article 102 of the 
Charter." 82 
711 Note from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nation to 
the Secretariat of the United Nations, no. l 0 l /94, 20 April 1994. 
n Schofield. R .. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the 
Twentieth Century." Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, Schofield R. (ed.), University of 
London, UCL Press. London ( 1994), at p.66. Interestingly, some maps published in the UAE in 
recent years place the area of Khor al-Udayd under the UAE sovereignty, see for example the 
National Atlas of the UAE. The University of the UAE Press, Al-A in, UAE, 1993. 
110 See the Note from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates, op. cit., n. 78. 
RI Ibid. 
R
2 Ibid. Likewise, the State of the Sultanate of Oman sent a letter to the Secretariat of the United 
Nations. The letter was circulated thereafter, at the request of the sender, to the members of the 
Security Council. The State of the Sultanate of Oman in this letter rejected the UAE-Saudi Arabia 
agreement. This was because, the Sultanate of Oman alleged, the said agreement affected some 
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The effect of the agreement on the offshore boundary 
The UAE-Saudi Arabia boundary agreement is quite different from the other 
two agreements concluded by the UAE. This is because it does not finalize the 
offshore boundary line between the two parties. Rather it has provided a 
framework for the contracting parties within which a delimitation agreement 
should be concluded to "delimit the offshore boundaries between the territory of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territory of the United Arab Emirates and 
between all of the islands subject to the sovereignty of each of them."83 This new 
agreement is expected to materialhe, in the next two years or so, since there is 
grave concern in the Gulf region that the process of finalizing the boundary 
between the Gulf States should be speeded up.84 
Article 5 of the UAE-Saudi Arabia agreement contained three particularly 
important provisions: (1) mutual recognition of the parties' sovereignty over 
certain islands; (2) the right to establish constructions, and (3) the creation of a 
joint sovereignty area. We shall now examine each in turn. 
(1) Mutual recognition 
The United Arab Emirates in this agreement recognized the sovereignty of 
Saudi Arabia over Al Khuwesat island. The island lies 4.32 nautical miles to the 
north of the Khor al-Udayd coastline, and about 2.16 nautical miles to the south-
west of the UAE island of Ghaghah. Correspondingly, Saudi Arabia recognized 
the sovereignty of the UAE over all the other islands opposite its coast in the 
Arabian Gulf. 85 
parts of Omani territory. and Omani people living and enjoying Omani nationality in that 
territory. See Aalam Al-khaleej (Gulf Ward), Monthly newspaper, published in London, no.15, 
September ( 1994 ), at p.3. 
11
> Article (3) of the UAE-Saudi Arabia agreement. For further discussion on a possible boundary 
line, see below. 
114 
Aalam Al-khaleej, (Gulf Ward), monthly newspaper published in London, no.19, January 
( 1995), at p. I. 
115 Article 5( I) of the agreement reads: "The United Arab Emirates recognises the sovereignty of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over Al Khuwesat island, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
recognizes the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over all the other islands opposite its 
coast on the Arabian Gulf.'' 
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(2) Saudi Arabia's right to establish public constructions 
Article 5(2) gives to Saudi Arabia the right to establish public constructions 
on the UAE islands of Al-Qaffay and Makasib. 86 However, this article is open-
textured in nature and the parties should have defined it in more precise terms. 
Otherwise conflict and disagreement may well arise between the parties, 
especially with regard to the meaning of the Arabic terms 'mnshat amah'. This 
term, which is used in the Arabic text, can have two meanings, either civil 
constructions or military constructions. 87 
In addition, a controversy may arise between the parties over the following 
points: 
1 Does Saudi Arabia have the right to dispose of its rights m establishing 
constructions on the two Islands to a third state? 
2. Does Saudi Arabia have the right to authorize a third state to take part, 
unilaterally or conjointly, in the establishment or use of constructions on the 
two Islands? 
In the light of the above, the parties are strongly recommended to agree on 
clarification for the text of paragraph two of Article 5 and to set up the necessary 
machinery to solve any possible dispute which may arise from the Saudi Arabian 
presence on the Islands. 
11
" Article 5(2) reads: "The United Arab Emirates agrees to any public construction on the islands 
of Al-Qaffay and Makasib that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wishes to establish thereon." 
117 In the Arabic language the term · amah' (public) is thus opposite to 'private', and means any 
building and construction that belongs to the state and not to individual. However, the ordinary 
understanding of the Arabic term 'mnshat amah' it is suggested in its most natural sense, is civil 
construction, and not military construction. So, Article 5(2) gives Saudi Arabia the right to build 
any public constructions. This may include, for example, constructing a beacon for navigation 
purposes, building a leisure area, port, and so on. See Al wassit Arabic-Arabic Dictionary, 2nd 
ed., vol. 2, Arabic Language Institution, Egypt ( 1973). This is indeed an interesting point, where 
further research and investigation may be required in order to determine the accurate meaning for 
the terms. However, such research is connected with the law of treaties, and therefore beyond the 
scope of this work. 
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(3) Creating a joint sovereignty wne 
Condominium or joint sovereignty, as a solution to rival political interests in 
particular areas, is not unusual. 88 There have been a number of examples where 
this solution has been utilized. The Gulf area contains one such example: the case 
of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait neutral zone of 1965.89 Condominium has been 
defined as: 
a term of art in international law [which] usually indicates ... a structured system for the joint 
exercise of sovereign governmental powers over a territory; a situation that might more aptly be 
I d 
. . 9U 
cal e co-1mpenum. 
Condominium can be created by agreement between the parties 
involved,91 whether over land or maritime territory.92 International adjudication 
applying international law 93cannot, therefore, impose a condominium solution. 
The regime of condominium in the UAE-Saudi Arabia boundary agreement 
Article 5(3) of the agreement provides: 
The High Contracting Parties shall have joint sovereignty over the entire area linking the 
territorial waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the open seas 
88 Brownlie, I., Principle of Public International law, 4th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford ( 1990), at 
p.116. 
89 The text of the agreement was reprinted in Al-Bahama, Arabian Gulf States, 2nd ed, Librairie 
De Liban, Beirut ( 1975), at p.376. For further discussion on Saudi Arabia-Kuwait neutral zone, 
see Huneidi, I., "The Saudi/Kuwait Joint development areas of the Neutral zone, onshore and 
offshore," .Joint Development a,( Offshore Oil and Gas, vol. 2, the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, Fox H. (ed.), London ( 1990), at pp.77-88. 
90 Gu(( o,( Fonseca Case, at para.399. The following definition of condominium has been 
suggested: "a piece of territory consisting of land or water is under the joint tenancy of two or 
more States, these several States exercising sovereignty conjointly over it, and over the 
individuals living thereon." Oppenheim 's International law, vol. I, 8th ed., Lauterpacht, H. (ed.), 
Longmans ( 1955), at p.453. 
91 Gu(( of Fonseca Case, at para. 399. It can also be terminated by agreement. The Chamber in 
the Ciu(( 4 Fonseca Case (a case concerning the dispute over land, islands and the maritime 
boundary between El Salvador and Honduras) did not rule out the legal possibility of substituting 
condominium, over the waters within the Gulf, by the delimitation of separate areas of 
sovereignty. The Chamber in this relation held that: "It is ... not suggesting that the waters subject 
to joint sovereignty cannot be divided, if there is agreement to do so. Condominium can cease to 
exist given the necessary agreement." See para.409. See also Scobbie, I., "The ICJ and the Gulf 
of Fonseca," 18 Marine Police ( 1994), at p.253. 
92 On the possibility of creating a Condominium over a maritime territory, the Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice in the Gulf of Fonseca Case of 1992 held that: "Certainly there is 
no reason why a joint sovereignty should not exist over maritime territory." See para.40 I. 
9
:i But international adjudication applying ex aequo et bona procedures may, if such a solution is 
necessary for reaching an objective justice, decide a joint sovereignty area. For further discussion, 
see Chapter Seven. 
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In future offshore delimitation between the UAE and Saudi Arabia the 
geographical character of the area would result in the highly unusual situation 
where Saudi Arabia's territorial sea would be blocked off from the open sea by 
the UAE's maritime zones. 94 To avoid this situation, the two parties agreed on the 
creation of a joint sovereignty zone [hereafter JSZ] to secure for Saudi Arabia 
free and direct access to the open sea through the U AE maritime zones. 
Logically, the area where joint sovereignty is to be exercised is beyond the 
territorial sea limit of Saudi Arabia 
The inner and the outer limit of the JSZ 
There is no difficulty in determining the inner limit of the condominium area 
between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The inner limit is the outer limit of Saudi 
Arabia's territorial sea in the area of Khor al-Udayd. However, there is some 
difficulty and ambiguity in determining the outer limit of the JSZ between the 
two States. In accordance with the provision of Article 5(3) of the agreement, the 
outer limit of this area is the open sea. But, there is no open sea in a semi-
enclosed sea such as the Arabian Gulf, nor is there room for suggesting that the 
outer limit of the area is the open sea, in the usual sense of the term, in the Indian 
Ocean. Thus, what is meant by th~ term 'open seas'?~ where can a possible outer 
limit for the JSZ be determined? In the next paragraphs an attempt will be made 
to address these issues. 
Suggesting an outer limit for the JSZ 
It is suggested that the concept of joint sovereignty in the context of this 
agreement can only be exercised in the area where the U AE itself has full 
sovereignty. The territorial sea area is the only area with this description, since 
the other three zones of national jurisdiction give the coastal state only sovereign 
rights for certain purposes. Hence the area beyond the U AE territorial sea limit 
would appear to have been in the minds of the two parties, as the open sea, when 
they drafted their agreement. This area in the modem law of the sea is the 
94 
See the map at p. 196. 
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exclusive economic zone. All states, according to Article 58 of the 1982 
Convention, enjoy in the EEZ the freedoms referred to in Article 87, 11amely, 
navigation and overflight in the EEZ and other peaceful uses of sea.95 The 
concept of the EEZ in 1974 was a new one, and had not yet become firmly 
accepted among coastal states.96 The ICJ in the Fisheries jurisdiction Case of 
1974, between the UK and Iceland concerning, inter alia, the legality of Iceland's 
declaration of an EFZ up to 50 nautical miles around its coast, stated that: 
the Icelandic Regulations of 14 July 1972 ... are not opposable to the United Kingdom, and the 
latter is under no obligation to accept the unilateral termination by Iceland of United Kingdom 
fi I . I . I 97 s 1ery ng 1ts m t 1e area. 
Moreover, there was uncertainty about the rights of coastal states in the 
EEZ.98 This uncertainty, regarding the acceptability of the EEZ and the ambiguity 
about the rights of the coastal state in this new zone, were the reasons why the 
two parties in their agreement adopted Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the high seas to accept that any area not included in the territorial sea or the 
internal water of coastal states was high seas or open seas. Nonetheless, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that the two parties were aware of the concept of 
the EEZ prior to the conclusion of their agreement on 21 August 1974. For 
instance both supp011ed the regime of the EEZ at the UN CLOS III. This support 
is found in their statements of 9 July 1974 in the 34th meeting in the case of the 
UAE,99and in the 35th meeting in the case of Saudi Arabia.
10° Furthermore, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia declared on 30 April 1974, an exclusive fishing zone 
')" For further discussion on these freedom, see chapter One/Section Four. 
96 See Churchill and Lowe, The law of the Sea, Manchester University Press, New rev. ed., 
Manchester ( 1988), at p.134. 
97 Fisheriesjurisdiction Case, (UK. v. Iceland) at para.67. 
98 As noted in Chapter One, some states preferred to establish an EFZ, because they were 
uncertain about the rights of coastal states within the EEZ. See Chapter One/Section Four. 
99 UNCLOS I Official Records, vol. I, at p.141, para.36. 
100 Ibid., at p.144, para.24. 
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around its coasts. 
101 
It is worth mentioning here that Article 3 of this Declaration 
considered the Saudi fishing zone as a high seas area. 102 
It seems right in light of the above to conclude that the UAE-Saudi Arabian 
JSZ is an area that should be measured from the outer limit of the Saudi Arabian 
territorial sea, and extend to the outer limit of the UAE's territorial sea. The 
breadth of the UAE territorial sea in this area is per se the breadth of the UAE-
Saudi Arabia joint sovereignty area. As a result of the foregoing, the parties 
meant by the term 'open sea', (in Article 5(3) of the agreement) what is now the 
EEZ of the United Arab Emirates. 
The length and the width of the JSZ 
There are two possible limits for the width of the joint sovereignty area. First, 
the joint sovereignty area may ·be limited to the width of a corridor or a 
navigation channel, which would link the territorial water of Saudi Arabia to the 
open seas through the UAE territorial sea. Second, the joint sovereignty area may 
be argued to correspond to that of the Saudi territorial sea. This, in practice, 
would be approximately 30 nautical miles. 103 
However, there is no need, in practical terms, to regard the width of the joint 
sovereignty area as corresponding to that of the Saudi territorial sea, since the 
corridor alternative would secure for Saudi Arabia free and direct access to the 
open seas. On the other hand, there is no need to minimize the UAE's pre-
existing sovereignty by unnecessarily extending the width of the joint sovereignty 
area beyond the necessary limit. Therefore the preferable view is that which 
causes the least possible disturbance to the UAE's pre-existing sovereignty, i.e. 
the channel or corridor option. This restrictive interpretation can be justified by 
the fact that the arrangement giving Saudi Arabia free access through the UAE 
territorial sea implies in reality some kind of obligation and limitation on the pre-
101 Reprinted in EL-Hakim, A., The Middle Eastern States and the law of the Sea, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester ( 1979), at p.204. 
102 Article 3 reads: "The implementation of this declaration shall not prejudice the status of the 
fishing zones as high seas in accordance with established principles of international law." Quoted 
from Ibid., at p.204. 
io:- See below' A Possible Boundary Line Between the Two States'. 
187 
Chllpter Four 
existing sovereignty of the latter. Such prov1s1on and arrangements, as the 
Permanent Court of International Justice stressed in the Wimbledon Case; 104 and 
in the case of the Territorial jurisdiction of the International Commission of the 
River Order, 
105 
should be restrictively interpreted in the case of doubt. 106 
Fortunately, there is no automatic implementation and designation of the joint 
sovereignty area, since the 1974 agreement called upon the parties to enter into 
negotiations in order to implement and designate it. What the joint sovereignty 
area entails, therefore, is not possible to determine since negotiations have not 
taken place or, if they have taken place, no information has been released to the 
public.
107 
However, it is very likely that the negotiation between the two parties 
may be hindered by the lack of an area suitable for deep-water navigation. 108 
The legal status of the water within the joint sovereignty area 
The Chamber of the ICJ in the Gu(( of Fonseca Case accepted the fact that the 
waters of that Gulf were subject to the joint sovereignty of the three riparian 
States. 109 These waters, the Chamber held, were not territorial sea per se but 
subject to a sui generis regime.J 10 In this regime the pa11ies enjoy "perfect 
equality of user of the waters and of common legal rights and the exclusion of 
any preferential privilege." 111 Moreover, the Chamber asserted that the vessels of 
other states enjoy the right of innocent passage within the Gulf. 112 
104 PCIJ Reports Series A-N° I, at p.24. 
105 PCIJ Reports Series A-N°23, at p.26. 
106 The Court in the River Order Case, however, held that there should be no recourse to a 
restrictive interpretation unless other means of interpretation had been exhausted. See Ibid. For 
more discussion on restrictive interpretation, see Lauterpacht, H., "Restrictive Interpretation and 
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties," 26 BYB/l ( 1949), at pp.61-7; 
McNair, op. cit .. n.56, at pp.762-6; Brownlie, op. cit., n.88, at p.631; Sinclair, op. cit., n.56, at p. 
133: Fitzmaurice. op. cit., n.59, at p.372. 
107 The fact that the 1974 agreement was for Saudi Arabia-and (probably) still is for the 
UAE--0ne of the top national secrets makes any attempt to find an answer to these questions an 
impossible task without assistance from the two parties. I had an opportunity to visit the UAE 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Saudi Arabia Embassy in the UAE. However, neither would 
agree to release any information concerning the agreement. 
108 The area of Khor al-Udayd is extrerpely shallow waters. For geographical description, see 
above at note 62. 
109 The Gulf of Fonseca Case, at para.404. 
110 'd lbt .. at para.412. 
111 Ibid., at para.407. Hence there is no exclusive sovereignty for either of them. This, however, 
may be in contlict with a coastal state's right to have a defined maritime area attributed to it, over 
188 
Chapter Four 
However. it is unclear with this type of regime, which may be suggested as a 
description of the water within the UAE-Saudi Arabia JSZ, whether each party 
has the right ·~to challenge the innocence of a [third state's] vessel's passage" in 
this area. 
113 
Similarly, it is unclear whether the right can be suspended and if so, 
by whom. The two parties therefore are required to determine an acceptable 
framework for these issues. 
Exception to the regime of condominium 
The two parties in an exchange of letters on the date of signature excluded the 
natural resources 
114 
of the sea-bed and subsoil from the rights of joint 
sovereignty.
115 
This, the parties agreed, should continue to be under the exclusive 
sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates. However, difficulties may arise here 
with regard to some activities other than the exploitation of natural resources. 
These activities include: the rights of the establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations, structures, and marine research. 116 The question which 
arises is whether these activities have also been, or should be, excluded from the 
right of joint sovereignty. The exchange of letters gives no indication of a 
solution to this problem. It is impo11ant to note that there are no travaux 
preparatoires, for the texts of the agreement have never been released to the 
public. Consequently, we have been left without any supplementary means of 
interpretation that may help to find an answer to the above question. Against this 
background, we shall proceed to interpret the relevant parts of the text of the 
exchange of letters according to the rules of interpretation enunciated in A11icle 
which it can exercise sole jurisdiction, conferred on it by International Law, Gulf of Fonseca 
Case, at para. 407. 
II:! lb"d 4 JI 1 ., at para. -· 
i 1.• Shaw, M., "Case concerning the land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case (El Salvador 
v. Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening), Judgement of 11 September 1992," 42 ICLQ ( 1993), at 
p.936. 
11
.i The scope of these resources as to which coastal state is entitled to in international law is well 
illustrated in Article 77(4) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 
115 Paragraph two of the exchange of letters provides that the JSZ "does not extend to ownership 
of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, inasmuch as these resources continue to be 
owned by the United Arab Emirates alone as an exception to the rights of joint sovereignty." 




3 1 ( 1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 117 Article 31 (I) 
declared that: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
As we saw at an earlier stage, the sovereignty of a coastal state over its 
territorial sea extends to the sea-bed and subsoil as well as to the superjacent 
waters and the air space above these waters. 118 In the 1974 agreement the UAE 
agreed with Saudi Arabia to create a JSZ over a part of the UAE's territorial sea. 
The object and purpose of this is well-illustrated in Article 5(3) of the agreement; 
to ensure for Saudi Arabia free and direct access to the high seas. The two parties 
in the exchange of letters exclude the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil 
of the JSZ from the rights of joint sovereignty. The purpose of this exclusion is to 
enable the UAE, and the UAE alone, to continue exploring and exploiting these 
resources. It is well-known that the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources require other activities, such as conducting marine research, 
constructing artificial islands, installations, and other offshore structures. There is 
a strong argument, in the light of the principle of good faith and object and 
purpose of the two parties' exchanges of letters, to suggest that the rights over 
these activities should also continue to be held exclusively by the UAE. 
Otherwise the exception to the joint sovereignty rights which the parties have 
agreed upon would fail to attain its objective, in that the UAE would lack 
comprehensive rights in respect to these activities. This interpretation would not 
be in conflict with the purpose of creating the JSZ; that is to secure for Saudi 
Arabia free and direct access to the open sea. This direct passage is not dependent 
upon the exercise of any rights connected with the exploration and exploitation of 
the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil. 
It might be argued that such an interpretation is beyond the scope of the 
ordinary meaning of the words actually used. Such an argument, however, cannot 
117 This Article was regarded as having passed into the general principle of international law. 
Libya v. Chad Territorial Dispute Case, at para.4 l. See also Sinclair, op. cit., n.56, at pp. l 3 l and 
153. 
118 See Chapter One. 
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be sustained, since, in the words of Professor Sinclair, the "true meaning of a text 
has to be arrived at by taking into account all the consequences which normally 
and reasonably flow from that text." 119 He went on to remark that "there is no 
such thing as an abstract ordinary meaning of a phrase, divorced from the place 
which that phrase occupies in the text to be interpreted." 120 
To conclude, the agreement to exclude natural resources of the sea-bed and 
subsoil from the rights of joint sovereignty should be interpreted to mean that the 
sovereignty over these resources and over other activities that are associated with 
the exploration and exploitation of these resources would continue to be under the 
sovereignty of the U AE alone. Saudi Arabia should have no rights over the sea-
bed' s resources or the activities that are linked with the right of exploring and 
exploiting the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil. Adopting such an 
interpretation is necessary to secure for the UAE unimpeded and effective 
exploitation of the natural resources that agreed to be under its exclusive 
sovereignty. Any other meaning that can be attached would deprive the text of the 
exchange of latters of its effect and could well, moreover, lead to an unreasonable 
result. 121 
The concept of equity in the light of Article 5(3) 
The two parties agreed that the boundary line between their territorial seas 
should be determined on the basis of equity to ensure free and direct access to the 
open seas from the territorial waters of Saudi Arabia. It is well-known that the 
concept of equity is often suggested in the course of the delimitation of 
continental shelf boundaries. 122 The parties in the 1974 agreement, nevertheless, 
have introduced equity in the context of a territorial sea delimitation. 123 
119 s· I . . S6 l'I me air, op. ell .. rL , at p. _ . 
1 ~ 0 Ibid. See also Qatar v. Bahrain Case (1995), at para.40. And see Cullen, J.L., The Rules of 
Treaty Interpretation in International Law, LLM Thesis. University of Edinburgh ( 1992), at p.84. 
1 ~ 1 For discussion of the principle of effectiveness. see also Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n.59, at pp.816-
9; Qatar v. Bahrain Case (1995), at paras. 27, 28, 35 and 63. 
p~ 
-- See Chapter Three. 
i2:1 In a treaty relationship states often made reference to equity "as a way of allowing exceptions 
to be made when individual circumstances appear to call for them." See Schachter, 0., 




From the two parties' point of view the equitable delimitation will be that 
which would ensure for Saudi Arabia free and direct access between the open 
seas and that part of the territory of Saudi Arabia. It is arguable that the role of 
equity is to be limited only to the act of designating a linking area, where the two 
parties would have joint sovereignty, and not to the act of drawing the boundary 
line between the two territorial seas. In order to reach an equitable result the 
parties need to select an area where the depth of the water is suitable for 
navigation and free from the usual obstacles, such as reefs, rocks and shallow 
water in general. A possible equitable designation for the joint sovereignty area 
has therefore been suggested below and illustrated on a sketch map. 
A possible equitable designation for the Joint sovereignty area 
The suggested area, illustrated on the sketch map below, is a corridor about 
3.78 nautical miles in width and 55 nautical miles in length. From the outer limit 
of the Saudi Arabian territorial sea it runs in a north-easterly direction for about 
18 nautical miles between the UAE islands of Makasib and Al-Qaffay on the one 
hand, and the UAE-Qatar continental shelf boundary line of 1969 on the other. 
This is the only area, according to .available geological data, where free and direct 
access from Saudi territory to the open seas can be achieved. 124 Moreover, the 
Saudi Arabian right to establish public constructions on the UAE islands of 
Makasib and Al-Qaffay can be invoked to sustain this possible designation for the 
Joint sovereignty area. The said islands are located at the south-eastern limit of 
the suggested designated area. Saudi Arabia would thereby secure free and direct 
access to its constructions on these two islands without needing to pass through 
the U AE territorial sea area. The corridor of the JSZ turns to the east for a 
distance of about 3 7 nautical miles until it reaches the open seas, i.e. the UAE's 
EEZ. 
124 See the National Atlas of the UAE, op. cit., n.79, at p.22. 
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The Rights of the State of Qatar in the light of Article 62 
The UAE as a sovereign state has the right in International Law to cede 
sovereignty over any part of its territory to another state. 125 The validity of this 
transfer does not depend, properly speaking, on the will of a third state. 126 This 
being so, the consequence of transferring sovereignty may open the question of 
the rights of a third state to invoke the principle of fundamental change in 
circumstances as a ground for terminating an existing agreement. The UAE has 
relinquished sovereignty over the area of Khor al-Udayd where it had an adjacent 
land boundary with Qatar. The coastal states' rights in respect to the continental 
shelf is derived from its sovereignty over the landmass. The UAE, after it 
renounced its title over Khor al-Udayd, had no landmass adjacent to Qatar, from 
which its sovereignty over the continental shelf, adjacent to Qatar, might be 
derived. This may raise the question of whether the State of Qatar has the right to 
terminate its continental shelf boundary agreement of 1969 with the UAE by 
invoking the principle of fundamental change in circumstances. 
The answer does not seem to be in the affirmative. This is so for two 
reasons: 
1. In the light of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties the 
concept of fundamental change in circumstances may not be invoked as a 
ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty establishing a boundary. 
Juridically, this-as we have seen--extends to the maritime boundary as well 
)?7 
as to the land boundary. -
2. A glance at the map shows that the UAE side of the agreed boundary line with 
Qatar is dominated by a significance number of the UAE islands, such as Das, 
Diyenah, • Arzanah, Dalma, Sir Bani Yas, Ghaghah, al-Qaffay, al-Mihayyimat, 
and Makasib. Thus the continental shelf has remained under UAE jurisdiction, 
which derived from its sovereignty over these islands. Therefore the essential 
nature of the agreement, in respect of the continental shelf, probably remains 
125 Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n. 53, at p.680. 
126 For a dissection on the right of veto for third state with regard to cession of territory, see 
Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n. 53, at p.683. 
127 See Chapter Two/Section One. 
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unchanged as a result of the UAE's renunciation of its title over the area of 
Khor al-Udayd. 
The impact, if any, of the 197 4 agreement on the Qatar-Abu-Dhabi agreement of 
1969 
It will be recalled that the Qatar-Abu-Dhabi continental shelf boundary line 
extends for a distance of 115 nautical miles. This line extends from point 'A' to 
point 'D', where the outer limits of the two parties' 3-nautical-mile territorial sea 
intersects. So, the agreed boundary line does not extend far enough to determine 
the boundary line between their territorial seas. 128 The UAE in 1974 ceded its 
sovereignty over the Khor al-Udayd area to Saudi Arabia. 129 The Khor al-Udayd 
sector thereby became under the sovereignty of the successor state, i.e. Saudi 
Arabia. This change in the Khor al-Udayd's ownership could not effect the 
existing continental shelf boundaty line between Qatar and Abu-Dhabi (UAE) 
that determined earlier. This is because, as noted in Chapter Two, boundary 
agreements enjoy a degree of stability, and the succession of a state, according to 
Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States of 1978, does not 
effect a boundary agreement. Hence, Saudi Arabia, as a successor state, is obliged 
to respect the Abu-Dhabi-Qatar agreement of 1969. 130 Nevertheless, Qatar sent a 
note to the Secretariat of the UN in which it declared that it reserved all the rights 
against any effect on its agreement with Abu-Dhabi of 1969 that may result from 
the 1974 Saudi-UAE agreement. 131 
A possible maritime boundary line between the two States 
In 1958 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by decree extended its territorial sea 
limit to 12 nautical miles. 132 The UAE did likewise in 1993. 133 The two 
l:!K For further discussion on the Qatar-Abu-Dhabi boundary agreement, see above pp.163-70. 
1
:!
9 Hence. Saudi Arabia is responsible with Qatar for determining the boundary line between the 
north-western side of the Khor al-Udayd area and Qatar's territorial sea on the north-eastern side. 
130 See Chapter Two for further discussion of the stability of boundaries. 
DI The Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note no. 95/2146-3/200/15, 16 December 1995. 
L~:! The Saudi Arabia Official Gazetteer (Umm al-Qura), no. 1706, 21 February 1958. 
133 The Federal Law no. 19 of 1993 in respect of the Delimitation of the Maritime Zones of the 
United Arab Emirates, The UAE Official Gazelleer, issue no. 257 ( 1993). See also Chapter 
One/Section One. 
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legislative measures contain provisions for the delimitation of the territorial sea 
boundary. However, the Saudi decree contains no reference to any particular 
method to be used in the delimitation, rather it asserts that the boundary of the 
territorial sea shall be determined by the Government in agreement with other 
states in accordance with equitable principles. 134 By way of contrast, the UAE 
Federal Law provided the median line system for the delimitation of the UAE 
territorial sea boundary. This provision will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
The geographical relationship between the UAE coast and the Saudi Arabian 
coast, is such that it is laterally adjacent in the inner sector, but opposite in the 
outer sector. The land boundary terminal point is point 'A' on Dawhat As 
Sumeran at the coast of the Arabian Gulf. This point was determined in the 1974 
agreement. 
135 
A possible simplified equidistance line between the two coasts 
should therefore originate from point 'A' on the land boundary. The line (Figure 
12) could extend from this point in a straight line proceeding north-west to point 
"1 ·, leaving Al Khuwesat island to the south-west and Gahaghah island to the 
north-east of the boundary line. 136 The two islands are located close to the median 
line between the two parties, and face each other. Thus they would cancel out 
each other and have no effect thereby in the delimitation. 137 As a result, no 
departure from the median line is necessary according to Article 15 of the 1982 
Convention. The UAE-Saudi Arabia boundary line would intersect with the 
Qatar-UAE agreed continental shelf boundary line of 1969. The tri-section point 
between the territorial seas of Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia would be called 
point D2. The total distance for the possible UAE-Saudi Arabia boundary line is 
about 25 nautical miles. from point ·A' on the UAE-Saudi Arabian land boundary 
1 ~· 1 Article 7 of Saudi Arabia Decree no. 33 of 1958. 
1.•~ Article 2 of the 1974 UAE-Saudi Arabia boundary agreement. 
n<, For further description and illustration of a strict equidistance line between the two parties, see 
Al-Ulama, op. cit., n.62, at pp.184-5. 3imilarly, see Al-Muwaled, F.M.J, Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation of the Kingdom o.f Saudi Arabia, A study in Political Geography, Thesis submitted 
for the degree of Ph.D., University of Durham ( 1993), at pp.90-3. See also Figure 3.5 at p.51 of 
Al-Muwaled, F.M.J, Supplementary Volume Atlas. 
137 See Chapter Six for a discussion on the effect of islands on maritime boundary delimitation. 
195 
___________________ _________________________________ Chapter Four 
terminal point, to point ~02' on the Qatar-UAE continental shelf boundary 
I
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The Remaining delimitations 
The UAE, in addition to the foregoing, has yet to determine its boundary with 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and with Iran, with respect to the area of the continental 
shelf opposite the Emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain and Ras al-
Khaimah coasts.
139 
Each case will be examined in turn. 
(1) Oman-UAE boundaries 
Oman is an adjacent country to the UAE, sharing a common border at the 
bottom of the Arabian Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman. On 5 April 1981, the state 
of Oman and the government of Ras al-Khaimah concluded a compact to 
determine the boundary between them. As far as the maritime boundary is 
concerned, Article 1 ( 4) of 1981 agreement reads: 
The offshore boundary extends, from the land boundary terminal point, towards the sea in 
accordance with international law. 
This somewhat empty provision is similar to the formula of Article 83( 1) of 
the 1982 Convention which was examined at an earlier stage. 140 This similarity 
may be because the parties were influenced by the compromise formula for 
continental shelf delimitation which emerged in the 1981 session of the UN CLOS 
III. Nothing much need be said about the UAE-Oman maritime boundary, save 
that the Omani Foreign Minister stated, on 9 April 1993, that: "The frontier 
dispute between Oman and the UAE is completely settled." 141 
Interestingly, this statement, if true in Iota, relates solely to the land boundary 
according to an informal source in· the UAE government. There is no information 
about the existence of a maritime boundary agreement between the two countries. 
Hence the UAE needs to define its territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive 
139 See the enclosed map at the end of this chapter. 
14° For further discussion on the formula of Article 83( I) of the 1982 Convention, see Chapter 
Three/Section One. 
141 Arab Times, I 0 April ( 1993). It is worth mentioning here that the UAE and Oman have set up 
in the last few years a high Commission of high-ranking officials from the two States. Their 
mandate is to settle and reconcile any dispute, including boundary disputes, that may arise 
between the two countries. 
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economic zone and the continental shelf boundaries with Oman. 142 It goes 
without saying that this will nol be possible until the two parties reach an 
agreement to determine the terminal land boundary points between them. This 
needs to be done in the UAE (Ras al Khaymah) and Oman (Khassab) at the 
Arabian Gulf, and between the UAE (Sharjah) and Oman (Dibba) at the Gulf of 
Oman; and, finally, between the UAE (Sharjah) and Oman (Shanase) at the Gulf 
fo 143 o man. 
This being so, the Ras al-Khaimah-Oman agreement of 1981 raised some 
concern about the right of the former, as a component unit in the UAE federation, 
to enter into a treaty relationship with a foreign state despite the fact that Ras al-
Khaimah is not state in international sense of the term. 
It was mentioned in the general introduction to this work that the UAE 
Constitution did not entirely prohibit the Emirates' members of the federation 
from entering into separate agreements or compacts with other neighbouring 
states. This authority to conclude treaties, which normally falls within the federal 
government and only exceptionally within the member Emirates, is not an 
unusual practice in other federal states. The Constitution of the United States, for 
example, contains the following provisions: 
(3) No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact 
with another State or with a foreign Power. 144 
In the UAE Constitution the right of the member Emirates to enter into a 
treaty relationship is subject to the following conditions: 
1- The agreement should be with a neighbouring state, and one which is of a local 
and administrative nature. 
2- It should not be in any way contrary to the interests of the Union or the Union 
laws. 
142 Most likely the two States would follow their pre-existing practices and determine one single 
maritime boundary line between their respective offshore zones. 
1 • 1 ~ See also Chapter Five/Section Two. 
144 Article I 0(3) of the USA Constitution. For additional examples, see McNair, op. cit., n.56, at 
p.38; Sohn L. and Shafer P., "Foreign Affairs," Studies in Federalism, Bowie R. and Friedrich C. 
(eds.), Little, Brown and Company, Toronto (1954), at pp. 255-8. 
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3- The Union should be informed 111 advance about any agreement which the 
Emirate wishes to conclude. 
4- The Union should raise no objections to the conclusion of such agreements. 145 
In the event of differences between the Emirate and the Union authority the 
matter shall be submitted to the Union Supreme Court to rule on the dispute. 146 
In 1981 Ras al-Khaimah sigl)ed an agreement with the state of Oman to 
determine the land boundary between them. Without going into exhaustive 
constitutional argument on whether the Ras al-Khaimah-Oman boundary 
agreement conforms with the U AE constitutional requirements for an Emirate to 
enter into such a relationship, one may raise a question from a different angle: 
whether Ras al-Khaimah as a component or division of the UAE Federation has, 
in international law, a treaty-making capacity. 
The issue was discussed in the ILC work on the Law of the Treaties. 
Lauterpacht, the Special Rappo11eur, in his comment on draft Article 10 147 on the 
capacity of the parties to conclude treaties in 1953, held the view that treaties 
concluded by a unit of a federal state "are treaties in the meaning of international 
law," if they are compatible with the authority of the unit members of the federal 
state as assigned to it in the federal constitution. Hence, Lauterpacht continued, in 
the "absence of such authority conferred by federal law, member States of a 
Federation cannot be regarded as endowed with the power to conclude 
. "148 treaties. 
The matter, however, was viewed differently by Fitzmaurice in his report 
149 
in 1958 to the ILC. He accepted the capacity of a member state of a federation to 
enter into a treaty with a foreign power, not in its own right, but as "an agent 
empowered to conclude treaties on behalf of the union as a whole," 150 and within 
145 Hence, no consent is required, toleration on the part of the federal authority would be 
sufficient. 
146 Article 123 of the Constitution. 
147 Draft Article IO in the Lauterpacht report to the ILC in I 953 reads: "An instrument is void as a 
treaty if concluded in disregard of the international limitation upon the capacity of the parties to 
conclude treaties." /LC Yearbook (1953), vol. 2, at p.137. 
1411 Ibid., at p.139. 
149 The Third Special Rapporteur. . 
15° Fitzmaurice, /LC Yearbook ( 1958), vol. 2, at p.32, para. 26. 
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the federal constitution limitations. 151 In this case the international responsibility 
to carry out such an agreement would be on "the union as a whole." 152 
In 1966 the ILC presented to the General Assembly draft Articles on the Law 
of the Treaties. 153 Article 5 of the draft contained the following paragraph on the 
subject of the states members of federations: 
2-States members of a federal union may possess a capacity to conclude treaties if such 
capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down.
154 
This paragraph, however, met with considerable opposition from the majority 
of federal states, 155 including India, USA, Canada and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties. Their objection was 
that the paragraph did not recognize the exclusive authority of the federal state in 
interpreting its constitution "to determine whether the constitution conferred a 
treaty-making capacity upon members of the federation," 156 or whether an 
agreement concluded by a component unit is consistent with the federal 
constitution's conditions. Such failure in the above paragraph of Article 5 caused 
a significant number of federal states to feel that "the provision would enable 
third states to intervene in the internal affairs of federal states by seeking to 
interpret the constitution of the latter." 157 This fear, however, was considered by 
some writers, including Van De Craen, as unfounded. His view was that an 
151 A similar view was held by Waldock, the fourth Special Rapporteur, /LC Yearbook ( 1962), 
vol. 2. at p.36. In addition, he addresses the case of a component of a federation, such as Ukraine 
and Byelorussia, where the federal constitution and foreign state have recognized the component 
state as possessing an international personality, which is separate from the personality of the 
federal state. In this case, Waldock held the view that it is difficult to deny such an entity "any 
international treaty-making capacity." See /LC Yearbook (1962), vol.2, at p.37. 
152 
/LC Yearhook ( 1958). vol. 2, at p.32, para.26. 
1 ~ 1 /LC }'ear/wok ( 1966), vol. 2, at p.177, para.36. 
154 Ibid .. at pp.191-2. 
155 It is worth mentioning here that the opposition to para. 2 was not limited to federal states; 
some unitary states, e.g. Japan, Republic of Korea, voted against the provision of this paragraph. 
See the Official Record\·, the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, 1968, New 
York (1969), at p.69, para.47. 
156 Stanford, J.S., "The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties," 20 UTLJ (1970), at p.29. 
157 Shaw, op. cit., n.57, at p.153. See also Stanford, Ibid. 
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"energetic protest and elucidation by the federal government would in such a case 
be the most apt means for a correct interpretation." 158 
The protest of the federal states to the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 5 
was not limited to fear of the possibility of foreign states' intervention in their 
domestic affairs. They also advanced the argument that "the paragraph made the 
constitution-an internal law of the federal state-alone determinative of status 
and capacity in international law, thereby establishing a principle potentially 
disruptive of state representation in the international community." 159 
As far as the UAE is concerned, the rights of the Emirates' members of the 
Union to conclude separate treaties with other neighbouring states, as noted, is 
limited by the conditions delineated in Article 123 of the UAE Constitution. The 
validity in international law of an agreement concluded by an Emirate member of 
the Union depends on the compatibility of that agreement with the provision of 
Article 123. Disregarding these provisions would result in the agreement being 
considered "as having been concluded in disregard of the limitations imposed by 
international law upon its treaty-making power. As such it is not a treaty in the 
contemplation of international law. As a treaty, it is void." 160 This is simply 
because a state member of a federation has no power in international law to enter 
into a treaty relationship with other states. In the case where the union 
constitution gave such a power, the component state would act as a representative 
in expressing the consent of the federation to be bound by a pai1icular treaty. If 
the federal constitution made the authority of a component state subject to 
specific restrictions and requirements, its failure to observe these restrictions 
would prevent it binding the federation. This would result in the agreement being 
void in international law, since the representative, i.e. the component state in this 
case. ignored the limitation placed on it by the federal constitution. 161 But where 
isK Frank L.M. Yan De Crean. "The Federated State and its Treaty-Making Power," Collection de 
droit international. Actes du colloque de Bruxelles, institut de sociologie, 26-27 fevrier 1982, 
Editions Bruylant, Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles ( 1984), at p.381. 
159 Stanford, op. cit., n.156, at p.29. See also the Official Records, the UN Conference on the Law 
of the Treaties. 1968, First Session, New York (1969), at p.67, para.23. 
160 /LC Yearbook ( 1953), vol. 2, at p.139, para.4. 
161 /LC Yearbook, ( 1958), vol. 2, at p.34, para.36. 
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the agreement is considered to be compatible with the limitation of the UAE 
Constitution, the federal authority is the responsible entity, vis-a-vis other states, 
. I l 162 to unp ement sue 1 an agreement. 
To sum up, the Ras al-Khaimah-Oman agreement gives no indication of the 
position of the federal government regarding the agreement. There were three 
possibilities here; (1) the federal authority approved the agreement before its 
conclusion; (2) the Union had not been informed of the agreement prior to its 
conclusion; (3) the agreement was concluded, dispute the protest of the federal 
government. In the first case the agreement is valid, and the Union of the UAE as 
a whole is bound by it. In the second case the agreement in question is voidable; 
"'thus only valid if the federal government does not veto it or approves of it later 
on." 163 In the final case the agreement is void, because Ras al-Khaimah 
concluded the agreement in a violation to the Union's constitutional requirement 
for an Emirate, member of the federation, to enter into a treaty relationship with a 
foreign state. 
(2) The remaining UAE-Iran boundaries 
In Chapter Five we shall identify the remaining un-delimited sectors in the 
Iran-UAE boundary, and the difficulties, if any, holding back the two sides from 
finalizing the maritime boundary between them. 
(3) Saudi Arabia-UAE offshore boundaries 
As mentioned above, the two countries should, in accordance with Article 
5(3) of the 1974 agreement, enter into bilateral negotiations to conclude an 
agreement to determine their marit.ime boundaries. 
162 Ibid., at p.32, para.26. 




The Inter-Emirates' boundaries 
As we saw in the introduction to this work the UAE is a federation of seven 
Emirates. The UAE constitution preserves the autonomy of the member Emirates 
in some aspects, notably the member Emirates' sovereignty over their own 
territories and territorial seas in all matters not within Union jurisdiction. 164 
Natural resources 
165 
are considered in the constitution to be the public property of 
the individual Emirate where the resource are located. Hence, it was necessary to 
define the boundary of each Emirate, though these boundaries are no longer to be 
regarded as international in character, in order to avoid any overlap in exercising 
jurisdiction or exploring and exploiting the natural resources that in the area. The 
necessity of defining the boundaries between the component parts of the UAE 
Federation is well-reflected in the case of the Dubai-Sharjah boundaries. The two 
Emirates, as will be seen, had to .refer their dispute on the delimitation of their 
boundary to ad hoc arbitration, after they failed to reach an agreement. 
Examination of the Inter-Emirates practice in determine their offshore boundaries 
provides a valuable source of understanding of the elements of the UAE practice 
in this respect. Four internal maritime boundaries have been drawn between the 
various members of the UAE Federation. 
A: Abu-Dhabi-Dubai agreements of 1965 and 1968 
In 1965 Abu-Dhabi and Dubai accepted a British proposal to determine the 
boundary between them. This boundary line was initially proposed in 1951 as a 
boundary between the oil concession area for each party. As far as the offshore 
boundary was concerned, the boundary line was the equidistance line. It was 
agreed that this ·•starts at Ras Hasine on the coast and extends seawards in a 
JM Article 3 of the UAE Constitution. 
165 Natural resource is one of the essential objective behind boundary dispute, see Libya v. Malta 
Case, at para.50; Gulf of Maine Case, at paras.48 and 232. See also above at p.152. 
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. I 1 · . 1 I d. . " 166 stra1g it me m a nort i-wester y 1rect1on. Shortly afterwards, in 1966, the 
Continental Oil Company discovered the Fatuah oil field in Dubai's continental 
shelf area. The oil field was situated 47 nautical miles off mainland Dubai, and 
near the boundary line that was agreed upon with Abu-Dhabi in 1965. As a result 
of a fresh discovery, in 1968 the parties reached an agreement to modify the 1965 
boundary line. Under the new agreement, the boundary line was shifted ten 
kilometres towards Abu-Dhabi to the west of the Fatuah oil field. 167 This was to 
take account of this field which was located close to the 1965 boundary line. 
Nothing more need be said about the agreement, except that the island of Sir Abu 
Nu' ayr, which 1 ies about 12 nautical miles to the west of the boundary line 
between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai, had no effect upon the boundary line. This is 
because it belongs to the Emirate of Sha1jah which was not party to the 1968 
agreement between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. 168 
l<•<i See Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.20, at p.1480. Furthennore, the equidistance line 
proposed by the British Government was quite commonly used to define the various Emirates' 
(Formal Trucial States) offshore boundaries in the Gulf. 
1<·
7 Ibid. See also EL-Hakim, op. cit., n. I 01, at p.99. 
I Mi The island of Sir Abu Nu' Aair becomes an enclave into the Abu-Dhabi territorial sea, as a 
result of the Abu-Dhabi/Dubai boundary. agreement. For the text of the agreement, see Charney 
and Alexander, op. cit., n.20, at p.1480. 
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B: Dubai-Sharjah boundaries169 
The Dubai-Shaijah boundary is the only one in the Gulf region that has been 
determined by arbitration. The Award, it will be recalled, was between the two 
adjacent Emirates. There was a land frontier dispute between the two parties. The 
British Government, during its special treaty relationship with them prior to 1971, 
took steps to determine the land boundary between Dubai and Sharjah in order to 
define the oil concession area for each Emirate. The British Political Agent, Mr. 
Peter Tripp, in 1956-57, made such a proposal. 170 Dubai declined to accept the 
Tripp proposal. In 1963, the British Government proposed a lateral boundary 
offshore starting from the Al Mamzar peninsula. This peninsula was the coastal 
terminal point of the land boundary as proposed by Tripp.· Again, Dubai rejected 
the 1963 proposal since it would result in dividing the Al Mamzer peninsula, to 
which Dubai laid claim in its entirety. 171 Thereafter, the two Emirates joined the 
other five Emirates, the former Trucial States, to form the Federation of the UAE 
in 1971. The Federation authority thereafter endeavoured to settle the dispute 
between the parties. 172 On 30 November 1976, the two Emirates concluded a 
special agreement to refer their frontier dispute to ad hoc arbitration. 173 The 
parties in their special agreement did not determine the law which the tribunal 
should apply. The applicable law in this case must be the Federal Law. However, 
the Court found, though not surprisingly, that "the constitution of the United 
Arab Emirates contains no provisions that relate to the law applicable to 
territorial disputes between the member Emirates."
174 
Therefore, it concluded 
that: 
"•'> For further comments on the Arbitration, see Bowett, D. W., "The Dubai/Sharjah Boundary 
Arbitration of 1981." 65 BYBIL ( 1994), at pp. I 03-33. 
170 Duhai/Shat~jah Award, at p.544. 
171 Ibid. 
172 b"d 9 I 1 ., at pp.6 5-9. 
rn Article I of this agreement provides: ·'the outstanding dispute between the two Emirates of 
Dubai and Sharjah concerning the demarcation of the boundaries between them shall be referred 
to Arbitration." See Ibid., at p.550 
174 The constitution documents of the majority of Federations, the Court said, contain no such 
provisions. See Ibid., at p.586. 
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although the dispute affects internal relationships within a Federation, it is international law 
that is applicable. It is, however, necessary to add that the Parties have not authorised this Court 
. A d I 175 176 . to arrive at an war ex aequo el wno. 
The Court of Arbitration held its first formal meeting on 2 May 1978. In 
1981, the Court delivered its decision in determining the land and sea boundaries 
between Dubai and Sharjah. Considering the maritime boundary, it found the 
equidistance method to be the appropriate one for the delimitation and to be 
required in light of the relevant circumstances of the area. 177 Moreover, the 
presence of the Sharjah island of Abu Musa (claimed also by Iran), which lies 35 
and 36 nautical miles off Shaijah and Dubai respectively, was seen by the Court 
as a special circumstance, that required a departure from the principle of 
equidistance. The result of the delimitation, therefore, was a boundary line 
extending to a distance of roughly 39 nautical miles, where it terminated at the 
intersection with the Iran-UAE line of 1974. The lateral boundary line contained 
eight turning and terminal points (A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H). Points A to E were 
equidistant points from the mainland of the respective parties. From points F to H 
the boundary line coincides with Abu Musa's arc of a 12-nautical-mile territorial 
sea limit. The Court of Arbitration refused to give the island of Abu Musa any 
effect beyond its 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit. This was in order, the 
Court indicated, to preserve the equities of the geographical situation and to be 
"consistent, for example, with comparable regional practices as applied to the 
island of Al-Arabiyah and Farise in the Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement of January 
1969."178 
175 Ibid., at p.587. 
rn. Recourse to international law to determine the boundary between two components of a federal 
state is not an unusual practice in the literature. For example, the US Supreme Court 
acknowledged the application of the 1958 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention on 
the case concerning the lateral boundary between Texas and Louisiana of 1976. For further 
details. see Charney, J.I.. "The Delimitation of Ocean Boundaries,'' 18 ODIL ( 1987), at pp.497-
531. 
177 Duhai/Sharjah Award, at pp.550-3, p.658 and p.672. 
178 Ibid., at pp.677-8. For further discussion on the Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement, see Chapter 
Five/Section One. 
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C: Sharjah-Umm al Qaiwain boundaries 
As with the boundaries between Dubai and Sharjah, the British Government 
made a proposal in 1961 to determine the boundary line between the Emirate of 
Sharjah and the Emirate of Umm al Qaiwain. 179 The two Emirates, in parallel 
unilateral declarations issued in 1964, declared their acceptance of the British 
Government's proposal. 
180 
The parties, at that time, were known to have a 3-
nautical-mile traditional limit for their territorial sea. The declaration of the two 
Emirates, in 1964, did not explain the effect of the Sharjah island of Abu Musa, 
which lies on the Umm al Qaiwain side of the equidistance line, and 35 nautical 
miles from the Sharjah mainland. There was no map attached to either 
declaration, but a 3-nautical-mile limit around the island of Abu Musa was shown 
on one Admiralty Chart, which was produced by the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 181 Restricting the territorial sea limit of Abu Musa island 
to 3 nautical miles was rejected by the Government of Sharjah. This stance was 
based on the fact that the two Emirates declarations of 1964 "established only a 
lateral sea boundary between Sharjah's mainland territory on the Arabian Gulf 
and Umm al Qaiwain, running ... from the terminus of the land frontier, seaward 
on an azimuth of 312° for an undefined distance. It was not, therefore, an 
agreement establishing a continental shelf boundary." 182 
In 1969 the two Emirates granted an oil concession to two foreign companies. 
The Occidental Petroleum Corporation obtained from the Umm al Qaiwain 
Government the right to explore for and exploit oil within all the territories in the 
Emirate. The Buttes Gas and . Oil Company obtained from the Shaijah 
Government similar rights. A decree dated 10 September 1969 was issued by the 
179 The proposed boundary contained a "line starting from a point on the coast near the site of the 
dead well Mirdar Bu Salaf and going out to the sea on a bearing of 312°." For the text of the 
agreement, see Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.20, at p.1555. 
IRO • lbtd., at p.1549. 
IRI House of Lords' decision in Buttes Gas and Oil Constitutional. v. Hammer Case, 29 October 
1981. The decision was reproduced in 21 ILM ( 1982), at p.95. 
182 Sharjah argument in Dubai/Shm:jah Award, at p. 667. 
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Government of Sharjah to extend its territorial sea limit to 12 nautical miles. uo 
The outcome of this extension OI? the boundary between the two Emirates was 
that the boundary line extends from a point on the coast and "proceeds seaward 
on an azimuth of 312° until it intersects the 12-mile arc around Abu Musa and 
would then follow that arc in a counter clockwise direction." 184 In addition, the 
extension of the breadth of the Sharjah territorial sea gives the Emirate the right 
to explore and exploit Mubarak Oil Field which is situated 9 nautical miles from 
Abu Musa island. At the same time these extension in Sharjah territorial sea 
prevents Umm al Qaiwain from doing so. In respect to the two foreign 
companies, the Shai:jah extension for its territorial sea limit to 12 nautical miles 
caused an overlap in the offshore oil concession areas. This was because Buttes 
Gas obtained, by the extension of the Sharjah limit, the right to explore the 
Mubarak oil field. This oil field was located in the Umm al Qaiwain continental 
shelf area and, consequently, it should have been in the Occidental Petroleum oil 
concession area, if the extension of the Sharjah territorial sea limit had not taken 
place. 
There were reactions from the parties concerned. The Umm al Qaiwain 
Government and the Occidental Petroleum Company rejected the Sharjah decree 
and challenged its validity. The initial reaction of the UK Government was to 
express its view to the Government of Sharjah that "it was not right for the Ruler 
of Sharjah to extend his territorial waters in this way." 185 Iran took advantage of 
the situation and renewed its claim of ownership over Abu Musa island and its 
12-nautical-mile territorial sea. The UK, as a result of the Iranian interference, 
ceased in its opposition to the Sharjah Government and put pressure on the Umm 
al Qawaine Government to impose limits on the Occidental Petroleum Company, 
namely. that it must not operate within the 12-mile limit for Abu Musa. 186 After 
un For the text of the Amir of Sharjah Decree, see the Report of the Trucial States Mediation, vol. 
2, unpublished studies on the matter of Sharjah Territorial Sea and Continental shelf rights. at p. 
36 of the report. 
1114 See Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.20. at p.1550. 
185 See Bui/es Gas and Oil Co v. Hammer and another (no.2)/0ccidental Petroleum Corporation 
v. Bui/es Gas and Oil Co and another, All England law Report ( 1975), vol. 2, at p.55. 
'"<·Ibid. The two oil companies engaged into judicial litigation for a period of about ten years. For 
further discussion on these judicial litigation, see All England law Report (1975), vol. 2, at 
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the creation of the federation of the UAE, the government of Umm al Qawaine, 
according to the Government of Sharjah, "acknowledged expressly Sharjah 's 
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Figure: (JS) Sharjah-Umm al Qaiwain boundary line. 
Source: International Maritime Boundaries, at p. J 554. 
pp.51-64; 17 /LM(l978), at pp.1190-7: 21 ILM(l982), at pp.92-108; Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.89, 
at pp.316-2. 
187 
Duhai/Sharjah Award, at p. 667. It was reported that Umm al Qawaine would gain a 15% 
stake in the resources of Mubarak oil field, whereas Sharjah retained a 35% stake and Iran would 
gain a 50% stake. See the work of the British Institute, op. cit., n. 30. at p.56. Different 
percentages were given in Al-Ulama, op. cit., n.62. at p.200. For the Iranian interest in Abu Musa 
island and its share in the oil field, see Chapter Six. 
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D: Sharjah-Ajman boundaries 
The Emirate of Ajman is an enclave of 100 square kilometres. within the 
Emirate of Shai:jah. There is no text available to the public of an existing 
agreement between the two Emirates. However, the Government of Sharjah in 
1964 issued a declaration, in which it accepted a proposal from the British 
Government for determining its boundary with Umm al Qaiwain and Ajman. 188 
No record of a similar declaration from the Ajman Government exists. Finally, 
the boundaries between the two Emirates, either in the no11h or the south, would 
be affected by the presence of the ~harjah island of Abu Musa and its arc of a 12-
nautical-mile territorial sea limit. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The UAE has a complex series of maritime boundary delimitations which 
arise by virtue of its geographical position as a littoral state encircied by four 
neighbours. This geographical location raises the need to determine the boundary 
lines for the UAE territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and 
continental shelf area. Nevertheless, the UAE practice internal and external, 
indeed the practice of the Gulf States in general, has been exclusively concerned 
with the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary, without providing 
specifically for the delimitation of the other three zonal boundaries (territorial 
sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone). This can be explained, in 
large measure, by the nature of the Gulf area as one of the worlds' richest seas in 
terms of offshore petroleum deposits. Hence the delimitation of the continental 
she If boundaries and the definition of the offshore resources, or oil concession 
areas. are extremely important issues for the littoral states in the Arabian Gulf. It 
was not surprising therefore to find that the proclamations of 1949, asserting 
188 As far as the boundary between Sharjah and Ajman is concerned, paragraphs two and three of 
the 1964 declaration read: "I further agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Ajman 
in the north shall be a line starting from a point on the coast in Zora ... and going out to the sea on 
a bearing of 304°. I further agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Ajman in the 
south shall be a line starting from a point on the coast in Bu Athum ... and going out on a bearing 
of 310°." For the text of the declarations, see Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.20, at p.1555. 
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authority over the sea-bed and subsoil, contained a provision to determine the 
boundary of the continental shelf area. The Abu-Dhabi Proclamation, for 
instance, asserted that the boundary of its continental shelf could be "determined 
more precisely, as occasion arises, on equitable principles, by [Abu-Dhabi] after 
consultation with the neighbouring states.'' 
The extend of the remaining undetermined areas m the network of UAE 
maritime boundaries is not unusual in the Gulf region. There is no state in the 
Arabian Gulf area (see the map below) which has succeeded in finalizing all its 
maritime boundaries. Starting from the north of the Gulf, Iraq has undefined 
maritime boundaries with Iran and Kuwait. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has undefined 
maritime boundaries with Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. Qatar has a complex and a 
sensitive dispute with Bahrain over the ownership of certain islands between 
them.
189 
Iran in the north and north-west of the Gulf has a boundary dispute with 
Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE. Finally, Oman has an undefined boundary with the 
UAE.190 
In addition to the foregoing the following points are of general interest. 
Firstly, the UAE has concluded maritime boundaries' agreements in various 
ways. These may be summarized as follows: 
1- Negotiation that led to bilateral agreement, e.g., the Iran-UAE agreement. 
2- A decision of an ad hoc arbitration that led to agreement between the two 
parties, e.g., the Dubai-Sharjah agreement of 1985 in adopting the decision of 
the Court of Arbitration in the Dubai/Sharjah Award of 1981. 191 




') However, the ICJ in its decision of 1995 accepted Qatar's claim that the Court has jurisdiction 
to examine the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. The Court's decision at para.50. 
1''° For further details on the remaining undetermined maritime boundaries in the Arabian Gulf, 
see Gault, l.T., "Off-shore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian/Persian Gulf," Ocean Boundwy 
Making, Johnston and Saunders (eds.), Croom Helm, London ( 1988), at pp.216-9. See also 
Prescott, V ., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Methuen, London ( 1985), at 
pp.171-3. 
191 Al-lttihad, UAE daily newspaper. 24 April ( 1985). 
192 For a possible explanation of the nature of this commission, see above at pp.164-6. 
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4- An administrative decision by the British authorities followed by 
acknowledgement from the parties concerned, which constituted an agreement, 
e.g., Shar:jah-Umm al Qauwain parallel unilateral declarations. 193 
Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that the UAE's determined boundaries were 
made entirely in respect to the coritinental shelf area, these boundaries have acted 
as the boundary for the exclusive economic zone. This is because the boundary of 
the EEZ, as far as the UAE is concerned, should, according to Article 3 of the 
UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaration in 1981, coincide with the boundary 
of the continental shelf.
194 
Thirdly, the equidistance method has been used in all 
the agreements, albeit without express articulation. Fourthly, the Gault and 
Anderson Committee demonstrates that conciliation can be a useful mechanism 
for solving boundary disputes.
195 
Finally, all the agreements have been bilateral. 
No trilateral meeting has been held, even to define a tri-point. The UAE-Qatar-
Iran tri-point emerged from the Iranian-Qatar agreement which accepted point A 
in the UAE-Qatar boundary line as the terminal point in their boundary line. 
1 ''~ The Court of Arbitration in the Duhai-Shw:iah Award, described the decision of the British 
Government, in the delimitation of the boundaries between some Emirates of the UAE Federation 
prior to 1971, as administrative. Such a decision was binding on the Emirates concerned by their 
prior or post consent. and not by the British will. This was because, the Court pointed out that the 
British Government had no right, during its special relation with the Emirates, "to delimit 
unilaterally the boundaries between the Emirates and ... no British administration ever asserted that 
it had the right to do so.'' Dubai-Shw:jah Award, at p.567, see also pp.568-80. 
194 Article 3 of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs' declaration in 1981, in respect to the 
exclusive economic zone, reads: The boundary of the EEZ "shall be determined in accordance 
with the provisions of the agreements concluded by the Emirates members of the Union in 
connection with their continental shelf. If the Emirates members of the Union have not concluded 
such agreement, the outer limit of the economic zone of the United Arab Emirates shall extend to 
the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baseline." 
195 For further discussion on the flexibility of conciliation, see Chapter Seven. 
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The lranian-UAE maritime boundary 
Iran and the United Arab Emirates are two opposite states whose maritime 
boundary extends in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf for a distance of 
approximately 214 nautical miles. Boundary matters are often a source of 
difficulty and political sensitivity between neighbouring states. Thus the 
delimitation of the boundary with Iran as a major economic and political power in 
the Gulf region is an important element for the stability of the region in general 
and for the UAE in particular. In 1974, as we have seen, Iran and UAE agreed to 
determine part of the boundary between them. 1 However, the agreed continental 
shelf boundary line extended for only about 39 nautical miles. The remaining un-
delimited area, of about 175 nautical miles, still needs to be fixed to prevent 
further problems from arising. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the 
reasons that prevent the two neighbouring states from settling their boundaries. It 
has been divided into two sections: ( 1) The difficulty of finalizing the boundary 
between Iran and UAE; (2) Suggestion of a possible boundary line. Before we 
commence, however, it would be of value to provide a geographical description 
of the area of delimitation between them, in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman. 
The area of delimitation between the Iranian and UAE coastlines in the 
Arabian Gulf extends from the Strait of Hormuz in a south-westerly direction to a 
point situated midway between Iran, the UAE and Qatar, whose geographical co-
ordinates are latitude 25°3 l '50:'N. and longitude 53°02'05"E.
2 
The width 
between the two coastlines varies from about 52 nautical miles on the south west 
1 See Chapter Four/Section One. 
2 This is the trisection point between Iran, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, see Chapter 
Four/Section One. 
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of the Strait of Hormuz to some 160 nautical miles at the centre of the Gulf. 3 The 
average water depth similarly increases gradually from about 10 metres on its 
south eastern side to about 90 metres where a traffic separation zone has been 
designated.
4 
On the UAE side the coastline may be described in two parts, A and 
8:5 
A: From the Sha'am area on the north-east side to the Ras Ghantut area on the 
south-west side. This part of the UAE coastline follows a relatively regular south 
western course, marked only by a number of indentations and coastal islands, e.g. 
the al-Hamrah island and the as-Siniyyan island. 
B: From the Ras Ghantut area to the Ras Ghames peninsula. In contrast to A, this 
part of the UAE coastline is marked by three geographical features: 
1- Its general form is a marked concavity. 
2- The general configuration of the coast is irregular and deeply indented. 
3- A number of islands are scattered in the vicinity of the coastline, the more 
considerable ones being Abu Al Abyad island, Abu-Dhabi island, Kisheshah 
island and Sir Bani Yas island. 
On the Iranian side, the coastline, from Hengam island to Lavan island, 
follows a relatively regular6 south-east direction. It is marked by only a few 
headlands, notably Ra's osh Sha'vari, Ra's-e Kha'rgu, and Ra's-e Yared. 
Moreover, there are two distinct geographical features in this part of the Iranian 
coastline. First, the island of Qeshm, lying at the entrance of the Gulf, which is 
separated from the mainland by only a narrow passage. This Island has been 
included in the Iranian straight baseline system. 7 It is approximately 69 miles in 
length and 7 miles in width. In addition to Qeshm island there are a number of 
islands of some significance lying opposite the Iranian mainland; these are Sirri, 
1 Measured from Lavan Island, on the Iranian coastline, to the Arwes area on the UAE coast. 
•
1 See the Times Atlas and Encyclopaedia of the Sea ( 1989), at p.154. 
5 For illustration, see figure I. 
6 The Iranian coastline in this area is rarely deeply indented or fringed by islands. See the United 
States' note to the UN, January 11, 1994 (USUN 3509/437). Reprinted in the limits in the Seas, 
Series No.114, at p.30. 
7 By an Iranian Decree-Law of 21 July 1973. An English translation of this Decree-Law may be 
found in the UN Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The law of the Sea, Baselines: 
National legislation With Illustrative Maps, New York ( 1989), at pp.194-6. 
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Qais and Lavan. Second, the coastline forms a marked convexity between Bandar 
M6ullem and Ra's-e Bostanheh, and a marked concavity on the Bandor-e Moghu 
area between Ra's-e Bostanheh and Ra's-e Yared. 
In the Gulf of Oman the delimitation area between Iran and the UAE is 
relatively small compared with that in the Arabian Gulf. The UAE coastline in 
the Gulf of Oman extends in a northern direction for about 50 nautical miles. This 
coastline is sandwiched between two Omani territories: Dibba in the north and 
Shanase in the south. This part of the UAE coastline is free from any indentation 
or islands that may disturb its regular shape. On the opposite side is the Iranian 
coastline which continues its extension from the Strait of Hormuz up to the 
boundary with Pakistan for a distance of about 246 nautical miles. This long 
coastline puts Iran into a position opposite to the UAE and Oman. As far as the 
boundary with the UAE is concerned, the area between segments 15 and 17, (see 
the map below)8 which extends up to 45 nautical miles in the Iranian straight line 
system, is opposite the UAE coastline. With the exception of some headlands, 
such as Ra's al Kuh and Ra's Jask, this part of the Iranian coastline is generally 
straight and smooth. 
The width of the delimitation area between Iran and the UAE in the Gulf of 
Oman increases from about 55 nautical miles in the north west, to about 100 
nautical miles in the south east. In the same direction, the average depth increases 
gradually from about 90 to 250 metres. 
In contrast with the area between them in the Arabian Gulf, the delimitation 
area between the two pai1ies in the Gulf of Oman is free from any islands that 
could complicate the construction of a median line system between them. 
8 See also the map reproduced in Section Two of this chapter. 
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Section One 
The difficulty of finalizing the boundary between Iran and 
UAE 
As noted above, twenty-five years after the formulation of the UAE 
federation, its boundary with Iran has not been fully determined.9 There may be 
difficulties preventing the two states from addressing the delimitation question 
between them. These may stem from geographical features or from the two 
parties' respective positions on the question of maritime boundary delimitation. 
(1) Geographical circumstances 
In the literature on maritime boundary delimitation the presence of islands is 
considered among other geographical features as the one often capable of 
complicating the delimitation process. 10 In the Gulf region islands are scattered in 
several places. Fortunately, because the Gulf is a semi-enclosed sea with a width 
of less than 160 nautical miles, tt:e effect of islands in the Gulf States' practices 
has been restricted to the islands' 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit. 11 
Therefore, the number of islands in the Gulf which may have a role to play in 
continental shelf delimitation is limited to those situated midway between the 
states concerned. Other islands whose geographical positions are far from the 
location of the median line area-and situated on the correct side of it-12have 
been disregarded in pre-existing practices in the Gulf. 13 As far as the Iran-UAE 
'> This, however, is not the only case in the region. For a general overview on undefined 
boundaries in the Gulf, see the conclusion to Chapter Four. 
10 Boyle, A.E., "Maritime Boundaries and UNCLOS: Some Current Problems," (unpublished 
paper) Greenwich Forum, 30 May ( 1996), at pp.1-2; Bowett, 0., The legal Regime of Islands in 
International law, Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York ( 1979), at p.152; Evans, 
M., Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, Claredon Press, Oxford (I 989), at 
pp.150-1. 
11 With the exception of the Iranian island of Kharag. 
12 Up until now there has been no existi"ng practice in the Gulf area concerning the effect of an 
island belonging to one state, but situated very close to another state's mainland. In addition to 
the case of the two Tunbs islands, there is that of the Bahraini island of Hawar situated less than 2 
nautical miles off the Qatari coastline. 
13 See below for examples. 
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maritime boundary is concerned there are four islands which have, or may have in 
the future, some influence in the drawing of the boundary line between them. 
These islands are Sirri, Abu Musa, and the Greater and Little Tunbs islands. 
The effect of Sirri island on the median line system between Iran and UAE 
was settled by the 1974 Iran-UAE continental shelf agreement. 14 The outstanding 
dispute over the sovereignty of the remaining islands, viz., Abu Musa, and the 
two Tunbs islands, has impeded the process of delimitation between the two 
countries. The gap in the boundary line where these islands are present will be 
termed for convenience the "Islands sector". Chapter Six will be devoted to 
examining what possible effect these Islands might have on the UAE-Iran 
offshore boundary. 
In addition to the Islands sector there are two remaining gaps in the UAE-Iran 
boundary line. First, there is the area which extends from the Qatar-UAE-Iran 
trisection point to point ( 1) in the Iran-UAE continental shelf agreement of 
1974. 15 For convenience we shall term this gap the "Abu-Dhabi sector." The 
second is the area between them in the Gulf of Oman. With the exception of the 
interests of Oman as a third state, 16 there is neither a geographical difficulty nor a 
sovereignty dispute in these two sectors between Iran and UAE that could hold up 
or complicate the delimitation between them, or explain their refraining from 
addressing the question of their ~n-delimited boundary in these cases. Indeed, 
there are several reports, as will be shown, of an existing agreement between Iran 
and UAE in the Abu-Dhabi sector. 17 
(2) Policy positions and pre-existing agreements on maritime 
boundary delimitation 
The problem that may hold back Iran and UAE from fixing the remaining 
boundary between them, in sectors other than the Islands sector, could spring 
from the different approach that each has taken to the delimitation of maritime 
14 
See Chapter Four/Section One. 
15 For a discussion on Qatar-UAE agreement of 1969 and lran-UAE agreement of 1974, see 
Chapter Four/Section One. 
16 This point is addressed in detail below, see pp.233-6 and pp.241-3. 
17 
See below at p.244. 
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boundaries. This could well impede the process of reaching agreement between 
them. From the literature, one can see that such a possibility would not be 
unusual. In the North Sea Cases, for example, the dispute between Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was based on the 
applicable method for the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between 
them. The Netherlands and Denmark argued for the use of the equidistance 
principle, whereas the FRG rejected such an argument. 18 The three states had to 
refer the matter to the World Court to identify the principles and rules that were 
applicable to the delimitation between them. 19 Another example is the dispute 
between Iran and Iraq over the equidistance method in Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq, as a 
geographically disadvantaged state argued for applying the concept of equitable 
principles, whereas Iran insisted on the equidistance method.20 
Therefore, it is important to examine Iranian and UAE practices on maritime 
boundary delimitation to identify the compatibility and the contrast between the 
two states' position regarding the question of continental shelf delimitation. To 
do so, it is necessary to have a standard rule of delimitation, then to compare the 
practice of each party to this rule. International law must be the source of this 
rule. In the light of the conclusion reached in Chapter Three that international law 
provides for continental shelf delimitation, and in the absence of agreements to 
the contrary, a single rule of equidistance/special circumstances under Article 6, 
or equitable/relevant circumstances under customary law, the two rules are in that 
both seek to reach an equitable result. There were three aspects where the two 
parties' respective positions can be compared to the single rule of continental 
shelf delimitation. Hence, this discussion will be conducted on three different 
levels: ( 1) the two parties' policy positions before the UN Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea: (2) the two parties~ delimitation practice; and (3) their relevant 
domestic legislation 
18 
The North Sea Cases, at para.15. See also Chapter Three. 
19 
Article l of the special agreement to submit the two cases to the Court, ICJ Reports 1969, at 
p.6. 
20 Amin, S.H., Political and Strategies Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf, Royston Limited, 
Scotland ( 1984 ), at pp. I 13-4. 
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A: The United Arab Emirates' Practices 
(a) Tile UAE policy position at the UN Co11ference on the Law of the Sea 
The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was the first Conference on 
the Law of the Sea in which the UAE had participated. An explanation for the 
absence of the UAE from participation in the previous UN Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea was given in Chapter One of this work. In the UNCLOS III the 
UAE Government supported the equidistance/special circumstances single rule 
for the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf boundary. 21 Mr. Khalfan, the 
UAE representative at the 34th meeting of the Conference stated: 
Where the coasts of the two States were opposite or adjacent to each other, the median line 
should be the line of demarcation of the economic zone [and continental shelf], unless 
otherwise prescribed by mutual agreements, or unless other boundary lines were justified by 
historic title or other special circumstances. 
22 
(b) The UAE's pre-existing practice 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the equidistance line was in general 
the starting point in the UAE's delimitation agreements concerning the 
delimitation of its external and inter-emirates maritime boundaries. This 
equidistance line was modified in some sectors to take account of islands present 
in the vicinity of the equidistance line, (Abu-Dhabi-Qatar, lran-UAE); or to take 
account of the location of oil fields midway between the two states (Abu-Dhabi-
Dubai, Qatar-Abu-Dhabi). Proportionality was invoked in the UAE practice to 
prevent islands from having an excessive weight that might have resulted in 
disproportionately distorting effects in the delimitation between the two parties 
(Sharjah-Dubai). To sum up, the UAE's pre-existing internal and external 
practice in respect of continental shelf delimitation is in general agreement with 
the rules of international lav-,1. 23 
21 See Chapter Three for more discussion on the single rule of equidistance/special circumstances. 
22 UNCLOS Ill Official Records, vol.6, at p.141, para. 37. 
23 A similar conclusion was held by Richard Young after he examined the practice of the Gulf 
States as a whole; see Young, R., "The Persian Gulf," New Direction in the law of the Sea, vol. 3, 
Collected Papers, Churchill, Simmonds and Welch (eds.) Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, 
New York ( 1973 ), at p.234. 
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(c) The UAE Maritime Legislation 
As has been mentioned previously, m 1949 the Trucial States Emirates 
declared exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf areas adjacent to their 
coastlines. These declarations contained reference to the concept of equitable 
principles to determine the boundary of the continental shelf.24 The delimitation 
of the continental shelf in accordance with equitable principles was discussed in 
Chapter Three of this work. 
In 1969 the Emirate of Sha~jah extended its territorial sea to a 12 nautical 
miles limit. 25 The Decree did not address the question of delimitation. One year 
later a supplementary Decree was issued by the Emirate in which it reclaimed a 
12-nautical-mile territorial sea. In relation to delimitation, Article 4 of the 
supplementary Decree adopted, in the absence of agreement, the median line 
system as the boundary line for the Emirate's territorial sea.26 In addition to the 
1949 continental shelf declarations and the Emirate of Sharjah Decrees, in 1981 
the Federal Government of the UAE declared an exclusive economic zone. The 
boundary of this zone, according to the declaration, should be determined "in 
accordance with the provisions of the agreements concluded by the Emirates 
members of the Union in connection with their continental shelf. If the Emirates 
members of the Union have not concluded such agreement, the outer limit of the 
economic zone of the United Arab Emirates shall extend to the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baseline." 27 
2
.i An English translation of these 1949 declarations may be found in the United Nations 
Legislative Series laws and Regulations on the High Seas, vol. 1, New York ( 1951 ), at pp. 23-9. 
25 For the text of the Amir of Sharjah Decree, see the Report of Trucial States Mediation, vol. 2, 
unpublished studies on the matter of Sharjah Territorial Sea and Continental shelf rights, at p. 36 
of the report. 
2
<' Article 4 referred to Article 12 of the 1958 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention to 
define the median line system. The text of the Supplementary Decree is reproduced in Al-
Baharna, H., The Arabian Gu(f States, 2nd ed, Librairie De Liban, Beirut ( 1975), at pp. 402.:.3. 
27 See the UN Office for Ocean Affairs· and the Law of the Sea, The law of the Sea, National 
Claims to Mari!ime Jurisdiction, New York ( 1992), Article 3, at p.135. 
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The UAE Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 
ln 1993 the Government of the UAE issued a comprehensive 'Federal Law in 
respect of the Delimitation of the Maritime Zones of the United Arab Emirates' .28 
As far as the delimitation of the UAE maritime boundary is concerned, Article 23 
of this Law distinguishes between the case of the territorial sea on one hand, and 
the case of the contiguous zone and the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zone on the other. For convenience we will adopt this distinction when 
examining the formula of Article 23. 
The Delimitation of the Territorial Sea Boundary 
Article 23( 1) reads: 
I. Where the territorial sea of the State is opposite or adjacent to the territorial sea of another 
State, the outer limit of the territorial sea of the State shall be the median line. 
The provisions of this paragraph differ from the formula in Article 15 of the 
1982 Convention. It will be recalled that Article 15 suggested for the delimitation 
of the territorial sea boundary three possible lines; namely, ( 1) a line resulting 
from agreement; (2) a line justified by historical title or other special 
circumstances; and (3) the median line system. Article 23(1) of the UAE Federal 
Law provides only one possible solution, that is, the median line. It does not 
address the concept of special circumstances, which is used as a ground to justify 
a departure from the median line. It follows that the UAE government has 
declined to accept any boundary line, for the territorial sea, other than the median 
line. The case of the Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb islands which lie at a distance 
of 15 and 20 nautical miles respectively from the Iranian coastline, could have 
been in the minds of the UAE legislature when the restriction-not to accept a 
territorial sea boundary line other than the median line system-was imposed in 
the Article in question. This being so, the provision of Article 23(1) could create 
two difficulties for the UAE Government. The first would face the Government 
211 An English translation of this 1993 Federal Law may be found in the UN Office of legal 
Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The law of the Sea Bulletin, No.25, 
New York. June (1994), at pp. 94-100. 
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when considering whether to ratify the LOS. At that stage it should give serious 
consideration to bringing this provision of its domestic legislation in to line with 
the rules of the Convention. The second difficulty would arise if and when Iran 
and UAE agreed to seek amicable settlement for the boundary between the two 
Tunbs and the Iranian coastline. Amicable settlement-as we shall see in Chapter 
Seven--may be reached, in the absence of agreement, by ref erring the issue to the 
World Court applying ex aequo et hono adjudication, or to a conciliation 
commission. In either instance. the outcome of such a form of third-party 
settlement may not be in harmony with the provision of Article 23(1) of the UAE 
Law. 
Delimitation of the Contiguous Zone, Continental Shelf and EEZ Boundaries 
Article 23(2) of the Federal Law reads: 
In the absence of an agreement between the State and another opposite or adjacent State, the 
outer limit of the contiguous zone and the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone 
shall be the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
baselines. 
The language in the first sentence of the paragraph takes on board the fact that 
the UAE has negotiated boundary agreements with Qatar and with Iran, in 
determining parts of the continental shelf boundary between the two countries. 
Further_ Article 23(2) is consistent with Article 24(3) of the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone Convention of 1958, and with some parts of Article 6 of the 
1958 Continental Shelf Convention. The difference between Article 23(2) of the 
UAE Law and Article 6 of the 1958 Convention is that the former does not 
address the concept of 'special circumstances' to be used as a ground to justify 
the departure from the median line. whereas the latter does. However, departure 
from the median line in Article 23(2) of the UAE Law is still possible by 
negotiated agreement between the UAE and a neighbouring state. Hence, unlike 
the formula of paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Federal Law, the UAE is, as a 
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matter of domestic law, in a position to accept a boundary line different from that 
of the median line system, where there is an agreement. 29 
B: Iranian Practice 
(a) The Iranian policy position at the UN Conferences on the Law oftlze Sea 
At the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1958, Iran accepted in 
principle the draft of Article 72 of the ILC final report on the continental shelf 
regime. This, however, did not hold Iran back from arguing for amendment to it 
'"to permit some measure of relaxation of the general rule followed in delimiting 
the boundary"
30 
in shallow seas such as the Arabian Gulr.3 1 
The Iranian proposal was that "where special circumstances so warrant, the 
median line shall be measured from the high-water mark along the coastline" of 
the States concerned.32 In order to clarify its objection to the use of the rule of the 
low-water line in the Gulf, the Iranian delegate went on to explain that: 
... when large bodies of water carrying sediment deposited it near the coast and formed 
extensive mud flats which were exposed at low-water ... it would be almost impossible to 
identify the low-water line by visual observation or by photography. 33 
It may well be, however, that the real reason for Iranian concern about the 
application of the low-water rule in the Gulf was the fact that "a median line 
drawn from low-water marks in the Persian Gulf would have been distorted to 
Iran's disadvantage since the waters on the Arab side are shallower than those on 
the Iranian side. " 34 As was seen in Chapter Three, the Iranian proposal was 
defeated, by a vote of 2 in favour and 33 against, with 21 abstentions.
35 
Iran 
consequently registered a reservation upon signature to Article 6 of the 1958 
C 
. 16 onvent10n. -
~9 Therefore, paragraph 2 of Article 23. in general, does not contradict the formula of Article 6 of 
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. 
30 MacDonald, C.J .. Iran. Saudi Arabia. and the law of the Sea, Greenwood Press, London 
( 1980), at p.179. 
·' 
1 Ibid., at p.178. 
3 ~ Docu. A/CONF-13/C.4/L.60, UNCLOS I q[ficial Records, vol. 6, at p.142. 
33 Ibid., at p.92. 
34 MacDonald, op. cit., n.30, at pp.179-80. 
35 UNCLOS I Official Records, vol. 6, at p.98. 
36 The Iranian reservation was that: "with respect to the phrase 'and unless another boundary line 
is justified by special circumstances' included in paragraphs I and 2 of this Article, the Iranian 
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On the question of the effect of islands in the delimitation process, Iran 
argued in favour of disregarding in delimitation any island situated beyond the 
territorial sea limit. In justifying this position Mr.Rouhani, a member of the 
Iranian delegation, remarked: 
the question that arose, however, was how to trace the median line in relation to islands. It was 
clear that, if they are to be taken into account, serious complications would arise and the benefit 
of having adopted the median rule would be lost by the difficulty of applying it. It was because 
such difficulties were always encountered that his delegation believed that the most convenient 
and most equitable solution was ... nol to permit islands· situated much .further olll than the 
territorial sea to have any i1?fl11enc.:e on the houndwy 
37 
The Iranian position on the effect of islands changed dramatically, however, 
at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. It supported the opposite 
direction to its earlier position in 1958.38 The new policy can be seen in the 
various statements of the Iranian delegates to the Conference. Mr. Mir-Mehdi, the 
Iranian representative, in a statement at the closing session of the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea in Montego Bay said that: 
islets situated in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas which potentially can sustain human 
habitation or an economic life of their own but which, owing to climatic conditions, resource 
restriction or other limitations, have not yet been put to full development, fall within the 
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 121, concerning the regime of islands, and therefore have 
full effect in the boundary delimitation of various maritime zones of the interested coastal 
39 
States. 
To sum up, Iranian policy regarding the influence of islands in the 
delimitation process developed in two stages. Initially, the Iranian position, as 
mentioned, was to suppo11 a complete denial of maritime zones for islands that 
lay beyond the territorial sea limit. This position found no significant support in 
the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. Article 12 of the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone Convention, as was mentioned above, provided a different 
approach: the presence of special circumstances could be used as a ground to 
Government accepts this phrase on the understanding that one method of determing the boundary 
line in special circumstances would be that of measurement from the high water mark." See 
A411/ii/a1eral Trealies Deposiled wilh !he Secrela1)1-General Assembly, UN, New York ( 1986), at 
pp. 695-6. 
37 Italic added, UNCLOS I Q[ficial Records, vol. 6, at p.96, para.2, see also para.69. And see 
Amin, S., H., "Law of the Continental shelf: The Gulf Example," 27 NILR ( 1980), at p.341. 
38 A possible explanation for the change in the Iranian position is given below. 
39 
UNCLOS Ill Official Records, vol.17, at p.106, para.73. A similar position was stressed early at 
the Ninth session by Mr. Farivar, the Iranian delegate, see Ibid., vol.14, at p.42, para.2. 
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justify the departure from the median line. Moreover, the early Iranian position 
finds no support in Iranian practice subsequent to the 1958 UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea.
40 
This was especially true in the Iranian agreements with Saudi 
Arabia of 1968, and with the UAE and Oman of 1974. In these agreements 
islands were taken into account, even though they lay in the median zone area. 
This resulted in an adjustment of the median line in each case.41 
Not unexpectedly, Iran espoused a different approach at the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. This shift in Iranian policy, calling for islands 
to be considered special circumstances, may have been because Iran wanted its 
policy position to coincide with its actual practice in the region. Furthermore, the 
development of the International Law of the Sea could not support a total denial 
of islands affecting the delimitatio·n just because they lay beyond the 12-nautical-
mile territorial sea limit.
42 
In addition, during the First UN Conference Iran had 
no de facto control over the disputed Islands. This was completely changed 
during the period of the Third UN Conference, when Iran controlled the Islands 
as a result of its invasion of them in 1971.
43 
Finally, and a direct result of that 
control, Iran was anxious to claim in a possible future delimitation a role for 
islands lying beyond the median line (e.g. Abu Musa island) or beyond its 
territorial sea limit (e.g. the two Tunbs islands). 
(b) Pre-existing Iranian agreement on maritime boundary delimitation 
The length of the Iranian coastline in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf 
is approximately 756 miles from Pakistan in the east to Iraq in the north-west. It 
is adjacent or opposite to eight different states; namely, Pakistan, Oman, the 
UAE. Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are ten international 
offshore boundaries, some of which, as we shall see, have been dealt with, while 
others are yet to be addressed. These boundaries in a counter-clockwise direction 
are: in the east, Iran's adjacent boundary with Pakistan, to the west an opposite 
''°A . . '"'7 '"'41 m111,op.c11.,11._, ,atp.-' . 
41 See below. 
42 For further discussion on the effect of islands in maritime boundary delimitation, see Chapter 
Six/Section Two. 
4> See below at Chapter Six/section One. 
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boundary with Oman and the UAE. In the Strait of Hormuz Iran again has a 
boundary with Oman. Proceeding to the west and north-west, the Iranian 
boundaries' network in the Arabian Gulf begin with the boundaries with the 
UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The series of Iranian maritime 
boundaries comes to an end with an adjacent boundary with Iraq in the north-west 
direction. From 1968 until 1974 Iran succeeded in concluding five international 
agreements with neighbouring states to determine pai1s of its continental shelf 
boundary. 
The first Iranian-Arab agreement was with Saudi Arabia.44 This resolved a 
long-standing territorial dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia concerning the 
sovereignty of the Al-Arabiyah and Farise islands.45 Both Islands are situated on 
the Saudi Arabian side of the median line. In April 1964 the two parties agreed to 
set up a joint committee of expe11s, and to submit to it their offshore boundary 
dispute. According to Amin, an Iranian scholar, the committee of experts' 
mandate was to recommend "an· equitable basis for resolving the dispute .... 
Accordingly, the two states initialled an offshore boundary agreement on 
December 13, 1965." 46 
The agreement allocated Al-Arabiyah island to Saudi Arabia and Farise island 
to Iran. In respect of the delimitation of the continental shelf between them, the 
agreed boundary line was a modified median line to take into account the 
presence of Farise, Al-Arabiyah and Kharg islands. The two contracting parties 
agreed to give Farise and Al-Arabiyah islands in the central sector full effect 
territorial sea limit, and to construct a local median line where the Islands' 
territorial sea limit would overlap.47 This has resulted in the adjusting of the 
boundary line between the two parties' mainlands to take an S-shape in the two 
.i.i For the text of the agreement, see !nte~national Maritime Boundaries, Charney and Alexander 
(eds.), Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993), at p.1520. 
"
5 Ibid., at p.1519. 
46 Amin, S.H., International and legal Problems of the Gulf, Middle East and North African 
Studies Press Limited, London ( 1981 ), at p. I 02. It is interesting to note that no reference was 
given by the author. 
.i? Article I of the agreement. The agreement is summarized in Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.26, at 
p.310. 
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Islands area. To the north they agreed to give the Iranian island of Kharg, 17 
nautical miles off the Iranian coastline, a half-effect continental shelf limits-the 
first time this method was utilised in the practice of continental shelf 
delimitation.
48 
In the Gulf the treatment of Kharg island remains the only case to 
date where an island has been given continental shelf effect. In the next chapter 
we will examine the method of al·locating half-effect in a more detailed form; in 
the present context it is sufficient to assert that the ""half-effect principle is a trade 
off between considering the island as part of the mainland (full-effect) or 
completely ignoring the island (no-effect)."
49 
The reason for this special 
treatment was probably ""because the general outlines of the mid-Gulf oil fields 
were known and concessions had been granted. "50 
The 1965 agreement, however, was never ratified because ""the Iranian 
concessionaire discovered a petroleum structure situated largely on the Saudi side 
of the boundary [line] determined by the agreement. " 51 An effort to solve the 
problem was made, and Saudi Arabia eventually agreed to revise the boundary 
line on the basis of ""an equitable division of the oil in place."52 The new line, as 
reproduced below, extends over 16 turning and terminal points for a distance of 
approximately 139 nautical miles. The difference between the 1965 line and the 
new line of 1968 is limited to the section that extends from point 8 to point 14. 
The new line between these two points runs in zigzag fashion to divide in an 
equitable manner the oil fields discovered in the area between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. 53 This revised part54 of the boundary line contributed to '"a substantial 
increase in Iran's share of estimated oil reserves. " 55 
.Hi Bowett, op. cit., n.10, at p.140. 
·•'> Limit in the Seas. Series No.24, July ( 1970), at p.7. 
50 El-Hakim, A., The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester ( 1979). at p.95. 
51 See Charney and Alexander. op. cit .. n. 44. at p.1520. See also Amin, op. cit., n. 46, at p. I 03; 
A I-Bahama. op. cit., n.26, at pp.351-3: Young, R., ''Equitable Solutions for Offshore Boundaries: 
The 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement," 64 A.f/L ( 1970), at p.154: Limit in the Seas, Series 
No.24. July ( 1970), at p.3. 
5
:! Young, Ibid .. at p.154. 
5
:; Ibid., at p.155. Ratifications of the 1968 agreement were exchanged on January 1969, "at 
which time the Agreement came into force." Limit in the Seas, Series No.24, July ( 1970), at p. I 
54 Which "gave only a slight net gain in seabed area to Iran." See Young, op. cit., n.23, at p.155. 
55 Ibid. See also Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n. 44, at p. 1522. 
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Figure: ( 18) Iran-Saudi Arabia boundary. 
Source: International Maritime 801111daries, at p.1525. 
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Following the conclusion of the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement in 1968, Iran 
moved to delimit its offshore boundary with Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and UAE. 56 In 
each agreement the contracting parties appear to have drawn a median line 
between the two opposite coastlines. In the Iran-Qatar continental shelf 
agreement of 1969, the boundary consists of a geodetic line connecting six points 
and extended for a distance of about 131 nautical miles.57 No island is situated 
midway between Qatar and Iran 58 that could require adjustment in the median 
line between them. 59 In a similar manner, the boundary line between Iran and 
Bahrain, which runs m a straight line for a distance of 28.28 nautical miles 
b !' . 60 etween iour pomts. 
In the Strait of Hormuz the boundary between Iran and Oman extends for a 
distance of 124.85 nautical miles. As seen from the map reproduced below, the 
location of the Iranian island of Larak 61 in this narrow area resulted in the 
shifting of the boundary line between points 9 and 10, towards Oman. This was in 
order that the boundary line be consistent with the 12 nautical miles arc drawn 
from Larak Island. 
The effect of the agreed boundary line on third states was shown in the 
Iranian continental shelf agreements with Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. In these 
agreements, at least one terminal point in the boundary line was not described in a 
precise way. This was because one of the contracting parties had an undefined 
boundary with a third state. For example, in the Iran-Qatar agreement point 1, the 
north-west terminal point, was not described in geographical co-ordinates. Rather 
it was referred to as "'the westernmost point on the westernmost part of the 
northern boundary line of the continental shelf appertaining to Qatar formed by a 
5
" For full discussion on the lran-UAE ag·reement, see Chapter Four. 
57 See Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.44, at p.1511. See also Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.26, at 
pp.353-4. 
511 This does not mean that there were no islands between the two mainlands, e.g., Qatar's island 
of Halul. However, the general tendency in Gulf States' practice is to disregard in delimitation 
islands situated far from the median line, but on the correct side of it. See below. 
59 See Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n. 44, at p. 1513. 
60 Ibid., at pp.1480-4. See also Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.26, at pp.354-5. 
'" Included in the Iranian system of a straight line. 
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line geodetic azimuth 278°14 '27" west from point 2 below. "62 The reason for this 
is that Qatar had no offshore boundary agreement with Bahrain. Hence it was 
impossible to select a tripoint between Qatar, Bahrain and Iran.63 A similar 
provision was agreed upon by Iran and Bahrain in respect of the eastern terminal 
point in their boundary line,
64 
and in the Oman-Iran agreement in regard to the 
two terminal points in the boundary line between them in the Strait of Hormuz.65 
156"E 54"E 157"E 
\ I 
- '-:~\' __ - - 'I 
~~ 
I I RAN 
27°N 
QESHM / __ ' I 
_/ 
-· ..-............ _ _.,,,./ 
Ptrsian Gulf 
r ---------------
Contint!nl•I Shrlf Bounduy 
IRAN-OMAN 






Ra\ al Khaymah: : 
/., ! //''----,; : i 
Nautic11 m11~, ~__...., 1 , 
--'.;..'~.;..-•".;.''".;..".;.."'''..;..'· __ ,. -'""-"'"'..;.."".;."'-"-· ---~._· -----!"'" -UNITED AR1AB I 
.• _;.: EMIRATES \ 
20 40 
0 man 
Figure: (19) Iran-Oman boundary. 
Source: International Maritime Boundarie.\", at p.1507. 
6 , . f h - Article I o t e agreement. 
6
:; This is in contrast with point 6 which is the southern terminal point of the Qatar-Iran boundary 
line. The geographical co-ordinate of this point is consistent with the position of the Qatar-Abu-
Dhabi (UAE) boundary line terminal point as constructed in the two parties' agreements of 1969. 
Point 6 therefore, is an equidistance tripoint between Qatar, Iran and UAE. See Chapter Four for 
more details on this agreement. 
64 
Where a tri-junction point with Qatar needs to be designated. 
65 
Where two tri-junction points with the UAE need to be designated. 
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Such an easy, straightforward solution, to avoid the involvement of a third 
state in the delimitation by preserving its actual or potential claim, is not an 
unusual in state practice. For example, in the Greece-Italy continental shelf 
agreement of 1977, the two parties agreed to stop the boundary line before 
reaching a possible tri-junction point between them and third states in the region. 
Article 1 paragraph 3 declares that: 
The Contracting Parties have agreed that for the moment such delimitation shall not extend 
northward beyond point I or southward beyond point 16. This delimitation shall subsequently 
extend in both directions to the points of intersection with the zones of the continental shelf 
belonging to the respective neighbouring countries. 66 
Ending the boundary line before the area where a third state may have a claim 
as a technique to avoid its involvement at the time of constructing the boundary 
line was adhered to by the World Court in the Libya v. Malta Case of 1985. In 
this case Italy, the third state, informed the Court that it had an interest in part of 
the delimitation area between Libya and Malta that could be affected by the Court 
judgement. Thus it requested permission from the Court to intervene in 
accordance with Article 62 of the ICJ Statue.67 The Court rejected the Italian 
request, 68 but emphasized the need to take into account the legal interests of 
Italy .69 To do so, the Court decided to limit the scope of the delimitation area to 
that where the Italian claims would not be affected. 70 
The negative result of stopping the boundary line before reaching an area 
where a third state may have interest is that it does not provide a complete 
solution to the boundary question between the two contracting parties. As we 
66 For the text of the agreement, see Charney and Alexander, op. cit., n.44, at p.1599. For further 
examples. see Colson, D., "The Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements," International 
Maritime Boundaries, Charney and Alexander (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the 
Netherlands ( 1993), at pp.62-3. 
67 For further reading on the scope of Article 62, see Greig, D.W., "Third Party Rights and 
Intervention Before the International Court, 32 V.JJL ( 1991-92), at pp.287-376; Rosenne, S., 
Intervention in the International Court of Justice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands 
( 1993). 
<>R Mainly "because both disputing parties opposed it." See Degan, V. D., "Equitable Principles in 
Maritime Delimitations," International Law at the Time of its Codification, Essay in Honour of 
Roberto Ago, vol. 2, Milano-Dott.A. Giuffre Editore ( 1987), at p.121. 
<•
9 Application by lta~v for Permission to lnte1fere in Libya v. Malta Continental Shelf Case, at 
para.41 ; see also para. 4 7. 
70 
Libya v. Malta Case, at para.21. See also Chapter Three for more discussion on the interest of a 
third state as relevant circumstances, and the reaction of Professor Weil to the Court decision. 
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shall elaborate at a later stage, the parties involved need in the future to enter into 
a new round of negotiations in order to close the gaps left as a consequence. 
(c) Iranian Maritime Legislation 
In general terms it can be said there have been five Iranian Acts with respect 
to offshore zones.
71 
The earliest was the Act of 19 July 1934 concerning the 
breadth of territorial waters and the zone of supervision. It did not address the 
question of delimitation. 72 On 19 June 1955 the Iranian Cabinet adopted an Act 
concerning the sovereignty of Iran over the continental shelf area. 73 Article 3 
addresses the case where a dispute arises over the limits of Iran's continental 
shelf area. In such a case the dispute was said to be ''settled in conformity with 
the rule of equity."74 The Iranian Act went on to stress that the Iranian 
government would "take the necessary steps for the settlement of any [continental 
shelf] disputes through diplomatic channels."75 
The Act of 1934 was amended by the Act of 2 April 1959.76 This amendment 
extended the breadth of the Iranian territorial sea to 12 nautical miles. In so far as 
delimitation is concerned, the amended Act provides for the median line system 
to be used, in the absence of agreement, as the boundary line between the Iranian 
coast and these of other neighbouring states. 
On 30 October 1973 the Iranian Cabinet proclaimed an exclusive fishing 
zone. The outer limit of this zone, according to the proclamation, should 
correspond to the outer limit of the continental shelf boundary as specified in the 
agreement concluded between Iran and neighbouring states. However, where 
there were no agreements to determine the boundary of the Iranian Continental 
71 In addition, Iran issued a Decree on 21 July 1973 to establish a baseline. For the text of the 
Decree, see the Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea, Baseline: 
National Legislation with Illustrative Maps, UN, New York ( 1989), at p.194. 
72 An English translation of this 1934 Act may be found in the UN Legislative Series, Laws and 
Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas ( 1951 ), at p.81. 
7
> An English translation of Articles 1 and 2 of the 1955 Law may be found in the UN Office for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea, National Legislation on the 
Continental Shelf, New York ( 1989), at p.134. 
7
.i See MacDonald, op. cit., n.30, at p.125. 
75 Article 3 of the of the 1955 Law was reproduced in Ibid., at p.125. 
7
'' An English translation of this 1959 Law may be found in the UN Legislative Series, National 
Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, New York (1974), at pp. I 0-1. 
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The Iranian Marine Law of 1993 
On 2 May 1993, the Iranian cabinet enacted an "Act on the Marine Areas of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran'. 78 Articles 4 and 19 of this Act are relevant to the 
present discussion. Article 4 reads: 
Wherever the territorial sea of Iran overlaps the territorial seas of the States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts, the dividing line between the territorial seas of Iran and those States shall be, 
unless otherwise agreed between the two parties, the median line ... 
Article 19 reads: 
The limits of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, unless otherwise determined in accordance with bilateral agreements, shall be a line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest point on the baselines of two states. 
Articles 4 and 19 stress the fact that Iran is willing to negotiate an appropriate 
boundary line with neighbouring states. The formula in these two articles, though 
they contain some differences in language, coincide in practice, viz., in the 
absence of an agreement between Iran and one of its neighbouring states, the 
boundary line between the two countries is the median or the equidistance line. 
To sum up, the influence of the Truman Proclamation of 1945 and other Gulf 
States' Declarations of 1949 was manifested in the Iranian legislation, as far as 
the question of continental shelf boundary delimitation is concerned, in the 
adoption of the rules of equity in Article 3 of the Act of 1955. This, like other 
Gulf States' continental shelves, leaves the Iranian continental shelf without a 
clear boundary in cases where no agreement has been concluded. In addition, by 
referring to the rules of equity for the delimitation of the continental shelf Iran 
has indicated the lack of a preference for the equidistance line enunciated in the 
I LC report of 1953. Indeed, at the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of 
1958. Iran, as noted, registered a reservation to Article 6 of the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958. This however was changed.79 
77 An English translation of this 1973 proclamation may be found in the UN Legislative Series, 
National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, New York ( 1976), at pp.334-5. 
78 An English translation of this 1993 Marine Law may be found in the US Department of State, 
Limits in the Seas, Series No. 114. 
79 Like its position regarding the effect of islands in continental shelf delimitation. 
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Article 19 of the 1993 Marine Law provided, unless otherwise agreed, the 
equidistance line for the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ 
boundaries. 
The compatibility and the contrasts between the practices of the two states 
Although Iran and the United Arab Emirates are not parties to the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention, the tendency to follow the formula of Article 6 is 
shown in their agreements. 80 The equidistance line, as seen above, was the 
starting point in almost all of the. delimitation agreements. 81 Where an island is 
close to the median line zone, the island's full effect territorial sea limit has been 
preserved. This, as in the case of the Sirri and Larak islands, has resulted in the 
creation of an arc in the boundary line. But where an island is situated far from 
the median line--though on the correct side of the line--it has been ignored in 
the delimitation, and a straight line drawn. The case of the Qatar island of Halul 
may serve as an example. Situated about 28 nautical miles from the median line, 
it was disregarded in the delimitation between Iran and Qatar in respect of the 
continental shelf boundary. 82 
In addition to the presence of islands, the equidistance line has been modified 
in Iranian and UAE agreements so as to define an oil field situated close to the 
equdistance line. 83 In the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement, for example, the 
boundary line (between points 8 and 14) was modified to give each party an equal 
share of the Marjan-Feyerdoon oil field. 84 Similarly in the Qatar-UAE (Abu-
Dhabi) agreement of 1969, as was seen in Chapter Four, the two contracting 
parties selected a point (point B) independently of any consideration of the 
xo The same is true in respect of other Gulf States' practice. 
xi Young, op. cit .. n. 23, at p.233; Amin, op. cit., n.37, at p345; Alexander, L.M., "Persian Gulf 
Maritime Boundaries," International Maritime Boundaries, Charney and Alexander (eds.), 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993), at p.315; El-Hakim, op. cit., n.50, at pp.130-
1; MacDonald, op. cit., n.30, at p.140; Gault, l.T., "Offshore Boundary delimitation in the 
Arabian/Persian Gulf," Ocean BoundmJJ Making, Douglas M. Johhson and Phillip M. Saunders 
(eds.), Croom Helm, New York ( 1988), at pp.221-2. 
82 y . 2"" 2""3 oung. op. cit., n. _,,at p. -' . 
83 Amin, op. cit., n. 37, at p.346; Young, op. cit., n. 23, at pp.233-4. 
84 See above at p.23 l. 
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equidistance principle, so as to coincide with the location of the al-Bunduq oil 
field. 
The similarity of the pre-existing agreements of the two parties is reflected in 
some part in their recent maritime legislations. As far as the continental shelf and 
the EEZ boundary delimitation are concerned, both have adopted in principle the 
median line rule. This, however, would not prevent either of them from entering 
into a bilateral agreement which employed a different method. Such a provision, 
as mentioned earlier, is similar in effect to the single rule of equidistance/special 
circumstances. Article 4 of the Iranian Act of 1993 adopted a similar provision in 
respect of the delimitation of the Iranian territorial sea boundary. 
However, the issue of territorial sea delimitation was addressed differently in 
Article 23(1) of the UAE Law of 1993. This, as we have seen, did not provide the 
UAE government with an escape clause: "unless otherwise agreed between the 
two parties", to justify a departure from the median line. It follows that the UAE 
is under a domestic legal obligation not to agree to anything other than the 
median line. This limitation may be the source of some difficulty85 were the UAE 
and Iran to seek a amicable settlement86-that not necessary to be consistent with 
the provision of Article 23(1) of the UAE Law-for the territorial sea boundary 
between the UAE's islands of Tunb87 and the Iranian island of Qeshm. 
With the exception of this difficulty, which is limited as far as the UAE-Iran 
boundary is concerned to the Tunb islands' territorial sea boundary, Iran and the 
UAE's pre-existing offshore agreements, their policy position at UNCLOS III, 
and their latest maritime laws, present no problems that might impede the 
finalizing of the continental shelf ~oundary between them. 
In summary, the delimitation areas between Iran and the UAE in both the Gulf 
of Oman and the Abu-Dhabi sectors are free from any unusual geographical 
circumstance and from disputes over the sovereignty islands situated between 
85 
For further discussion. see above. 
86 
For further discussion on the method of amicable settlement and objective justice, see Chapter 
Seven. 
87 
As when Iran agreed to withdraw its forces from the occupied Islands and let the UAE re-
exercise its sovereignty over the Islands. See Chapter Six for further examination on the effect of 
these Islands upon the two states' offshore boundaries. 
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them. As regards their respective legal policies there is, as suggested, a degree of 
consistency. On this bases, it is possible to assert that the boundary between Iran 
and the UAE in both the Gulf of Oman and the Abu-Dhabi sectors poses no 
particular geographical or legal difficulties that would complicate or preclude the 
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between them. This is in contrast to 
the situation in the Islands' sector. In the next chapter the UAE-Iran maritime 
boundary in that area will be discussed in greater detail. Furthermore, in Chapter 
Seven, an attempt will be made to recommend the use of certain mechanisms 
which would help to facilitate a solution to the dispute between the two states 
over the Island's sovereignty. In the remaining part of this chapter we shall 
investigate a possible boundary line between Iran and UAE in the Gulf of Oman 
and the Abu-Dhabi-Iran sectors. 
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Section Two 
A possible boundary line between the two parties in the 
Gulf of Oman Sector and the Abu-Dhabi-Iran Sector 
(1) Gulf of Oman sector 
The delimitation area between Iran and UAE in the Gulf of Oman, as seen in 
the earlier geographical description, is free from any unusual features that may 
complicate the delimitation between them. The median line system bisecting the 
area is an equitable boundary line. Support for the use of the median line in such 
a circumstance is mirrored in state practice, including that of the UAE and Iran. 
Fortunately, as mentioned above, the international case law confirms the 
postulation of the median line as leading primafacie to an equitable result. 88 
There is, however, a difficulty which will face Iran and UAE in determining 
the two terminal points of this median line; the lack of agreement between Oman 
and the UAE over their adjacent offshore boundaries. Oman and UAE, as seen in 
the map reproduced below, have an adjacent boundary in three different areas: 
one in the Arabian Gulf and two in the Gulf of Oman. A straightforward solution 
would be to follow the practice of other Gulf states in dealing with such an issue. 
The Iran-Oman agreement of 1974 may provide a practical solution for the 
uncertainty of the location of two tri-section points. Iran and Oman in their 
agreement of 1974 managed to solve the matter of determining the location of the 
two terminal points of their agreed boundary line: 
Point (I) is the most western point which is the intersection of the geodetic line drawn between 
point (0) having the co-ordinates of 55°42' I 5" E 26°14' 45" N and point (2) having the co-
ordinates of 55°47'45" E 26°16'35" N with the lateral offshore boundary line between Oman 
and Ras Al-Khaimah. 89 
Adopting such a technique would help Iran and the UAE to work out the only 
obstacle which appears to prevent them from addressing the delimitation question 
118 See Chapter Three/Section One. 
89 Similar language was used in respect of a point (22), the second terminal point in the boundary 
line. 
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in the Gulf of Oman area. On the other hand this suggested treatment, as 
mentioned earlier, would result in two gaps needing to be addressed in the future. 
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A possible trisection point between Iran-Oman-UAE. 
2 A possible median line between Iran and UAE. 
3 A possible equdistance line between Oman and UAE. 
Figure: (20) lran-UAE boundary in the Gulf of Oman 
sector and the interest of Oman as a third state. 
Source: The Author. 
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An example of such an instance is the boundary between Poland, Sweden and 
the former USSR inter se. In 1985, Poland and the former USSR concluded an 
agreement to determine the offshore boundary between them. The boundary line 
was ended about 3 nautical miles short of a possible former USSR-Poland-
Sweden tri-junction point.90 Sweden and the former USSR in 1988 signed an 
agreement to define the maritime boundary between them. In a manner similar to 
the first agreement, the boundary line here also stopped before the possible 
location of a tri-point with Poland.91 One year later Poland reached an agreement 
with Sweden on the maritime boundary between their respective coastlines. Due 
to the lack of agreement on the location of the tri-point, no precise terminal point 
was laid down for the boundary between them.92 
In order to close the gap between the three boundaries, Poland, Sweden and 
the former USSR had to enter into a further round of negotiations. On 30 June 
1989 the three states reached an agreement to eliminate the gap between them by 
selecting a tri-junction point between their respective boundaries.93 
An alternative solution to ending the boundary line short of the tri-junction 
point would be for Iran and UAE to invite Oman into tri-lateral negotiations. 
Such a suggestion would end the boundary question, and would save the need to 
re-enter into future negotiations. There have been a number of examples in state 
practice where a tri-lateral negotiation has been resorted to and where agreement 
has been reached. The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand agreement of 1971 may be 
cited as an example. In this instance, the three contracting parties defined the tri-
junction point between their maritime boundaries. They then closed the gaps 
between the tri-junction point and the boundary between: ( 1) Indonesia and 
Malaysia:(2) Indonesia and Thailand, as defined at an earlier stage in a bilateral 
agreement.94 Finally, they drew the boundary between Malaysia and Thailand.95 
90 Article 2 of the agreement. For the text of the agreement, see Charney and Alexander, op. cit., 
n. 44, at p. 2056. 
91 Ibid .. at p. 2063. 
92 Article 2 of the agreement; see Ibid., at p. 2086. 
93 Ib"d 110"' 4 1 ., at PP·- _,_ . 
94 For the text of the Indonesia and Thailand agreement of 1971, see Ibid., at pp. 1462-3; For the 
text of the Indonesia and Malaysia agreement of 1969, see Ibid., at p. l 025. 
95 Article I paras. 1-4 of the 1971 tri-lateral agreement. see Ibid., at pp.1452-3. 
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(2) Abu-Dhabi-Iran sector 
The Abu-Dhabi-Iran sector is regarded as an area where an agreement needs 
to be reached to determine the co~1tinental shelf boundary between the UAE and 
Iran in this sector. This understanding is widely reflected in the majority of legal 
texts dealing with maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf, 96 mostly because 
no existing text of a treaty has ever been released to the public. However, there is 
some indication to suggest that Abu-Dhabi prior to the federation appears to have 
reached some understanding with Iran over the continental shelf boundary 
between them. For example, the London journal Arab Report and Record 
reported in September 1971 the announcement of the Abu-Dhabi Oil and Industry 
Minister that "Abu-Dhabi and Iran had initialled an agreement demarcating the 
continental shelf dividing their territories beneath the waters of the Gulf. "97 This 
announcement was picketed up by Amin, an Iranian scholar, who suggested that 
the agreement was initialled in 1971 and ratified by Iran on 14 May 1972. The 
boundary line in the agreement is said to be a median line constructed from the 
two parties' mainlands. No effect was apparently given to islands situated 
between the two coastlines.98 However, the most detailed information about the 
boundary line in the said agreement is that produced by Bundy in his ai1icle 
"Maritime Delimitation in the Gulf'. He wrote that: 
the agreement is cast in the same terms as the Iran-Qatar and Iran-Bahrain agreements. Point I 
of the boundary line in the west coincides with the end-points of the Iran/Qatar and Qatar/ Abu-
Dhabi boundaries, and point 6 in the east is defined as coinciding with the intersection of the 
lateral boundary between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. Otherwise, the line is basically a median line, 
and was referred to as such during the proceedings before The Hague Tribunal. 99 
% See. for example, El-Hakim, op. cit., n.50; also Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.26; Al-Awadi, B., 
General Principles of International Law of the Sea and Its Applicability in the Arabian Gulf, 
University Press. Kuwait ( 1988). 
97 Arah Report & Record, 1-15 September (1971), at p.470. In an interview with the Legal 
Adviser of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was confirmed to the present writer that the 
Abu-Dhabi-Iran agreement, concluded in 1973, was yet to be ratified by the UAE government. 
No reason was indicated for the UAE's delay in ratification. 
98 Amin. op. cit., n.46, at p.134. See also Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, "Iran's Maritime Boundaries in 
the Persian Gulf," The Boundaries of Modern Iran, Keith Mclaclan (ed.), University of London, 
UCL Press, London (1994), at p.101; Gault, op. cit., n.81, at p.216. 
99 Bundy, R R., "Maritime Delimitation in the Gulf," Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, 
Richard Schofield (ed.), University of London, UCL Press, London ( 1994), at p.182. In order to 
discover further information on this agreement, the writer made several attempts to contact the 
Embassy of Iran in London, as well as some UAE Officials. Unfortunately, he was told that they 
had nothing to release on the said agreement. On 25 July 1995 the author contacted Mr. Bundy to 
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Any analysis must be speculative since no text has ever been made public. 
This is, however, not a unique incidence in state practice. 100 Assuming the 
existence of this agreement, the application of Article 102(2) of the United 
Nations Charter arises for consideration. This prevents a state which is party to an 
unregistered treaty from invoking it before any organ of the United Nations. 101 
The delimitation area between Iran and the UAE in Abu-Dhabi sector extends 
approximately 62 nautical miles from the Iran-Qatar-UAE tri-point, having the 
co-ordinates of 53°02'05" E 25°31 '50" N to point 1 on the Iran-UAE boundary 
line agreed upon in 1974. In the delimitation area, there is no island that would 
disturb the construction of a straight median line connecting the tri-point with 
point 1 in the Iran-UAE continental shelf boundary line. There is, however, an oil 
field straddling the median line between them in this sector. The two parties 
appear to have an understanding over the rights of exploiting the field. According 
to Bundy "'there were periodic meetings between the parties to exchange technical 
information relating to the field." 102 The part of the field exploited by Iran is 
known as the Sassan oil field, whereas that part exploited by the UAE is known 
as the Abu al Bu Khoosh oil field. To prevent the capture problem, ' 03 Iran and 
UAE could follow the pre-existing Iranian-Arab agreements providing that: 
Each Party agrees that no oil drilling operations shall be conducted by or under its authority. 
within a zone extending five hundred (500) 104 meters in which in the submarine area on its side 
of the Boundary Line ... 105 
ask for a copy of the agreement. In his letter of 28 July 1995 Mr. Bundy confirmed that he seen a 
copy "during the course of a commercial arbitration before the Iran-US claim Tribunal," but did 
not have a copy of the text. 
10° For example. the UAE-Saudi Arabia agreement of 1974; not until 1994 was the agreement 
released by one party. For further discussion, see Chapter Four. 
101 But it can be invoked before ad hoc arbitration tribunal. See the remark of the Tribunal in the 
Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Award, 42 /LR, at p. 83, para. 78. For further reading on the question of 
the failure to comply with the obligation to register an agreement, see Brownlie, I., Principle of 
Puhlic International law, 4th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford ( 1990), at pp.612-3. See also the 
Qatar v. Bahrain Case(/994), at para. 29. 
102 Bundy, op. cit., n. 99, at p.183. See also Amin, op. cit., n. 46, at p. 134. 
103 For further discussion on this problem, see Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.26, at pp. 298-300. 
io.i In some agreements the distance was just 125 metres. See Article 2 of other Iranian 
agreements with Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Oman. 
105 Article 4 of the Iran-Saudi Arabia agr~ement. 
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Iran and UAE, in addition, could enter into technical arrangements to 
facilitate the determination of the geographical location offshore in the Sassan 
and Abu al Bu Khoosh areas. 
To sum up, the Abu-Dhabi and Gulf of Oman sectors, as two potential 
delimitation areas in UAE-Iran offshore boundary, represent an ideal and simple 
area where a delimitation could easily be reached, and where there is no 
advantage in seeking a solution through a third-party settlement procedure. 
However, the desire to reach a package-deal settlement for the entire area of the 
Iran-UAE network of maritime boundary delimitations, especially in the disputed 
Islands' sectors, may question the wisdom of concluding a separate agreement in 
respect of each sector. This may be one of the reasons holding the UAE 
government back from ratifying its 1974 agreement with Iran in respect of 
determining part of the continental shelf boundary between them. Because the 
flexibility and the degree of compromise is much greater where the package-deal 
technique is to be used-and thus the delimitation area to extend over 214 




::······:·:·:·:·=:::::::::::::::~:~:~:~:~:~:}::;:;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ..... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:~::::::::::-:::::::::·:·:·:·:·:·:::·:·:·:·:·;·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·· 
The effect of certain Islands upon the 
lranian-UAE's boundary 
We have seen in the previous chapter that there are three gaps in the United 
Arab Emirates-Iran maritime boundary; the areas in the Gulf of Oman sector, the 
Abu-Dhabi sector and the Islands sector. The first two have been dealt with in 
Chapter Five. As illustrated in the previous chapter, no serious difficulties exist 
that would prevent the two countries from addressing these un-delimited 
boundaries. This is in contrast with the situation in the Islands sector. It has been 
submitted in the previous chapter that the long-standing dispute between the UAE 
and Iran over the sovereignty of certain Islands in the Gulf, namely, Abu Musa, 
and the Greater and Little Tunbs islands, has been the primary obstacle to the 
finalizing of the boundaries between them in this sector. The continuing dispute, 
moreover, has affected 1 the good relations between the parties involved2 and, in 
the last few years, has given rise to a war of words between Iran on one hand, and 
a number of Arab countries supporting the UAE position on the other.3 
This chapter is devoted to examining what possible effect these Islands may 
have on the U AE-Iran offshore boundary, and whether that effect would, standing 
alone, justify the continuing dispute over their ownership. Our treatment of the 
issue is somewhat different, as we shall see, from the approach adopted in the 
1 The Gulf Corporation Council Secretary General in a statement on the three Islands. See Al-
Kalij·, UAE daily newspaper, 20 October (l 992), at p.14; Al-lttihad, UAE daily newspaper, 3 
September ( 1992), at p. l. See also Al-wast, weekly magazine published in London in 27 June 
1994 interviewing the UAE's Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs. 
2 Due to the domestic and regional considerations that existed in the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
UAE government did not consider it wise to sever relations with Iran. Relationships between the 
two countries were conducted at all levels. Al-Alkim, in The Foreign Policy of the UAE, recorded 
the ups and downs in relations between the two sides during the last two decades; see Al-Alkim, 
H., The Foreign Policy of the UAE, Saqi Books, London (l 989), at pp.145-68. 
3 Al-Kali}, 13 September (l 992), at p. l; Al-lttihad, l 5 September (l 992), at p. l; Al-lttihad, l 
October ( 1992), at p. l. 
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case law in dealing with a boundary dispute.4 The justification for this is that in 
the U AE-Iran case no boundary dispute as such exists between the two parties. 
Their dispute is territorial. 5 This could explain the absence of any boundary line 
proposed by one party, and rejected by the other. 6 What is at stake between them 
is the claim of one party to have sovereignty over certain Islands in the Gulf set 
against a counter claim from the other party. This disagreement over the 
ownership of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs has hitherto never extended to the 
question of the maritime boundary delimitation between the two mainland coasts. 
It is not the aim of this work to examine in details the sovereignty over the 
Islands in question. 
This being so, there is some concern among scholars that the effect of these 
Islands on the two sides' boundaries is one of the principal motives behind the 
dispute over their ownership.7 An attempt to examine the reality of this concern 
will be conducted in the present chapter. State practice and international decisions 
will be examined to identify the likely effects that the three Islands may have on 
Iran's and the UAE's boundaries where the case between them is to be referred to 
international adjudication. If the conclusion is that the Islands have a considerable 
4 
See, for example, Geoffrey Marston, who explains the approach taken in the France/Canada 
Award of 1992, Marston, G., "St Pierre-Miquelon Arbitration," 17 Marine Policy ( l 993);at pp. 
160-3 Charney, J.I., "Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law," 88 AJIL 
( 1994 ), at p.234. 
5 For a distinction between boundary dispute and a territorial dispute, see Chapter Two. 
6 Dispute has been defined as "a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law or policy 
in which a claim or asse11ion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or denial by 
another." See Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement, 2nd ed, Grotius Publications Ltd, 
Cambridge ( 1993), at p. l. See also the definition of the PCIJ in Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions Case (1924), of the term 'Dispute'. See PCIJ Reports Series A-N°2, at p. l l; 
Jennings, R., "Reflections on the Term 'Dispute'," Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, Macdonald 
J. (ed.), Marti nus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands ( 1994), at p.402; Higgins, R., 
Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1994), 
at pp.195-7; Shaw, M., International Law, 3rd ed, Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge 
( 199 I), at pp.629-32; Gordon, E., "Legal Disputes Under Article 36(2) of the Statute," The 
International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, Damrosch L.F. (ed.), Transnational Publishers 
Inc., New York (I 987), at pp. I 98-202. 
7 Al-Bdwly Abd, Judge at the Federal High Court of the UAE, Islands in the Arabian Gulf and 
the Legality of the Acquisition of Territo!)' by Force, A dissertation for a Master's degree in 
public law, submitted at Mohammed Al-Kammes University, Morocco, and reprinted by Ras al-
Khaimah Archive and Study Centre, Research Book Series, No. 9 ( 1992), at pp.348-53. See also 
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Arabian Department's Memorandum on the 




effect, it would be of interest to investigate the possibility of any form of 
settlement whereby the effect of these Islands could be minimized and the general 
interest of the two parties maintained. 
Hence, the present chapter rather than seeking to propose a solution for the 
sovereignty dispute identifies one of the important reasons behind it. This is, of 
course, different from the task which international adjudication may be charged 
with when dealing with a boundary dispute. Such a difference justifies the 
separate approach that will be used below. This chapter has been divided into 
three sections: ( 1) definition of the dispute between the two states; (2) islands in 
maritime boundary delimitation; (3) the effect of the three disputed islands upon a 
possible boundary line between Iran and the UAE. In Chapter Seven we shall 
examine certain methods of peaceful settlement that may help to furnish a 
solution for the sovereignty dispute. In the conclusion of the next chapter an 
attempt will be made to suggest a possible solution for the knock-on effect of 
Abu Musa, Greater and Little Tunbs islands upon the UAE-Iran boundary line. 
Section One 
Definition of the dispute 
The area of maritime boundary with which this chapter is concerned 
(hereafter termed the "disputed area") forms part of the maritime boundary of 
Iran and the United Arab Emirates in the Arabian Gulf. The disputed area, which 
is illustrated on the map below, may be described by reference to four points 
(ABCD). 
Point A is situated on the south coast of Hengaum island on the Iranian 
coastline, whose geographical co-ordinates are: latitude 26° 36' 40" N. and 
longitude 55° 51' 50"E. Point B is situated in the Sha'am area, on the UAE's 
coastline, whose geographical co-ordinates are: latitude 26° 03' 00" N. and 
longitude 56° 06' OO"E. Point C is situated on the north-east of the Ras Ghantut 
area, on the UAE's coastline, whose geographical co-ordinates are: latitude 24° 
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49' 00" N. and longitude 54° 48' OO"E. Point D is situated at Ras-o-Shenas,
8 
on 
the Iranian coastline, whose geographical co-ordinates are: latitude 26° 29' 35" N. 
and longitude 54 ° 4 7' 20"E. 
c::) ~'"' 
nn~ Gh:-1111111 
A. f..ltlllMl/11( _. _ 
1 
r I 




rolnls /\nCll nrn lhn hnun<l:>•y nl U1n rll<prrlrrl n•rn 
lr:in shnlglil hnsrllnM 
lr:>n nml UAr: t:> 111.l lrrrllnrl:>I ~"" llmll 
Ucr.l!Jnnlnd 1 rnlllc ltouln lnwnrrl• lhn 01111 
On~l9•1nlor1 l 1nlllc nn11tn townrd• lhn Slrnll ol I lo1111m 
1 ltf" mrcl111n llnn -:y~lr.m hrlwr."n lltn lJAF: nnd l1nn r:o11r;ltuc1rct 
wllhnul tl!l"rf'ncn In lhn lr;l:uuf"t 
Figure: (21) The disputed area between Iran and the UAE 
in the Islands sector. 
Source: The Author. 
8 The area is spelt Ra's osh Sheyas in the Admiralty Chart No. 2887. The form which we will use, 
however, is the one used in the Iranian Decree-Law of 21 July 1973. An English translation of 
this Decree-Law may be found in the UN, The Law of the Sea, Baselines: National Legislation 
With !llustrative Maps ( 1989), at pp.194-6. 
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The continental shelf of this area, indeed of the Arabian Gulf area in general, 
is characterized by the essential continuity of its geological structure, and by the 
shallowness of its water which gradually becomes deeper near the Persian side of 
the Gulf.9 The coastlines of the two parties are clearly classifiable as opposite 
coasts. The U AE' s coastline in the disputed area, measured from north-east of the 
Sha' am to the Ras Ghan tut area, is 100 nautical miles. The length of the Iranian 
coastline in the disputed area, measured from Ras-o-Shenas 10 to the south coast of 
Hengaum island, is 58.3 nautical miles. The ratio between the two coastlines is 
1. 71 to 1. 
Geographic description of the disputed territory 
Abu Musa island lies about 32.40 nautical miles off the UAE coast in Umm 
al-Quwain, and about 38 nautical miles off the Iranian coast in Ras-o-Shenas. 11 12 
The Island is situated on the UAE side of the median line, about 1 nautical mile 
inside it. As can be seen from the admiralty chart reproduced below, Abu Musa is 
approximately 4 square miles in size. Its permanent population of about 800 is of 
UAE nationality, nearly all of them engaged in fishing. 13 The Island is connected 
to the UAE mainland by a regular ferry service. 
Little Tunb (or Tunb Assughra) is a small, barren, uninhabited and waterless 
island, approximately 1 mile long and 3/4 mile wide. 14 It lies about 8 nautical 
miles to the west of Greater Tunb, about 44 nautical miles from the U AE 
9 "The area of20 metres or Jess in depth closely follows the coast of the UAE to Abu-Dhabi city." 
See Mitchell, K., ''The Persian Gulf," Persian Gulf States: A General Survey, Alvin J. Cottrell 
(ed.), The John Hopkins, University Press, London ( 1980), at p.541; Amin, S. H., International 
and legal Problems of the Gulf, Middle East and North African Studies Press Limited, London 
( 1981 ), at p. 9; El-Hakim, A., The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester ( 1979), at p. 66. 
10 
See note 8. 
11 
See note 8. 
12 The Court of Arbitration in the Dubai/Shwjah Award found the distance from the Iranian 
coastline to Abu Musa island to be 43 nautical miles. However, an alternative possible calculation 
based on Admiralty Chart No. 2887 scale 1,350 000 suggests that the distance from the nearest 
point on the Iranian coast to the Abu Musa coastline is only about 38 nautical miles. See 
Dubai/Sharjah Award, at p.663 and p.668. 
13 Jn addition, the island has about 700 Arab workers. See Al-Bdwly, op. cit., n.7, at p.164. See 
also Sharjah's argument at Dubai/Shwjah Award, at p.668. 
14 "After rain the island is covered with brilliant green vegetation." Persian Gulf Pilot, published 
by Hydrographer of the Nave, 12th ed (1982), at p.94. 
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coastline al Umm al-Quwa111, and 20 nautical miles off the Iranian coastline at 
Ra 's Daskakah on Qeshrn islanci .1' 
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1 ~ Ibid See also Young. Y. ··The Persian Gulf," l\ew Direction m 1he La11 of the Sea. vol 3, 
publlsht!d by The Bnush I nsu1u1c of I nternauonal and Comparative La\\. vol.I, Oceana 
Publicauons Inc., Dobbs Ferr) . NC\\ York (1973), at p.231, Al-Bdwly, op cu. n.7. at p.165 
252 
Chapter Sb: 
Greater Tunb ( or Tunb Alkubra) island lies about 40 nautical miles from the 
UAE coastline at al-Jazirah al-Hamrah and 15 nautical miles from the lranian 
coastline at Ra's Daskakah on Qeshm island. ft is situated 15 nautical miles to the 
north north-east of Abu Musa island. The Island, as seen below. is roughly 
circular in shape and about 2.25 miles in diameter. Greater Tunb is about 1 98 
square miles in size and has a permanent population of about 200. As with the 
inhabitants of Abu Musa island, the people in Greater funb island are UAF 
























Figure: (23) Greater Tunb hland 
ourcc: Admiralty chnrt i\o: J-'52. 
Al-Bd"'ly. op elf. n 7, at p 165 
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See tht! f?eport on the two Tunhs Islands, (Unpublished study prepared for Ras al Khaimah) 
government. Vmson and Flkins Attorne) sat Law, llouston, Texas ( 1982). Book 11 , at p. 3.3 
18 
" The Island 1s covered with coarse grass and shrubs and small venomous snakes are found 
there, goats and some caule are kept.. .. f>ersum Gulf Pt!ot, op ca. n 14. at p.93 . 
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The strategic and economic importance of the disputed Islands 
The strategic geographical position of the Islands 
The three Islands lie just outside the Strait of Hormuz. With such a location 
they are able to influence the entrance to the Gulf. This important geographical 
location of the Islands was, and still is- as will be suggested-the real reason 
behind the Iranian claim for ownership of the Islands. This is demonstrated by 
various statements made by the Iranian authorities. For instance Abu al Hassan 
Bani Sadr, the first president of Iran said, in March 1980: 19 
Evacuate the Islands? Who is going to take them? To whom do the islands belong? Not to 
anyone ... in the south there is Abu-Dhabi, Qatar, Oman, Dubai, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia ... to us 
these states are connected with the United States and are not independent. At the end there is 
the Strait of Hormuz through which oil passes. They (the Arab governments) are afraid of our 
revolution. If we allow them to have the islands they will control the Strait. In other ·words the 
United States would control the waterway. Is it possible to give such a gift to the United 
States? ... If all of them, the littoral states of the Gulf, were independent, we would have returned 
the islands to them. 
20 
In a similar manner the Shah of Iran said on 28 September 1971, in relation to 
these Islands that: "we need them, we shall have them, no power on earth will 
stop us."21 Furthermore, in one study oflran's foreign relations Chubin and Zabin 
explained the important geographical position of the Islands for Iran: 
The islands ... are situated at a critical 'choke point' near the strategic and easily blocked straits 
of Hormuz. Iran was vitally dependent on the free flow of oil and other commodities through 
these straits, and had a disproportionately large stake in free navigation in the Gulf, partly 
because of the length of its coastline, and partly because it has possessed no alternative means 
such as a pipeline by which to export its petroleum.22 
It is evident from these statements that political factors, and not historical or 
legal arguments, lie behind the Iranian occupation of the Islands.23 Al-Alkim, 
Associate Professor of Political Science at United Arab Emirates University, has 
summarized these political factors as follows: 
19 One year after the Islamic revolution. 
20 Italics added, quoted from Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.2, at p. I60. 
21 Quoted from Al-Alkim, H., "The United Arab Emirates' Perspective on the Islands' Question," 
Round Table Discussion on the Dispute over the Gulf Islands, The Arab Research Centre, London 
( 1993), at p.28. For similar statements, see El-Hakim, op. cit., n. 9, at pp.130, 254. 
22 See Chub in and Zabih, The Foreign Relation of Iran, A Developing State in a Zone of Great-
Power Conflict, University of California Press, London ( 1974), at p.223. 
23 El-Hakim, op. cit., n.9, at p.130. 
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Iran ... was determined to seize the Islands for the following reasons:( I) Freedom of navigation 
in this waterway at all times was essential, for Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia and Iraq, depended 
upon the Gulf as the only outlet for its oil exports. (2) Iran needed to exploit its offshore oil 
resources and to protect not only its extensive oil installations at Kharaq Island and elsewhere 
but its oil cargoes for the entire length of the waterway. 24 
The economic importance of the Islands 
The importance of the Islands, however, is not confined to their geographical 
location, but rather extends to their economic value. Two non-living natural 
resources exist in commercial quantities in the Islands; oil and red oxide. 
Controlling these resources would not be possible without owning the Islands. 
Apart from some concession agreements concluded by the Government of Ras al 
Khaimah to explore and exploit these resources on the two Tunbs prior to the 
Iranian occupation in 1971,25 there is no information on the condition of the 
resources in the Tunbs islands. This is due to the Iranian seizure of them, and the 
suspension of exploitation activities. 
In Abu Musa the situation is different. Operations in the Mupark oil field,26 
an offshore field situated 9 nautical miles from the island coastline towards the 
Sha1jah mainland, have not been affected by the presence of Iranian troops on the 
northern part of the Island. The field produces about 40 thousand b/d 27"with 
plans to sell 100 million cubic feet/day of gas. It has estimated remaining reserves 
of 50 million barrels of oil and 1.5 trillion cubic feet of gas."28 The issue of 
exploiting the Mupark field remains governed by the arrangement between 
Sha1jah and Iran in the Memorandum of Understanding. Article 4 of the Iran-
Sharjah Memorandum provides: 
2
-1 See Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.21, at p.29. 
25 For example, the Ruler concluded an oil concession agreement with the Union Oil Exploration 
and Production Company and the Southern Natural Gas Company on 3 March 1964, to explore 
oil and gas on Emirates' land, including the area of the two Tunbs and their territorial seas. See 
the Report on the two Tunbs Islands, op. cit., n.17, at p.108. 
26 In addition to the oil field the island of Abu Musa was reported to contain a commercial 
quantity of red oxide. See Laithwaite, "Memorandum on the status of islands of Tunb, Little 
Tunb, Abu Musa and Sirri islands on 24 August 1928," Arabian Bounda1J' Disputes Primal)' 
Documents 1853-1960, vol. 13, Archive Editions, Schofield and Blake (eds.) Redwood Press 
Ltd., England ( 1988), at p. 79, para. I; Persian Gulf Pilot, op. cit., n.14, at p.95. 
27 Al-Ulama, H.M., The Federal Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates, Thesis submitted for 
the degree of Ph.D., Department of Geography. University of Durham ( 1994), at p. 200. 
28 See David Pike, "Cross-border Hydrocarbon Resources," Territorial foundation of the Gulf 
States, Schofield R. (ed.), University of London, UCL Press, London ( 1994), at p. 197. 
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L -.:ploita11on of the petroleum resources of Abu Musa and of the seabed and subsoil beneath its 
territorial sea will be conducted by Bunes Gas and Oil Company under the existing agreemi:nt 
which must be acceptable to Iran I lalf of the governmental oil revenues hereafter atuibutable 
to the said exploiralion shall be paid direct I}' by the compan}' to Iran and half to SharJah. 29 
CJG. ........... 
J--- --· ... ..... .. _ 
, ... _. ---
J 1gure: (24) The three disputed hlnnds. . . 
Source: \(ltio1wl ltltts of tlte vA £ , The L "" ers1t) of the 




For comments on this A111cle, see .Joim Development of Offshore Oil and Ga~ Model 
Agreement ]01 States fnr ./01111 Developmenl w//h £xp/u11alo1y Commentary, vol.I, the British 
Institute of International and Comparatl\ e Law, London ( 1989), at p.56 
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The legal status of the disputed Islands 
The sovereignty of the three Islands was, and still is, the subject of a long-
standing dispute between Iran and the UAE (representing the Emirate of Sharjah, 
in respect of Abu Musa, and the Emirate of Ras al Khaimah in respect of the two 
Tunbs). The two rival parties are in general agreement that the Islands have been 
owned from time immemorial. 30 They disagree however as to who is the 
sovereign or who held the original title. Each of them claims that they were and 
still are the owner. 
The UAE claim is based on the historical title that the two concerned 
Emirates, Ras al Khaimah and Sharj ah, for more than two centuries exercised 
over the three Islands; a continuous and peaceful display of state function with 
sovereign-acting intention. 31 Evidence of such activities include the hoisting of 
the two Emirates' flags on the Islands, in the presence of the representatives of 
the two Emirates' Rulers on the Islands' soil. Other evidences of the Emirates' 
authority over the Islands are: 
(a) The collection of annual fees from the residents of the Abu Musa and Greater 
Tunb islands. 
(b) The establishment of public and military constructions on the Abu Musa and 
Greater Tunb islands. 32 
(c) The governments of both Ras al Khaimah and Sharjah concluded concession 
agreements to explore and exploit the natural resources on the Islands and in 




31 For a discussion on the effective control, see Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International 
law, 4th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1990), at pp. 138-45; Shaw, op. cit., n.6, at pp. 289-302. 
32 Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.21, at p.30. 
1~ 
· _, For example, on 6 February 1952 an agreement was reached between the Ruler of Ras al 
Khaimah and Golden Valley Colors Limited of Wick, Bristol, England to mine and export any 
red oxide in the Tunbs islands. Article 2 of the agreement provides: " .. the Shaikh hereby grants to 
the Company ... the sole and exclusive right to search for work excavate mine or otherwise recover 
and export any Red Oxide or Iron which may be situate in the Islands of Tunb and Nabiyu Tunb 
in the Persian Gulf the Property of the Shaikh ... " Italic added. Quoted from the Report on the two 
Tunbs Islands, op. cit., n.17, Document No. 17, at p.98. 
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( d) The inhabitants of the Islands hold passports issued by the government of the 
Emirates concerned. 
In addition, the UAE claim 1s understood to be based on the following 
grounds: 
( 1) The recognition and support of the British Government during its presence in 
the Gulf region. 34 
(2) The inhabitants of the Islands were Arabs who shared language, character, 
tradition and tribal links with the Arab people in the Emirates.35 
(3) Iran offered to buy or to lease the Islands from Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah in 
1929, 1930 and 1971. This is, in turn, regarded as recognition by Iran of the two 
Emirates' ownership of the Islands.36 
In similar manner Iran, which officially claimed the two Tunbs and Abu Musa 
for the first time in 1877 and 1888 respectively, based its claim of sovereignty on 
historical factors. Iran argued that the Islands were controlled by the al-Quwasim 
Arab Sheikhs of Lingah, who "had for long been Persian subjects governing 
Lingah as Persian officials, and .. .it was in this capacity that they had administered 
the Islands, which had become Persian territory."37 Moreover, the three Islands, 
Iran claims, had always been Iranian, but British 'Imperialism' had given them to 
the Arab al-Quwasim in the southern side of the Gulf. Iran therefore demanded 
that these three Islands be considered to fall under Iranian sovereignty. 38 
Iran, in addition, has advanced its claim to the two Tunbs islands on the basis 
of geographical considerations. It has argued that the two Tunbs lie closer to the 
:;.i Laithwaite, op. cit., n.26, at pp.84-6. See also a letter from the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs for the UAE on 25 April 1972; reproduced in the Report on the two 
Tunbs Islands, op. cit., n.17, at pp.51-61. 
35 Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.21, at p.30. 
36 Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah Latter, op. cit. n.34. See also Lascelles, "Memorandum on the Persian 
Claim," Arabian Boundary Disputes Primary Documents 1853-1960, vol. 13, Archive Editions, 
Schofield and Blake (eds.) Redwood Press Ltd., England (1988), at p.136, para. I I. 
37 Laithwaite, op. cit., n.26, at p.79, para.3. For the British view of the Persian claim, see Mr. 
Lascelles's Memorandum, Ibid., at p.134, para.8. 
38 The statement of the representative of Iran to the UN. See UN Security Council Official 
Records, 26th Year, 1610th meeting: 9 December 1971, New York ( 1971 ), at p.18, para.21 I. 
Also the Iranian newspaper Kayhan International on 23 October 1971, quoted from UN Security 
Council Official Records, 1610th Meeting: 9 December 1971, New York ( 1971 ), at p.5, para. 69. 
See also Chabin and Zabih, op. cit., n.22, at p.223. 
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Iranian mainland than to the UAE mainland.39 Mirfenderski, an Iranian professor 
in international law, suggested from this that: 
The position of the Tonbs40 near the Iranian coast and the bicoastal dominion of the Buyids in 
the eastern Persian Gulf leads to the inescapable and necessary conclusion that in Buyid times 
(A.O. 945-1055) the Tonbs in all likelihood belonged to Iran. Just as Oman was annexed to 
Fars, the Tonbs too in all likelihood belonged to Fars as a matter of the administrative structure 
of Iran's maritime possessions.41 
Furthermore, Iran in supporting its claim furnished a British War-Office Map 
as evidence of its title. Its argument was that the Islands were coloured in the 
same fashion as the Iranian mainland on the British War-Office Map of 1886.42 
This, the Iranians alleged, confirmed British recognition of Persian ownership of 
the Islands.43 Some years later, the British government informed the Iranian 
government that the map had been a mistake and the "error in question .... cannot 
be taken as a formal declaration by His Majesty's government of their view of the 
status of the islands."44 Such a declaration from the British Government did not 
convince the Iranian Cabinet. Mr. Afshar, the Iranian representative to the UN, in 
answering the British declaration stated that: 
39 As regards a title arising out of contiguity, Haber, the arbitrator in the Island of Pa/mas Case, 
stated that "it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the 
effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from the mere fact 
that its territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size)." Scott, 
The Hague Court Report, Second Series, Oxford University Press, New York ( 1932), at p.111. 
40 The Iranian spelling for Tunbs. 
41 Mirfenderski, G., "The Ownership of the Tonb Islands: A legal Analysis," Small Islands, Big 
Politics, Amirahmadi H. (ed.), Macmillan, USA ( 1996), at p.12 l. 
42 The writer had an opportunity to see the said map. Surprisingly, and contrary to the Iranian 
claim, it contains no colour for the Iranian mainland that is distinguishable from the mainland of 
neighbouring states. What the map does show is an orange line marking the Iranian coastline in 
the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Some of the islands in the Gulf, including the three 
disputed Islands, are coloured orange, i.e., the colour that marked the Iranian coastline, not the 
Iranian mainland. Examining this map in more detail to ascertain the value of the Iranian claim is 
beyond the scope of this work. But, at first glance, the said map neither accept nor rejects the 
Iranian claim. 
43 Lascelles, op. cit., n.36, at p.131, para.2. Arbitrator Haber, in his Award in the Island of Pa/mas 
Case, cited conditions that required a map to be accepted as evidence in law. In his conclusion he 
stated that: "Anyhow, a map affords only an indication-and that a very indirect one--and, 
except when annexed to a legal instrument, has not the value of such an instrument, in involving 
recognition or abandonment of the rights." See Island of Pa/mas Case, op. cit., n.39, at pp. I 09-
10. See also Taha, F., The International legal Aspects of the Boundaries of the Sudan with 
Ethiopia and Kenya, PhD. Dissertation, vol. I, Jesus College, Cambridge University ( 1973), at 
pp.172-87~ Akweenda, S., "The Legal Significance of Maps in Boundary Questions: A 
reappraisal with Particular Emphasis on Namibia," 60 BYB/l (1989), at pp.205-55. 
44 Laithwaite, op. cit., n.26, at p.85, para.36. 
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For more than a century, beginning in 1770, British maps marked the Tonb islands as being 
Persian. A mistake can be made once, but what sort of mistake is it that can be made for 120 
45 
years? 
Finally, Iran argued that the Islands have a strategic geographical position in 
that they control the entrance to the Gulf. One of Iran's vital interests is to secure 
free navigation in the Gulf. This, Iran alleges, could not be achieved without 
controlling the Islands.46 The Shah of Iran in this context said that: "to the 
possibility of certain strategic positions [meaning these three Islands] falling into 
the wrong hands: a small group of men using a boat and a bazooka could threaten 
. . . h ,,47 48 navigation m t e waterway. 
In international law the value of these non-historical considerations such as 
geographical factors and evidence from maps, is that these factors, in the general 
understanding in the literature, "can never be conclusive. But they may furnish 
important evidence of general opinion or repute as to the existence of certain state 
of fact, and pro tanto, therefore, may support the conclusion that that state of fact 
does actually exist." 49 This is in contrast with the case of the historical factor, 
which may constitute the crucial issue that would determine who has the better 
rights to the Islands. To decide between these two competing claims it would be 
necessary, as arbitrator Haber in the l'iland of Pa/mas Case 50 and the World 
Court in Minquiers and Ecrehos Case 51 have done, to study and analyse "first 
the one title by itself, and the other by itself, then the first again, comparing the 
45 See the representative of Iran's statement, op. cit., n.38, at p.18, para.212. See also 
Mirfenderski, op. cit .. n.4 Lat p.131. 
4
<i Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, "Iran's Maritime Boundaries in the Persian Gulf, The case of Abu 
Musa island," The Boundaries of Modern Iran, Keith Mclachlan (ed.), UCL Press, London 
( 1994 ), at p. I 06, and see also Chabin and Zabih, op. cit., n.22, at p.223. 
47 Kayhan International on 23 October 1971. Quoted from the statement of the representative of 
Iraq to the UN Security Council. See UN Security Council Official Records, op. cit., n.38, at p.6, 
para. 71, and see the Report on the two Tunbs Islands, op. cit., n.17, at p.3. I 1 O; Taha, op. cit., 
n.43, at p.173. 
48 This argument is of a political nature which has no direct role either to conform to or to reject a 
state title to a territory. 
49 Fitzmaurice, G., The law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 194 7-59, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1995), at p.315. See also Island of Pa/mas Case, op. 
cit., n.39, at pp.109-11. 
50 Island of Pa/mas Case (United States of America v. the Netherlands) (1928), op. cit., n. 39, at 
p.93. 
1 Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. VA.), ICJ Reports 1953. 
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two titles .. .in respect of their legal weight, taken as a whole over the whole 
period. "52 Such a task lies beyond the scope of this work. Notwithstanding, the 
events of November 1971-when Iranian troops landed on the Islands--deserve 
some clarification. 
The events of November 1971 
In 1968, shortly after the British Government announced its intention of 
withdrawing from the region by the end of 1971, Iran embarked on a campaign to 
justify its claims of ownership of the Islands. The British Government, by vi11ue 
of its special treaty relationship with the Emirates,53 was anxious to solve the 
Islands' problem before pulling out from the Gulf. At the same time, Iran, the 
most powerful state in the region, had threatened not to recognize the proposed 
federation between the Emirates, due to be established in December 1971, and to 
annex the three Islands by force, if its demands were not met. This threat was 
narrated in the Iranian media. For example, Iran's Kayhan International reported, 
on 9 November 1970, that ''Iran would be prepared to use force to maintain its 
sovereignty over the islands if its claims were not conceded."54 
The British Government appointed Sir William Luce as a special envoy to 
mediate between the two sides. 55 He suggested an arrangement wherein the 
Islands would remain disputed territories. Iran rejected the offer. 56 A suggestion 
to refer the issue to a binding arbitration was advanced by the Emirates, but was 
also discarded by Iran. 57 In September 1971 the British envoy discussed the 
Islands' issue with the Iranian ambassador to London. The two sides at the end of 
their negotiations asked the two Emirates to formulate a declaration whereby they 
52 Sir L. Heald oral argument before the World Court in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, see /CJ 
Pleadings ( 1953), vol. 2, at p.49. See also the ICJ Judgement in this case, ICJ Reports 1953, at 
P:p.53-9. And see Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n.49, at p.276. 
3 See the introduction for brief a discussion on the relationship between the Emirates and the 
British Government. 
54 Quoted from Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.21, at p.28. See also Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.2, at pp. 140-2. 
And see the Times of London, 18 November (1971), at p.7. 
55 Al-Tadmory, A.J., The Three Arabian ls/ands, Ras al Khaimah National Press, UAE ( 1995), at 
p. 129. For further details on mediation, see Chapter Seven. 
56 Ibid., at p. l 28. 
57 Ibid., at p.15 l. 
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would relinquish their sovereignty over the Islands. In return, Iran would provide 
the Emirates with financial assistance, and would accept the median line system 
as the boundary line between the two sides' respective mainlands. The two 
Emirates declined to accept this British-Iranian proposal. 58 
In October 1971 the Iranian Government introduced a new idea for settling 
the dispute. Their proposal was that the Arabs should relinquish their sovereignty 
of the two Tunbs islands, and in return Iran would acknowledge that its 
ownership to the island of Abu Musa was not undisputed. The proposal, in 
addition, would give Iran full jurisdiction in certain areas of Abu Musa, and 
would recognise the rights of Sharjah "to name the company to explore the 
Island's waters for oil on condition that the company would come under Iranian 
Laws. Oil income, when discovered, would be divided equally between Iran and 
Sharjah."59 In respect to the two Tunbs islands, Iran proposed a financial 
agreement with the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah whereby the Emirate would receive 
an annual payment of £1.5 million for nine years, and 50 percent of any oil 
discovery in the two Tunbs areas. 60 
Iran and the United Kingdom were satisfied with these arrangements, whereas 
the two Emirates were not. 61 In the last two days of November 1971 the Emirate 
of Sharjah accepted the British proposal to give Iran the rights to deploy its troops 
on the northern part of the island of Abu Musa and to maintain the disputed status 
of the Island. Not unexpectedly, Ras al Khaimah continued to oppose the British 
proposal. The result was that Sharjah concluded with Iran the so-called 
'Memorandum of Understanding' 62 over Abu Musa island, while Ras al Khaimah 
did not. Iran subsequently occupied the two Ras al Khaimah islands of Tunbs. 
58 Ibid., at pp.129-31. 
5') 
Times of London, 2 November ( 1971 ), at p.8. 
60 Al-Tadmory, op. cit., n.55, at p.149 and p.165. 
61 See the Report on the two Tunbs Islands, op. cit., n.17, at p.3.59. See also the Sharjah's daily 
newspaper a/-Kha/eej, dated 2 and 3 November ( 1971 ); Times of London, 2 November ( 1971 ), at 
p.8. 
62 For a distinction between treaties and informal instruments, such as Memorandums of 
Understanding, see Anthony, A., '"The Theory and practices of informal International 
Instruments," 35 ICLQ (1986), at pp.787-812. 
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In respect to Abu Musa island the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Memorandum of Understanding read: 
Neither Iran nor Sharjah will give up its claim to Abu Musa nor recognise the other's claim. 
(I) Iranian troops will arrive on Abu Musa. They will occupy areas the extent of which have 
been agreed on the map attached to this memorandum; (2/A) Within the agreed areas occupied 
by Iranian troops, Iran will have full jurisdiction and the Iranian flag will fly; (2/B) Sharjah will 
retain full jurisdiction over the remainder of the island. The Sharjah flag will continue to fly 
over the Sharjah police post on the same basis as the Iranian flag will fly over the Iranian 
·1· 63 m 1 1tary quarters. 
The text, in addition, contain some arrangement over the exploration of the 
petroleum resources of Abu Musa, 64 and the rights of the nationals of each party 
to fish in the territorial sea of the Island.65 
Since the early 1980s, however, Iran had begun to interfere with and to 
encroach in that part of the island of Abu Musa which it had been agreed was to 
be under the UAE jurisdiction.66 These encroachments came to the surface in 
August 1992 when the Iranian police prevented one of the UAE passenger-ferrys, 
with 110 people on board, from disembarking in the UAE part of the Island. Such 
action was justified by Iran on the basis of the failure of the passengers to obtain 
an entry visa to Iran. In the face of significant diplomatic support for the UAE in 
the region, Iran backed off and blamed the incident on the ''misjudgement of 
junior Iranian officials."67 
Subsequently, the two parties began their first formal negotiation over the 
issue of the Islands. 68 Both parties supported the need to find a peaceful 
63 For the text of the Memorandum, see Al-Bahama, H., The Arabian Gulf States, 2nd ed, 
Librairie De Liban, Beirut ( 1975), at p.345; see also the Times of London, 30 November ( 1971 ), 
at p.6. 
<>-I See above in "the economic importance of the Islands." 
65 
Article 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding declared that: "The nationals of Iran and 
Sharjah shall have equal rights to fish in the territorial sea of Abu Musa." 
66 
Al-Alkim, H., The CCC States in an Unstable World, Saqi Books, London (1994), at p.114. 
For examples of these encroachments, see below. 
67 
Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, "Perspectives on the Territorial History of the Tonb and Abu Musa 
Islands," Small Islands Big Politics, Amirahmadi, H. (ed.), Macmillan, USA ( 1996), at p.59. For 
comments on the incident, see Al-Ulama, op. cit., n. 27, at pp.200-1; Rugh, W., "The Foreign 
Policy of the United Arab Emirates," 50 The Middle East Journal (1996), at pp.60-2. 
68 
This delay in starting the negotiation between the two sides was not because the Islands' issue 
had been neglected, but because some domestic and regional affairs in both countries suggested 
the undesirability of pressing the Islands' issue in the last two decades. In despite of this, the UAE 
Government took every opportunity before the UN General Assembly to record its objection to 
the Iranian occupation on the two Tunbs, and to the Iranian violation to the Memorandum of 
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settlement to the question, though there was no treaty obligation between them to 
negotiate a settlement or to resort to any other form of third-party settlement. The 
UAE, however, felt the attempt to solve the dispute by negotiation was exhausted 
after the failure of the two parties to make any progress. Secondly, Iran, although 
it committed itself to meaningful negotiations, did not refrain from its attempts to 
change the existing social and political situation on the Islands in order to support 
its claim of sovereignty. This is manifested in the Iranian actions to build civil 
and military constructions on Abu Musa island and to encourage Iranian citizen 
from the mainland to settle on the Island.69 At the same time Iran, in pursuing its 
policy of changing the identity of the Island, began to harass the livelihood of 
citizens of the Emirates living there, in order to force them to leave. This policy 
took various forms of intervention in "the daily lives of the citizens of the Island 
by preventing them from constructing new buildings or renovating old ones, 
closing down their businesses, and requiring Iranian permits for new 
businesses."70 In respect to the two Tunbs, Iran objected to the UAE demand that 
it should terminate its military occupation of these Islands. 71 In addition, at every 
opportunity Iran claimed the Islands as Iranian and its sovereignty over them to 
be non-negotiable. 72 Therefore, the U AE has considered recourse to international 
adjudication necessary to solve the dispute and to maintain the friendly 
relationship between the two neighbouring states. Iran, on the contrary, believes 
negotiation can still provide a settlement to "'the misunderstanding with the 
Understanding of 197 l over Abu Musa, see the UN Security Council Official Records, Doc. No 
S/PV.161, 9 December 1971; DOC. No. S/10740, 18 July 1972; Doc No. S/PV,2055, 5 October 
1972; Doc. No. S/PV/1763 20 February 1974; Doc. No. A/C. l/PV.2092, 19 November 1975; 
Latter from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs to UN Secretary general, 6 August 1980; Doc 
No. S/1996/692, 26 August 1996. See also Ali Himidane, the former UAE ambassador to the UN, 
Al-Kali}, UAE daily newspaper, l l November ( 1993); Arab Research Center, Round Table 
Discussion on The Dispute over the Gulf Islands, London ( 1993), at p.53; Al-Bdwly, op. cit., n.7, 
at pp.355. For the reasons that suggested the undesirability of presenting the Islands' issue in the 
last two decades, see Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.2, at pp.145-68. 
69 Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.2, at p.114; Al-Bdwly, op. cit., n.7, at pp.343-6; Al-lttihad, UAE daily 
newspaper, 20 September ( 1994); Al-Kali), UAE daily newspaper, 20 December ( 1995). 
70 Al-Alkim, op. cit., n.66, at p.114. 
71 Ibid., at p. l l 5. 





even without any signs of achieving progress. Recourse to international 
adjudication is still rejected by Iran without any formal explanation.74 
To sum up, the need for Iranian consent to refer the dispute to the World 
Court is the main issue blocking the UAE attempt to recourse to international 
adjudication. This need might not appear to be an issue were the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention to enter into force between them. It will be recalled that the 
Convention contains a comprehensive system for the settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means. In the light of this system Iran and UAE may unilaterally refer 
the dispute between them to one of the forums listed in Article 287(1 ); whether 
the plaintiff refers to it as a territorial and delimitation dispute or as only a 
delimitation dispute, the result appears to be the same. This is simply because 
submitting the dispute as a maritime boundary delimitation will certainly require 
a judgement regarding the dispute between them over the ownership of the three 
Islands. The power of a court or tribunal, having jurisdiction under Section 2, to 
decide cases which are not on the law of the sea is supported by the convention 
itself. Article 293( 1) authorizes the court or tribunal to apply customary law as far 
as it is not incompatible with the rules of the 1982 Conventions. Moreover, there 
is no "neat division between a law of the sea case and other types of dispute."75 
This being so, Article 298(1) allows states to exclude certain disputes 
including maritime boundary delimitation from being subject to compulsory 
settlement procedure. 76 In this case the only possibility of referring the dispute to 
international adjudication is to conclude an agreement to that effect.77 These 
7
-:i Statement from the Iranian Embassy to the UAE, reprinted in Al-Tadmory, op. cit., n.55, at 
~-1-~~:~ement from the UAE Ministry ofForeign Affairs, reprinted in Ibid., at pp.311-3. 
75 See Boyle, A., '"Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of 
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction," 46 !CLQ ( 1997), at p.49. Maritime boundary delimitation 
disputes and disputes over the sovereignty of islands are clear examples of the connection 
between a law of the sea case and other international law cases. 
76 See the observation of Professor Boyle on the effect of this allowance on the overall force of 
the system of dispute settlement in the Convention. See Ibid., at pp.46-7. 
77 If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, any party to the dispute may 
submit the dispute to compulsory conciliation under Annex V, section 2. For this to be valid 
under the provisions of Article 288(a) the dispute should be one which only arises after the 1982 
Convention entry into force. Hence, past disputes, unless the parties otherwise agree, are excluded 
from the scope of compulsory resort to conciliation. Secondly, disputes concerning sovereignty 
over land territory or islands, according to Article 298( 1 )(a)(i), are also excluded. As far as Iran 
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limitations on the provision of compulsory jurisdiction of settlement may only 
reflect an ancient argument that ''obligatory judicial settlement must be limited to 
matters of minor importance." 78 Disputes of a grave character, i.e. these affecting 
the vital interests of a state, such as territorial disputes, "are unfit for compulsory 
arbitration." 
79 
As a result, the current problem of the need for Iranian consent to 
refer the dispute to judicial settlement is still facing the UAE Cabinet, even if Iran 
and UAE were to ratify the LOS. This is because Iran, rejecting any international 
adjudication at the moment, would presumably exclude maritime boundary 
disputes from the scope of the compulsory settlement procedure. Hence, there is 
no real advantage likely to be gained, as far as the settlement of the Iranian-
UAE' s dispute is concerned, from ratifying the 1982 Convention. 
The effect of the Iranian seizure of the Islands on navigation in the Gulf 
The Iranian occupation of the UAE Islands has had various political and 
social effects. As far as the law of the sea is concerned this occupation may affect 
navigation in the Arabian Gulf. One of the vital interests of other littoral states in 
the region is to maintain unimpeded passage in this semi-enclosed sea. In the 
light of this it is of value to examine what effect, if any, the Iranian occupation of 
the Islands may have on the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. This is indeed an 
important issue, since the Intergovernmental Maritime Organization (IMO) 
designated four areas in the Gulf to be used as shipping routes. 80 The two Tunbs, 
as appears below, are situated on the traffic separation zones of one of these four 
sea-lanes, while Abu Musa island lies only 13 nautical miles to the south of the 
traffic routeing. Since the Iranian seizure of the two Tunbs in 1971, traffic 
and UAE are concerned there is no maritime boundary delimitation dispute which has arisen 
between them until now. Their dispute, as noted earlier, is limited to their difference over the 
ownership of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands. Such a dispute is excluded from the 
compulsory resort to conciliation. 
78 Lauterpacht, H., The Function of law in the International Community, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford (1933), at p.143. 
79 Ibid. For more dissection on the so-called political disputes, see Ibid., part Ill. 
80 Persian Gulf Pilot (1982 copy), op. cit., n.14, at p. IO; see also Al-Bdwly, op. cit., n.7, at 
pp.166-8. And see Admiralty Chart, No.2858 (Gulfof Oman to Shatt Al' Arab), printed in 1988. 
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routeing has been entirely within the Iranian territorial sea.
81 
Foreign ships using 
the sea-lanes in the Tunbs area come. as a result under Iranian sovereignty. The 
effect of such development and the rights of passage in the Iranian territorial sea 
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Figure: (25) Sea-lanes in the Tunbs area. 
Source: The Times Atlas o/tlie Sea, (1989) at p.154. 
81 
Al-Bdwly, op. cil., n.7, at pp.166-8. See also the Times Atlas and Encyclopaedia of the Sea 
( 1989), at p.154. 
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The right of innocent passage is considered as one of the most important 
principles in international law. 82 It is indisputably applicable to merchant ships 
within the provision of international law. 83 Article 5 of the Iranian Marine Law of 
1993 reaffirmed the right of innocent passage for foreign merchant ships through 
the Iranian territorial sea. 84 Iran, as a coastal state, has the right in international 
law to take "the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is 
not innocent," 85 and to temporarily su.spend in f)pec(fied areas of its territorial 
sea the rights of passage, "if such suspension is essential for the protection of its 
security, including weapons exercises." 86 The right of suspension was adopted in 
the Iranian law of 1993 without, however, any limitation. Article 8 declares that: 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran inspired its high national interest and to 
defend its security may suspend the innocent passage in parts of its territorial sea. 
Iran therefore can block the international traffic route in the two Tunbs areas, 
which becomes part of its territorial sea as a result of its occupation to the Islands. 
Indeed, during the Iran-Iraq conflict (1982 to 1988) the belligerent parties 
announced war zones. As far as the Iranian war zone87 is concerned it extended 
for a distance of at least 12 nautical miles beyond the median line. All Iranian 
82 See Article 17 of the 1982 Convention; Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester 
University Press, New rev. ed., Manchester (1988), at pp.68-76; Shaw, op. cit., n. 6, at pp.351-3; 
Brownlie, op. cit., n.31, at pp. 194-7; Butler, W.E., "Innocent passage and the 1982 Convention, 
the Influence of Soviet Law and Policy," 81 AJIL (1987), at pp.331-47. 
83 There is, however, some controversy over the recognition of an equivalent right for warships. 
For example, the Court in the C01fu Channel case 1949 avoided answering the question of 
innocent passage of warships through territorial seas not included in a strait. See ICJ Reports 
1949, at p.30. See also Oppenheim 's International law, 9th ed., vol. I, Peace, Jennings and Watts 
(eds.), Longman, London ( 1996), at pp.618-20; O'Connell, D., The International law of the Sea, 
Shearer (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford (l 982), at pp.274-97; Jessup, P.C., The law of Territorial 
Waters and Maritime .Jurisdiction, G.A. Jennings Co. INC, New York ( 1927), at p. l 20; Bowett, 
D., "Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," 9 /ClQ ( 1960), at p. 418; 
McDougal and Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, Yale University Press, UAS (1962), at 
pp. 192-4; Gilmore, W., "Sea and Continental Shelf," 21 The law of Scotland (1994), at p.9, 
para.9. 
84 Warships, submarines and nuclear-powered ships are excluded from the right of innocent 
passage in the Iranian territorial sea without prior authorization. Hence such ships do not enjoy 
the right of innocent passage in the international traffic route in the two Tunbs area. Article 9 of 
the Iranian Marine Law of 1993. 
85 Article 25(1) of the 1982 Convention. To the same effect, see Article 7 of the Iranian Law. 
86 Article 25(3) of the 1982 Convention. Moreover, because the international shipping route is 
within the Iranian territorial sea, Iran is entitled in law to exercise "enforcement jurisdiction 
against vessels infringing prescribed schemes." See Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.82, at p.213. 
87 Known also as an advisory zone in the Admiralty Chart No.2858. 
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coastal waters were declared a war zone, whereby foreign ships--with the 
exception of deep-draught tankers-were prohibited from entry, unless bound for 
an Iranian port. Deep-draught tankers, wishing to use the traffic separation zone 
in the restricted area, were obliged to submit a request to the Iranian Port and 
Shipping Organization 48 hours before departure. 88 Such inconvenient measures 
to neutral vessels could be difficult to justify in international law. 89 
To ensure unimpeded passage in the shipping route in the Tunbs area (even if 
only as a temporary measure), and to minimize Iranian control, Iraq proposed an 
amendment to the regime of transit passage 90 so that the "regime also applies to 
the passage between islands situated near the international straits, if the IMO has 
designated shipping lanes lying near such islands." 91 According to the regime of 
transit passage there should be "no suspension of innocent passage through ... 
straits." 92 Apart from the fact that the Iraqi proposal failed to be adopted in the 
1982 Convention, Iran-as a non-ratified for the convention-considered the 
regime of transit passage in LOS as "merely the product of quid-pro-quo which 
do not necessarily purport to codify the existing customs or established usage 
(practice) regarded as having an obligatory character."93 Therefore, towards 
pursuing this view, "only States parties to the Law of the Sea convention shall be 
88 Persian Gulf Pilot ( 1990 copy), op. cit., n.14, at p. l; similarly, see copies 1984, 1986 and 1988. 
For an illustrative map, see the Admiralty Chait No. 2858. 
89 On the legality of the war zone, see Leckow, R., "The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf: The Law 
of War Zones," 37 /CLQ ( 1988), at pp.634-6; On the British position from the Iranian war zone, 
see Warbrick, C., "The British position to the Gulf Conflict," 37 ICLQ ( 1988), at p.427; Gray, C., 
"The British position with regard to the Gulf Conflict (Iran-Iraq): Part 2," 40 ICLQ (1991 ), at 
pp.467-8. See also Peace, D.L., "Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf Between 1984-1991: 
A juridical Analysis," 33 VJ/L (1993), at p.547; Boczek, B.A., "Law of Warfare at Sea and 
Neutrality: Lessons from the Gulf War" 20 ODIL ( 1989), at pp.243-51. 
9° For further discussion on this regime, see Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.82, Chapter 5; Moore, 
J. N ., "The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," 
74 AJIL (1980), at pp.77-121; Reisman, W.M., "The Regime of Straits and National Security. An 
appraisal of International Lawmaking," 74 AJIL ( 1980), at pp.48-76; Schachte and Bernhardt, 
"International Straits and Navigational Freedoms," 33 VJIL ( 1993), at pp.530-89; Gilmore, op. 
cit., n.83, at p.9, para. JO. 
91 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.82, at p.91. 
92 Article 45(2) of the 1982 Convention. See also Ibid., at pp.87-96. 
93 The Iranian declaration upon signature to the LOS. See Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 25, June 
( 1994), at p.29. For further discussion on the relation of the regime of transit passage and 
customary law, see Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.82, at pp.93-4. 
269 
Chapter Six 
entitled to benefit from the contractual rights created therein. "94 Thus, the· Iraqi 
proposal would have no effect, at least as far as the passage in the shipping route 
between the two Tunbs islands is considered, even if it had been embodied in the 
Convention. 
The entitlement of the three Islands to maritime zones 
An island, as we have seen in Chapter One of this work, has been defined as 
••a naturally formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above water at 
high-tide. "95 The entitlement of islands to maritime zones is not, in principle, 
questionable in international law.96 Article 121 (2) of the 1982 Convention, for 
example, assimilates islands to other land territory.97 This entitlement, however, 
is questionable where the island is considered to be a rock which cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of its own. In this case, according to Article 
121 (3) of the 1982 Convention, the island ""shall have no exclusive economic 
zone or continental shelf." Two questions have arisen in respect to the application 
of Article 121 (3). First, what is a rock? Second, what is the status of the Article in 
customary law? As we have seen in Chapter One, this Article was poorly drafted, 
and has consequently been subjected to criticism by a number of scholars.98 Its 
status is also controversial. 99 If we accept that Article 121 (3) reflects modern 
customary law, or if Iran and UAE ratify the 1982 Convention, would it apply to 
the present case? 
In the light of the geographical data concerning Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and 
Little Tunb islands, the relevance of Ai1icle 121 (3) to the present case would 
appear to arise only in relation to the entitlement of Little Tunb island to a 
94 law of the Sea Bulletin, No.25, June ( 1994), at p.29. 
95 Article 10(1) of TSCZ 1958 (Article 121(1) of LOS 1982). This definition was adopted in 
Article l of the UAE Federal Law of 1993. No definition was given for islands in the Iranian 
offshore legislation. 
96 See Chapter One/Section Five. 
•n See also Article l (b) of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and Article l 0(2) of the 1958 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention. 
98 See, for example, Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., n.82, at p.41 & p. l 35. For discussion of the 
meaning of 'rock', see Brown, E.D., Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal 
Regime, vol. l, Continental Shelf, 2nd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands {l 992), at 
pp.37-8. 
99 See Chapter One/Section Five for more discussion on the status of Article 12 l (3). 
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continental shelf and an EEZ. This is because the Island is uninhabited and 
waterless. Hence, Little Tunb, it might be argued, cannot sustain human 
habitation of its own. 100 Professor Bowett, for example, has described "a naturally 
formed area of land surrounded by water" with this character as a rock and not as 
an island. 101 Thus it appears to be of importance to determine the status of this 
Article in customary law, since the two parties are not yet bound by the LOS, and 
to determine the exact meaning of the term "rock." The island of Little Tunb, it 
will be recalled, is situated between two mainlands in an area where the distance 
between the two coastlines is just 65 nautical miles. If the Island is to retain 
UAE's sovereignty, it would be regarded as an island on the wrong side of the 
median line. Such an island, as will be seen, has often been denied any 
continental shelf effect. If however, the Iranian view on sovereignty prevailed, the 
Island also would be prevented, for equitable requirement, 102 from generating any 
effect beyond its territorial sea limit, or at least would reduce its continental shelf 
area to a half effect limit. In the latter case, as we shall see, this would have no 
significant impact on the median line between the two sides. 103 As a result, an 
examination of the exact meaning of rocks and the status of A11icle 121 (3) in 
customary law would appear in this instance to be only impo11ant from an 
academic viewpoint. 
100 Mr. Zadeh, an Iranian Scholar, described Little Tunb as a rock. See Zadeh, op. cit., n.46, at 
p.107. 
101 For the opinion of Professor Bowett, see Chapter One/Section Five above. 






Islands in maritime boundary delimitation 
This section is devoted to an analysis of the question of the effect of islands in 
maritime boundary delimitation. The purpose of this examination is to determine 
the cases where an island can be regarded as a special circumstance and, 
secondly, to identify the effect of islands in different geographical circumstances. 
Such an examination, moreover, will help to furnish the necessary legal 
background for our discussion on the effect of Abu Musa, Greater and Little 
Tunbs islands on a possible UAE-Iran boundary line. The discussion will be 
conducted on two levels; by reference to both the case law and state practice. The 
purpose of following these approaches is to identify the difference, or the 
similarity, between the case law-which is stressed as being based on the rules of 
law-and that of state practice, which is based on negotiation. 
It is well known that states in their agreements can derogate, in the absence of 
jus cogens rules, from the rules of international law. 104 This flexibility and 
freedom that states enjoy, compared to the situation in case law, may suggest that 
there may be a difference between the two in dealing with similar circumstances. 
This, however, is not entirely true. The position in case law and in state practice, 
as we shall see, is largely the same in a number of incidents, especially in respect 
to continental shelf delimitation. 105 International adjudication, moreover, refers in 
some cases to state practice as enduring or justifying a particular delimitation. For 
example, in the Anglo/French Arbitration, the Court referred to state practice to 
uphold its decision to give half-effect continental shelf to the Scilly Isles. 106 
Similarly, the Court in the Dubai/Sha1jah Award cited a number of instances of 
10
"' North Sea Case, at para. 72. There is some concern, however, about an equivalent right 
between states parties to LOS. For further details, see Marston, G., "The Stability of Land and 
Sea Boundary Delimitation in International Law," Maritime Boundaries, World Boundaries, vol. 
5, Blake (ed.), London (I 994 ), at p.156. See above at pp. I 18-9. 
105 As we saw in Chapter Two, there are not many cases concerned with territorial sea 
delimitation. 
106 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.251. 
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state practice to support its finding to give no continental shelf effect to the 
Sharjah island of Abu Musa. 107 
For the sake of clarity, in our discussion of state practice and the case law we 
shall distinguish between the case of an island whose sovereignty is undisputed 
and the case where it is disputed. 
First: The effect of undisputed islands in delimitation 108 
(1) The effect of islands in territorial sea delimitation 
There are three geographical positions where the effect of islands might be 
different: 
(a) Where an island lies close to the coastline under the same sovereignty 
It is quite usual to find an island situated on the correct side of the median line 
being given full effect territorial sea, since it has been regarded as an integral part 
of the coastal frontage. Such a case can be found in the Netherlands/UK 
agreements of 1965. The Dutch islands of Walcheren, Schouwen, Texel, and 
Vlieland were given full effect when the equidistance line was drawn between the 
Netherlands and the UK. 109 Another example may be found in the Bahrain-Saudi 
Arabia Agreement of 1958 where two islands, the Saudi island of Kaskus and the 
Bahrain island of Khor Fasht, were given full effect territorial sea. The two 
Islands face each other, and each lies opposite its own mainland. 110 
(b) An Island situated midway between the parties 
State practice in dealing with such a situation is to give the island a full effect 
territorial sea limit. An example may be found in the Iran-UAE agreement of 
1974 where Sirri island was given an arc of about 12 nautical miles. 111 In case 
107 Dubai/ShG1jah Award, at p.676. In similar vein, see Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.129. 
108 For reasons pointed out elsewhere, our discussion is limited to the effect of islands in 
territorial sea delimitation and their effect in continental shelf delimitation. For the reason why 
there is no separate section for the effect of islands in contiguous zone and in EEZ boundary 
delimitation, see p.60 and p.294. 
109 International Maritime Boundaries, Charney & Alexanders (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993), at p.1866. 
110 Ibid., at p.1495. 
111 Limits in the Sea, Series No. 63, Continental shelf boundary Iran-UAE (Dubai), 1974. 
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law, the enclave effect is not unusual treatment for an island located on or Close to 
the equidistance line. The Sharjah island of Abu Musa in the Dubai/Sharjah 
A1vard, for example, was attributed full effect territorial sea limit. This resulted in 
a bulge in the boundary line between the two parties. 112 
(c) An Island proximate to a foreign mainland 
An island, depending on size, economic and geographical importance, which 
is proximate to a foreign mainland may either be ignored or taken into account. 
For example, in the Argentina/Uruguay boundary agreement of 1973, the 
Argentinean island of Martin Garcia, located on the Uruguay side, was ignored in 
the delimitation. This was because the parties did not want to hamper or 
jeopardize the reaching of an agreement between them by insisting upon an effect 
for a small and unimportant island such as the one in issue. 113 
This approach, however, has not been followed in areas where there are 
potential natural resources, like the Arabian Gulf. In such cases, claiming a 
territorial sea limit for any geographical features means having a larger share of 
the natural resources in the area. The Iran/Saudi Arabia Continental Shelf 
agreements of 1968 may be cited as an example where an island, namely the 
Iranian island of Fares, was given a 12 nautical miles territorial sea, in spite of the 
fact that it lies on the Saudi side of the median line. A glance at the map explains 
the reason for this treatment to the Fares island; the said Island is facing the Saudi 
island of Al-Arabian which is situated along the san1e longitude. 114 Another 
example can be found in the boundary agreements between the Emirates of 
Sharjah and the Emirate of Umm al Qaywayn of 1964 (both Emirates are now 
members of the UAE Federation). The Sharjah island of Abu-Musa which is 
112 Dubai/Sharjah Award, at p.674. For an illustrative map, see figure 14. 
113 See Articles 44 and 45 of the 1973 agreement. For the text of the agreement, see Charney & 
Alexanders, op. cit., n.109, at p.767. See also below. 
114 However, in reality, the effect of Fares island in extending the Iranian boundary was more than 
the effect of the Al-Arabian island on the Saudi boundary. The reason behind this is that both 
Islands, i.e. Fares and Al-" Arabia, lie on the Saudi side. See Charney & Alexanders, op. cit., 
n. l 09, at p.1522. For an illustrative map, see figure 18. 
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situated on the wrong side of the equidistance line, i.e. opposite to the Umm al 
Qaywayn mainland, was given an arc of 12 nautical miles territorial sea. 115 
In case law the treatment of the Alcatraz island in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
Arbitration of 1986 may be cited as an example, although not a good one, of the 
treatment of an island on the wrong side. 116 In this A ward, it will be recalled, the 
parties were in dispute over whether the 1886 agreement between France and 
Portugal, the former colonial powers, had established the maritime boundary 
between the two Guinea States. 117 The Tribunal answered the question in the 
negative, and went on to determine the boundary between them. As far as the 
Guinea island of Alcatraz was concerned, the Tribunal gave the Island 2.25 
nautical miles to the north. This limit in the northerly direction "marked the 
maximum claim by Guinea in its conclusions." 118 The Tribunal as a court of law 
is expected not to " decide more than it is asked to decide, and will not award by 
way of compensation or other remedy more than it is asked to award." 119 For that 
reason the Island was attributed a belt of 2.25 nautical miles territorial sea limit in 
the north. To the west, where there was no similar limitation from Guinea, the 
Tribunal considered it equitable to grant the Island in question "the 12 nautical 
miles provided for in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention." 120 
These examples, it should be mentioned, are different from the case where an 
island lies very close to a foreign mainland. This is, as in the case of the Channel 
Islands, when the distance between the island and the foreign mainland does not 
exceed 24 nautical miles. In this case, a distinction needs to be drawn between the 
landward side and the seaward side. In respect to the landward side, where the 
coast of the island faces the coast of the foreign state mainland, a local median 
line is to be constructed in the area between the two coasts. In the Anglo/French 
Arbitration, where the Channel Islands were isolated from the French coast by 
115 See Charney & Alexanders, op. cit., n. l 09, at p.1550. For an illustrative map, see figure 15. 
116 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Arbitration, at para. 103. 
117 Article 2 of the special agreement between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, see 77 /LR, at p.643. 
118 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Arbitration, at para 1 11 (a). See also para.16. It is worth mentioning 
here that a 2 nautical miles territorial sea limit in this direction was also proposed by Guinea-
Bissau. See para. 17 of the Award. 
119 F. · · 49 524 1tzmaunce, op. cit., n. , at p. . 
120 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Arbitration, at para. 111 (a). 
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narrow waters, the Court was not asked to delimit the boundary in this area. 121 
This, however, did not prevent the Court from observing that in such narrow 
waters a median line appears to be a practical and an equitable boundary. 122 
In state practice such a solution was adopted in a similar situation to that of 
the Channel Islands. The Australia-Papua New Guinea agreement of 1978 may 
serve as an example. In this agreement the two parties agreed to grant the 
Australian Islands situated off the Papua New Guinea coast 3 nautical miles 
territorial sea. 
123 
This limit in the landward side is in fact a median line between 
the Islands' coastlines and that of the Papua New Guinea, since the distance 
between the two coasts is about 6 nautical miles. 124 In respect to the seaward side 
the Australian Islands have been restricted to a 3-nautical-mile limit. 125 
An alternative treatment of the effect of an island situated very close to a 
foreign mainland is to give the island no effect in the delimitation. As mentioned 
earlier, Argentina and Uruguay in their boundary agreement of 1973 agreed to 
disregard the Argentinean island of Martin Garcia, situated on the Uruguayan side 
of the agreed line. However, such a solution, in the absence of agreement, could 
not be based on law, but can be decided by a court applying an ex aequo et bona 
procedure, or can be recommended by a conciliation commission. 126 
(2) The effect of islands in continental shelf delimitation 
A general survey of state practice and international decisions indicates that 
islands in continental shelf delimitation have been variously attributed three 
121 Article 2( 1) of the arbitration agreement. 
122 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.22. Similarly, see Dubai/Sharjah Award, at p.674; 
0{1penheim 's, op. cit., n.83, at pp.613-4. 
12
· See Article 3(2) of the agreement. The text of the agreement is reproduced in Charney & 
Alexanders, op. cit., n.109, at p.941. 
124 Bowett, D.W., "Islands, Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation," International Maritime Boundaries, Charney & Alexanders (eds.), Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands (1993), at p.147. Another example is the territorial sea 
agreement between France and Canada of 1972 in regard to the boundary between St Pierre-
M iquelon and Newfoundland. The text of the agreement is reproduced in Charney & Alexanders, 
op. cit., n.109, at pp.396-7. 
125 See Article 3(2) of the Australia-Papua New Guinea agreement of 1978. 




different effects: ( 1) no effect; (2) partial effect; (3) full effect. Each outcome will 
now be examined. 
(a) Islands given no effect 
Although there is no doubt about the entitlement of islands to continental 
shelf rights, in some cases this entitlement may be denied. In reality, this depends 
primarily upon an island's geographical position in the area of delimitation. For 
example, if the island is situated on, close to, or on the wrong side of the median 
line zone, it would be denied any effect in continental shelf delimitation where 
this is necessary in order to avoid any disproportionate distorting effect on the 
overall result. This is usually done where the delimitation area is in a closed sea 
or semi-enclosed sea, or where the size of the delimitation area is insignificant. 
Giving the island no continental shelf effect could be done by granting it an 
enclave of territorial sea only. State practice provides a number of instances for 
such treatment. For example, the treatment of Abu-Dhabi island of Diyenah in the 
Qatar-Abu-Dhabi agreement of 1969 is often cited in the literature as a case 
where an island was attributed an enclave effect of a territorial sea limit only. 127 
This treatment is somewhat similar to the outcome given in case law for an island 
in a similar position. The case of Abu Musa island in the Dubai/Sharjah Award 
serves as a good example. The Court in this Award gave the Island no effect in 
the continental shelf delimitation between two adjacent Emirates. In the course of 
justifying its decision the Court said that giving no effect for continental shelf 
purposes to the said island "would preserve the equities of the geographical 
situation and would be consistent, for example, with comparable regional 
practice."' 28 The Court went on to give examples of these practices.
129 
127 See, for example, Bowett, op. cit., n.124, at p.143; Karl, 0., "Islands and the Delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf: A framework for Analyses," 71 AJIL ( 1977), at p.66 l: Evans, M., Relevant 
Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, Claredon Press, Oxford ( 1989), at p.149. 




(b) Islands given partial effect 
In some cases, giving full effect to an island that is situated between two 
mainlands would cause a disproportionate distorting effect on the result of 
delimitation. Equally, giving no effect would not result m an equitable 
delimitation. The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo/French Arbitration was faced 
with such a dilemma when it considered the effect of the British Isles of Scilly. 
These Isles are situated on the correct side of the median line, but 21 nautical 
miles from the mainland of England. They face the French island of Ushant, 
which is situated only 14 nautical miles off the French coast. The French and the 
English coasts are opposite each other, and an equidistance line, therefore, should 
be an equitable boundary between them. The location of the Scilly Isles resulted 
in the extension of the British coastal frontage farther into the Atlantic region 
than the French coastal frontage. The effect of the Scilly Isles was thus '~to deflect 
the equidistance line on a considerably more south-westerly course than would be 
the case if it were to be delimited from the baseline of the English mainland."
130 
The Court of Arbitration raised the question of whether giving the Scilly Isles a 
full effect continental shelf would "distort the boundary and have 
d . . f:c: b h " 131 Tl C d 1 1sproport1onate e 1ect as etween t e two states. 1e ourt answere t 1e 
question in the affirmative, and then concluded that: 
the additional projection of the Scilly Isles into the Atlantic region does constitute an element 
of distortion which is material enough to justify the delimitation of a boundary other than the 
strict median line envisaged in Article 6, paragraph I, of the Convention. 132 
However, it was felt that it would be equally inequitable to give no effect to 
the said Isles since they already had a 12-mile fishery zone, which had been 
recognized by the French Government. In addition, the Scilly Isles are a 
geographical fact in the Atlantic region, of a certain size and population, and 
there is no question of equity completely refashioning geography. 133 The Court, 
as appears in the map reproduced below, attributed a half effect continental shelf 
t:rn Anglo/French Arbitration, at para. 243. 
131 Ibid., at para. 244. 
132 Ibid. 
m Ibid., see also para. 249; North Sea Cases, at para. 91. 
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for the Scilly Isles in the delimilation. This half effect, the court said, was an 
"appropriate and practical method of abating the disproportion and inequity 
which [wouldJ otherwise result from giving full effect to the Scilly Isles as a 
base-point for determining the course of the boundary."134 
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Figure: (26) I lalf effect continental shelf for the cilly Isles. 




Ibid , at para 251. see also para. 248. More discussion on the Serif) Isles· half effect m later 
stages of 1h1s chapter 
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Professor Bowett, commenting on the concept of 'half effect', wrote that the 
notion "was designated to reduce if not eliminate the assumed distorting effect of 
the island."
135 
A half effect continental shelf limit for an island, which was used 
for the first time in the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement of 1968, 136 is in practice 
halfway between two equidistance lines. The first is an equidistance line between 
the two coastlines measured without reference to the island; and the second is an 
equidistance line constructed between the island coast and the foreign mainland 
coast. The method of giving half effect consists in drawing a line "mid-way 
between those two equidistance lines." 137 
It worth noting here that the technique of half effect, though it is used in the 
context of continental shelf boundary, is measured from the baseline and not from 
the outer limit of the territorial sea where the continental shelf begins. 138 In the 
Tunisia v. Libya Case, for example, the World Court in the course of elaborating 
the method of half effect to the Tunisian islands of Kerkennah stated that: 
the delimitation line ... is to be parallel to a line drawn from that point bisecting the angle 
between the line of the Tunisian coast (42°) and the line along the seaward coast ~f the 
Kerkennah Islands (62°), that is to say at an angle of 52° to the meridian. 139 
In international decisions, where such a method is applied, there is no clear 
explanation of why a half effect continental shelf for an island is to be a mid-way 
line between two equidistance lines constructed from the baseline, and not from 
the outer limit of the territorial sea. 140 A possible explanation could be that the 
method of half effect, as the Court in the Anglo/French Arbitration stated, 
"consists in delimiting the line equidistant between the two coasts." 141 An 
equidistance line, it will be recalled, is a line "every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
135 Bowett, op. cit., n.124, at p.140. 
136 Bowett, 0., The legal Regime of Islands in International law, Oceana Publications Inc., New 
York ( 1979), at p.140. For discussion on the 1968 agreement, see Chapter Five. 
137 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.251. 
138 Article 76 of the 1982 Convention. 
139 Italics added, Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.129. See also Anglo/French Arbitration, at para. 
251; Gulf of Maine Case, at para.222 of the Judgement and para.13 of the Technical Report. 
140 Tunisia v. Libya Case, at para.129; see also Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.251. 
141 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.251. 
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sea of each State is measured." 142 Furthermore, although the continental shelf 
began from the outer limit of the territorial sea, the distance of 200 nautical miles 
continental shelf limit is started from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each state is measured. Finally, it is difficult to determine what 
the half effect continental shelf would be, if it were to be measured from the outer 
limit of the territorial sea, where the two states involved in the delimitation 
claimed different territorial sea limits. 
Figure 27 below explains the process of measuring half effect for an island. 
This uncomplicated process makes the half effect technique the easiest and "the 
most 'popular' method of giving islands reduced effect," 143 rather than a 25 per 
cent or 75 per cent effect. An example of giving half effect in state practice is the 
agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in respect to the effect of the Iranian 
island of Kharag. 144 The two parties, as we have seen, agreed to give the Island a 
half effect continental shelf limit. 145 Additional examples of giving half effect for 
an island can be found in the ICJ treatment to the Tunisian islands of Kerkennah 
in the Tunisia v. Libya Case. The Islands, which lie opposite the Tunisian 
mainland, were granted a half effect continental shelf. The Court justified this 
amount for the Kerkennah islands for the following reasons: (I) there were a 
number of examples in state practice in which only partial effect had been given 
to an island situated opposite to the coast; (2) the Kerkennah islands were close to 
the Tunisian coast; 146 (3) the Islands have an area of 180 square kilometres. 147 In 
a similar maimer, the Chamber in the Gu({ of Maine Case dealt with the Canadian 
island of Seal in the delimitation between the US and Canada. The Chamber 
enumerated the following reasons for attributing half effect: (I) Seal island is in 
142 Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958. 
l.tJ See Evans, op. cit., n.127, at p.148. 
1
.i
4 For the text of the agreement, see Charney & Alexanders, op. cit., n.109. at p.1526. Similarly, 
in the Greece/Italy agreements of 1977, the parties agreed to give half effect to the Greek island 
of Strofades, which is small and far from the Greek mainland. See Ibid., at p.1598. 
145 See Chapter Five for more details. 
146 The Islands are situated 11 nautical miles off the Tunisian coastline. This, however, did not 
characterize the Islands as coastal islands, to be used in calculating the length of the Tunisian 
coastline, like Jerba island. 
147 Tunisia v. Libya Case, at paras.12 and 129. 
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an important geographical position, in that it controls the entry to the Gulf of 
Maine;(2) although the Island is only two and a half miles long, it is inhabited 
throughout the year;(3) the Chamber rejected a full effect for the said Island, 
since that effect would be excessive and would result in cutting off an area from 
the US continental shelf. 148 
State A 
,. Islands disregarded 
Islands aiven half effect_::..-.-..:.--::::-.:.-.-...:::...-.-..:-: 
~ ------- ~Islands given full effect 
State B 
Figure: (27) A method of giving half effect to islands belong 
to State A. 
Source: Map distributed at Workshop on Geographical 
and Technical Considerations in Maritime Boundary . 
Delimitations. University Of Durham. International 
Boundary Research Unit. 17 July 1996. 
148 
Gulf of Maine Case, at para.222. It is notable that Seal island was given half effect, unlike the 
Tunisian island of Jerba, despite the fact that it had been used, like Jerba island, in calculating the 
length of the Canadian coastline. The important geographical position of the Canadian Island 
might be the reason behind the difference in effect between the Canadian Island and the Tunisian 
island of Jerba. Otherwise this difference in treatment demonstrates nothing other than the 
difficulty of detecting any general rules in actual practice. 
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(c) Islands given full effect 
Although in international law it is indisputable that both an island and a 
continental mainland can equally generate maritime zones, m practise this 
equality has not always been observed. As we have seen, the entitlement of an 
island has for some time been reduced or ignored in favour of a continental 
mainland. There were, however, two situations in state practice where this equal 
capacity has been maintained. 
The first was where the island was not situated between two mainlands. The 
Thailand-India (Nicobar islands) agreement of 1978 can be cited as an example. 
The Indian islands of Nicobar, a remote island isolated 1275 kilometres from the 
Indian coastline, was agreed to have, in principle, full effect against the Thai 
coastline. 149 Another example may be found in the Norway-Denmark (Faroe 
islands) agreements of 1979. These Danish islands, isolated from Demnark's 
mainland, and situated opposite to the Norwegian mainland, were given, m 
principle, full effect in the said agreement vis-a-vis the Norwegian coastline. 150 
The second situation in which an island would have full effect is where there 
is another island under the sovereignty of the other state, and thus the two islands 
would balance each other out. The US-Mexico agreement of 1978 granted full 
effect continental shelf to the US islands of San Clemente and San Nicolas. In 
return, the said agreement gave full effect to the Mexican island of Guadelupe. 151 
In case law where delimitation is based on law, an island, as in state practice, 
has often been afforded less, or no, effect on the continental shelf and EEZ 
boundary. A number of examples have been cited earlier. In spite of this, the 
Court of Arbitration in the St.Pierre and Miquelon Award, 152 and the World 
Court in the Jan Mayen Case 153 have deviated from early practice and reasserted 
the equal capacity of an island and a continental mainland when they faced a 
149 For the text of the agreement, see Charney & Alexanders, op. cit., n.109, at p.1440. 
150 Ibid., at p.1717. 
151 Ibid., at p.444. 
152 Between France and Canada. 
153 Between Norway and Denmark. 
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similar geographical situation to that of the Indian islands of Nicobar and the 
Danish islands of Faroe. 154 The ICJ for example stated that: 
The coast of Jan Mayen, no less than that of eastern Greenland, generates potential title to the 
maritime areas recognised by customary law, i.e. in principle up to a limit of 200 miles from its 
baselines. 155 
The justifications for the Court's position are that the islands involved in 
these two cases are ocean islands and not "an incidental feature in a delimitation 
between two mainland, and approximately commensurate, coasts." 156 Secondly, 
"there being nothing to the east of St.Pierre and Miquelon except the open waters 
of the Atlantic Ocean, there is more scope for redressing the inequities" as 
opposed to the case where the island is situated in narrow waters between two 
continental mainlands. 157 
As a result, the French islands of St.Pierre and Miquelon, and the Norwegian 
island of Jan Mayen were found not to constitute special circumstances and thus 
were, in general, on an equal footing with the continental mainland in terms of 
the entitlement to generate maritime zones. The Court of Arbitration in this 
context stated that the "extent of the seaward projections will depend, in every 
case, on the geographical circumstances; for example, a particular coast, however 
short, may have a seaward projection as far as 200 miles, if there are no 
competing coasts that could require a curtailed reach." 158 The outcome in the Jan 
Mayen Case, however, was not strictly consisted with the Court's 
acknowledgement of the existence of an equal capacity between Jan Mayen coast 
and that of Greenland. In this case, as we have seen in Chapter Tlu·ee, the Court 
considered the difference in length between the two coasts as a special 
circumstances within the meaning of Article 6. For this and other reasons, 159 as 
15
"' See above. 
155 Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at para. 70. 
156 France/Canada Award, at para.42; Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.200. 
157 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.200. Likewise the case of Jan Mayen, Greenland v. Jan 
Mayen Case, at para. 70. 
1511 France/Canada Award, at paras. 45 and 70; Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at paras.70 and 80; 
see also Evans, M., "Less than an Ocean Apart: the St Pierre and Miquelon and Jan Mayen 
Islands and the Delimitation of Maritime Zones," 43 ICLQ ( 1994), at pp.689-90. 
159 E.g., to give equal access to fishing resources in the area of overlapping claim. Greenland v. 
Jan Mayen Case, at paras.72-76 and 92. See also Chapter Three/Section Two. 
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appears in the map below, it adjusted the equidistance line between the two coasts 
to the advantage of the Greenland. 160 The Court in doing so, was giving a 
decision which was incompatible with the doctrine of equal capacity that it had 
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Figure: (28) Greenland-Jan Mayen boundary. 








Greenland v . .Jan Mayen Case, at para.69. For further discussion on proportionality, see above 
at pp.142-6. 
161 
Ibid., at para. 70. 
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Second: The effect of a disputed island in the delimitation 
In this case we can distinguish between two situations. The first is when the 
dispute about the sovereignty of the island is between the parties to the 
delimitation. The second, when the dispute about the sovereignty of the island is 
between one of the parties in the delimitation and a third state. In respect of the 
former one solution is to draw the boundary line and determine the sovereignty of 
the island. However, it is most likely that the island in this case will have reduced 
effect or no effect at all. Bowett, in this regard, remarked that this possible 
treatment for an island in such a case "may be the 'price' one party has to pay for 
having its sovereignty recognised." 162 The India/Sri Lanka agreement of 1974 
may be cited as an example. Sri Lanka by this agreement secured its sovereignty 
over the Kachchantiva island, which lies in the median zone. Correspondingly Sri 
Lanka claimed no effect for the Kachchantiva island that could modify the 
median line between the two coastlines. In addition, Sri Lanka allowed Indian 
fishermen access to visit Kachchantiva island. 163 Another example is the island of 
Hans which is situated midway between Canada and Denmark (Greenland). The 
sovereignty over the island is disputed between the two states; in their maritime 
boundary agreement of 1973 the island was given no effect in delimitation. 164 
An alternative solution, however, is to stop the boundary line short of the 
point where the disputed island may have an effect on the boundary line. The 
197 4 continental. shelf agreement between Iran and U AE ended the agreed 
boundary line between them at point 5, that is, 14.54 nautical miles from the 
disputed island of Abu Musa. 165 
In respect of the latter, the case where the dispute about the sovereignty of the 
island involves a third state, the disputed island, it might be argued, should have 
162 Bowett, op. cit., n.124, at p.136; See also Bowett, D.W., "The Dubai/Sharjah Boundary 
Arbitration of 1981," 65 BYBIL (1994), at p.130. 
163 Charney & Alexanders, op. cit., n.109, at pp.1416-7. For an illustrative map, see Figure 4. 
164 Ibid., at pp.380-5 and see also p.372. 
165 For further examples, see Oxman, B., "Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations," 
International Maritime Boundaries, Charney & Alexanders (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
the Netherlands ( 1993), at pp.20-1. For an illustrative map and discussion on the UAE-Iran 
agreement of 1974, see Chapter Four/Section One. 
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no effect in the delimitation. This is because its ownership is not certain for the 
claiming or the controlling state. It is, however, difficult to find an example in 
state practice to support the denial of the island's effect because of a dispute over 
its ownership. However, the converse is not true. The Fiji-France (New 
Caledonia) agreement of 1983 (not yet in force) may serve as an example of 
giving effect to an island whose ownership by one party to the agreement is not 
certain. The French islands of Matthew and Hunter (also claimed by Vanuatu), in 
this agreement, were given full effect in drawing the equidistance line between 
the French (New Caledonia) and Fijian economic zones boundary. 166 
In the Dubai/Sharjah Award, the Government of Sharjah declared, with 
regard to the effect of an island the sovereignty of which is disputed, that it was 
"aware of no case where a boundary agreement between two States has ignored 
the presence of an island which was claimed both by one party only to the 
agreement, and a third State."167 The Court of Arbitration clearly did not uphold 
the Sharjah argument, though it gave a full effect territorial sea limit to the island 
of Abu Musa, despite the fact that there was a dispute about the sovereignty of 
the island between Iran and Sharjah (UAE). The precise reason behind the 
attribution of this full effect territorial sea to the Abu Musa island, it might be 
suggested, was that the Island already had a 12-mile territorial sea limit. This 
limit was recognized by Iran which was, and still is, in dispute with Sharjah over 
the sovereignty of the Island. 168 Moreover, Dubai itself did not argue for no effect 
to be given to the Abu Musa island, rather it proposed a three nautical miles 
territorial sea for it. 169 Therefore, the decision of the Court of Arbitration to give 
an effect to the island of Abu Musa-whose sovereignty is claimed by Iran and 
Sharjah--cannot be used as conclusive evidence to support an effect for an island 
whose ownership is disputed by one party to the negotiation and a third state. 
166 Charney & Alexanders, op. cit., n.109, at p.1000. 
167 Dubai/Shwjah Award, at p.666. 
168 Article 3 of A 'Memorandum of Understanding' between Iran and Sharjah of November 1971. 
The Memorandum is re-printed in Al-Bahama, op. cit., n.63, at p.345. 
169 Dubai/Sharjah Award, at p.664 and p.674. 
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It might be suggested that here the island should be ignored until the question 
of its sovereignty is resolved. An illustration of this point would be of value. 
Suppose that states A and B are negotiating an agreement to determine their 
respective maritime boundaries. The parties have agreed to give no effect to state 
A's island. This is because of a dispute about the sovereignty of the island 
between state A and state C. In the delimitation agreement between states A and 
B, the parties need to indicate that, if there is a future settlement to the 
sovereignty question over the island between states A and C, the boundary line 
between states A and B would be adjusted to be consistent with the settlement of 
the territorial dispute between states A and C. Otherwise the boundary line 
between states A and B should be terminated at a point before the area of 
disputed sovereignty; the island. The Australia-France agreement of 1982 may 
serve as an example. The boundary line, as traced in the map reproduced below, 
was terminated at point R22, which was situated about 220 nautical miles from 
the disputed islands of Matthew and Hunter (both claimed by France and 
Vanuatu). This was because going any further would prevent Australia from 
avoiding any involvement in "the territorial dispute between France and Vanuatu 
over the ownership of Matthew and Hunter islands which are controlled by 
France but claimed by Vanuatu." 170 
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An island as a special circumstance 
In order for an island to be regarded as a special circumstance two conditions 
must be fulfilled. Firstly, its position needs to be between two mainlands, either 
opposite or adjacent. Secondly, the island would cause disproportionately 
distorting effects, if it were to be given full effect in the delimitation. Hence, the 
position and the distorting effect of an island together determine the legal 
character of a particular island as to whether or not it is considered as constituting 
a special circumstance. 171 In addition, the issue of the political status of an island 
is a factor which may distinguish between an island which is a special 
circumstance from an island which is not. If the island is an independent state, 
e.g. the state of Malta, it would be treated as a mainland. 172 But, if the political 
status of the island is only that of a dependent territory or if it forms a part of 
another state, e.g. the Channel Islands, it could be seen as a special circumstance, 
if the first two conditions, i.e. the position and the effect, are fulfilled. The natural 
result which follows from the foregoing is that an ocean island (i.e. one not 
situated between two mainlands) or an island given no effect in the delimitation, 
could no longer be regarded as a special circumstance. 173 
In the next section we shall investigate the possible effect of Abu Musa and 
the two Tunbs islands on the maritime boundary of Iran and the U AE. The 
Islands, as mentioned, are situated in a semi-enclosed sea between the coasts of 
opposite states. 174 And, as we shall illustrate in the following section, any effect 
these islands may have, would have some knock-on effect on the two sides' 
offshore boundaries. These two factors would cause these three Islands to be 
regarded as special circumstances that may justify a departure from the median 
line between the two states. 
171 O'Connell, op. cit., n.83, at p.718. See also Judge Schwebel's separate opinion in the 
Greenlandv. Jan Mayen Case, at p.123. 
172 Libya v. Malta Case, at para. 53. See also Evans, op. cit., n.127, at p.13 7. 
173 Similar view was held by Evans, op. cit., n.127, at p.149. 




Our discussions on the effect of islands in maritime boundary delimitation 
show the similarity between state practice and case law in addressing the question 
of islands in delimitation. 175 This consistency between the two may improve the 
degree of predictability and compatibility in the law of maritime boundary 
delimitation. 176 Moreover, our examination of state practice and case law in this 
section indicate some common elements, although these do not clearly show how 
much effect should be given to an island to guide decision making, 177 in the 
matter of what effect needs to be attributed to an island when it is constituted a 
special circumstance. Generally speaking, this effect might be full, partial or 
nothing at all. We shall now list these elements for each effect: 
(a) Giving no effect to the island 
An island is ignored: 
( 1) If the geographical feature is merely a rock, which cannot sustain human 
habitation or an economic life of its own, the island, for the parties to the 1982 
Convention, has no continental shelf or EEZ; (2) If it faces another island under 
the sovereignty of the opposite or adjacent state, the two islands may cancel each 
other out and have no effect in order to create a simple median line; (3) If the pre-
existing regional practices give no effect to an island in that region, the island 
might have no effect for the continental shelf. 
(b) Giving full or partial effect 
An island is attributed a full or reduced effect: 
175 This was specially clear in regard to continental shelf delimitation where almost all the 
existing case law involves a dispute on the continental shelf boundary. 
176 See the conclusion of Chapter Three. 
177 In this regard it is interesting to quote the statement of Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion in 
the Tunisia v. Libya Case: "It must be admitted that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
devise a general formula applicable to all cases in such a way as to indicate the shape of any 
coastline, or the nature (size, economy, distance from mainland, etc.) of any island, to be wholly 
or partially disregarded. The geographical circumstances will have to be evaluated in each case in 
the light of what is regarded as representing equity, to be verified by proportionality between the 
continental shelf areas assigned and the lengths of the relevant coasts." See ICJ Reports 1982, at 
p.267, para.176; similarly, Judge Weeramantr's separate opinion in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen 
Case, at p.244, para. I 09; Bowett, op. cit., n.136, at p.42; Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.83, at pp.613-4. 
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( 1) If the regional practices acknowledge this effect to similar islands in that 
region. 
(2) If it has significant size, population or potential resources. 
(3) If it is situated on the correct side of the median line, and not too close to it. 
( 4) If it has an important geographical position. 
( 5) If the full or partial effect will not cause a disproportionately distorting effect. 
(6) If there is another island on the opposite side of the median line lying under 
the sovereignty of the opposite or adjacent state, both islands may balance each 
other and have the same effect, either full or partial. 
(7) If the island already had a certain limit for one of its maritime zones which 
had been recognized by the neighbouring states. 178 
(c) Giving an enclave 
An island is given an enclave if it is situated on or close to the median line or 
on the wrong side of the median line, and if giving full or partial effect would 
result in cutting off an area belonging to another state. Finally, adopting the 
enclave solution is an implicit rejection of the equal capacity to generate maritime 
space between the coast of an island and that of a continental mainland. 179 This 
was possibly the reason why the Court in the St Pierre and Miquelon Award, was 
unwilling to adopt the enclave solution, and thus it rejected the Canadian 
argument to restrict the effect of the French Islands to the west within an enclave 
of 12 nautical miles limit. 180 Geoffrey Marston in explaining the Court's position 
wrote that the Court acceptance of equal capacity between the two coasts "to 
generate maritime space, made it almost impossible for the court to cut down 
( ) SPM l81 . . 1 ,,182 ampuler to a mere terntona sea. 
178 For example. the Channel Islands already had a fishery zone. Similarly, Abu Musa island, in 
the Dubai/Sharjah Award, had a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. 
179 See above. 
18° French/Canada Award, at para.70. The Court considered an additional belt of 12 nautical 
miles represented "a reasonable and equitable solution," and "would meet to some degree the 
reasonable expectations of France of title beyond the narrow belt of territorial sea." See paras.69 
and 68. 
is1 S p· M' 1 t 1erre- 1que on. 




The effect of the three Islands 
The effect of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands upon the median line 
depends primarily upon their legal status. Since the focus of this work is the 
maritime boundary and not the question of sovereignty, the task of determining 
where sovereignty over the three islands properties lies is beyond its scope. 183 
However, it is possible to address the delimitation issue in the context of the two 
parties' positions on the sovereignty question. In such a case two likely scenarios 
are suggested: 184 
( 1) The U AE secures sovereignty over the Islands and Iran, therefore, drops its 
claims and withdraws from them; 
(2) Iran gains the Islands and the UAE gives up its demands to have its 
sovereignty over them restored. 
Each possible scenario has its own impact upon the median line between the 
two neighbouring states. This median line is the provisional boundary line 
between the two parties' continental shelf and exclusive economic zone limit. 185 
Due to the fact that the width between the two sides of the Gulf is increasing in a 
westerly direction, the median line between the UAE and Iran constructed 
without reference to the three Islands is a line every point of which is about 28.5 
(in Greater Tunb area) and about 32.5 nautical miles (in Little Tunb area) and 
about 36.715 nautical miles (in Abu Musa area) from each coastline. 
110 A number of writers have discussed the question of sovereignty, e.g. Al-Bdwly, op. cit., n.7; 
see also Al Roken, M., "A Historical And Legal Dimensions Of The United Arab Emirates-Iran 
Dispute Over Three Gulf Islands," Attaawun Quarterly Journal, Department of Information, The 
General Secretariat of the GCC., Saudi Arabia ( 1992), at pp.13-28. For the Iranian view, see 
Davoud H. Bavand, The Historical, Political and legal Bases of Iran's Sovereignty over the 
Islands of Tunb and Abu-Musa, Internet Concepts Inc., New York ( 1994); Amirahmadi H. (ed.) 
Small Islands, Big Politics, Macmillan, USA ( 1996). 
184 This does not mean that there are no other possible scenarios, e.g., joint sovereignty. However, 
in our discussion we will be limited to the two scenarios suggested in the text, since these 
possibilities are the only two advanced by the Iranian and the UAE's authorities. 
185 See the provision of Article 19 of the Iranian Law and Article 23(2) of the UAE Law. For 
more details, see Chapter five. 
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The entitlement of an island to maritime zones in international law extends, as 
we have seen, to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic 
zone and the continental shelf. Our discussion here, however, is limited to their 
territorial sea and continental shelf effect in a possible UAE-Iran continental shelf 
boundary delimitation. This is because a single boundary line for the continental 
shelf and the EEZ boundaries was adopted by Iran 186 and the UAE. 187 Moreover, 
a delimitation of an EEZ boundary will automatically bring about delimitation of 
a contiguous zone boundary, since the latter forms part of the former. 
Now we shall turn to examine the effect of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and 
Little Tunb in respect of a territorial sea and continental shelf boundary in each of 
the two scenarios described above. 
(1) The territorial sea 
In general, where the distance between an island and the coast of an opposite 
or an adjacent state is 24 nautical miles or more, entitlement to a 12 nautical 
miles territorial sea limit is not questionable. 188 However, when the distance is 
less than 24 nautical miles, the median line system, in some cases, is the 
boundary line, whereas in other cases a modified median line is a more 
appropriate and equitable boundary line. This was clearly stated by the Court of 
Arbitration in the Dubai/Sharjah Award, in respect to the entitlement of Abu 
Musa island to a 12 nautical miles territorial sea limit. The Court in this regard 
indicated that: 
Abu Musa is an island in the mid-Gulf which is, in the view of this Court, entitled ex principio 
to a belt of territorial sea quite independently and separately from either the actual or potential 
continental shelf claims of neighbouring States. The entitlement of an island to a belt of 
territorial sea does not of course prejudge how much territorial sea the island is entitled to. That 
is a question which will arise, for example, if the entitlement to territorial sea of an island 
affects its territorial sea boundary with another adjacent or opposite State. Such is not the case 
with the island of Abu Musa; here there is no question of an equidistance territorial sea 
boundary between the island and adjacent or opposite States, or of the examination of 'special 
186 See the Iranian statement before the UNCLOS Ill, Official Records, vol. I, at p.72, para.22; see 
also the Iranian EFZ Proclamation of 1973. For further information on this proclamation, see 
Chapter Five/Section One. 
187 Article 3 of the UAE declaration of 1980. For more discussion on the notion of single 
boundary line, see Chapter Three/Section One. 
188 See Chapter One/ Section Five. 
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circumstances' which might give rise to equitable considerations with respect to the territorial 
189 
sea boundary of Abu Musa. 
The territorial sea limit of the disputed Islands, namely, Abu Musa and the 
two Tunbs islands, in this case should be considered in the two possible 
scenarios. This, however, makes no significant difference to the island of Abu 
Musa, since it is located mid-way between the two parties. Very likely a third 
party applying international law would give that Island a full effect territorial sea 
limit, irrespective of whether it was allocated to the UAE or Iran. 190 In doing so, 
the third party would be endorsing the decision of the Court of Arbitration in the 
Dubai/Sharjah Award, and at the same time be upholding the mutual recognition 
of Iran and Sharjah of a 12 nautical miles territorial sea for the said Island. 191 
Moreover, a full effect territorial sea limit would be consistent with comparable 
regional practice as applied to the islands of al-Arabiyah and Farise in the Saudi 
Arabia-Iran agreement of 1968. 192 
The case of the two Tunbs is quite different. This is because they are located 
close to the Iranian mainland. Thus, if Iran obtained sovereignty over them, they 
would be viewed as islands proximate to their own mainland coast. In 
delimitation, this case usually causes no difficulty, and thus the two Islands 
would be allocated a full effect territorial sea limit. Professor Bowett in this 
regard wrote that: 
It is not unusual to find islands lying close to a mainland, and under the same sovereignty, 
being given full effect. Because of their proximity, they are regarded as integrated with the 
. I d 193 mam an . 
1
R
9 Dubai/Shwjah Award, at p.674. See also Anglo/French Arbitration, at para.22; Jennings, R.Y., 
"Equity and Equitable Principles," 42 Ann Suisse De Droit International ( 1986), at p.29; Bowett, 
op. cit .. n.136. at pp.34-44. 
190 See below for the need to construct a local median line to the south-east of Abu Musa island 
between its territorial sea and the Tunbs islands group territorial sea where the sovereignties over 
the three Islands do not fall within one party. 
191 Article 3 of the Memorandum reads: 
"Iran and Sharjah recognized the breadth of the Island's territorial sea as twelve nautical miles." 
192 For more information on this agreement, see Chapter Five. 
193 Bowett, op. cit., n.124, at p. I 37. In a similar vein, Padwa held that it seems reasonable to 
include for the purpose of territorial sea measurement, islands which "could be fairly considered 
an integral part of the coastal domain." See Padwa, D.J. "Submarine Boundaries," 9 ICLQ ( 1960), 
at p.647. 
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However, were the UAE to restore its sovereignty over the two islands, they 
would be characterized as islands proximate to a foreign mainland. On the 
landward side, facing the Iranian coastline, where the distance is 20 nautical miles 
in Little Tunb and 15 nautical miles in Greater Tunb, a local median line may be 
established between the Islands' coastlines and the Iranian coastline. 194 On the 
seaward side, the two Islands (see the map below) would most likely be given an 




rnJ 12 NM territorial sea limit for the two Tunbs in lhe seaward side. 
Figure: (30) 
Source: The Author. 
\ .-
, -
194 The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo/French Award acknowledged the equity of constructing 
a median line in the narrow waters between the coast of the Channel Islands and the French coast; 
see the Award at para.22. For further examples, see above in Section Two. For the possibility of 
formulating a general rule for the effect of islands, see above at note 77. 
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The most compelling precedent of relevance is the Channel Islands in the 
Anglo/French Arbitration. 195 In this Award the Court of Arbitration gave the 
Channel Islands a three nautical miles territorial sea limit 196 in the northern and 
western sectors of their coast towards the English coastline, despite their being on 
the French side of the median line. 197 The three nautical miles limit at that time, it 
must be noted, was the full effect territorial sea limit under the British laws. 198 
Towards the southwest of the two Tunbs islands is the island of Abu Musa. In 
this case a local median line would be constructed between the two Tunbs 
territorial seas and the Abu Musa island territorial sea, since the distance between 
the two baselines is about 20 nautical miles. Needless to say, this median line is 
necessary only where the Iranian view on sovereignty of Abu Musa prevails. 199 
(2) The continental shelf 
As far as Abu Musa island is concerned the location of sovereignty would, as 
with the territorial sea, be irrelevant, in respect to its entitlement to a continental 
shelf effect in the delimitation of the boundary between Iran and UAE. It is 
submitted that the Island should have no effect beyond its territorial sea limit. 
Otherwise, a disproportionate and exaggerated entitlement to maritime space 
between the two parties would result. Such a distorted effect of the Island may 
qualify it as being a special circumstance and thus requiring special treatment to 
eliminate this effect. This could be done by giving the Island an enclave effect of 
a territorial sea limit only. The enclave effect, Evans stated, is the appropriate 
solution for islands that are located close to, or on the wrong side of the median 
195 
For the reasons why it is the most compelling precedent of relevance, see p.299. 
I% In addition to a nine nautical miles continental shelf limit. This meant that the Channel Islands 
were attributed an area of 12 nautical miles. See in this relation the remarks of Professor Brown, 
op. cit., n. 93, at p.120. See also below for further discussion on the effect of the Channel Islands. 
197 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para. 202. 
198 
The British Government, by the Territorial Sea Act of 1987, extended the breadth of the 
British islands' territorial sea limit to 12 nautical miles. The provision of this Act, however, does 
not apply to the Channel Islands. See Article 4(4) of the Act. The Territorial Sea Act of 1987 is 
reproduced in New Direction in the law of the Sea, vol.I, Simmonds K.R. (ed.), New Serial, 
Oceana Publications Inc., London, Released 88-1, issued in March 1988. 
199 Were Iran to obtain sovereignty over the two Tunbs and the UAE to restore its sovereignty 
over Abu Musa island, the need to construct a local median line between the Tunbs group and 
Abu Musa would remain the same. 
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line.200 In similar vein, Karl held that an island located close to the median line 
"is entitled only to a territorial sea and [is] not to be used as a basepoint or given 
any other significant effect in a delimitation." 201 Furthermore, M.A. Movahned, 
one of Iran's negotiators on continental shelf delimitation, has emphasized that, 
with the exception of Kharg island "no island in the Gulf should be given any 
continental shelf rights." 202 
Interestingly, the Island itself was subject to a legal examination in the course 
of the Dubai/Sharjah Award. The Court of Arbitration, it will be recalled, was 
charged with the task of determining the course of the boundary line between the 
land and maritime boundary of two member Emirates of the UAE's Federation. 
The island of Abu Musa was located close to the equidistance line between 
Sharjah and Dubai. The Court of Arbitration rejected Sharjah's claim for a half 
effect continental shelf for the Island. In justifying its decision the Court held 
that: 
To give no effect to the continental shelf entitlement of the island of Abu Musa would preserve 
the equities of the geographical situation and would be consistent, for example, with 
comparable regional practice as applied to the island of Al-Arabiyah and Farsi in the Saudi 
Arabian-Iranian agreement of January 1969,203 and Dayinah in the Abu-Dhabi-Qatar agreement 
of March 1969,204 where the continental shelf rights of islands were limited to coincide with 
their respective territorial waters, but not used as base points for the purpose of constructing 
median or equidistance boundaries in respect of the continental shelves between opposite or 
d
. 205 
a Jacent States. 
So much for the entitlement of Abu Musa island. Now we must examine the 
entitlement of the two Tunbs islands for a continental shelf effect in the 
delimitation between Iran and the UAE. Whereas the entitlement of Abu Musa 
island for a continental shelf effect should be zero, irrespective of the delimitation 
of sovereignty, the entitlement of the two Tunbs islands might be different--due 
to their proximate location to the Iranian mainland-according to whether they 
200 E . 1?7 149 vans, op. cit., n. _ , at p. . 
201 Karl, op. cit., n.127, at p.658. 
202 Quoted from Amin, S.H., "Law of the Continental Shelf: The Gulf Example," 27 NILR., 
( 1980), at p. 341. 
203 For further discussion on this agreement, see Chapter Five/ Section One. 
204 For further discussion on this agreement, see Chapter Four/ Section One. 
205 Dubai/Sha1jah Award, at p.677. 
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come under UAE sovereignty or under that of Iran. Therefore it is necessary to 
examine the effect of the two islands in each scenario separately. 
(a) Continental shelf effect of the two Tunbs islands if the UAE were to 
restore its sovereignty 
A very strong argument exists for the two Islands having no effect beyond 
their territorial sea limit in these circumstances, since they are located on the 
wrong side of the median line. An opposing argument, as illustrated in the map 
below, would produce a substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf 
which would otherwise accrue to Iran. Again the case of the Channel Islands is 
the most compelling precedent of relevance.206 The Channel Islands, it will be 
recalled, located in the English Channel are under British sovereignty, but 
situated within the arms of a gulf on the French coast and only a few nautical 
miles distant from that coast. In other words, they are situated on the wrong side 
of the median line. The Court found the presence of these Islands would, prima 
facie, constitute a special circumstance, which justified a delimitation other than 
the median line. 207 The Court of Arbitration in that Award restricted the 
continental shelf effect of the Channel Islands within their potential 12 nautical 
miles territorial sea limit, and rejected the British government's claim to give the 
Islands any further continental shelf effect beyond that limit. 208 Thus the Channel 
206 Although some recent cases in case law may appear at first glance to be relevant, since they 
contain the question of an effect for an island (like the case of the St. Pierre et Miquelon 
Arbitration of I 992), they are in fact different from the present case. This difference was been 
highlighted at p.284. 
207 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para. I 96. 
208 The Court of Arbitration found that the proper effect for the Channel Islands is "to enclose 
them in an enclave formed, to their north and west. by [a zone of seabed and subsoil extending I 2 
nautical miles from the baselines of the two Bailiwickes] and, to their east, south and south-west 
by the boundary between them and the coasts of Normandy and Brittany, the exact course of 
which it is outside the competence of the Court to specify." Anglo/French Arbitration, at para. 
202. The rationale for the Court's decision was as follows: I- Their position on the wrong side 
would result in a "substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise 
accrue to the French Republic", if they were attributed full effect; see para. I 96. 
2-The size and the importance of the Channel Islands would result in an inequitable delimitation, 
if the said Islands were ignored. Interestingly, the French Republic itself did not argue for no 
effect to be given to the Islands. Rather it proposed a six-mile enclave for them; see paras. I 87 
and I 50. 
3- The Channel Islands already had a I 2 nautical miles fishery zone, which was expressly 
recognized by the French Republic; see para.187. 
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Islands had, in effect, been given no continental shelf. Professor Bowett, in his 
highly critical remarks on the Award, noted that the Channel Islands had been 
considered by the Court of Arbitration as special circumstances. This "was for 
their geographical location, as isolated islands, on the wrong side of the median 
line and between states which were otherwise in a situation of approximate 
geographical equality, which seemed to the Court to qualify the islands as 
'special circumstances' and to be primafacie, creative of inequity." 209 
However, Professor Brown, although he agreed with the Court that the 
Channel Islands constituted special circumstances, opposed the conclusion of the 
Court in giving the Islands in effect no continental shelf limit.210 He wrote that 
the decision of the Court was hard to justify, or to "square with Article I of the 
Geneva Convention on the Continental shelf and its endorsement by the ICJ as 
declaratory of international customary law." 211 
There is no room here to challenge Professor Brown's argument that Article I 
of Convention on the Continental shelf reflects present day customary law,212 and 
thus the entitlement of islands to a continental shelf is well established.213 But the 
presence of the Channel Islands in that particular situation "disturbs the balance 
of the geographical circumstances which would otherwise exist between the 
Parties in this region as a result of the broad equality of the coastlines of their 
mainlands."214 Therefore, it was necessary to minimize the knock-on effect of the 
location of these Islands being close to the French coastline. The Court of 
Arbitration found this could be done by restricting the effect of these Islands 
within their potential territorial sea limit. 
20') . Bowett, op. cit., n.136, at p.204. 
210 This is because, in his view, 9 nautical miles of continental shelf (which the Court had decided 
for the Channel Islands, in addition to its 3 nautical miles territorial sea limit) the United 
Kingdom could have obtained independently of the Arbitration, "by claiming the [ 12 nautical 





- - North Sea Cases, at para. 63. 
m Dubai!Sharjah Award, at p.675. 
214 Anglo/French Arbitration, at para. 183. 
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Likewise, the presence of the two Tunbs islands on the wrong side of the 
median line in a rich and semi-enclosed sea, would result, as appears on the map 
below,
215 
in depriving Iran in the Tunbs islands sector of any continental shelf 
area were the two Islands to have any effect beyond their territorial sea limit. In 
addition to the foregoing, giving the two Tunbs islands no effect for the 
continental shelf would be consistent with pre-existing practice in the Gulf. The 
case of the Iranian island of Farise in the Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement of 1968 
may be cited as an example of preventing an island situated on the wrong side of 
the median line from having any effect beyond its territorial sea limit.216 
(b) Continental shelf effect of the two Tunbs islands were Iran to gain the 
Islands 
Whereas the entitlement of the two Tunbs islands to a territorial sea belt is the 
same, their entitlement to a continental shelf limit may differ. Here a distinction 
can be made, in terms of size and proximity to the Iranian mainland, between the 
Greater Tunb and the Little Tunb islands. 
The Greater Tunb island 
As mentioned above, approximately 3. 98 square miles in size, this Island lies 
15 nautical miles off the Iranian coast and 40 nautical miles off the U AE coast. It 
has a permanent population of about 200. Iran could claim a full effect 
continental shelf boundary in this context. Such a claim would, as noted earlier, 
run counter to pre-existing state practice which prevents islands situated at a 
considerable distance from the mainland having full effect continental shelf. The 
case of the Scilly Isles, located on the correct side of the median line (but 21 
nautical miles from the English mainland) in the Anglo/French Arbitration, may 
be cited as an example of denying full effect continental shelf limit for an island 
located at such a considerable distance from its mainland.217 Professor Bowett, in 
"ll5 
- See below at p.306. 
216 See Chapter Five. 
217 Anglo/French Arbitration, at paras. 243, 244, 248 and 251. See also above in Section Two for 
more details on how the Scilly Isles were treated. 
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regard to the effect of islands with such a location, wrote that, where an island is 
lying outside the territorial sea of a state, to which it belongs, the island should 
only have partial continental shelf effect.218 
Moreover, giving full effect continental shelf would result in additional 
projection to the Iranian continental shelf, brought about by cutting off an area 
which appertains to the UAE continental shelf and attributing it, thereby, to Iran. 
The overall result, as it appears in the map below,219 would mean that the Iranian 
continental shelf in the Greater Tunb area would be twice as large as the U AE 
continental shelf.220 This would cause an inequitable result in the delimitation 
between the two states, a result which both customary law and treaty law are 
anxious to avoid. 221 
Iran, however, could convincingly argue for a half effect continental shelf 
limit. The method of half effect, as we have seen,222 is mid-way between two 
equidistance lines drawn between, in this case, Iran and the U AE. The first is a 
line drawn without reference to the Greater Tunb island, and the second is a line 
constructed using the Tunb island as a base point. The method of half effect is a 
line representing half way between these two lines. Such an outcome can be 
justified on the ground that the Island lies only 15 nautical miles off the Iranian 
coast, and pre-existing practice in the Gulf gave half effect for an island with a 
similar geographical location. The case of the Iranian island of Kharg, although it 
is the only case in the region, may be cited as an example of giving half effect to 
an island situated 1 7 nautical miles from its mainland. 223 
Interestingly enough, this half effect continental shelf would not have any 
impact on the median line between the two parties' respective continental 
shelves' limit. Some nice calculations are necessary for illustration. The distance 
m Bowett, op. cit., n.136, at p.177. See also Karl, who suggests that an island in such a location 
should have no effect beyond its territorial sea limit. Karl, op. cit., n.127, at p.658 . 
..,,9 1 6 - See be ow at p.30 . 
220 The Iranian continental shelf area would extend to 38.5 nautical miles in the Greater Tunb 
area, Correspondingly, the UAE continental shelf would be limited to 18.5 nautical miles in this 
area. 
221 See Chapter Three for a discussion on the need to reach an equitable delimitation. 
222 See above at pp.280-2. 
223 See Chapter Five. 
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between the two mainlands is about 57 nautical miles. The median line between 
the mainlands, if Greater Tunb island did not lie where it does, would be a line 
every point of which would be situated at 28.5 nautical miles from Iran and the 
UAE respectively. The 28.5 nautical miles is the full effect continental shelf for 
each party's mainland. Now, turning to an interesting point, the distance between 
Greater Tunb and the UAE coastlines is 40 nautical miles. So, the median line 
between these two coastlines is a line every point of which is situated at 20 
nautical miles from Greater Tunb and the UAE respectively. Again, the 20 
nautical miles is the full effect continental shelf for Greater Tunb and the UAE 
coastlines. Giving the island half effect would mean that the island would have 10 
nautical miles' continental shelf. This is less than the 12 nautical miles' territorial 
sea limit. Accordingly, this half effect would not result in giving the Island any 
effect beyond its territorial sea limit. 
The Little Tunb island 
As noted earlier, this Island is small, barren, uninhabited and waterless. It lies 
20 nautical miles off the Iranian coast. With this geographical nature it might be 
considered to be a rock within the meaning of Article 121 (3), and thus it would 
have no continental shelf effect. However, this denial depends on whether the 
Article is a part of customary law.224 If the Article does not represent present-day, 
customary international law,225 and there was agreement to give the island a 
continental shelf effect, this could not be a full effect for the same reasons 
suggested in the case of the Greater Tunb island. In respect to a half effect 
continental shelf limit this, in practice, would give Little Tunb island only 11 
nautical miles continental shelf limit. This limit, as in the case of Greater Tunb, 
would be entirely within its 12 nautical miles territorial sea, and therefore would 
have no effect upon the UAE-Iran median line.226 
224 See above at p.270, and see also Chapter One/ Section Five for more discussion. 
225 Thus it is not applicable since the 1982 Convention is not in force between Iran and the UAE. 
226 In other words, it would give no further effect for the Island beyond its 12 nautical miles 
territorial sea limit. 
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The knock-on effects of the Islands 
These are the legal entitlements of the three Islands. The governments of the 
two countries must be regarded as being aware of these entitlements, and the 
disadvantageous effect on their maritime boundaries, if either had to give up its 
claim of sovereignty over the Islands. Such an effect, as is illustrated in the map 
reproduced below, on the loser's interests and maritime boundary limit may be 
centred, inter alia, on the following aspects. 
(a) In respect of Abu Musa island 
In effect, if Iran obtained the ownership of Abu Musa island, this would 
project the Iranian continental shelf 15 nautical miles beyond the median line. 
There would be less projection, however, were the converse to happen. This is 
due to the location of the Island in the UAE side of the median line. Thus there 
would be an 11 nautical mile adjustment in the median line towards the Iranian 
coastline. Such an adjustment in the median line in the Abu Musa island sector 
would result in putting the winner very close to the loser's mainland.227 This may 
be perceived as threatening the loser's vital interests, and preventing it from 
protecting interests which reqmre 
. 228 
protection. The Tribunal 111 the 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, in this regard, stated that: 
In order for any delimitation to be made on an equitable and objective basis, it is necessary to 
ensure that, as far as possible, each State controls the maritime territories opposite its coasts and 
in their vicinity. [Therefore, it is unacceptable, according to the equitable principles, to have a 
delimitation where] either party ... should see rights exercised opposite its coasts or in the 
immediate vicinity thereof, which could prevent the exercise of its own right to development or 
compromise its security.229 
In addition to the foregoing, the party losing the Island would lose the right of 
exploration and exploitation of Mupark oil field, which is situated 9 nautical 
miles to the south-east of the Island coast. 
227 For further details on security interest and its relevance to the delimitation process, see Chapter 
Three. 
228 Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at para.81; Libya v. Malta Case, at para.51. 
229 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Award, at paras.92, 98 and 124. 
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(b) In respect of the two Tunbs areas 
If Iran dropped its claim over the two Tunbs islands in favour of the UAE, the 
two islands would add to the UAE maritime boundary enclaves of about 19.5 and 
22 nautical miles long and about 30 nautical miles wide, completely isolated from 
other UAE maritime zones.230 This would deprive Iran of any continental shelf 
rights in this area, and would also prevent Iran from supervizing navigation in the 
designated traffic zone.231 On the other hand, it would give the UAE national 
sovereignty in an area just 7.5 nautical miles, in respect of the Greater Tunb area, 
and 10 nautical miles in respect of the Little Tunb area , from the Iranian coast. 
However, should the Iranian view prevail, there would be no significant extension 
in its maritime boundary limit beyond the median line.232 
It seems fair to suggest that the Iranian government's fear of the possibility of 
reducing its territorial sea limit to less than 12 nautical miles, and as a result 
preventing it from monitoring the innocence of a vessel's passage in the traffic 
route just outside its territorial sea, should it give up control over the two Islands, 
is the main obstacle in solving the crisis.233 This is because the two Tunbs 
islands, according to one Iranian scholar, constitute the fifth stage in the Iranian 
strategic defence line. 234 The Iranian Cabinet, therefore, would be likely to 
continue to reject any offer from the UAE to negotiate over the sovereignty of the 
two Islands; at the same time they would continue to claim their legitimate 
presence on the Islands, since this would be the only way that they could preserve 
rn> This were the two Tunbs to have no continental shelf effect beyond their 12 nautical miles 
territorial sea limit. But. if they were to have an effect, say for example a full effect, this would 




1 See above. 
m This where the islands would only generate half effect continental shelf. But, if the islands 
gained full effect continental shelf limits, as we have seen, Iran would be given a continental shelf 
area twice as larger as it should have; see the map below for illustration. 
m It is worth mentioning here that Iran rejected any offer from the UAE to put the question of the 
Tunbs islands on the agenda of negotiation, and insisted on limiting the discussion on the Abu 
Musa island. In contrast, the UAE insisted on the examination of the issue of the three Islands as 
a whole. For further details on the negotiation between Iran and the UAE, see Section One of this 
chapter. 
2:\-t See Pirouz, op. cit., n.46, at p.106. 
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their full effect territorial sea limit, and preserve their entitlement to exercise 
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction on the traffic routeing area. 
IRAN 
Strait baseline system ! 
0 
c'.) Sirri 
O Sir Bu :-.;icr Island 
Agreed boundary line. 
- - - - • A possible median line between Iran 
and UAE constructed without reference 
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The extension on the UAE boundary as a result of giving 
the three Islands full effect. 
The extension on the Iran boundary as a result of giving 
the three Islands full effect. 
Figure: (31) The knock-on effect of the Islands on the 
UAE's and Iranian boundary. 




It was mentioned at an earlier stage that there are three gaps in the U AE-Iran 
offshore boundaries which need to be addressed by the parties. These are the Gulf 
of Oman sector, the Abu-Dhabi sector, and the Islands sector. The first two were 
examined in Chapter Five. The boundary between the two countries in the Islands 
sector extends for a distance of about 66 nautical miles. The boundary line would 
originate from a possible UAE-Iran-Oman tri-junction point to point 5 in the 
UAE-Iran agreed boundary line of 1974. However, the dispute over the 
sovereignty of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands has prevented the 
construction of such a line. This dispute, moreover, would, primafacie, constitute 
a threat to the stability of the region. 
In the introduction to this chapter we posed the question regarding the value 
of the dispute over sovereignty of these Islands. Is it justifiable for each state to 
sustain its claim whatever the consequence? Section Three of the present chapter 
was devoted to a discussion of the effects of these three Islands on the winner and 
on the loser maritime boundaries. The conclusion which emerged is that the 
knock-on effects of the Islands is an understandable matter of concern to the UAE 
as well as to Iran. Notwithstanding this, a settlement for the dispute must be 
reached in order to prevent an escalation of the dispute. 
The government of the United Arab Emirates, in order to solve the dispute 
over sovereignty, has suggested submitting the issue to the International Court of 
Justice. The Iranian Cabinet, however, declined to accept this option. 235 A 
possible explanation for the two parties' opposite positions is that those with a 
better claim were in a position to propose a judicial settlement, while those with a 
less certain claim declined to accept in order to protect themselves from the 
knock-on effect of losing the Islands.236 
235 Statement by Mr. Rashid Abd Allah, the UAE Foreign Minister to the UN General Assembly, 
on 30 September 1992. 
236 In an unpublished memorandum on the Iranian claims to Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands, the 
British Government held the view that "the Iranians would win neither claim if they resorted to 
international adjudication even thought the Tunbs (but not Abu Musa) are on the Iranian side of 
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As a result of the foregoing, it is unlikely that the two parties could reach an 
agreement to refer the matter of sovereignty to third-party settlement applying 
international law, before reaching an amicable settlement on the effect of the 
Islands and other related matters. 237 This settlement, in order to be acceptable, 
should contain some kind of special treatment for certain fundamental issues in 
the area. In particular there should be: 
1. An arrangement for the oil field, whether Abu Musa island goes to UAE or 
Iran. 
2. A reconsideration of the full effect territorial sea limit for Abu Musa island, 
irrespective of the outcome of the sovereignty question. This would minimize 
its effect on each party's continental shelf limit. 
3. A reconsideration of the full effect territorial sea limit for the two Tunbs 
islands, were they to become Emirates Islands. This would avoid an extensive 
cut-off effect from the Iranian continental shelf. 
In the next chapter we shall identify the methods that the parties could use to 
reach an amicable solution on the issue of the effect of the three Islands on the 
respective maritime boundaries of the two States. Such a solution could, as is 
demonstrated below, also help to facilitate a settlement of the sovereignty issue. 
the Gulf median line." The memorandum prepared by the Arabian Department, British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 28 June 1970; at p. l. 
:m The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo/French Arbitration, after it assumed that the median line 
between the Channel Islands and the French coastline was the boundary line, went on to 
acknowledge that the two parties were right when they decided that the delimitation of the 
boundary line in this area needed to be determined outside the law, by their direct negotiations; 




As we have seen, the delimitation between Iran and the United Arab Emirates 
in the Islands sector is complicated by rival claims to territorial sovereignty over 
Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands. Several reasons, as noted in Chapter Six, 
have been suggested for the importance of these Islands, which justify the 
continued dispute over them. In general, their natural resources and strategic 
geographical position appear to be the primary features behind disputes over 
islands. In the Iran-UAE case, as illustrated earlier, 1 these two factors are clearly 
present in the location of these Islands in a semi-enclosed sea where "about two-
thirds of seaborne trade in crude oil" is shipped from the area. 2 Natural resources 
are also available on the Islands or in their vicinity. 
The aim of this chapter is to recommend certain methods of dispute 
settlement that may help Iran and UAE end their long-standing dispute over the 
Islands' sovereignty, or at least nanow the gulf between their opposing views. At 
the moment, the two sides' efforts to settle their differences do not go beyond the 
level of negotiation, 3 which formally began in 1992. Negotiation, however, has 
proved unsuccessful. Indeed, one of the two parties, namely the UAE, proposed 
adjudication as an alternative. Iran, as noted, rejected this proposal. An 
explanation for this negative reaction was given in Chapter Six.4 It will be 
recalled that the fear of the knock-on effects of the three disputed Islands on the 
Iranian offshore boundary-where its claim of sovereignty over these Islands 
might fail to be accepted-prevented it from responding to the UAE's call to 
1 See Chapter Six. 
2 The Times At/as and Encyclopedia of the Sea ( 1989), at p.154. 
3 In addition, there have been unverified reports of unsuccessful attempts at mediation from some 
states, e.g. Oman, Syria and Morocco. For further discussion on mediation, see below. 
4 See above, at pp.307-8. 
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submit the sovereignty issue to the World Court. The Iranian fear, as noted, is 
centred, inter alia, on the possibility of reducing its territorial sea area to less than 
12 nautical miles limit in the two Tunbs sector, and on losing the right of 
exploitation of the offshore oil field in the Abu Musa territorial sea area. It may 
be argued that Iran can hardly be expected to risk a decision of law on a question 
of this kind. Moreover, the existing status quo on the Islands satisfies the Iranian 
interests in the area. Iran, it will be recalled, has been occupying the two Tunbs 
islands and has a military presence on part of Abu Musa island. 5 If this is the 
case, then the question to be asked is why Iran should be expected to accept the 
UAE invitation to refer the issue of the Islands' sovereignty to international 
adjudication, the outcome of which "may be difficult to predict." 6 
A possible solution to accommodating these Iranian concerns would be to 
reverse the process of solving the dispute by reaching an amicable settlement on 
the effect of these Islands, with the mutual interests of the parties being taken into 
account, before examining the sovereignty issue. There are three forms of dispute 
settlement, which have not been utilized and which are worthy of consideration 
by the parties in this context. These are: (1) mediation; (2) conciliation; and (3) ex 
aequo et bono adjudication. In this chapter we shall explain these three 
procedures inasmuch as they are relevant to the present work. 
Mediation 
As noted earlier, the UAE-Iran negotiations failed to bring the two sides into 
agreement over a settlement of the dispute between them. A practical measure for 
solving such a political stalemate could be through seeking or accepting the 
mediation of a third party, whether this be a foreign government, a disinterested 
individual, 7 or an international organization. Mediation, it will be recalled, is a 
5 For further discussion, see Chapter Six/Section One. 
6 Bilder, B.R., "International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International Adjudication," The 
International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, Damrosch L.F. (ed.), Transnational Publishers 
Inc., New York ( 1987), at p.167. 
7 For discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of a government mediation or an individual 
mediation, see Waldock, H., International Disputes: the legal Aspects, Europa Publications, 
London ( 1972), at p.86. 
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form of dispute settlement through the participation 8 of a third party in the 
negotiations between adversaries "in an attempt to induce them to change their 
stance."9 Mediation is distinguishable from conciliation. The major differences 
between the two methods of settlement include the following: 
( 1) A mediator usually represents a foreign government which has its own 
interest in ending the conflict between the adversaries. 10 However, in the case 
of a conciliator, no interest exists except that of securing an acceptable 
settlement between the parties. 
(2) A conciliation commission can not be set up without a pre-existing agreement 
by the parties on the task of the commission, its membership and the procedure 
before it. In the case of mediation, a third party could offer its willingness to 
act, though the consent of the parties 11 and their co-operation is vital for 
success. 
(3) A "mediator usually makes his proposals informally and on the basis of 
information supplied by the parties, rather than through independent 
investigations which are a feature of conciliation." 12 
The participation of a mediator in the negotiations between the parties can 
take various forms. He can bring the two parties together in a triangular 
relationship. The aim is to relax the tension between the adversaries, in order to 
improve the negotiation atmosphere, 13 "to maintain the parties' commitment to 
8 A distinction is sometimes drawn between mediation and good offices. It is suggested that the 
latter means "the action taken to bring about or initiate negotiations, but without active 
participation in the discussion of the substance of the dispute." See Waldock, Ibid., at p.83; 
Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Selllement, 2nd ed, Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge 
( 1993), at p.27, Glahn, G.V., law Among Nations, 4th ed, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London 
( 1981 ), at pp.517-8: Oppenheim 's International law, 7th vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality, 
ed. Lauterpacht H. (ed.), London ( 1952), at p.10: Northedge and Donelan, International 
Disputes: the Political Aspects, Europa Publications, London ( 1971 ), at p.297. 
9 
Touval S. and Zartman W. (eds.). International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Westview 
Press, USA (1985), at p. 7. 
1° For further discussion on the possible interest of a foreign state in solving the dispute between 
the two states, see Ibid., at pp.8-9 and pp.252-3. 
11 For further discussion on the reasons behind parties in conflict to seek or accept mediation, see 
Ibid., at pp.9-10. 
12 Merrills, J.G., "The Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," The United Nations and the 
Principles of International law, Essays in Memory of Michael Akehurst, Lowe V. and Warbrick 
C. (eds.), Routledge, London ( 1994), at p.50. 
13 Waldock, op. cit., n.7, at p.85. 
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agreement," and to avoid the stalemate and recrimination that sometimes occur in 
the negotiations. 14 The Algerian role in the Iran-Iraq negotiations over the 1975 
peace treaty may serve as an example of a mediator present in the negotiations 
b h d
. . 15 
etween t e 1sputant parties. 
Another role for a mediator is to serve as a channel of communication where 
the formal relationship between the parties has broken down. The diplomatic 
hostage crisis in 1979 between the United States and Iran may be cited as an 
example in which the mediation of the Algerian government helped to re-
establish some form of communication between the Carter administration and the 
revolutionary authorities in Tehran. 16 The role of a mediator, in addition, may 
extend to introducing a new idea into the discussions and to proposing a 
settlement to the parties. This may take the form of securing a cease-fire where 
war has already broken out, 17 making a temporary arrangement to cool down the 
issue, 18 signing a special agreement to refer the conflict to other forms of third-
party settlement 19 or, finally, concluding an agreement to end the dispute 
permanently .20 Depending on the circumstances of each case, achieving one of 
these conclusions would be a successful outcome for the mediation mission. 
Notwithstanding the flexibility and usefulness of the role of the mediator, 
states which are parties to a dispute may reject any offer of mediation simply 
because they are thinking about alternative means to defeat each other's claim. 
Moreover, were states to accept the offer of a third party to mediate between 
14 Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.40. 
15 Ibid. For further discussion on the mediation between Iran and Iraq, see Touval and Zartman, 
op. cit., n.9, at pp.67-86. 
16 M ·11 . 8 ""5 em s, op. cit., n. , at p . .) . 
17 The India-Pakistan war over the disputed territory of Kashmir in 1965 and the intervention of 
Soviet mediators to stop the hostility between them is an example of the role of mediation where 
war has began. For more discussion on this mediation, see Touval and Zartman, op. cit., n.9, at 
pp. l 4 l-71. 
111 lran-Sharjah dispute over the sovereignty of Abu Musa island and the British role in 1971 in 
securing a Memorandum of Understanding over the dispute. For more discussion on the relevant 
parts of this Memorandum, see Chapter Six/Section One. 
19 In the Rann of Kutch dispute between India and Pakistan the British mediation succeeded in 
getting the parties to sign an agreement to refer their difference over the disputed territory to 
international adjudication before an ad hoc tribunal. The award of the arbitration is reproduced in 
50 !LR. 




them, it would not necessarily mean that the mediator would succeed in his task. 
He may fail, "if the positions of the parties are for political reasons so widely 
separated and so firmly maintained that the persuasions and proposals of the 
mediator cannot bring them on to common ground. "21 The Saudi Arabian 
mediation between Iraq and Kuwait in the period 28 July and 1 August 1990 may 
be cited as a regional example of the failure of a mediator to bring two parties to 
any form of understanding. The result, it will be recalled, was the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq. 
As far as the dispute between Iran and the UAE is concerned, mediation could 
break the deadlock in the negotiations and help the parties find some form of 
final settlement or at least a face-saving arrangement. Mediation, it should be 
noted, is not an unusual method of settlement in the existing practice of the states 
concerned. Iran had the leading role in accepting the intervention of a third party 
in the negotiations with another state. The Algerian and Egyptian role in the 
signing of the peace treaty between Iran and Iraq, and the Algerian mediation in 
the hostage crisis between Tehran and Washington have already been referred to; 
they are also fully reflected in the literature of dispute settlement through 
mediation.22 So far as the Iran-UAE relationship is concerned, British 
intervention between them in 1971 to secure an arrangement is relevant to their 
present differences. As was seen in Chapter Six, the result of Britain's special 
envoy, Sir William Luce, shuttling between Tehran, Sharjah and Ras al K.haimah 
was the conclusion of a provisional arrangement between Iran and Sharjah over 
Abu Musa island, and the failure to bring about any compromise between Iran 
and Ras al Khaimah. 23 
The full reasons for the achievement of a solution to part of the problem and 
failure in respect of the other have never been released to the public.24 What is of 
21 Waldock, op. cit., n.7, at p.92. 
22 Ibid., pp.83-92; Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at pp.27-42; Touval and Zartman, op. cit., n.9, at pp.21-
88. 
23 The Times of London, 30 November ( 1971 ), at p.6. See also above, at pp.261-3. 
24 Ambassador Julian Waker--one of the important figures in the mediation with Sir William 
Luce between Iran and the Emirates in 1971-argument in the conference on the Arabian Gulf 
Islands: the Root of the Problem and the Requirement for Settlement, Centre d'Etudes Euro-
Arabe, Paris ( 1994 ), at p.14 7. 
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importance to note here is that the provisional arrangement that Sir William Luce 
succeeded in achieving-as that of Mr. Kosgin, the Soviet mediator in the 
Kashmir dispute--was not the ideal outcome for a mediation mission. Although 
such a provisional solution is often better than nothing, it is a far from perfect 
one. As Professor Merrills explains, it is "like a temporary filling in a bad tooth 
[which] may mean even more trouble in the future if steps are not taken to get to 
the root of the problem. "25 As mentioned in Chapter Six, the problem of Abu 
Musa did indeed come to the surface again. Since 1992 Iran and the UAE have 
entered into bilateral negotiations, but no progress has been reported. 
Negotiations have never gone beyond the stage of "talks about talks". Iran insists 
on limiting the agenda of discussion on the question of "the misunderstanding 
over Abu Musa", whereas the UAE government demands discussion on the 
sovereignty question-the root of the problem-and Iranian withdrawal from the 
two Tunbs islands. The negotiations are at a standstill. To break such a deadlock, 
the U AE could invite a superpower state having leverage with the government in 
Teheran to act as mediator.26 China, it may be suggested, is in an ideal position to 
exercise this role, largely because of its close relationship with Iran,27 28 and also 
because of its weight in the international community. 29 Iran, undoubtedly, is 
anxious to maintain the sympathy of its powerful friend, whose political and 
economic support might be useful in the event of conflict, and thus might be 
expected to respond to any new idea that China may introduce to end the dispute 
between the two neighbuoring states. 30 
25 Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.40. 
26 For further discussion on the source of leverage, see Touval and Zartman, op. cit., n.9, at 
rp-25.5-6~. . . . . . 
- Chma 1s one of the mam countries supplying Iran with arms and defence equipment. See the 
Egyptian daily newspaper Al-Hraam, 29 March ( 1992); Aa/am Al-Kaleej, monthly newspaper, 
London, Issue no.43, January ( 1997), at p.4. 
28 For a discussion on the advantage of inviting a mediator having a close relationship with the 
other party in the dispute, see Touval and Zartman, op. cit., n.9, at pp.255-8; Merrills, op. cit., 
n.8, at p.34. 
29 China is one of the five permanent nations in the UN Security Council. 
:io For further discussion on the importance of the mediator as a powerful state to secure a 
settlement for the dispute, see Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at pp.31-4; Touval and Zartman, op. cit., n.9, 
at pp.263-6. 
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Conciliation 
Conciliation has been defined as "the process of settling a dispute by referring 
it to a commission of persons whose task it is to elucidate the facts and ... to make 
a report containing proposals for a settlement, but which does not have the 
binding character of an award or judgment."31 
Early in the present century conciliation was regarded as a procedure suitable 
for handling political or non-legal disputes. Lauterpacht, for example, wrote that: 
As a rule conciliation is adopted as obligatory for disputes described as non-legal, or non-
justiciable, or for disputes other than those which can be settled by the application of rules of 
law, or for disputes as to matters other than respective rights. In some treaties it is prescribed as 
the obligatory preliminary instrument of settlement in regard to all disputes, whereas in others, 
although obligatory in regard to the so-called non-legal disputes, it is optional in regard to 
controversies described as legal. 
32 
The distinction between legal or justiciable disputes and non-legal or non-
justiciable disputes33 has not been fully followed by some scholars. Their view, in 
short, has been that any dispute is suitable to be brought before a judge. However, 
where the difference involves a change in the existing rules of law between the 
parties in as much as it is inequitable, the judge can only give a decision if he is 
authorized to apply the ex aequo et bono 34 procedure,35 or the two disputed 
parties set up a conciliation commission. 36 The difference between the two 
methods is considered below. 
Conciliation procedures were recorded for the first time in 1920 when 
Sweden and Chile concluded an agreement containing in one clause a reference 
to conciliation as an optional procedure for solving conflicts between them.37 In 
~ 1 Oppenheim 's. op. cit., n.8, at p.12. 
:>:! Lauterpacht, H., The Function of law in the International Community, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford ( l 933), at p.261. 
:n For further discussion on political disputes and legal disputes, see Lauterpacht Ibid., at pp. 139-
65; Judge Lachs' separate opinion in the Military and Paramilitary activities case, Nicaragua v. 
USA Case, at p. l 68; Gordon, E., "Legal Disputes Under Article 36(2) of the Statute," The 
International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, Damrosch L.F. (ed.), Transnational Publishers 
Inc., New York (1987), at pp.207-14; Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at pp.139-44. 
34 See below for further discussion on an ex aequo et bono procedure. 
35 For further discussion on the two lines of thinking, see Habicht, M., The Power of the 
International Judge to Give A Decision Ex Aequo Et Bono, Constable & Co Ltd, London ( 1935), 
at pp. 79-8 l . 
36 Ibid., at p.80; Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.77. 
:n Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.59. 
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1922 the Assembly of the League of Nations recommended that member states 
conclude "agreements providing for the submission of disputes to conciliation 
commissions. "
38 
A few years afterwards conciliation was incorporated into the 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1928. 39 
Because it is not the purpose of this work to describe in detail the methods of 
international dispute settlement, it will not engage in a historical study of the 
development of conciliation or of its place in modern international law. Such a 
discussion can be found elsewhere.40 Here it will suffice to indicate the flexibility 
that conciliation procedures can provide in solving law of the sea disputes. This 
flexibility, as will be seen below, stems from two factors: the wide range of 
relevant circumstances that are taken into account; and the wide range of 
recommendations that could come out of a conciliation commission. 41 
The usefulness of conciliation procedures on law of the sea issues can be no 
better illustrated than by reference to the provision of the system for dispute 
settlement in the 1982 Convention. In this system, it will be recalled, conciliation 
procedures "occupy a prominent place."42 Optional and obligatory submissions to 
conciliation procedures were provided in Part XV of the Convention. In the case 
of optional submission, the system begins with a general reference to Article 
33(1) of the United Nations Charter where peaceful means of settlement are 
listed.43 In spite of this, Article 284, entitled "Conciliation", calls on any party to 
a dispute to invite the other party to submit the dispute to a conciliation 
commission. If the invitation is accepted and the procedure is agreed upon, any 
party to a dispute may "institute the procedure by written notification addressed 
:>R Ibid., at p.60. 
)<) b'd 61 · I 1 ., at p. . 
.io Ibid., at pp.59-79; Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.8, at pp. I 2-20. In the course of our examination of 
the UAE practices in determining its maritime boundaries we have discussed the important 
elements of conciliation. This was necessary in order to determine the nature of the Gallet-
Anderson commission and their work of recommending a settlement for the boundary and 
territorial disputes between Qatar and Abu-Dhabi (UAE) in I 962. See Chapter Four/Section One 
at pp.164-6 . 
.i 
1 Churchill, R.R., "Maritime Delimitation in the Jan Mayen Area," 9 Marine Policy (1985), at 
p.25, p.31 and p.38; Shaw, M, International law, 3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge ( 1991 ), at p.63 7. See also Article 5 from Annex Y of LOS. 
42 Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p. I 64. 
43 Article 279 of the I 982 Convention. 
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to the other party or parties to the dispute."44 But, if the invitation is rejected, the 
conciliation procedure will be terminated, and the disputed parties have to seek a 
settlement by alternative means, including compulsory procedures entailing 
binding decisions under Section 2 of Part XV of LOS. 
This contrasts with the case of mandatory submission to conciliation, which 
was provided as an attempt to fill the gap in the system for settlement where 
recourse to an obligatory judicial procedure was not possible.45 Article 11 (2) of 
Annex V imposed on any party which had been notified of proceedings of 
conciliation, the obligation to submit to such proceedings.46 Failure to do so, 
according to Article 12 of Annex V, would not prevent the conciliation 
commission from proceeding in the dispute. A dispute concerning maritime 
boundary delimitation is one of the categories which states may exclude from 
obligatory submission to judicial settlement in Section 2 of Part XV of the 
Convention. Where such exclusion is declared by one party to a dispute, the 
dispute in this case can only be submitted to a compulsory conciliation 
commission according to Part 2 of Annex V.47 
Where states which are parties to LOS submit a dispute to a conciliation 
commission-either obligatory or voluntary-and then fail to incorporate its 
repo11 into an agreement, subparagraph 2 of Article 288( a) invites them to 
conclude an agreement to refer their conflict to judicial settlement in accordance 
with Section 2 of Part XV.48 The rejection of the conciliation report means the 
failure of the commission.49 This undesirable outcome requires the conclusion 
that there ""is no occasion for self-congratulation because States have agreed to 
.i.i Articles I and 11 of Annex V. 
"
5 Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.165; Adede, A. 0., The System for Selllement of Disputes under the 
United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea, Publications on Ocean Development, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1987), at p.280. See also the remark of Merrills on the 
mandatory submission to conciliation; see Merrills, op. cit., n.12, at p.54. 
"
6 Adede, Ibid., at p.210 and p.255; Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.165. 
47 Article 298 of the 1982 Convention. 
48 Subparagraph 3 excludes from this a sea boundary dispute which is finally settled from the 
application of subparagraph 2. This, however, may only reflect the nature of boundary 
agreements which enjoy some degree of stability and permanence. For further discussion, see 
Chapter Two/Section One. 
49 The unbinding element of the recommendation of a conciliation has been restated in Article 
7(2) of Annex V. 
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mee1 before a body of conciliators authorized 10 propose recommendations v.hich 
Governments are not bound lo accept. ,,so 
Bui where the disputing states arc not parties to l OS, like Iran and the UAh, 
they are still entitled to submit their difference to a conciliation commission on a 
consensual basis. The Iceland-Norway agreement lo refer the maritime boundary 
delimitation dispute between them, in respect to Jan Mayen island, to a 
conciliation commission in 198 J may be cited as an example. The two parties 
asked the commission to take into account Iceland 's strong economic interests in 
the disputed area, together with the existing geographical and geological factors, 
and other special circumstances. 51 The recommendation of the commission, 
which appears in the map reproduced below, was incorporated subsequently into 
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SI' Lauterpacht. op c11, n 32, at p.267 For the possibility of binding conciliation. see below 
51 The repon of the Commission 1s reprinted in 21 /LJ\1(1982), at p 1222. Forcommems on the 
rcpon, see Brown. F D. Sea-Bi:d £11ergy und Hmera/s The lnternat1011al legal Regime. vol. I, 
'I he Contmental Shelf, Martinus N1jhotT Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1992), at pp.130-7. 
\ Charne} and Alc\ander (eds), ln111rnatt011al \fant1111e Boundaries. Martmus Nijhoff 
Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993). at pp.1762-5 
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Ex aequo et bono adjudication 
An obvious alternative to referring the matter to conciliation is to refer it to ex 
aequo et bona adjudication before the ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal, or the new 
I TL OS. 
53 54 
Before we go on to examine the important elements of the notion of 
an ex aequo et bona adjudication, it is of interest to draw some comparisons 
between the task of a conciliator and that of a judge applying an ex aequo et bona 
procedure. This is because both procedures are applied to reach "amiable 
compositeur;" 55 a settlement which does "not necessarily coincide with the rights 
and obligations obtaining between the parties." 56 
Perhaps the most important difference between the two methods is that a 
conciliation, as has been noted, normally proposes and recommends a 
settlement,57 whereas a judge imposes a settlement on the states concerned.58 
This difference is considered by Merrills as an advantage for conciliation over a 
World Court decision ex aequo et bona, since it enables the parties to retain 
control of the dispute. 59 Other scholars, however, regard a decision of ex aequo et 
bono--because of the power of the judge to impose a solution-as being more 
capable of securing "peace within international society. "60 This difference, 
however, would disappear were the parties to agree in advance to consider any 
53 Although Iran and the UAE are still not parties to LOS, they can have access to the ITLOS on a 
consensual basis. Atticle 20(2) of Annex VI declares that: "The Tribunal shall be open to entities 
other than States Parties in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted 
pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all 
the parties to that case." See also Boyle, A., "Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea 
Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction," 46 ICLQ ( 1997), at p.53. 
s.i For a comparison between ITLOS and ICJ, see Boyle, Ibid., at pp.50-1. 
55 Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at pp.69-70. See also Gilmore, W., "Legal and International aspects of 
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States," Review of International Studies. vol. I l, no. 4, 
October ( 1985), at p.323. 
56 Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p.70; Schwarzenberger and Brown, A Manual of International Law, 
6th ed., Professional Books Limited, Abingdon ( 1976), at p.197. 
57 See Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.59. However, the two parties, as far as conciliation is concerned, 
may agree to consider the status of its recommendation as binding upon them. See Merrills, op. 
cit., n.8, at p. 71. 
58 See Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
59 Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.77. 
60 Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at p.267; Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p.81. 
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decision or recommendation of the conciliation commission in resolution of the 
dispute as final and binding on them. 61 
Another important difference between the two methods concerns the 
procedures used before them. Whereas the Statute of the ICJ articulates these 
procedures, in general there is no counterpart to these which the parties should 
follow before a conciliation commission.62 However, the two parties may set up 
their own procedures which they would agree to follow. 
A further distinction is that a conciliation commission can be formed using 
individuals who need not possess legal training or skills, whereas a judge in the 
World Court 
63
--Dr in ITLOS 64-must have legal qualifications. An additional 
difference between the two methods is that the World Court-Dr ITLOS-is a 
readily available organ, whereas a conciliation commission in normal cases has to 
6~ 
be set up. ) 
Having highlighted the most important differences between the two methods, 
we shall now examine the ex aequo et bona procedure in more detail. An ex 
aequo et bona decision, a phrase derived from civil law, has been defined as 
"meaning, in justice and fairness; according to what is just and good; according 
to equity and conscience."66 In modern international law, reso11 to an ex aequo et 
bona process "is an extraordinary procedure and is destined to supplement the 
ordinary procedure applying the rights and obligations in force between the 
parties. The ex aequo et bona procedure has been provided by the Statute of the 
'" Gilmore, op. cit., n.55, at p.323. 
6
:? For the parties to the 1982 Convention they may follow the procedure in Annex V. 
63 Article 2 of the ICJ Statute. 
64 Article 2(1) of Annex VI provides that "The Tribunal shall be composed of a body of 21 
independent members, elected from among persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness 
and integrity and of recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea." 
65 In addition to these two differences there are others in respect to the establishment of each, the 
rules which govern the activity of each, and the nature of each. For more details, see Scheuner, 
U., "Decision ex aequo et bona by International Courts and Arbitral Tribunals," International 
Arbitration liber Amicorum for Martin Domke, Pieter Sanders (ed.), the Netherlands (l 967), at 
pp. 282-3. 
66 See Black's law Dictiona1J', 6th ed., West Publishing CO, USA (1994), at p.557. See also 
Degan, V. D., "Equitable Principles in Maritime Delimitations," International law at the Time of 




Permanent Court of International Justice67 .. .to permit a different settlement than 
that which the parties can obtain by having recourse to the ordinary procedure. "68 
The object of authorizing a judge to give an ex aequo et bono decision is, 
therefore, "to avoid inevitable consequences which would have resulted from the 
application of the rules of traditional law."69 For it, the parties charge the judge to 
create special rules for them in order to reach an equitable settlement or objective 
justice for their disputes. 70 This is specially true in the case where a dispute 
arises, as it frequently does in international relations, in which one of the parties 
finds the existing rules of law would not be in its favour or would result in a 
situation that would be inequitable from its point of view. Thus it seeks to alter 
these rules to have objective justice. 71 Authorizing the court to apply an ex aequo 
et bono procedure does not, however, mean the court is entitled to "a complete 
freedom of action ... [ or can] act capriciously and arbitrarily." 72 Rather it would 
mean that the court, by authority of the parties, would be required "to make 
adjustment to an existing legal situation" in order to reach a fair decision.73 
To do so, a judge applying ex aequo et bona procedure will not start from a 
vacuum, he will begin the process by ascertaining the existing legal relation 
between the parties, and then he may adjust--or discard-this relation, in the 
67 Now Article 38(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
68 Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p.67. 
69 Ibid., at p.83. 
70 Schwarzenberger and Brown in this relation have explained that in ex aequo et bono 
adjudication "the parties grant the Court an ad hoc legislative power to seek an equitable and 
practical solution to their dispute, even though such a settlement may not be in conformity with 
the legal rights and duties of the parties." See Schwarzenberger and Brown, op. cit., n.56, at 
p.197. To the same effect, see Lauterpacht, E., Aspects of the Administration of International 
.Justice, Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Research Centre for International Law, Grotius 
Publications Limited, Cambridge (1991), at p.147; Degan, op. cit., n.66, at p.110; Habicht, op. 
cit., n.35, at p.81. 
71 Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p.79; Louis, 8.S., "Arbitration of International Disputes Ex aequo et 
bono", International Arbitration liber Amicorum for Martin Domke, Pieter Sanders (ed.), 
Netherlands ( 1967), at p.333; Schwarzenberger and Brown, op. cit., n.56, at p.257. 
72 Louis, Ibid., at p.331 See also Scheuner, op. cit., n.65, at p.283; Rosenne, S., The Law and 
Practice of the International Court, vol. I, A. W .Sijthoff-Leyden, the Netherlands ( 1965} at p.326; 
Degan, op. cit., n.66, at p. I l 0; Schwarzenberger and Brown, op. cit., n.56, at p.197; Oppenheim 's 
International Law, 9th ed., vol. 1, Peace, Jennings and Watts (eds.), Longman, London (l 996), at 
~.44. 
3 Scheuner, op. cit., n.65, at p.283. See Swiss-French Free Zones Case ( 1930), PCIJ Reports 
Series A-N° 24, at p.10; Thirlway, H., "The Law and Procedures of the International Court of 
Justice 1960-1989," Part Six, 65 BYBIL (1994), at p.16. 
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light of all the relevant circumstances, in as much as is necessary to reach an 
equitable settlement. 
74 
An ex aequo el bono decision in this meaning is different 
from applying equity within the existing rules of International law. 75 This latter 
form of equity is said to have: (1) a role of adapting or mitigating the law to 
apply it to "the facts of individual cases," 76 in order to reach an equitable result; 
or (2) a role of a general principle of law that constitutes "a starting guide for 
seeking, ex ante, an equitable result based on the balance of all the relevant 
circumstances of each case."77 
In the concept of maritime boundary delimitation, however, this delicate 
distinction between equity and ex aequo et bono could be argued to be 
inapplicable. A number of scholars, including a member of the World Court, 
consider the resort of the court to equity and equitable principles to be no more 
than an application of ex aequo et bono adjudication, but without admitting so. 78 
For example, Sir Robert Jennings wrote that: "what the litigants get is in effect a 
decision ex aequo el bono whether they wanted it or not."79 
74 
Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at p.315; Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.95; Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p. 
69 and p.81; Louis, op. cit., n.71, atp.331; Degan, op. cit., n.66, at p.110. 
75 Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at p.314; Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p.68; O'Connell, D.P., 
International law, vol. I, Stevens and Sons, London ( 1965), at p.14; Brownlie, I., Principles of 
Public International law, 4th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford ( 1990), at p.27; Scheuner, op. cit., 
n.65, at p.282. See also above at pp. I 07-10. 
76 Akehurst, M., "Equity and General Principles of Law," 25 IClQ ( 1976), at p.80 I. See also 
Lowe, V., "The Role of Equity in International Law," 12 The Australian Year Book of 
International Law ( 1992), at p.56; Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at p.314; Lauterpacht, op. cit., n. 70, 
at p.1 19; Frank, T., Fairness in International law and Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
( 1995), at p.57; Miyoshi. M., Consideration of Equity in the Settlement of Territorial and 
Boundary Disputes, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands ( 1993), at p.12. 
77 Jimenez de Arechaga, "The Conception of Equity in Maritime Delimitation," International 
Law at the Time of its Codification, Essay in Honour of Roberto Ago, vol. 2, Milano-Dott.A. 
Giuffre Editore ( 1987), at p.238. 
78 See, for example, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's observation on Elihu Lauterpacht's paper: "Equity, 
Evasion, Equivocation and Evolution in International Law" reproduced in Lauterpacht, op. cit., 
n.70, at p.125. A similar view was expressed by Judge Gros in his dissenting opinion in the Gulf 
of Maine Case, at p.382, para.37 and p.389, para.48; Judge Oda in his separate opinion in the 
Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at pp.113-4, paras.85-8; Weil, P., The law of Maritime 
Delimitation-Reflection, Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge ( 1989), at p.167; Degan, op. 
cit., n.66, at p. 126. 
79 Jennings, R.Y., "The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries," Staat und 
Volkerrechtsordnung, Festschrift fiir Karl Doehring ( 1989), at p.40 I; cf Judge Shahabuddeen in 
his separate opinion in the Greenland v. Jan Mayen Case, at p.194. 
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In our view this is not an acceptable position. The distinction between equity 
within the law and an ex aequo et bono decision is not a matter of whether the 
law is relevant or not. Rather is it a question of what relevant circumstances and 
factors can be taken into account in each process. In an ex aequo et bono 
procedure the range of factors is much wider, to the extent-as will be seen-of 
including matters that have no direct relevance to the two parties' receptive legal 
rights. This, however, does not mean a judge applying this procedure would 
necessarily or systematically leave aside in toto the existing rights and duties 
between the parties; he may do so, but he may also use the existing legal 
relationship as a basis for laying down a new and more appropriate relationship 
that satisfys the equitable requirement between the two parties. 80 
A decision ex aequo et bono would permit the judge to give consideration to 
various factors, which would not be the case were he to apply a rule of law. 81 
Such a power arouses some concern over the adequacy of the court's necessarily 
technical knowledge to perform such a task. Headlam-Morley, for example, 
expressed his doubts about courts or tribunals-whose normal function is to 
determine a dispute over a point of law-and their ability to devise "a scheme for 
future administration, for such a scheme will probably require teclmical 
knowledge and administrative experience which a judicial authority does not 
possess."82 In similar vein, Sir Robert Jennings suggested that a "decision ex 
aequo et bono could well be made without the need of specifically legal training 
or skill; indeed may perhaps be made better by one with a d(fferent skill."83 
However, such doubts about a court or tribunal's capability should not be 
exaggerated, since they can where necessary call in the assistance of experts, as 
does a judge in the domestic system.84 Article 27 of the Statute of the 
iw Merrills, op. cit., n.8, at p.95; Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p.81; Louis, op. cit., n.71, at p.331; 
Degan, op. cit., n.66, at p.110. 
81 Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at p.319. 
82 Ibid., at p.321. 
83 Italics added. See Jennings, R. Y., "Equity and Equitable Principles," 42 Ann Suisse De Droit 
International ( 1986), at p.30. 
84 Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at pp.322-4; Waldock, op. cit., n.7, at pp.136-7. Another argument 
was advanced to answer the question of the court's capability. The argument was that "the expert 
and technical knowledge required for the creation of new rights and obligations is not necessarily 
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International Court of Justice provides "for technical assessors to assist the 
special chambers of the Court in labor and communication and transit cases. "85 In 
the system for settlement of disputes in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 
A11icle 289 allows the court or tribunal-exercising jurisdiction under this 
system-at the request of a party to the dispute or proprio motu, to appoint 
technical experts to assist it in determining the issues. 86 The C01:fu Channel Case 
between the UK and Albania in 1949 is "the outstanding example of the use of 
experts by the I CJ. "87 In this case one of the questions, which the Court was 
asked to determine was the Albanian Government's responsibility for the 
explosion in 1946 from mines in its territorial sea, and for the damage and loss of 
human life which resulted to two British vessels. In determining this 
responsibility it was necessary, inter alia, to prove that the Albanian Government 
knew of the minelaying operation in its territorial sea. In helping to do so, the 
Court used experts to ascertain "the time the minelayers would have been in the 
waters." 88 
The flexibility of conciliation commissions and ex aequo et bono 
procedures in solving maritime boundary disputes. 
The flexibility of conciliation and ex aequo et bono procedures can best be 
illustrated by reference to two features: 
(1) The scope of factors 
The range of relevant circumstances that a conciliator or a judge applying an 
ex aequo et bono procedure may take into account is much wider, covering 
factors that have hitherto been regarded as irrelevant to maritime boundary 
greater than that necessary for the application and determination of existing rights." See 
Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at p.321. 
i;s Ibid., at p.324. 
116 The list of experts is prepared in accordance with Annex VIII, Article 2. In addition, a special 
arbitral tribunal is provided in this system where the parties wish to refer a dispute which 
involves scientific factors. See Annex VIII for the provision of submitting a dispute to a special 
arbitral tribunal. 
117 White, G., "The Use of Experts by the International Court," Fifty Years of the International 
Court of Justice, Essays in Honour of Sir R. Jennings, Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge ( 1996) at p.529. 





In Chapter Three we discussed some of these, such as economic 
and socio-economic factors, arrangements for navigation aids, pollution control, 
security and other administration arrangements, and how they have been 
prevented from influencing the course of a boundary line in the context of 
international adjudication. Moreover, the agreement on a conciliation 
commission or for an ex aequo et bona adjudication may contain a valuable 
source of guidance to a conciliator or a judge in performing his task.9° For 
example, in the case oflran and the UAE, the two sides could submit the issue of 
the knock-on effects of the three Islands to a conciliation commission or an ex 
aequo et bona adjudication to find an effect for the three disputed Islands that 
would have a minimum impact on their common maritime boundary. Were they 
to agree on that, they could ask the commission or the court to determine the 
course of the boundary between them in the disputed area taking into account 
specified elements. These could include the following: 
( 1) The disputed status of the Islands; 
(2) The welfare of the inhabitants of Abu Musa and Greater Tunbs;91 
(3) The political interest of the two parties and the interests of peace and security 
in the Arabian Gulf; 
( 4) Convenience and necessity; 
( 5) The disproportionately distorting effects of the tlu·ee islands for the course of 
the continental shelf boundary line between the two pai1ies, which would 
otherwise be indicated by the general configuration of their coasts; 
(6) The presence of Abu Musa island on the UAE side of the median line, and the 
location of the two Tunbs on the Iranian side of the median line; 
(7) The location of Mupark oil field 9 nautical miles off Abu Musa island toward 
the UAE coastline; and 
89 Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at p.3 19; Churchill, op. cit., n.41, at p.3 l. It is interesting to note that 
in the Jan Mayen Island Conciliation commission of 1981 the two parties asked the commission 
to take into account Iceland's strong economic interest in the disputed area, together with the 
existing geographical and geological factors and other special circumstances. The report of the 
Commission is reprinted in 21 ILM ( 1982), at p.1222. 
90 Munkman, A.L.M., "Adjudication and Adjustment-International Judicial Decision and the 
Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes," 46 BYB/l ( 1972-3 ), at p.21. 
91 Little Tunb is an uninhabited island, See Chapter Six/Section One for further discussion. 
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(8) The flexibility of the two parties in their pre-existing practice in dealing with 
questions of maritime boundary delimitation. 
(2) The context of settlement 
The range of settlement outcomes that may be advised by a conciliator or 
decided by a judge applying an ex aequo et bono procedure is also wider than 
would be the case in "normal" adjudication. For example, it may include a co-
operative arrangement over natural resources.92 An agreement between the parties 
involved is required to create a joint development zone.93 The possibility that a 
conciliation commission may recommend a joint development zone is to be 
understood from the nature of conciliation as a procedure that recommends, 
unless the parties otherwise agree, 94 a settlement. These recommendations needs 
to be incorporated into an agreement between the parties involved to take effect. 
Such an agreement would be the instrument that creates the co-operative 
arrangements, and not the recommendations of the conciliation commission. The 
possibility of a conciliation commission proposing a joint development zone is 
demonstrated in practice by the act of the Jan Mayen conciliation commission of 
1981. In this, there was a unanimous recommendation for Norway and Iceland to 
establish such a zone between them. 
In an ex aequo et bona procedure the situation is complicated by the fact that 
a judge is imposing, and not proposing, a settlement for the dispute. For this 
reason, it appears to be difficult for a court to decide on a system of a joint 
sovereignty zone. For such a zone to be created de nova, the Chamber in the Gulf 
q( Fonseca case held, required an agreement between the parties concerned.95 
Notwithstanding this fact, there seem to be two situations where it would be 
possible for the court to impose or recognize the concept of joint sovereignty, 
92 This can be no better illustrated than in the provision of Article 5 from Annex V of UN CLOS. 
The Article, it will be recalled, asks the conciliation commission to "draw the attention of the 
parties to any measures which might facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute." One of 
these measures can be the contracting of a joint sovereignty zone between them. 
93 See below. 
94 For a discussion on the possibility of binding conciliation, see above, at p.319. 
95 Gulf of Fonseca Case, at para.399. 
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whether applying paragraphs 1 or 2 of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. The first 
situation which may arise under Article 38(1) is where there is an existing area of 
joint sovereignty between the parties involved. This pre-existing co-operative 
zone could have emerged on historical grounds as in the Gulf of Fonseca Case, 96 
or have been established from a co-operative arrangement between them.97 In the 
latter instance the court must have been asked to maintain the status quo respect 
of such zone. As far as Iran and the UAE are concerned, the two sides, it will be 
recalled, agreed in the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding on a form of co-
operative arrangement over the oil field in the Abu Musa territorial sea.98 The 
World Court would not be expected to disregard such an arrangement. Rather it 
could be expected to preserve it, if it had been asked to do so.99 
The second situation in which it is possible to have a joint sovereignty 
outcome is where the parties to a dispute ask the court to give a judicial 
suggestion 100 and to identify the factors that they may take into account in 
determining the boundary between them ex aequo et bona. In this case the court, 
as it did in the North Sea Case 101 and in the Tunisia v. Libya Case, 102 would 
identify a number of factors 103 that may help the parties to draw the line between 
them, but it would not draw a boundary line itself. 104 In the light of the com1's 
judgment the parties would then work out an agreement to draw the boundary 
line and, if necessary, construct a joint sovereignty zone between them. 
<)(,Gulf of Fonseca Case, at paras.401, 404-5. 
n See Judge Basdevant's separate opinion in the Minquiers Case (1953), at pp.83-4. See also the 
remark of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ( 1995), at p.562. 
')X See above, at pp.254-5. 
'>'>Judge Basdevant's separate opinion in the Minquiers Case (1953), at pp.83-4. 
10° For a discussion on judicial recommendation, see Fitzmaurice, op. cit., n.97, at pp.559-63; see 
also the World Court judgment in Morocco Case ( 1952), at pp.211-2. 
101 Article 1 of the special agreement to submit the two cases to the Court. 41 I LR, at p.333. 
102 ICJ Reports 1982, at p.23, see also para.23 of the Judgment. 
io:i It is possible that, as in the delimitation agreements in the North Sea region following the 
World Court judgment in the 1969 case, the parties will not use all these factors. See Malloy, M., 
P., "An Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice Cases concerning 
Boundaries," in 14 National and International Boundaries, Thesaurus Acroasium (Session 1983), 
Institute of Public International Law and International Relations, Thessaloniki (1985), at p.333. 
104 It may draw an illustrative one. 
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The interesting question is, however, that if the parties in the compromise 
agreement did not ask the court to give recommendations or to preserve what had 
been established between them, would it be possible for a court applying an ex 
aequo et bona procedure to designate a joint sovereignty zone between them or 
not? There is some difficulty in answering this question for two reasons. First, the 
nature of the court's function to determine rights and obligations. 105 Second, the 
fact that the court has not been charged with the power to apply an ex aequo et 
bona jurisdiction to date (nor has it the opportunity to clarify clearly the exact 
limits of its judicial function in this context.) 106 
Designating a joint sovereignty zone is certainly different from the allocation 
of rights and duties. Creation of such a new regime-which is usually done 
through an agreement between the legislative bodies of the parties involved-107 
through this procedure is denied by some judges and scholars. Judge Kellogg, for 
example, in observations appended to the Order in the Swiss-French Free Zones 
Case of 1930, held to the view that the court had no power under its Statute to 
create new rights and obligations, 108 nor had it the power "to pass upon questions 
essentially economic and political in their nature." 109 Mr. Ulrich Scheuner, in his 
article Decision ex aequo et bona, expressed sympathy with Judge Kellogg's 
observations 110 and suggested that: 
There are limits to the function of a court or tribunal beyond which it ceases to function as a 
court proper and becomes an instrument of conciliation or of political advice. There are tasks 
which only a legislative organ or a political commission can tackle, e.g., the drafting of a 
complicated new regulation for a situation of international law, and which are alien to a 
court.
111 
In supporting his op11110n, Mr. Scheuner cited the judgment of the World 
Court in the South West Africa Case where the Court declined to engage in an 
105 Lauterpacht, op. cit., n. 76, at p.139; Habicht, op. cit., n.35, at p.84. 
106 Lauterpacht, H., The Development of International law by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, Longman, Green and Co., London ( 1934), at p.66; Gordon, op. cit., n.33, at 
p.185. 
107 Gulf of Fonseca Case, at para.399. 
108 Judge Kellogg's observations in the Swiss-French Free Zones Case, PCIJ Reports Series A-N° 
24, at p.33. 
109 Ibid., at p.32, see also pp.34-43. 
110 Scheuner, op. cit., n.65, at p.283. 
111 Ibid., at p.284. 
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essentially legislative task. The Court justified its decision on the basis that such· 
a task lies outside the function of a court of law. 112 But a court applying an ex 
aequo et bono procedure is not strictly a court of law, whose function is one of 
determining rights and obligations. 113 An ex aequo et bono procedure goes 
beyond that. It gives the court the power of arriving at "a new and more 
appropriate legal relationship," 114 even if this is "inconsistent with the essentially 
judicial function of the Court." 115 In reaching such a settlement the court has the 
power "to depart from the law, 116 to change the law, to accept a claim not 
recognized by the law or to reject a claim based on the law." 117 That is why "a 
clear and explicit provision to that effect" is required from the parties. 118 
As a result of the foregoing, it seems fair to suggest that, while some doubt 
exists, a court applying an ex aequo et bono procedure is entitled to create a joint 
sovereignty zone between the parties, if such a regime would fulfil the 
requirement of justice and fairness. The power to establish such a new regime, Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht has stated, is "already contained in nuce in the very 
agreement conferring upon the Court jurisdiction ex aequo et bono. The Court 
gives flesh and bones to this agreement. The [new regime] which it lays down is 
not of its own creation, although it is of its own formulation. It is the creation of 
I . "119 t 1e parties. 
As far as the boundary question between Iran and the UAE is concerned, the 
two parties could submit the whole dispute-including the question of 
sovereignty-to the International Court of Justice or ITLOS, and require the 
112 Italics added. South West Africa Case (1966), at p.36, para. 57. 
113 See the comment of Dr. Max Habicht on the court judicial function. Habicht, op. cit., n.3 5, at 
pp.53-4. 
11
.i Ibid., at p.53. See also Lauterpacht, H., The Development of International Law by the 
International Court of Justice, Stevens & Sons Limited, London ( 1958), at p.213; Degan, op. cit., 
n.66, at p.110. 
115 Oppenheim 's, op. cit., n.72, at p.44. 
116 This, however, does not mean it is necessary that the court depart from the rule of law. It will 
do so where the rule of law is not compatible with justice and fairness. See Ibid., p.44; Habicht, 
op. cit., n.35, at p.69. 
117 L. . 71 ..,..,3 oms, op. crt., n. , at P·-'-' . 
118 Swiss-French Free Zones Case, PCIJ Reports Series A-N° 24, at p.11. 
119 Lauterpacht, op. cit., n.32, at pp.318-9, see also p.317, and p.374. To the same effect, see 
Degan, op. cit., n.66, at p.110. 
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Court to decide the sovereignty over the Islands in accordance with International 
law, but decide the case of maritime boundary delimitation ex aequo et bono. The 
Court in this instance would have two different bases of jurisdiction. First, it 
would be required to decide the question of sovereignty over the Islands in 
accordance with international law as indicated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice or Article 293( 1) of LOS in the case of ITLOS. 
Secondly, on the basis of its decision on the sovereignty question, it would be 
required to determine the maritime boundary between the two countries ex aequo 
et bono as provided in Article 38(2) of the ICJ Statute or Article 293(2) of LOS 
in the case of ITLOS. 
An alternative would be for Iran and the UAE to conclude an agreement to 
submit the sovereignty dispute to the ICJ, applying the rules of law in the normal 
manner. In this agreement they could also provide that, in the light of the Court's 
judgment, the two contracting parties would enter into bilateral negotiations to 
reach an agreement which would embody objective justice on the effect of these 
three Islands on the maritime boundary delimitation between them. Where no 
agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, it could stipulate 
that any party may submit the delimitation question to an ex aequo et bono 
procedure, or to a binding conciliation. 120 
Possible Equitable Effect 
It was argued at an earlier stage of this study that the knock-on effect of Abu 
Musa and the two Tunbs islands is a matter of concern for Iran as well as for the 
UAE. Certain mechanisms to minimize this effect have been proposed in the 
present chapter. Here, we shall suggest a possible fair and equitable effect for 
these Islands in a maritime boundary delimitation between U AE and Iran. This 
possible effect is suggested and illustrated in a map reproduced below: 
12° For the difference between the two methods, see above. 
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(1) In respect of Abu Musa island 
We have seen that the knock-on effect for losing sovereignty over the Island 
would centre on two issues: diminution of the limit of the loser's continental 
shelf; and, the loss of rights to the oil field. A possible equitable solution, in the 
light of the relevant circumstances of the area, would be to allocate maritime 
space to the Island in a manner such that the interests of the two parties are taken 
into account. This possible suggestion therefore is two-fold: 
(a) In respect of the continental shelf 
It has been submitted that giving a full effect territorial sea to the island of 
Abu Musa would not create fairness in the delimitation between Iran and the 
U AE. 121 An appropriate and practical method of abating the disproportion and 
inequity, which would otherwise result from giving the Island a full effect 
te1Titorial sea limit, might be achieved by giving the Island, for example, a half 
effect territorial sea limit. This half effect in practice would only result in a 5-
nautical-mile adjustment in the median line, were the UAE to win the ownership 
of the Island. 122 Were Iran to obtain sovereignty the half effect territorial sea limit 
would cause a 9 nautical mile adjustment in the median line towards the UAE 
coastline. This is because the Island in this case is located on the wrong side of 
h d. l' 123 t e me ian me. 
(b) In respect of the oil field 
A major interest of each party is to preserve its rights in the oil field. This 
could be done by designating a joint development zone for the oil field, 
irrespective of the determination of sovereignty over the island. A joint 
development zone would preserve the unity of the field and would maintain the 
status quo, as a joint development zone, which was determined in the Iran-
121 See Chapter Six/Section Three. 
122 The Iranian continental shelf limit as a result would be reduced to 31.751 nautical miles, 
instead of to 36.751. Correspondingly, the adjustment in the median line would cause an 
extension in the UAE continental shelf limit to 41.751 nautical miles instead of 36.751. 
123 This would add 3 nautical miles to the adjustment in the median line. 
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Sharjah ~Memorandum of Understanding'. A number of examples in state 
practice in creating a joint development zone were examined in Chapter Four. 
(2) In respect of the two Tunbs area 
As was mentioned, there would be a cut-off from the Iranian side of the 
median line were the UAE to have its claim to sovereignty of the two Tunbs 
acknowledged and they be given a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit. Equity 
and fairness, however, call for only a limited effect to be attributed to the two 
Islands in this particular geographical situation in order to reach an equitable 
result for the delimitation. A three-mile enclave around the two Islands would 
serve as an intermediate solution that would effect a more appropriate and a more 
equitable balance between the respective interests of the two parties. 
Furthermore, this solution would give the UAE the opportunity to observe the 
innocence of a vessel's passage in the designated traffic route towards the Gulf, 
since this traffic route is within the two Tunbs' three-nautical-mile territorial sea 
limit. 124 Moreover, this intermediate solution would preserve the Iranian 
mainland's 12-nautical-miles territorial sea limit. 
It is believed that in this manner this long standing irritant to the relations 
between these two states in an economically important and politically sensitive 
area of the world could be resolved to the lasting benefit of both. 
124 Iran, by virtue of its position as a strait State on the Strait of Hormuz, would be in a position to 
monitor the innocence of a vessel's passage to and from the Gulf. Therefore, Iran, unlike the 
UAE, would be able to observe navigation in the two directions. 
332 













Polnls ABCD nro lhe bounrl:iry of Iha dlspuled nrcn 
Iran slrolghl ba~rllncs 
Iron And UAE 12 llM l~rrilorfnl SCA llmil 
Dcslgn:ilcd TrRlllc noule lowRrcls lho Oulf 
Deslgneled Trnrflc noulo lowRrds lho Slrell ol Hormuz 
The mrdlen line syslcm belwocn lhe UAE ond Iran conslruclcd 
wflhoul rolorencn lo lho l~lnnds 
II NM acflu~lm<'"l In lhP ml'dlan llno whoro lho llAE sccurc5 
sovereignly ovor Abu Musn Island And clnlm 12 NM lorrilorlal sen limll 
I 5 NM ndjuslmcnl In lhe m!'cli:in nnc where lrnn secures sovorelgnly over 
Abu Musn lslnnd nncl clelm 12 NM iiiirhorlnl sos nmll 
5 llM adju~lrnonl In ll>e medlrm nne whore UAE socuros sovereignly over 
Abu Musa Island and clelm 6 NM lerrllorlal so11 lmN 
9 NM a~uslmenl In Iha median ft1111 where Iran Jecures soverel!l"IY over 
Abu Musa lsl11nd and clnlm I 2 NM lerrllorial sea llmlt 
A 3 NM enc111ve around two Tur>bs Islands ~ra lhe UAE lo pain Iha Island~ 
Figure: (33) A possible fair and equitable effect for the 
three disputed Islands. 
Source: The Author. 
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